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ABSTRACT 
This thesis endeavours to detail the business history of the Afrikaans cinematic film industry 
and the economic influence of the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s1  Television 
Service on the Afrikaans cinematic film industry over the period 1976 to 1986.  The 
introduction of TV services in countries abroad had a profound (often detrimental) influence 
on their respective cinematic film industries. It would clearly be wrong to argue that these 
countries experienced identical influences. Each country has a distinctive political, cultural and 
socio-economic framework/context in which its industries operate, therefore creating sets of 
challenges for industries attempting to adhere to the prevailing conditions. South Africa was 
no exception, though the emphasis of this thesis is on the Afrikaans cinematic film industry, 
since Afrikaners dominated the local industry (regarding film production, distribution and 
screening)2 when South Africa’s television services commenced in 1975.  
Numerous factors stemming from South Africa’s pre-Television era contributed to the 
Afrikaner’s dominance of South African cinema, including the role of the apartheid state (for 
example, censorship regulations and the film subsidy scheme), the demands of the local and 
international market, foreign competition and, naturally, the ambitions and business 
approaches of the Afrikaans cinematic film companies. As such, the symbiotic relationship 
between these forces is reflected upon so as to illustrate the formation, progression and 
characteristics of the industry when it attempted to adapt to the impact of local TV services. 
Accordingly, the advent, birth and progression of the SABC and its TV services are examined. 
National TV was introduced in South Africa only in 1976 - relatively late considering the 
country was the economic power-house of the African continent and that its much smaller and 
subordinate neighbouring state, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), had already been transmitting TV 
broadcasts from 1960. Therefore, this research also examines whether the Afrikaans cinematic 
film industry could utilise foreign countries as case studies to develop and implement strategies, 
which could counter the financial threats posed by television.  
The timeframe covered in this reflection stretches from 1895 (the birth of South Africa’s 
cinematic industry) to 1986, as Electronic Media Network (M-Net), South Africa’s first 
independent Pay-TV service, was introduced in October of that year – thus transforming the 
face of SA’s TV industry. The focal point of the study is the impact of SABC-TV on Afrikaans 
1 South Africa’s public broadcaster.  
2 See terminology list. 
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film-making, since the government asserted a substantial degree of control over the public 
broadcaster, whilst the Afrikaans cinematic film industry (particularly its film producers) was 
heavily dependent on the financial assistance of the state. Assistance that was given as cinema 
presented government with an audio-visual mechanism to distribute its socio-cultural and 
political values and aims.   
OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis poog om die besigheidsgeskiedenis van die Afrikaanse bioskoopbedryf te 
bespreek en die ekonomiese invloed van die Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie se 
Televisiedienste op die Afrikaanse bioskoopbedryf in die periode 1976 tot 1986  te verduidelik. 
Die instelling van TV-dienste in die buiteland het diepgaande invloede (dikwels negatief) op 
hul onderskeie bioskoop industrieë gehad. Die invloede was nie identies nie, aangesien elke 
land ‘n unieke politieke, kulturele, sosiale en ekonomiese raamwerk/konteks het waarin hul 
industrieë gefunksioneer het. Suid-Afrika was geen uitsondering nie. Hierdie tesis fokus op die 
Afrikaanse bioskoop bedryf, aangesien die plaaslike bedryf tydens die instelling van Televisie 
in Suid-Afrika deur Afrikaners oorheers was (met betrekking tot rolprent vervaardiging, 
verspreiding en vertoning). 
Talle faktore, voor die koms van plaaslike TV, het bygedra tot Afrikaners se beheer, insluitende 
die rol vervul deur die Apartheid staat (byvoorbeeld sensuur regulasies en die film subsidie-
skema), die vraag van die plaaslike en internasionale mark, buitelandse mededinging en 
natuurlik, die motiewe en sake benaderings van die Afrikaanse bioskoop maatskappye. Die 
simbiotiese verhouding en wisselwerking tussen hierdie faktore word ondersoek om die 
vorming, verloop en karaktereienskappe wat die bedryf met die instelling van Suid-Afrikaanse 
Televisie vertoon het, te illustreer. Die koms en ontwikkeling van die SABC en sy TV-dienste 
word belig. Suid-Afrikaanse TV-dienste het egter eers in 1976 ‘n werklikheid geword- relatief 
laat as in ag geneem word dat die land die ekonomiese dinamo van Afrika was en sy veel 
kleiner en ondergeskikte buurstaat, Rhodesië (Zimbabwe), reeds in 1960 TV ingestel het. Die 
studie ondersoek ook die mate waarin die Afrikaanse bioskoopbedryf buitelandse ervarings as 
modelle gebruik het om strategieë te ontwikkel wat die finansiële bedreigings van Televisie 
kon teenwerk.   
Die periode wat in hierdie analise gedek word, strek vanaf 1895 (die ontstaan van die Suid-
Afrikaanse bioskoop bedryf) tot 1986, aangesien Electronic Media Network (M-Net), Suid-
Afrika se eerste onafhanklike subskripsie TV-diens, in Oktober van dieselfde jaar bekendgestel 
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is – ‘n ontwikkeling wat die aanskyn van SA se TV-industrie verander het. Die fokuspunt van 
die studie val op die impak van SABC-TV, ‘n staatsinstelling waaroor die Suid-Afrikaanse 
regering, ‘n aansienlike mate van beheer uitgeoefen het, terwyl die Afrikaanse filmbedryf 
(spesifiek die rolprentvervaardigers) terselfdertyd geweldig afhanklik was van finansiële 
ondersteuning deur die Staat.  Hulp wat verskaf is, weens die potensiaal van die bioskoopbedryf 
om die staat se sosiale, kulturele en politieke waardes en doelwitte te bevorder.   
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TERMINOLOGY  
Cinema (Bioscope): A motion-picture/movie theatre.  
Film industry: Commercial and technological bodies involving all aspects of film production, 
distribution and screening within the industry.  
Cinematic film industry: Commercial and technical institutions within an industry, which 
produce, distribute and/or exhibit films specifically for cinematic purposes (may also be 
referred to as the cinematic industry).   
Cinematic film producer/-maker (may refer to a person [independent] or production 
company): The coordinators of films produced for cinematic distribution and screening. 
Producers, therefore, are (or employ individuals who are) responsible for overseeing, for 
example, the creation of scripts, as well as the directing, editing and financing of a production. 
If needed, producers may appoint an executive producer(s), who (in most cases) funds or 
attracts investors to the creation of a production, yet they do not make technical contributions.     
Cinematic film distributor: Companies who dictate a motion picture’s marketing policies, 
release dates, media (such as television, home video, DVD and [in this case] cinemas) and 
means by which films are exhibited and circulated. Often seen as the “middleman”, contracts 
are secured between the distributor and exhibitor, specifying the percentage that exhibitors can 
collect from gross ticket sales. After auditing the ticket sales, the distributor collects its share, 
submits the screener’s share and transfers the rest to the film production company. Therefore, 
film distributing companies fulfil a significant function regarding the financing of a motion 
picture. Motion pictures are usually selected for distribution based on their potential 
profitability. In many instances, cinemas are owned by distributing companies themselves  
Cinematic film exhibitor (screener): Exhibitors are owners of movie theatres, such as “four-
wall” cinemas and/or drive-ins. Exhibitors are usually categorised into two groups, namely 
theatres that are owned by distributors (see cinematic film distributor) and those managed by 
independent owners.  
Afrikaans cinematic film industry: A section of South Africa’s cinematic film industry 
owned by Afrikaners (may be refer to as Afrikaans cinema).  
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INTRODUCTION 
“How can I know what I think until I see what I say?”- Karl E. Weick1  
The Afrikaans cinematic film industry and the SABC’s television service 
“The mistakes of other countries were thoroughly investigated by local filmmakers and when the 
television service was introduced at the start of 1976, they were prepared. This, however, did not prevent 
large [local] production companies – such as Kavaliers and Killarney Films – being forced into making 
drastic changes. In their case, they became part of the Satbel group… Avid moviegoers simply stayed 
home at night and watched television.”2  
These statements in André I. le Roux and Lilla Fourie’s Filmverlede: Geskiedenis van die Suid-
Afrikaanse Speelfilm (1982) prompted the research for this thesis. Though short, the paragraph 
contains a lot of information to process. Considering that the account was written over three 
decades ago, the assumption may be drawn that quite a few questions will be raised as well. 
Particularly younger generations as, for example, three names listed, i.e. “Kavaliers”, 
“Killarney Films” and “Satbel group”, are not names synonymous with the current South 
African cinematic film industry. Arguably, the most important questions are what were the 
“drastic changes” and why were they made if the industry was “prepared”. 
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to identify the conditions which surrounded 
and ultimately shaped the inner workings of the Afrikaans cinematic film production, 
distribution and exhibition industries, and later the SABC’s TV service and the latter’s 
influence on the former. During this researcher’s evaluation of resources to formulate an 
adequate hypothesis and conclusion, it quickly became clear that both the histories of the 
Afrikaans cinematic film industry and the SABC, during South Africa’s pre-Television era, 
necessitated a detailed discussion. The fact that this thesis may become lopsided as a result was 
greatly considered. However, a complicated and intertwined web of political, economic, social, 
cultural, geographical, managerial and technological issues within and surrounding not only 
the Afrikaans cinematic film industry, but also the SABC during 1895-1975 had monumental 
implications regarding SABC-TV’s influence on the Afrikaans cinematic film industry. 
Therefore, the pre-Television era serves as the foundation of this thesis and the period from 
1976 (the year in which SABC-TV was launched) to 1986 as the climax.   
                                                            
1 Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, (London: SAGE Publications, 1995), p. 18. 
2 Translated from Andre I. Le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm 
(Pretoria: Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 196. 
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In brief, the formation of the South African film industry can be traced back to the late 1800s. 
However, few Afrikaners participated in the industry’s activities in this early period and the 
Afrikaans cinematic film industry only truly came into its own – as will be elaborated on later 
– after 1956, i.e. the year the National Party (at the time South Africa’s ruling party) introduced 
a subsidy scheme, thus providing local producers financial assistance based on a film’s box 
office performances. 3  Simply stated, the government’s scheme was introduced as local 
producers struggled to compete with motion pictures produced by foreign (especially American) 
companies. In addition, the government utilised the content of local films to subtly convey 
messages in line with their own ambitions. The incentive seemed promising at first as local 
cinematic film producers – most notably Jamie Uys Filmproduksies – rose to prominence. Until 
the late 1960s South Africa’s cinematic film distribution and exhibition networks remained 
largely controlled by American companies, in particular the Twentieth-Century-Fox Film 
Corporation. However, prominent Afrikaans insurance company, Sanlam, in a joint business 
venture with the Schlesinger Organisation, acquired Twentieth-Century-Fox’s shares. 
Consequently, Suid-Afrikaanse Teater Belange Beperk (Satbel) was formed to administer the 
partnership’s distribution and exhibition interests, Ster Theatres/Films and Kinekor. The 
Afrikaans cinematic film industry continuously expanded and ultimately came to dominate 
South African cinema, with cinematic film production peaking in 1975 (regarding the quantity 
of motion pictures produced). When the public broadcaster’s official TV broadcasts 
commenced the following year (after much deliberation between the government and the 
SABC), box office revenues generated by motion pictures, with a few exceptions such as Jamie 
Uys’s The Gods Must Be Crazy (1980), failed to match those of the pre-TV era. Congruently, 
the climate for distributors and screeners, above all the drive-in industry, became more arduous 
and led, for example, to Ster Films/Theatres and Kinekor’s merger. The drive-in industry has 
now virtually disappeared in South Africa. Television’s popularity amongst White South 
Africans (the niche market for the Afrikaans cinematic film industry) far exceeded expectations, 
as will be demonstrated statistically. Naturally, when discussing the dynamics of any industry. 
Its products also requires examination and evaluation. Afrikaans cinematic film productions of 
the time are, with a few exceptions, generally perceived as forgettable, lacking substance and/or 
inferior to foreign motion pictures. This is a perception which stems from the producers’ 
exploitation of the subsidy scheme, the country’s strict censorship regulations, the resolute 
                                                            
3 “Box office” refers to the commercial performance of a motion picture in terms of audience size and/or 
takings earned.  
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support of the local market and the roles played by South Africa’s larger distributors and 
exhibitors.          
Despite being one of the oldest in the world, South Africa’s cinematic film industry and the 
films it produced during the pre-1994 era has, says Martin Botha, only been documented in a 
“surprisingly” few number of books.4 Thelma Gutsche’s The History and Social Significance 
of Motion Pictures in South Africa: 1985-1940 (1972) provides an excellent and detailed 
account of the birth and early progress of South Africa’s film industry. Filmverlede: 
Geskiedenis van die Suid-Afrikaanse Speelfilm (1982), fulfils two primary functions. Their 
book presents a chronological account of South African film, whilst endeavouring to serve as 
a starting point for those attempting to research the film history of the country. Other important 
studies include Isabel Balseiro and Ntongela Masilela’s To Change Reels: Film and Film 
Culture in South Africa (2003), Jacqueline Maingard’s South African National Cinema (2007) 
and Eustacia J. Riley’s dissertation, From Matieland to Mothercity: Landscape, Identity and 
Place in Feature Films set in the Cape Province, 1947-1989 (2012). Keyan Tomaselli’s The 
Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film (1989) and Johan Blignaut and 
Martin Botha’s Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979-1991 (1992) all made 
valuable contributions to this thesis. The reason is that evaluations of the country’s cinematic 
past generally tend to emphasise film producers and/or the motion pictures they release. 
Cinema of Apartheid and Movies Moguls Mavericks are comprehensive, as the inner workings 
of the country’s distribution and exhibition industries of the past are also expanded upon in 
greater detail. These qualities are also found in David J. Garner’s dissertation, Hollywood, 
African Consolidated Films and “Bioskoopbeskawing”, or Bioscope Culture: Aspects of 
American Culture in Cape Town, 1945-1960 (2000).  Leon van Nierop’s Daar doer in die fliek: 
‘n Persoonlike blik op die geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse rolprent (2016), focuses, like this 
thesis, on the Afrikaans industry. His personal views, considering that Van Nierop is a 
renowned filmmaker and film critic in the Afrikaans community, offer unique and valuable 
insights into this section of the country’s cinematic past. When researching themes involving 
South Africa’s cinema, one has to consult the numerous works by Martin Botha, as he has 
published over 200 articles and reports (including five books) on South African media.5 Apart 
from Movies Moguls Mavericks, Botha’s publications include Kronieken van Zuid-Afrika: de 
                                                            
4 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 8. 
5 The Centre for Film and Media Studies, “Staff: A/Prof Martin Botha”, Accessed: 22 March 2017:  
http://www.cfms.uct.ac.za/fam/staff/botha.  
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films van Manie van Rensburg (1997) and Jans Rautenbach: Dromer, Baanbreker en Auteur 
(2006) – books dedicated to the works of prominent Afrikaans film directors. South African 
Cinema, 1896-2010 (2012), arguably one of his most ambitious undertakings, successfully 
illustrates and examines significant events of the country’s cinematic past against the backdrop 
of South Africa’s socio-political context. 
Since television was introduced in South Africa in the 1970s, the Afrikaans cinematic film 
industry had the opportunity to formulate their business undertakings according to examples 
presented by foreign industries. Similarly, numerous books and articles detailing the impact of 
television on foreign industries were considered in this thesis. Some valuable works include 
David Robinson’s World Cinema: A Short History (1973) and Eric Rhodes’s A History of the 
Cinema from its Origins to 1970 (1976). Both accounts provide comprehensive histories of 
cinema from its early days, as well as dealing with films and the most significant companies 
that produced, distributed and screened them, including – for example – the interconnectivity 
of the global cinematic industries, the factors that led to the USA’s domination of the global 
industry, the influence of the First and Second World Wars and, of course, the impact of 
television. World Cinema: A Short History and A History of the Cinema from its Origins to 
1970, as with Filmverlede, can be recommended for those attempting to research the various 
fields of film history for the first time. Although Douglas Gomery specifically references the 
USA, his article “The Coming of Television and the ‘Lost’ Motion Picture Audience” (1985), 
demonstrates that the impact of television on cinematic film industries can only be adequately 
defined when external socio-economic complexities influencing, for example, consumer 
patterns are considered.  
Some of the abovementioned studies have touched on the influence of SABC-TV on the 
Afrikaans cinematic film industry. However, there is still an academic void as there is as yet 
no comprehensive study – particularly one with a business-oriented approach, detailing the 
roots of the influence (i.e. the workings of the SABC and its TV service), presented with 
sufficient statistical evidence of SATV’s impact. This study ventures into the void.   
This thesis examines the complexities of South Africa’s cinematic film industry during the 
apartheid era. It can be regarded as a business history as it emphasises the history of business 
organisations, methods, competition and relations, as well as the dynamics of the market and 
government regulations. Furthermore, it reflects on the Afrikaans cinematic film production, 
distribution and exhibition industries, their relationships with one another and the forces that 
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shaped their respective developments. The history of Jamie Uys Filmproduksies/Kavalier 
Films (a filmmaking company) is utilised as a case study as the company was once the leading 
Afrikaans cinematic film producer. In addition, a few films (produced before and during South 
Africa’s TV era) are presented as examples to demonstrate the features of the industry. After 
giving an account of the history and factors that moulded the characteristics of the SABC’s TV 
service, the qualities of the products offered by both industries can be examined and compared. 
The Afrikaans cinematic film industry’s ability to adapt, however, is the paramount focus of 
the study. The study initially aimed to cover a longer timeframe, i.e. up to 1994 as apartheid 
had come to an end and the impact of M-Net’s service, as well as local and foreign film 
producers’ exploitation of South Africa’s tax regulations,6 could have been included. However, 
financial restrictions (for example, living and traveling costs) limited the period of study and 
the information presented would not have sufficed. Nonetheless, by excluding South Africa’s 
first Pay-TV service, a case study can be provided that investigates exclusively the influences 
of TV broadcasts highly regulated by the state.  
The topical data have been accumulated, interpreted and analysed through exploratory research 
of mainly primary sources, most of which are to be found at some key locations. The first is 
the National Archives Repository (public records of South Africa’s central government since 
1910) in Pretoria/Tshwane. The past involvement of government (whether it be a body, 
organisation or individual) in the Afrikaans cinematic film industry is preserved at the archives 
and available for public use. The archives proved to be a vital resource, considering that the 
government (particularly the Department of Trade and Industries) played a significant role in 
the developments of the local industry with the provision of film subsidies, while censorship 
regulations were administered by the Publications Control Board. Subsidies, for example, were 
continuously amended after their introduction in 1956 based on the successes and failures of 
the industry. In order to amend the scheme, it was necessary to accumulate statistics, data, 
complaints or suggestions related to the cinematic film industry – all of which are preserved at 
the repository in the form of memorandums, correspondence, financial statements, reports, 
minutes and or newspapers/journal articles. Accordingly, information on the introduction and 
progress of the SABC’s TV service are preserved as well. However, most of the data regarding 
the SABC and its TV service were found at the media library at the headquarters of the SABC 
                                                            
6 Nearly 600 productions were produced between 1986 and 1989. Section 11 of the Income Tax Act, designed 
to encourage exports, allowed exporters to deduct their marketing expenses against tax, followed by another 
deduction between 50% and 100% based on box office takings.  Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut’s Movies 
Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: Showdata, 1992), p. 119 and p. 121. 
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in Auckland Park, Johannesburg. The corporation’s annual reports (1937-1990) proved to be 
most significant. Research was also conducted at the Stellenbosch University Gericke Library 
Centre for Documents. Details regarding Jamie Uys Filmproduksies (Kavalier Films) are 
retrievable in the HB Thom collection. HB Thom, a prominent academic and former Rector of 
the University of Stellenbosch, served on the Board of Directors of the company, whilst acting 
as the head of the production company’s script committee.7 The history of the company, 
extending from its formation to its incorporation into Satbel, is presented in agendas, 
memoranda, minutes, financial statements, correspondence and scripts. Much of the 
information regarding South Africa’s distribution and exhibition industries were gathered from 
Sanlam’s head office in Bellville, as Satbel was a subsidiary of the life insurance giant.  
Unfortunately, personal access to Sanlam’s archives was denied; however, information was 
send via e-mail by Sanlam’s Archivist, Catherine Snel. In addition, events reported in 
newspapers, such as Die Burger, SA Film Weekly, Volkshandel and Die Transvaler, were 
examined. The majority of primary sources used were Afrikaans and hence the quotations 
presented in this thesis were translated into English to improve readability. However, some 
terms (referring, for example, to the names of companies, organisations, bodies and/or those 
difficult to translate) remain in Afrikaans so as to retain an authentic feel. In these cases, the 
terms are translated or defined in the footnotes.           
Social sources – communicated orally or otherwise – fulfil an important function in this study. 
Those consulted are individuals who were directly involved in either one or both of South 
Africa’s cinematic film and television industries during the timeframe investigated.  There are 
nonetheless inherent risks when utilising oral sources, such as the generalisability and 
subjectivity of statements made.  As a result, the data accumulated during the course of this 
study were compared to and complemented by other collated primary and secondary sources 
in an attempt to ensure objective and thorough research. Despite primary sources contributing 
most of the data, the use of secondary sources was essential for the thesis. Areas of this study 
adequately researched by scholars, for example, the early development of South Africa’s 
cinematic film industry discussed by Thelma Gutsche, Martin Botha and numerous others, or 
the political debate concerning the introduction of South African television, were consulted 
and referred to. Secondary sources are also utilised in the elaboration of external conditions 
that influenced both industries, for example, the operations of foreign film industries, the 
                                                            
7 This point is expanded upon in Chapter Two.  
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Afrikaners’ socio-economic advances during the 20th century and South Africa’s Border War 
(1966-1990).    
Chapter Layout 
Chapter One provides a historical overview of the forces that shaped the development of the 
Afrikaans cinematic film industry during and after the 1950s. Three topics are broadly 
discussed, i.e. the birth and development of the global cinematic film industry, the socio-
economic progress of the Afrikaner during the first half of the 20th century and the development 
of the South African cinematic film industry from 1895 to 1956 (the year in which the South 
African government introduced the film subsidy scheme).  
The second chapter expands on the progress of the Afrikaans cinematic film industry after 
subsidies were made available to South Africa’s cinematic film producers. The effects and 
objectives of the government’s subsidy scheme, as well as South Africa’s censorship 
regulations, the local and international markets, and Sanlam’s acquisition of the lion’s share of 
the country’s distribution and screening network are discussed. A short business history of 
Jamie Uys Filmproduksies (later known as Kavalier Films) and the films they produced will 
be utilised as a case study. The timeframe covered in this section extends from 1956 to 1970, 
as the introduction of South African television was officially announced the following year.  
Chapter Three reflects on the advent of the SABC’s TV service in South Africa. It details the 
early beginnings of television and broadcasting, the formation of the SABC in 1936, the South 
African government’s reluctance to introduce the service and the investigation that ultimately 
approved the implementation of a television service.  
Chapter Four is devoted to South Africa’s - more specifically the SABC and the Afrikaans 
cinematic film industry’s - preparations for the country’s TV service – more specifically with 
reference to the SABC and the Afrikaans cinematic film industry. Chapter Five, the most 
significant, details the influence of South African television on the Afrikaans cinematic film 
industry after the television service had been formally introduced in January 1976. This impact 
is demonstrated by elaborating on the developments of both SABC-TV and the Afrikaans 
cinematic film industry from 1976 to 1986. The conclusion sums up the findings of the research.
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Chapter One: Afrikaner Economic Advancement and an Overview of the South African 
Cinematic Film Industry,1 c.1895- c.1956 
 “Technological change creates new social environments with new values, ethics, morals and aspirations. In 
most cases the transition to the new way is difficult. Sometimes it is dangerous” – James Burke2 
 
Introduction 
The South African cinematic film industry emerged during the late 19th century, making it one 
of the oldest industries in the world. However, the socio-economic and political conditions of 
South Africa- as a British dominion during the early part of the twentieth century shaped an 
industry which largely excluded Afrikaners. A fully-fledged Afrikaans cinematic film industry 
therefore only emerged in the 1950s after state intervention was initiated by means of 
government subsidies. This section, therefore, outlines the conditions from which the Afrikaans 
cinematic film industry originated. The period 1895-1956 is relevant in this regard, i.e. from 
the birth of the global cinematic film industry to the introduction of government film subsidies 
in South Africa. It is this researcher’s opinion that in order to understand the Afrikaans 
cinematic film industry’s adaptation to the influence of SABC-TV, the industry itself 
(including its origins) has to be comprehended. First, a short history of the global industry will 
be presented, with attention focused on the Hollywood industry primarily. 3  This will be 
followed by a discussion of the economic rise of the Afrikaner during the twentieth century to 
indicate the reasons for the Afrikaner’s initial reluctance and/or inability to engage with an 
industry as modern as cinema. Lastly, an overview of South Africa’s cinematic film industry 
will be provided to illustrate the origins and progress of the local film industry,4 the market’s 
domination by foreign interests, and how Afrikaans producers utilised the socio-political 
context to establish a new Afrikaner enterprise. 
A Short History of the Origins of the Global Cinematic Film Industry, 1895-19405 
                                                            
1 May also be referred to as “cinematic industry” (see “Terminology”).  
2 James Burke, Foreword to Pandora’s Box: Social and Professional Issues of the Information Age, Andréw A. 
Adams and Rachel J. McCrindle, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2010), p. xxii.  
3 The American cinematic film industry had a profound influence on shaping the South African industry.  
4 The term “cinematic film industry” refers to a division within the “film industry”. For example, the television 
industry and the cinematic film industry (where films are distributed and exhibited in drive‐ins, indoor 
cinemas, school halls etc.) are two different entities, yet both form part of the South African film industry.    
5 This chapter does not in any sense try to provide a complete history of the global industry. It will only 
highlight some of the most significant events. Its focus falls not on the film themselves, but on the industry 
that created them. For a detailed account of the emergence of the global cinematic industry, see David 
Robinson’s World Cinema: A Short History (1973) or Eric Rhode’s A History of the Cinema: From its Origins to 
1970.    
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Film historian David Robinson (author of World Cinema: A Short History) considers the 
development of the cinematic film industry as a complex evolution which “involves an 
aesthetic, a technology, an economy and an audience: and all four of these elements will 
condition what moving images appear upon the screen at any particular place and in any 
particular period.”6 These conditions applied to the development of the Afrikaans cinematic 
industry; however, a fifth element of the utmost importance should be included, namely the 
political context (in many cases dictated by cultural conditions) within which the industry 
operates – as with all industries in South Africa during the twentieth century. During the advent 
of the cinematic film industry displaying moving images, such as Thomas Edison’s 
kinetograph7 or the Lumière brothers’ cinematographe,8 was generally perceived as a novelty,  
a “trick or gadget”, which nevertheless attracted large audiences during the 1890s.9  The 
Lumière brothers of Lyon, France, employed operators, who would display images projected 
by the cinematographe in upscale theatres across the world, thus targeting the bourgeoisie.10 
The Lumière brothers constructed the first permanent cinema theatre in 1897.11 Simultaneously, 
travelling cinemas emerged as itinerant showmen would utilise tents or mobile theatres which, 
for short periods of time, exhibited short films for the general public in villages or towns.12 
What distinguished the USA from countries such as Britain or France was that film established 
itself as a source of entertainment amongst the working class.13  
Within two decades cinema would transform from a novelty into a major entertainment 
industry and an art form.14 Gerben Bakker attributes the transformation, at least in the USA, to 
the establishment and development of the nickelodeon.15 From 1905 to 1907 nickelodeons 
were emerging across the USA with approximately 10 000 such movie houses established 
                                                            
6 David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 1. 
7 A motion picture camera, which captured movies for in‐house experiments.  
8 The invention was based on the kinetograph, but it could project images in a theatre‐like setting.  
9  Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by 
Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, Accessed: September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐
history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.     
10 In subsequent years films were frequently used in vaudeville or theatrical entertainments to enhance the 
experience. The first show of the Lumières’ cinematographe took place on 28 December 1895 in Paris. David 
Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 1. 
11 Ibid., p. 26. 
12 Ibid., p. 24.  
13 Ibid., p. 26. 
14 Eric Rhode, A History of the Cinema from its Origins to 1970, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1976), p. 29. 
15The term ‘nickelodeon’ would become a generic term for the first movie houses of the period. The first 
nickelodeon was opened in 1905 in Pittsburgh, USA.  Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the 
International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008. Accessed: 
September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.      
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during the period.16 In France, due to the popularity of motion pictures, the construction of new 
cinema theatres dramatically increased in 1905 and 1906, whilst many halls and theatres in 
Britain were converted to project motion pictures. In 1908 the first theatre in England 
specifically designed for cinematic purposes was constructed in Lancashire (Colne).17  As 
demand increased, so did the number of film production companies, whilst film distribution 
became a business activity in its own right (often controlled by the larger film-producing 
companies). A figure who established firm control over the cinematic film industry during this 
period was Charles Pathé (1863-1957). Pathé, born in Chevry-Cossigny France, utilised 
vertical business integration to obtain monopolistic control of the French industry, which 
subsequently enabled France to become the leading/dominant nation in the global cinematic 
industry until the First World War (1914-1918).18 
In the USA an intense struggle to gain control of the industry emerged after 1909 between 
production, exhibition and distribution firms.19 Competition and the ambition to control the 
market resulted in a considerable improvements of American productions. The dissolution of 
the Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC), an American cartel that endeavoured to 
monopolise film distribution and production, further enhanced the quality of American motion 
pictures. Between 1908 and 1912 the MPPC, headed by Thomas Edison restricted film lengths 
and rental prices.20 William Fox, founder of the Fox Film Corporation and Fox West Coast 
Theatres, in collaboration with the American Department of Justice, took legal action in 1912 
and the power exercised by the MPPC was consequently diminished.21 The outbreak of war in 
August 1914, however, disrupted the growth of the European industries, consequently 
providing America with the opportunity to seize control of the world’s market. 22  The 
introduction of the “fixed” cinema transformed the cinematic film industry, when the feature 
film emerged. 23  Films exhibited in the USA before 1915 rarely exceeded fifteen minutes and, 
as such, consumers watched a succession of short motion pictures, for example, sports films, 
                                                            
16 David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 27. 
17 The Central Hall. David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 27. 
18 Vertical business integration refers to producing films, whilst also establishing an exhibition and distribution 
network for them.   David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 28. 
19 They included film companies such as Edison, Vitagraph, Selig, Biograph and French firms, Méliès and Pathé.  
20 David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 29. 
21“Independent” producers and distributors would subsequently dominate the American industry. David 
Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 30. 
22 Ibid., p. 56. 
23 The minimum length of a feature film had been a topic of debate at the time. The Screen Actors Guild 
maintained it to be at least 80 minutes, whilst the British Film Institute and American Film institute argued that 
a feature film runs for 40 minutes or more. The Story of the Kelly Gang (1906, Australia) is generally considered 
as the first dramatic feature film as it was an hour long.  
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newsreels, dramas and comedies.24 Though the price of renting a film increased, exhibitors 
learned that an enhancement in quality and length attracted more consumers to cinemas, 
enabling owners to raise admission prices, thus generating greater profits. As a result film 
producers made great investments by ensuring their product was of a competitive standard – 
none more so than the American pioneer D.W. Griffith. Griffith, a director, producer and writer, 
pioneered film production techniques, most notably in the controversial, Birth of a Nation 
(1915)25 and Intolerance26 (1916).  Robinson argues: 
“His achievement can hardly be paralleled in the history of art. From a popular mechanical 
entertainment he fashioned an autonomous art, giving it forms and laws that were to remain 
largely unchanged and unchallenged for the next fifty years.”27  
Some of the most prominent American film companies to emerge in the 1910s to the 1930s 
included Universal Studios (founded in 1912 as Universal Film Manufacturing Company), 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (a merger of Metro Pictures Corporation and Goldwyn Pictures, 
founded in 1924), Warner Brothers (founded in 1923 as Warner Brothers Pictures, 
Incorporated), Columbia (founded in 1924 as Columbia Pictures Corporation), United Artists 
(founded in 1919), Radio-Keith-Orpheum (RKO), Paramount Pictures Corporation (founded 
in 1912 as Famous Players Film Company) and Twentieth-Century-Fox (a merger of Fox Film 
Corporation and Twentieth-Century Pictures [founded in 1935]).28 The American cinematic 
film companies also utilized vertical business integration in which producers and distributors 
acquired cinemas across the USA and the rest of the world, thus assuming firm control over 
the global industry. For example (and as will be expanded upon later), Twentieth-Century-Fox 
(Twentieth-Century-Fox Film (SA) Pty Ltd) accumulated the largest market share in South 
Africa from 1956-1969. As the First World War was fought on European soil, film producers 
                                                            
24 Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by 
Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, Accessed: September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐
history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.      
25 Birth of the Nation is praised for its advances in cinematography, although its content is deemed 
controversial as it promotes the Ku Klux Klan. It was the highest grossing film until it was overtaken by Gone 
with the Wind (1939). Although this has been a topic of much dispute, figures suggest that the film’s box office 
revenue can be estimated between $50‐100 million. The cost to develop the film amounted to $110 000.   
David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 63. 
26 Intolerance was by far the most expensive film to be produced up to that time (an estimated $2,5 million in 
1916). It featured monumental sets, employed over 3 000 extras and utilised advanced cinematography 
techniques, which enhanced Griffith’s already formidable reputation as film maker. However, the film was a 
commercial flop, consequently resulting in its production company Triangle Film Corporation being sold.  
27 David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 56. 
28 Eric Rhode, A History of the Cinema from its Origins to 1970, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1976), p. 45‐267. 
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there discovered that competing with the American product became problematic, as securing 
the required capital became increasingly difficult. Gerben Bakker, author of Entertainment 
Industrialised: The Emergence of the International Film Industry, 1890-1940, states: “Even if 
they would have managed, it may have been difficult to justify these lavish expenditures when 
people were dying in the trenches.”29  
However, declaring neutrality during the war provided the Nordic countries Denmark and 
Sweden with an advantage over their European counterparts. In Sweden prominent filmmakers, 
actors and directors emerged during this period – Charles Magusson (employed by the Svenska 
Bio Company), Mauritz Stiller (renowned for films such as Love and Journalism and Thomas 
Graal’s First Film [1917]) and Victor Sjöstrom (Terje Vigen (1917) and the Outlaw and his 
Wife (1918)) being the most prominent.30 The Danish Nordisk Film Company (NFC), founded 
in 1906 by Ole Olsen, managed to acquire and control cinema circuits and distribution networks 
in Switzerland, Germany and Austria, whilst investing in feature films.31 The climax of the 
Scandinavian cinematic film industry, according to David Robinson, was reached during and 
immediately after the war.32 Meanwhile, the French Pathé company sold its USA interests to 
the American firm, Radio-Keith-Orpheum (RKO). 33  One of the most renowned British 
producers, Cecil Hepworth, went bankrupt and by 1925 Britain was producing only a handful 
of films annually. To put this in perspective, half of the films shown on American soil in the 
first decade of the 20th century were produced in Europe, whilst in the 1910s the number 
declined to 20%.34  
“Hollywood” 35  subsequently assumed control of global markets – a dominance which 
continues to this day. The introduction of motion pictures with a synchronized soundtrack in 
                                                            
29 Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by 
Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, Accessed: September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐
history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.      
30 David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 80‐82. 
31 Notable works include Atlantis (1913) and The Sky Ship (1916). Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the 
International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, Accessed: 
September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.      
32In Germany, for example, government forced NFC to sell its assets to the German company, Universum Film 
AG. David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 80. 
33 Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by 
Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, Accessed: September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐
history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.       
34 Ibid.       
35 A neighbourhood in the central region of Los Angles, California. Its name had become a metonym for the 
motion picture industry of the United States. Many cinematic film firms relocated to Hollywood to escape the 
patent regulations enforced by Edison’s MPPC.     
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
13 
 
1927 (or “talkies”), further increased the cinematic film industry’s position as a mass 
entertainment industry. 36 Sound films were a novelty that enjoyed instant success and, as such, 
prominent industrial companies such as General Electric and Western Electric, as well as banks, 
including Goldman Sachs (GS Bank USA), Chase National Bank, Rockefeller and the Bank of 
America, were fascinated by the invention and enthusiastic to invest in productions that 
incorporated sound in this way.37  
A major difference between the silent and sound film was that one which incorporates 
synchronized dialogue tends to be more culturally specific. As a result the European cinematic 
film industry experienced increased revenues, since many films were produced in a language 
native to a certain country. However, “culture-specification”, as Bakker describes this, 
consequently decreased the foreign income received by European companies.38 Though the 
number of American films released in Europe declined, Hollywood still maintained dominance 
of the world industry as most of the world’s patent rights in sound equipment belonged to 
American studios.39 In the Netherlands, for example, 52% of the motion pictures screened in 
the country from 1934 to 1936 were produced in the USA, whilst local productions only 
amounted to 2%.40 Some European governments, such as Britain with the Cinematograph 
Films Act of 1927, endeavoured to protect their industries by limiting the influx of American 
productions. 41  To ensure that revenue exceeded expenditure, the cinematic industry – 
particularly the American industry which had the financial means – invested heavily in 
directors, actors, screenwriters and the rights to adapt novels/plays into film screenplays.42 
                                                            
36 The Jazz Singer (1927), an American musical, was the first feature film to incorporate synchronised dialogue 
sequences. The film was distributed by Warner Brothers. David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, 
(London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 163. 
37 Eric Rhode, A History of the Cinema from its Origins to 1970, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1976), p. 263. 
38 Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by 
Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, Accessed: September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐
history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.      
39In Britain, for example, the share of American films released between 1927 and 1930 dropped from 80% to 
70%. Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited 
by Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, Accessed: September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐
economic‐history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/. David Robinson, World Cinema: A Short History, (London: 
Methuen & Co Ltd, 1973), p. 170. 
40 John Sedgwick, Clara Pafort‐Overduin & Jaap Boter, “Explanations for the Restrained Development of the 
Dutch Cinema Market in the 1930s”, The International Journal of Business History 13 (2012), p. 644.  
41 D.L. Le Mahieu, “Reviewed Work: Cinema and State: The Film Industry and the Government, 1927‐84 by 
Margaret Dickinson, Sarah Street”, The American Historical Review 91 (1986), p. 673. 
42 One of the most famous examples: the actor Jack Nicholson agreed to star in Batman (1989), distributed by 
Warner Brothers, for $10 million. He played a supporting role as the Joker. His contract also stated that a 
percentage of the box office takings, merchandise and sequels (even though he did not appear in them) must 
be paid to the actor.   
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These investments acted as a marketing strategy to attract the consumer to a production (a 
phenomenon that continues to this day), optimizing “advertising effectiveness by rapidly 
amassing high levels of brand-awareness.”43 The cinematic film industry – with Hollywood at 
its core – continued to expand as a mass entertainment industry. However, the industry would 
be subject to serious disruption after the full-scale introduction of television services (a topic 
discussed in Chapter Four).      
Afrikaner Economic Advancement44  
Hermann Giliomee argues that the economic advancement of the Afrikaner has to be attributed 
to a combination of ethnic mobilisation, Afrikaner political control (particularly after 1948) 
and the expeditious economic development of South Africa during the course of the twentieth 
century.45 During the 1890s, when the advent of South Africa’s cinematic industry is generally 
thought to have commenced, most Afrikaners, particularly within the Transvaal Republic and 
the Orange Free-State, were engaged in what Giliomee describes as subsistence agricultural 
activity.46 The discovery of diamonds in Kimberley in 1866 and gold at the Witwatersrand in 
1886 contributed towards transforming South Africa’s economy from an agricultural to a 
mining and, consequently, an industrialised society.47 However, the financial management of 
South Africa’s mining industry was largely controlled and exploited by enterprising Britons, 
Eastern European Jews, and (to a lesser extent) Americans and Germans, whilst trade was 
managed by “thousands” of English citizens who had immigrated to South Africa.48 These 
foreigners, with knowledge gained from their experiences in the business sector, coupled with 
their business relations with foreign monetary powers, guaranteed them a lion’s share of South 
Africa’s newly discovered mineral wealth. The foreign businessmen were commonly referred 
                                                            
43 Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by 
Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008, Accessed: September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐
history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.      
44 This thesis focuses on the Afrikaans cinematic film industry, hence only the most significant events of 
Afrikaner economic advancement from 1896‐1956 will be discussed. The focus of this section falls on the 
socio‐economic history of the Afrikaner.  
45 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 175.  
46 Independent Boer republics established in 1852 and 1854, respectively. Hermann Giliomee. “The Afrikaner 
Economic Advance”, In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 145.  
47 J.L. Sadie, The Fall and Rise of the Afrikaner in the South African Economy, (Annale 2002/1, University of 
Stellenbosch, 2002), p. 8.   
48Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), 768. J.A. Lombard, „Die Ekonomiese Ontwikkeling van die Afrikaner“. 
In P. V. De Pienaar (ed.), Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner, (Kaapstad: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1968), p. 127. 
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to as Uitlanders (outsiders/foreigners) by Afrikaners in the Transvaal Republic.49 Afrikaners 
failed to engage in economic activity as they were – as J.L. Sadie, author of Die Ekonomiese 
Faktor in die Afrikaanse Gemeenskap, argues – “entirely unprepared for the effective 
exploitation of the land’s newly discovered gold and diamonds”, even in the Transvaal, where 
Afrikaners had assumed complete political control. 50  A number of scholars 51  have all 
endeavoured to establish the reasons for this lack of preparedness among Afrikaners and/or 
their reluctance to engage with the modern economic activity, citing factors such as the 
imposed religious, cultural and traditional constraints advanced by Afrikaner Calvinism and 
the Afrikaners’ lack of economic experience outside the agricultural framework, which resulted 
in the Afrikaner lacking the inducement to fully utilize the new economic environment to their 
advantage.  
The modernisation of South Africa’s economy inaugurated a period of technological and social 
advancement as South Africa’s railway networks were improved, 52  which connected the 
industrialised towns (such as Johannesburg and Kimberley for example) with ports; harbour 
facilities were enhanced; foreign trade was developed and coastlines benefitted from import 
tariffs. 53  However, as different regions were brought closer together, tensions increased, 
particularly between Afrikaners, foreigners and the British Empire. The South African War,54 
fought between the British Empire and the Boer Republics (and rebels in Natal and the Cape 
Colony) consequently commenced in 1899 and would prove to be the bloodiest war fought on 
South African soil.55 The years that followed were decisive for the shaping of Afrikaner 
national consciousness and economic enterprise in the twentieth century, largely as a reaction 
against British imperial domination. The British Empire’s initial  objective to incorporate the 
Boer republics into a federation of states, the Jameson Raid (1895-1896) and the South African 
                                                            
49 By 1900 Johannesburg (a city at the head of the gold‐mining industry) had 100 000 inhabitants, mostly 
consisting of foreigners, as well as 50 000 blacks. Johannesburg had been founded in 1886. Randall G. Stokes, 
“Afrikaner Calvinism and Economic Action: The Weberian Thesis in South Africa”, American Journal of 
Sociology 81 (1975), p. 69.  
50 J.L. Sadie, “Die Ekonomiese Faktor in die Afrikaner‐gemeenskap“. In H.W. van der Merwe (ed.), Identiteit en 
Verandering, (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1974), p. 87. 
51 Including academics such as Randall G. Stokes, J.L. Sadie, F.A. van Jaarsveld, Charles van Onselen and J.A. 
Lombard.  
52 This point will be expanded upon later.  
53 J.A. Wiid, “Die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaner“. In P. V. De Pienaar (ed.), Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner, 
(Kaapstad: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1968), p. 28. 
54 Also known as the Anglo‐Boer War or the Second Boer War.   
55 The British Empire suffered an estimated 22 000 military casualties and the Boers (Afrikaners) 6 000, whilst 
28 000 Boer women and children and 20 000 blacks perished in the British concentration camps. Fransjohan 
Pretorius, “The white concentration camps of the Anglo‐Boer War: A debate without end”, Historia 55 (2010), 
p. 44. 
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War  (1899-1902) are topics that have been documented at great length by numerous military, 
political and social historians: for example, Jean van der Poel’s The Jameson Raid (1951), Bill 
Nasson’s The South African War 1899-1902 (1999), Iain R Smith’s The Origins of the South 
African War 1899-1902 (1996), Fransjohan Pretorius’s The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 
(1985), Thomas Pakenham’s The Boer War (1992) and Peter Warwick’s Black People and the 
South African War, 1899-1902 (1983), to name but a few. As such, the full extent of this 
engagement will not be covered in detail. This period was a demonstration of British 
commitment to bring about political, socio-economic, capitalist-oriented reform by means of 
military might. Yet this period and its symbols – such as the British concentration camps, the 
scorched-earth policy, for instance – were utilized as a unifying force amongst the Afrikaner 
population. The war ended after the Treaty of Vereeniging (Treaty) was signed in 1902.56 The 
existence of the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free-State as independent republics was 
ended by the Treaty and they were annexed by the British.  
After the signing of the Treaty, Afrikaners remained the majority in the Orange Free State and 
Transvaal, but the British colonial authority determined political and economic policy despite 
the Afrikaners’ supremacy in numbers. 57  The outcome of the South African War was 
particularly damaging for the traditional economic lifestyle of the Afrikaners in the former 
Boer republics, considering that most relied on agricultural activity as a means of income. 
Apart from the costs of human lives and horses, the British military strategy such as the brutal 
yet effective scorched-earth policy resulted in the destruction of the Afrikaner’s agricultural 
lands (30 000 farmhouses were burned down) and livestock. 58 For example, three-quarters of 
livestock in the Transvaal Republic were destroyed and two-thirds in the Orange Free State.59 
The Afrikaner farming community was left with 40% or less of their pre-war assets.60 As a 
result, many Afrikaners were forced to migrating to the industrialised centres of South Africa 
                                                            
56J.L. Sadie, The Fall and Rise of the Afrikaner in the South African Economy, (Annale 2002/1, University of 
Stellenbosch, 2002), 8. Newelle Stultz, Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934‐1948, (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1974), p. 1. 
57 A census taken in 1904 indicated that Afrikaners represented 58% of the total white population of SA and 
that 19% of Afrikaners lived in towns and cities. Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic 
Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 768.   
58 J.L. Sadie, “Die Ekonomiese Faktor in die Afrikaner‐gemeenskap“. In H.W. van der Merwe (ed.), Identiteit en 
Verandering, (Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 1974), p. 87. 
59 Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 768.   
60 J.L. Sadie, “Die Ekonomiese Faktor in die Afrikaner‐gemeenskap”. In H.W. van der Merwe (ed.), Identiteit en 
Verandering. (Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 1974), p. 87. 
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and became increasingly urbanised.61 However, a lack of education, the inability to effectively 
communicate in the language of commerce and industry (English), and a lack of knowledge 
and experience of the modern business sector forced Afrikaners into unskilled forms of labour. 
Afrikaner migration brought about unexpected social and racial dynamics – white workers 
competed against black labour for low-paying occupations. Conditions favoured the black 
worker as a result of a longer engagement with urban industrial activity and a willingness to 
work for a lower wage.62 According to Grietjie Verhoef, post-war reconstruction policies 
adopted by the British authorities between 1902 and 1910 aimed at encouraging macro-
economic development in the colonies in service of the British Empire (particularly the 
goldmines), without focusing on a specific group of the South African population.63 During 
this period Afrikaners were unable to exercise substantial influence on socio-economic and 
political management; as Lord Alfred Milner stated: “they [Afrikaners] must remain an 
important element, though they will no longer be the dominant element… For a great 
Johannesburg… means a British Transvaal”.64 However, as Hermann Giliomee has indicated, 
though Afrikaners were experiencing “critical times” economically,65 some Afrikaners still 
managed to generate a substantial income by means of commercial farming. Despite their 
displacement, four-fifths of South African agriculture was still controlled by Afrikaners.66 
Furthermore, Afrikaners located in the Cape Colony were less afflicted by the upheavals 
experienced by their compatriots in the former Boer republics and as such were generally more 
affluent. However, notwithstanding a difference in their respective levels of income, Cape 
Afrikaners sympathised with the “northern” Afrikaners who suffered economically.67 The 
detestation of British capitalism (as an aspect of their anti-imperialist sentiments), the 
preservation of racial privileges and the commitment to develop Dutch (later Afrikaans) into a 
language that enjoyed similar status as English united Afrikaners in the “North” and in the 
                                                            
61 Though formally identified as South Africa after 1910, the term “South Africa” is used to include the colonies 
within the geographical area.  
62 Compared to an Afrikaner.  
63 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 212.    
64 Ibid.   
65 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 146.  
66 In 1910 farming contributed 22,9% of South Africa’s national income. Hermann, Giliomee, “The Afrikaner 
Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 146. 
67 “Northern” is used to identify Afrikaners living in the former Boer republics.  
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Cape – ultimately contributing to the development of an ethnic and social consciousness, in 
Afrikaner Nationalism. 
On 31 May 1910 the Union of South Africa was established as a dominion of the British Empire, 
which initiated the first steps to the modern economic advancement of the Afrikaner. During 
the first decades of the Union of South Africa (under the rule of the South African Party [1911-
1924]),68 economic growth occurred at a sluggish pace considering, for example, that gross 
national income increased by an average of 0,2% annually between 1912 and 1922. 69 
Afrikaners were yet again divided after the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, which 
ultimately led to the Rebellion of 1914-15.70 In the aftermath of the Rebellion numerous civil 
claims were lodged against the rebels as result of the losses suffered by loyalists as a 
consequence of the armed insurrection. Since many of the Afrikaner rebels were mired in 
poverty, their financial position made it impossible to pay these claims at their own expense. 
The Helpmekaarbeweging (Mutual Aid Movement) was consequently established to 
accumulate funds and as such settle the rebels’ debt.71 The movement, according to Anton 
Ehlers,72 had a political, social and – most significant for this discussion – economic influence 
on Afrikaner society: the political popularity of the National Party increased amongst 
Afrikaners in opposition to the ruling party (SAP),73 the movement granted Afrikaners the 
opportunity to engage in a social activity linked to their cultural heritage, thus contributing to 
a sense of national consciousness, and the movement encouraged the Afrikaner community 
(through vital Afrikaner businessmen) to eliminate the volk’s socio-economic difficulties.74 
The funds generated within the first months exceeded expectations and prominent Afrikaner 
entrepreneurs – particularly in the Western Cape, who received financial backing from wealthy 
farmers – realised that Afrikaner enterprises could be established to empower the Afrikaner in 
                                                            
68 Abbreviation: SAP 
69 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 213.    
70 The Rebellion 1914‐15 was an armed protest by Afrikaner nationalists against the South African government, 
sourced in the state’s decision to engage South Africa into the First World War as a British Ally. 
Anton Ehlers, “The Helpmekaar: Rescuing the “volk” through reading, writing and arithmetic, c. 1916–c 1965”, 
Historia 60 (2015), p. 89.      
71 Ibid. 
72 Author of Die Helpmekaarbeweging in Suid‐Afrika: Die Storm‐en‐Drangjare, 1915‐1920.  
73 South African Party. 
74 Anton Ehlers, Die Helpmekaarbeweging in Suid‐Afrika (Ongepubliseerede MA, University of Stellenbosch, 
1986), p. ii.   
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terms of business employment and training. 75  On 18 December 1914 76  prominent Cape 
Afrikaners gathered in Stellenbosch to deliberate on the prospects of establishing a nationalist 
newspaper in order, amongst other things, to oppose the decision of the government (SAP) to 
enter into the First World War as a British ally.77 Afrikaner philanthropists Jannie Marais and 
Christiaan Marais78 acquired over a quarter of 20 000 (£1) shares in the newspaper’s holding 
company.79 Nasionale Pers, founded in 1915, appointed (future Prime Minister) D.F. Malan as 
editor of its daily newspaper, De (later Die)80 Burger,81 which published its first issue on 26 
July 1915.82 In De Burger’s first editorial Malan emphasised that the newspaper was founded 
to address the socio-economic and political difficulties faced by the Afrikaner volk.83 The 
newspaper continuously appealed to Afrikaner solidarity, whilst encouraging Afrikaners to 
donate to the Helpmekaarbeweging.84 The movement was highly successful as it raised over 
£330 000 (surplus exceeded £92 000) with the assistance of Afrikaner community leaders, 
teachers, students and church leaders. The Helpmekaarbeweging accumulated its targeted 
amount before the deadline of 10 November 1917, which further manifested a sense of 
accomplishment and solidarity amongst Afrikaners.85 The movement, with support provided 
                                                            
75 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 147. 
76 The National Party was founded in the same year.  
77 C.F.J. Muller, Sonop in die Suide: Geboorte en Groei van die Nasionale Pers, 1915‐1948, (Kaapstad: Nasionale 
Boekhandel Bpk, 1990), 80. Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner 
Case, 1915‐1970”, South African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 766.   
78 The Marais brothers accumulated their fortunes in Kimberley after acquiring shares in the Kimberley Central 
Mining Company and later De Beers Consolidated Mines when the former merged with De Beers. Afrikaans 
advocate, Jannie Marais’ s ventures, for example, were numerous and extended beyond mining to include the 
Lion Distillery in Vlottenburg, the Malmesbury  Voogdy and Assuransiemaatskappy, as well as acting as a 
director of the Stellenbosch District Bank (to name only a few). Jannie Marais also played a substantial role in 
the development of Stellenbosch University (previously known as Victoria College) as he bequeathed £100 000 
to the institution, thus giving it the status of an independent university – one which granted Dutch/Afrikaans 
equal status to English. Pieter Kapp, Nalatenskap sonder Einde: Die Verhaal van Jannie Marais en die Marais‐
broers, (Kaapstad: Tip Africa Publishing, 2015), p. 62, p. 83, p. 142.       
79 C.F.J. Muller, Sonop in die Suide: Geboorte en Groei van die Nasionale Pers, 1915‐1948, (Kaapstad: Nasionale 
Boekhandel Bpk, 1990), p. 99. 
80 Die Burger would initially be published in Dutch. However, the first Afrikaans issue was published in 1916. In 
1921 the name change from De Burger to Die Burger. 
81 The Dutch/Afrikaans word for “citizen”.  
82 C.F.J. Muller, Sonop in die Suide: Geboorte en Groei van die Nasionale Pers, 1915‐1948, (Kaapstad: Nasionale 
Boekhandel Bpk, 1990), p. 75.   
83 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 213.    
84 Ibid.     
85 Anton Ehlers, Die Helpmekaarbeweging in Suid‐Afrika, (Ongepubliseerde MA, University of Stellenbosch, 
1986), p. 146.   
Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 769.   
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by the Nasionale Pers, revealed the potential of accumulating considerable Afrikaner savings. 
Within a space of a decade major Afrikaner companies were founded, including the 
Koöperatiewe Wijnbouwers Vereeniging (KWV)86 the Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Trust- en 
Assuransiemaatskappy (Santam) and (most significant for the future Afrikaans cinematic 
industry)87 the Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale Lewensassuransiemaatskappy (Sanlam), attracting 
Afrikaner savings through proclaiming themselves as Afrikaner institutions in the service of 
the ambition of creating economic self-reliance for the volk.88  
Encouraged by the Helpmekaarbeweging, Cape Afrikaner businessmen endeavoured to 
establish a true Afrikaner enterprise in the form of a trust and insurance company. The founding 
members of Santam and Sanlam89 – apart from the Scotsman A. MacDowell – were Afrikaners, 
namely W.A. Hofmeyr, C.G Fichardt, C.R. Louw, P.A. Malan, A.F.J. Benning and F.H. 
Dormehl. The members were involved in Afrikaner society in one way or another, but more 
importantly they had the necessary business experience and were capitalists. 90 Significantly, 
the members were Afrikaner nationalists, with W.A. (Willie) Hofmeyr, for example, playing 
an integral part in convincing D.F. Malan to enter the realm of South African politics.91 Santam, 
a short-term insurer, and Sanlam, a life assurer and subsidiary company of Santam, were 
established on 28 March 1918 and 8 June 1918 respectively. Sanlam, however, would later 
spearhead operations. Like most Cape Afrikaners, the Sanlam/Santam leadership engaged 
business with a sense of responsibility aimed at conducting business activities to educate the 
Afrikaner. Sanlam’s objective was evident from the outset, as the company employed and 
trained young Afrikaners and in this way social capital was utilised to mobilise Afrikaners in 
an extended business network. Grietjie Verhoef defines social capital as follows:  
“The core of social capital theory is that social networks have value. Social capital encompasses 
the connections among individuals, social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from these relations. These relations constitute resources that can be 
                                                            
86 Established as a winemaking co‐operative by winemakers in the Western Cape in 1918.  
87 Sanlam completely revolutionised the South African distribution and exhibition industry. This topic will be 
discussed in the following chapter.  
88 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 147. 
89 Though institutions such as KWV played a significant role, Sanlam and Santam are discussed in more detail 
since they played a paramount role in the Afrikaans cinematic industry.  
90 Grietjie Verhoef, “Nationalism, social capital and economic empowerment: SANLAM and the economic 
upliftment of the Afrikaner people, 1918‐1960”, Business History 50 (2008), p. 700. 
91 Lindie Korf, D.F. Malan: a political biography, (Unpublished PhD, University of Stellenbosch, 2010), p. 89.  
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utilised to obtain certain ends, such as neighbourliness and social support, engagement in 
business enterprise or enhanced productivity.”92   
Chairman W.A. Hofmeyr declared the establishment of Sanlam a ‘Geloofsdaad’.93 Though 
growth was initially slow, Santam and Sanlam demonstrated that Afrikaner savings could be 
utilised to increase the Afrikaners’ involvement in South Africa’s economy. It must be stated, 
however, that these institutions were not the result of government intervention by the SAP, as 
the state wished to increase white employment and wages, but not at the expense of capitalist 
expansion as indicated by the Rand Revolt of 1922.94 The government’s protection of South 
African industry was deemed to display a “colonial attitude” by the founders of 
Santam/Sanlam.95 As such, the latter’s board members thought it best to rely on establishing a 
local industry that could compete with the foreign product.96 The Afrikaans trade magazine 
Volkshandel 97  described Sanlam, for example, as “more than just another insurance 
company… It is a company established by Afrikaners for Afrikaners, and was indeed one of 
the leading companies that inaugurated the new era of the Afrikaner economic upsurge after 
1917-1918.” 98  As Verhoef correctly indicated, this period was significant for Afrikaner 
economic advancement; even though more attention was focused on the question of Afrikaner 
poverty, prominent Afrikaner business and agricultural figures emerged who had the influence 
and financial means to develop an economic solution for what would be known as the “poor 
white” problem.99    
                                                            
92 Grietjie Verhoef, “Nationalism, social capital and economic empowerment: SANLAM and the economic 
upliftment of the Afrikaner people, 1918‐1960”, Business History 50 (2008), p. 696. 
93 “An act of faith”, Ibid., p. 704. 
94The Rand Rebellion (or Rand Revolt, or Second Rand Revolt) was an armed uprising of white miners in the 
Witwatersrand region of South Africa in March 1922. Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. 
In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979), p. 149. 
95 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 215.    
96 As will be indicated in the next chapter, Sanlam would localise the film distribution and exhibition industry 
without financial assistance from the government.   
97 Volkshandel (Pty) Ltd’s Afrikaans trade magazine Volkshandel provided Afrikaners with information on 
economic issues to consolidate the realisation of Afrikaner economic empowerment and independence. The 
first issue was published in 1940 during the first meeting held by the Economic Institute (to be discussed 
shortly) the previous year. 
Volkshandel, March 1940, “Van die Redaksie”, p. 1.      
98 Volkshandel, April 1947, “Geskiedenis van Sanlam”, p. 5. 
99 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 216.    
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Meanwhile, in 1918 a group of Afrikaner nationalists, under the authority of H.J. Klopper, 
established an organisation that would play an important part in shaping the Afrikaner 
economic advance during the course of the twentieth century.100 The organisation, acting as a 
secret institution from 1921, identified itself as the Afrikaner Broederbond (or 
Broederbond).101 The main objective of the Broederbond was to assert Afrikaner cultural and 
political dominance in South Africa. The society was convinced that by achieving this level of 
dominance, its economic aims could be fulfilled. These aims included: nationally controlled 
industrialisation that would end foreign exploitation of South African resources; the 
Afrikanerization of education that would support Afrikaner economic self-development; 
alleviating the Afrikaner’s socio-economic position by the rehabilitation of rural areas; and the 
co-ordination of modern commerce and nationalisation of finance. 102  The Broederbond 
realised that its national influence was limited as a secret society and it subsequently 
established organisations such as the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (FAK)103 
in 1929 to act as a public extension. By 1937 almost 300 student associations, cultural bodies, 
church councils, scientific and educational organisations aligned themselves with the 
Broederbond.104 By 1960 this network expanded to 2 000 organisations affiliated with the 
society.105 
The establishment of business and cultural organisations aimed at uplifting the Afrikaner, 
continued capitalist expansion and rural poverty led to a dramatic increase in Afrikaner 
urbanisation from the creation of the Union to the mid-1930s. For example, in 1917 Afrikaners 
contributed only 13% to South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (a rather low figure, 
                                                            
100 Dan O’Meara, “The Afrikaner Broederbond 1927‐1948: Class Vanguard of Afrikaner Nationalism”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies 2 (1977), p. 156.     
101 The influence of the Broederbond, particularly during the second half of the twentieth century, is a topic 
hotly debated by scholars. But this thesis will not discuss its degree and nature of its influence in great detail. 
The origins of the Broederbond, initially known as Jong Suid‐Afrika, can be traced back to a speech made by 
the editor of De Burger, D.F. Malan (future Prime Minister of South Africa) at the end of the First World War. 
The speech invoked Afrikaner nationalism and consisted of anti‐British sentiments because of the events of the 
South African War. This led to a brawl between Afrikaner nationalists and British loyalists after the speech had 
been delivered. The young Afrikaners subsequently created the society. Ivor Wilkins & Hans Strydom, The 
Super Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond, (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012), p. 44. Dan 
O’Meara, “The Afrikaner Broederbond 1927‐1948: Class Vanguard of Afrikaner Nationalism”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies 2 (1977), p. 158.     
102 Ibid., p. 165‐166.     
103 A cultural organisation to promote the language and culture of Afrikaners.   
104 Dan O’Meara, “The Afrikaner Broederbond 1927‐1948: Class Vanguard of Afrikaner Nationalism”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies 2 (1977), p. 169.   
105 Rasjid Begg, The Afrikaners, Capitalism and Max Weber’s Ghost. (Kurdistan: Hewlêr Press, 2013), p. 177. 
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considering that Afrikaners constituted nearly 60% of the total white population).106 In 1900 
10% of the Afrikaner population were urbanised.107 By 1926 the figure grew to 41%, but as 
urbanisation increased so did poverty.108 The 1930s, however, would prove to be an even more 
challenging decade for the South African economy and the Afrikaner, particularly when the 
effects of the Great Depression sparked by the 1929 stock market crash came to be felt.109 The 
economic damage suffered by South Africa increased as the government refused to shift from 
the gold standard to the fiat monetary system.110 Hermann Giliomee writes:  
“Poverty was of course widespread in the Western world during the Depression, but in South 
Africa it was confined to one section of the white population, the Afrikaners… It was this context 
that made Afrikaner poverty such an emotional issue, allowing ethnic mobilisers to hold British 
Imperialism responsible… rather than accepting it as part of the generally painful process of 
industrialisation and the breakdown of the Western economic order.”111  
In 1927 the Nederduitse-Gereformeerde Kerk (N.G.K.) 112  commissioned an official 
investigation, known as the Carnegie Commission of Inquiry, to scientifically investigate the 
scale and character of South Africa’s “poor white” problem. 113  In 1932 the Carnegie 
Commission’s research indicated that 300 000 (or 25%) members of the Afrikaner population 
could be classified as a “poor white”.114 This meant that the number of extremely impoverished 
whites increased by approximately 100 000 between 1920 and 1933. The condition of 
Afrikaners trapped in poverty was a source of great concern amongst nationalists – including 
                                                            
106 Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 768.   
107 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 150. 
108 Ibid.   
109 The Depression had a destructive effect on the prices of primary goods and as such on the agricultural 
sector.  
110 When the Great Depression struck, people withdrew their deposits, consequently depleting the gold supply. 
Governments, including in South Africa, had to keep interest rates high. Consequently, the depression made 
borrowing too expensive for individuals and companies. In 1933 the USA abolished the gold standard to feed 
the economy and lower interest rates. In short, the fiat monetary system allowed people to have money and, 
more importantly, buying power – albeit by means of credit. 
111 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 150‐151. 
112 Dutch Reformed Church (DRC). 
113 The American Carnegie Corporation donated £4 000 for the research. Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van 
instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, 
Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns, 
University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 213.    
114“Poor whites” refer to white South Africans who were caught in a subsistence lifestyle, often dependent on 
welfare organisations. J.L. Sadie, Die Ekonomiese Faktor in die Afrikaner‐gemeenskap, In H.W. van der Merwe 
(ed.), Identiteit en Verandering, (Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 1974), p. 88. 
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the Pact government (elected in 1924).115 Apart from this plight of Afrikaners acting as a 
barrier to Afrikaner economic mobilisation, Prime Minister J.B.M Hertzog, leader of the 
National Party, regarded the “poor white” issue as a condition that could encourage racial 
mixing as both Afrikaners and Blacks lived in and shared squalid living conditions.116 As such, 
Hertzog implemented a labour policy that dramatically increased the number of unskilled 
and/or semi-skilled Afrikaners employed in South Africa’s public sector. In 1924 9,5% of 
unskilled white workers were unemployed, which increased to approximately 40% in 1933.117 
During the 1920s legislation was introduced in an attempt to protect the interests of white 
workers, including the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, the amended Customs Tariffs Act 
of 1925, the Wage Act of 1925 and the Mines and Works Act of 1926.118 However, as the 
Commission illustrated, despite government intervention the number of “poor whites” 
increased steadily.  
The Great Depression of the early 1930s, coupled with the unrest caused by the predicament 
around the gold standard, encouraged the political merger of Hertzog’s National Party and Jan 
Smuts’s South African Party on 5 December 1934, which created the United South African 
National Party (UP).119 Subsequently, the government introduced more strategies to benefit the 
Afrikaner economically; for example, between 1928 and 1939 expenditure on agriculture 
increased by 400%.120 A year before the creation of the UP, the Treasurer of the Broederbond, 
along with 60 other members, founded the co-operative bank (commercial bank in 1942), 
Volkskas, with the aim of utilising savings and granting loans to business owners, who would 
                                                            
115 The Pact Government was formed in 1924 and ruled from 1924 (June 17) to 1933, when it was succeeded 
by the United South African National Party (later called the United Party). The two main opposition parties of 
the time, J.B.M. Hertzog’s National Party and Creswell’s Labour Party, had formed a pact to defeat the SAP. 
The coalition represented two main groups: the National Party represented anti‐imperialists and Afrikaners 
who opposed Smuts’s industrialisation policies, while the Labour Party drew strong support from working‐class 
whites – particularly miners who were disaffected by the 1922 Rand revolt.  It was during this period that 
Afrikaans became an official language in South Africa (1925).  
116 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 151. 
117 Ibid.  
118 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 214.    
119 This led to D.F. Malan, along with other former NP members, forming the Purified National Party (PNP) in 
the same year.  
120 An industry strongly affected by the Great Depression and the drought of 1933. Hermann Giliomee, “The 
Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa 
Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 152. 
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in turn employ Afrikaners. 121  Although the growth of Volkskas, was initially slow, it 
represented a substantial milestone, considering that it was the first significant Afrikaner 
business enterprise from the “North” in an industry (banking) that was totally dominated by 
foreigners. 122  However, the income gap between Afrikaners and English South Africans, 
particularly within secondary industries (small businessmen and workers), had yet to be 
resolved. Furthermore, Afrikaners (occupying the lowest-level jobs available for whites) were 
handicapped as “English-dominated unions” regulated training facilities.123 In 1936 Afrikaners 
earned an average annual income of £86 p/capita (compared to £146 of other whites) and in 
1939 298 000 whites were estimated to earn a monthly income of £12 or less – thus trapped in 
“terrible poverty”.124  
In 1939, consequent upon instruction of the FAK (Broederbond), the Eerste Ekonomiese 
Volkskongres (Congress) was held in Bloemfontein.125 The Congress, according to Prof. W. 
Pretorius and Willem Keizer, was a “landmark in the history of the Afrikaner people, as a 
starting point of the Afrikaner’s awakening in the economic field.”126 Referring to the Congress 
as the “starting point” is rather debatable, considering the influence of the 
Helpmekaarbeweging and that both the government and the Afrikaner business elite had 
already deployed strategies for Afrikaner economic empowerment. However, the Congress was 
a vital step in expediting the efficiency of the process. According to its Patron, Ds J.D. Kestell, 
the objective of the Congress was to act as a spur for Afrikaner economic self-development 
(“’n Volk red homself”)127 and promoting the view that Afrikaners must form part of all sectors 
                                                            
121 Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 770.   
122 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 216.    
123 Ibid.     
124 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 154. 
125 The Congress was held on 3, 4 and 5 October 1939 and was attended by 757 cultural, church and economic 
representatives. J.D. Kestell was appointed Patron, whilst Ds Wm. Nicol acted as Chairman. Willem Keizer, Die 
Ekonomiese Opkoms van die Afrikaner vanaf die Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres van 1939 en ‘n Ontleding van 
sy Huidige Posisie in die Landsekonomie, (Ongepubliseerde MA, University of Stellenbosch, 1966), p. 20.   
126 Willem Keizer, Die Ekonomiese Opkoms van die Afrikaner vanaf die Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres van 
1939 en ‘n Ontleding van sy Huidige Posisie in die Landsekonomie, (Ongepubliseerde MA, University of 
Stellenbosch, 1966), p. 22.   
127 Literal translation: A nation saves itself. The slogan means that Afrikaners had to depend on their own 
initiative and reject any element of welfare to become economically self‐sufficient.    
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of the South African economy and not just a particular segment, such as agriculture.128 The 
impact of the Congress was that two bodies of economic thought would be utilised to propel 
the Afrikaner economic movement, i.e. economic cooperatism and capitalism: 
“The Volkskongres acted as a catalyst for Sanlam and the Broederbond to join hands in an attempt 
to bridge the acute North-South rivalry in the Afrikaner nationalist movement. The Transvaal-
based Broederbond [and other cooperatists] offered the cultural entrepreneurs and Sanlam [and 
other capitalists] the business enterprise. Several Sanlam senior executives now accepted 
invitations to become members of the [Broeder] Bond.”129  
The Congress concluded that an institution had to be created that would embody the aims of 
the meeting and the Ekonomiese Instituut was created, which was managed by the FAK.130 The 
institute would subsequently be required to establish the Reddingsdaadbond (RDB) to regulate 
the Afrikaner’s economic advance, to mobilise Afrikaner savings, and to establish and/or 
promote industrial, technical and agricultural institutions.131 Notwithstanding the RBD’s short 
existence (disbanded in 1956), 132  the organisation had significant value as it promoted 
economic and business sciences at universities as well as an economic national consciousness 
amongst Afrikaners. During the 1940s and 1950s the RBD accumulated funds (through 
membership and donations) valued at £183 000, which were utilised for student loans and by 
Afrikaner companies, including Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk (FVB). 133  Sanlam, 
influenced by the objective of the Congress, aimed to establish a financial enterprise that would 
accumulate, as Tinie Louw put it, “the greatest possible profits for its shareholders”, but its 
paramount aim “will always be to enhance the Afrikaner position in trade and industry.”134 
FVB, controlled by Sanlam, was founded in 1940,135 and encouraged Afrikaners (naturally 
                                                            
128 Willem Keizer, Die Ekonomiese Opkoms van die Afrikaner vanaf die Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres van 
1939 en ‘n Ontleding van sy Huidige Posisie in die Landsekonomie, (Ongepubliseerede MA, University of 
Stellenbosch, 1966), p. 23.   
129 Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 772.   
130 Willem Keizer, Die Ekonomiese Opkoms van die Afrikaner vanaf die Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres van 
1939 en ‘n Ontleding van sy Huidige Posisie in die Landsekonomie, (Ongepubliseerde MA, University of 
Stellenbosch, 1966), p. 27.   
131 Ibid.  
132 Assets were acquired by the Ekonomiese Instituut.  
133 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 217.    
134 Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 772. 
135 E.P. du Plessis, ‘n Volk Staan Op: Die Ekonomiese Volkskongres en Daarna, (Kaapstad: Human en Rousseau 
Uitgewers, 1964), p. 144.   
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including Broederbond members) to acquire investment shares in, what Sanlam deemed to be, 
financially sound Afrikaner businesses. Approximately £2 million were invested in Afrikaner 
companies (largely FVB) by 1943.136 In 1953 FVB founded Federale Mynbou, which acquired 
the gold and uranium mining company General Mining and Finance Corporation in 1963 (with 
assets valued at approximately R250 million).137 Giliomee argues that the acquisition was an 
important economic step in strengthening business relations between English-speaking South 
Africans and Afrikaners. The Bonus Beleggings Korporasie van Suid-Afrika (Bonuskor), an 
investment company (founded in 1948) managed by the Sanlam group, was the first Afrikaans 
enterprise to be listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.138 
The year 1939 was significant in shaping the future of Afrikaner economic advancement as a 
result of the coming together of the Afrikaner cultural and business elites, but also because of 
England’s decision to declare war on Germany i.e. the start of the Second World War (1939-
1945). J.B.M. Hertzog, strongly opposed to Smut’s intention to enter the war on behalf of the 
Allies, led a break-away faction in 1940 and reunited with D.F. Malan’s Purified National Party 
(PNP).139 On 6 November 1940 the Herenigde (Reunited) Nasionale Party (HNP, later the 
National Party) was established. During the 1940s the HNP promoted itself as an ethnic 
political organisation which endeavoured to endorse the socio-economic and political interests 
of the Afrikaner, thus appealing to the nationalistic and/or impoverished Afrikaner.140 In 1948 
the income gap between Afrikaners and other whites was still considerable, despite an average 
increase p/capita.141 On 26 May 1948 the NP won the general parliamentary election of 1948 
                                                            
136 Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 773.   
137 Previously managed by Anglo‐American Corporation. Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic 
Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1979), p. 169. 
138 Hermann Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner Case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal for Economics 76 (2008), p. 773. 
139 As a British dominion, South Africa, under Smuts’ authority, would fight for the Allies’ cause. The PNP was 
founded in opposition to the merger between the National Party and the South African Party. A faction of the 
NP, led by D.F. Malan, opposed the merger and consequently defected to form the PNP. The Purified National 
Party also opposed South Africa entering the war.  
140 Particularly to farmers and working‐class Afrikaners.  
141In Bloemfontein, for example, the average annual income per capita of Afrikaners was £180 and for other 
whites, £318. In the Johannesburg area Afrikaners’ annual income averaged £162, compared to other whites’ 
£349. However, as the statement suggests, substantial progress had been made as indicated by the Tweede 
(Second) Ekonomiese Kongres held in 1950. Afrikaner enterprises’ share of South Africa’s private industry 
increased to 11% (6% in 1939), whilst the number of Afrikaner manufacturers and directors increased by 295%. 
Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 160. 
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(acquiring 70 seats, whilst the UP obtained 65), thus ushering in the era of apartheid.142 When 
the NP assumed political control, as Hermann Giliomee argues, “it greatly increased the scope 
of state intervention in the economy while fostering Afrikaner economic advance” particularly 
through the protection of the white worker and improvement of South Africa’s agricultural 
conditions.143 For example, the government raised the average price of maize from 21s. 3d. in 
1949 to 30s in 1952, whilst also assisting the agricultural sector through government subsidies, 
foreshadowing the scheme which prompted the establishment of the Afrikaans cinematic film 
industry.144 Furthermore, public utilities/semi-state corporations were increasingly utilised by 
the NP to enhance modern economic activity amongst Afrikaners. J.L. Sadie maintains that 
public corporations – for example, the public broadcaster the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation, the energy and chemical company Sasol, the electricity public utility Escom (later 
Eskom), the iron and steel corporation ISCOR, and the 
Nywerheidsontwikkelingskorporasie/Industrial Development Corporation (NOK) – provided 
Afrikaners with the opportunity to obtain business experience which the private sector 
(particularly non-Afrikaner enterprises) could not offer. 145  The number of Afrikaners 
employed by the public corporations doubled from 1948 to 1968.146  Afrikaner economic 
advancement was enhanced by the relationship maintained between the National Party and the 
Afrikaner business elite and cultural figures. Another extension of the 1939 Congress was the 
creation of the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI) in 1942.147 AHI was established with the 
objective of supporting and educating Afrikaner businessmen regarding the management of 
companies and adapting to modernising industries, discussing the development of the general 
economy, promoting interaction between the largest and smaller Afrikaner business enterprises, 
whilst (crucially) acting as an instrument of communication between the business sector and 
government – particularly after the NP became the ruling party in 1948.148 Lastly, the NP 
                                                            
142 Newelle Stultz, Afrikaner Politics in South Africa, 1934‐1948, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1974), p. 143. 
143 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 161. 
144 Ibid., 162. 
145 J.L. Sadie, Die Ekonomiese Faktor in die Afrikaner‐gemeenskap, In H.W. van der Merwe (ed.), Identiteit en 
Verandering, (Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 1974), p. 98. 
146 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 165. 
147 Willem Keizer, Die Ekonomiese Opkoms van die Afrikaner vanaf die Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres van 
1939 en ‘n Ontleding van sy Huidige Posisie in die Landsekonomie, (Unpublished MA, University of 
Stellenbosch, 1966), p. 37. 
148 Grietjie Verhoef, “Die stigting van instellings as werktuie in die ekonomiese opbouproses van die Afrikaner 
sedert die Anglo‐Boereoorlog“, Lecture, Genl. J.B.M. Hertzog‐gedenklesing van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns, University of Johannesburg, Pretoria, 18 September 2003, p. 218.    
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improved educational facilities for Afrikaners, such as the founding of medical and engineering 
faculties at Afrikaans universities, and the construction of technical and secondary schools for 
Afrikaners which could compare with educational institutions attended by wealthier, urbanised 
whites.149  
The combination of urbanisation, Afrikaner ethnic mobilisation, Afrikaner nationalists 
assuming political control, and the modernising economic development of South Africa during 
the first half of the twentieth century had a profound impact on the establishment and 
development of the Afrikaans cinematic industry. Not only had economic advancement 
increased the Afrikaner’s financial position (consequently reducing the income gap), 
Afrikaners, though still dominating the agricultural sector throughout the 1950s, started to 
engage in all private business sectors – including the cinematic film industry. Afrikaner 
economic advancement was so effective that the question of “poor whites” virtually no longer 
existed by the time television services commenced in South Africa in 1976: “… Afrikaners had 
risen from a poor, underdeveloped population group to a prosperous bourgeoisie.”150 The 
following tables demonstrate the degree in which Afrikaner economic engagement expanded 
up until the inauguration of the fully-fledged Afrikaans cinematic film industry: 
Table 1:151 Percentage of Afrikaners Occupying Broad Sections of the Economy, 
1936-1960 
 1936 (%) 1946 (%) 1960 (%)
Agriculture 41,2 30,3 16,0
"Blue Collar" and 
Manual Labour 31,3 40,7 40,5
"White Collar" 27,5 29,0 43,5
Total 100 100 100
    
                                                            
149 Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power 
Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 168. 
150 Ibid., p. 145.  
151 J.L. Sadie. Die Ekonomiese Faktor in die Afrikaner‐gemeenskap. In H.W. van der Merwe (ed.), Identiteit en 
Verandering. (Kaapstad: Tafelberg, 1974), p. 94. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
30 
 
Table 2:152 Afrikaner Representation in Main Occupational Groups, 1936-1960   
  1936 (%) 1946 (%) 1960 (%) 
Professional 23,9 37,3 42,0
Trade and Finances 23,4 32,4 41,6
Agriculture 86,7 85,7 84,5
Mining 37,7 63,6 70,5
Transport 54,7 73,0 77,0
Industrial 39,5 48,2 56,5
Services 43,2 49,9 64,5
Economically Active 50,8 53,6 54,3
Total Population 57,4 58,1 58,9
 
Table 3:153 Income Ratio of Afrikaners to English-speaking Whites, 1946 and 1960 
Year Personal Income P/Capita Income 
1946 40 to 60 100 to 211
1960 47 to 53 100 to 156
 
Origins of the South African Cinematic Film Industry  
The advent of South Africa’s cinematic industry may be traced to the final years of the 19th 
century. After the discovery of gold and diamonds and the subsequent “influx of a large quasi-
sophisticated population” and modernisation of urban centres, South Africa’s urbanised white 
population felt a need for the theatrical arts.154 Before cinema, the need for entertainment was 
best fulfilled by the circus, 155  musical performances (orchestras and military bands) and 
theatres situated in the larger South African towns. As will be shown, South Africa’s small 
white population has continuously hampered the preservation and expansion of dramatic 
entertainment (both theatrical and cinematic). Nineteenth-century South Africa was no 
exception, as the small size of the population and absence of appropriate theatres, coupled with 
                                                            
152 Willem Keizer, Die Ekonomiese Opkoms van die Afrikaner vanaf die Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres van 
1939 en ‘n Ontleding van sy Huidige Posisie in die Landsekonomie, (Ongepubliseerde MA, University of 
Stellenbosch, 1966), p. 171. 
153 The table shows the narrowing of the per capita income gap between Afrikaners and English‐speaking 
White South Africans within the indicated timeframe.  Hermann Giliomee, “The Afrikaner Economic Advance”. 
In H. Adam and H. Giliomee (eds.), Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979), p. 174. 
154 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 1. 
155 Frank Fillis’s Circus and Boswell’s circus were arguably the most renowned.  
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the lack of an extensive transport system, created substantial difficulties for an industry to grow. 
However, during the 1880s and early 1890s circumstances improved considerably with the 
development and expansion of South Africa’s railway networks, 156  the construction of 
sophisticated theatres in larger towns (Theatre Royal in Durban [1882], the Opera House in 
Pretoria [1893] and Good Hope Hall in Cape Town [1893]), the consequent introduction of 
theatrical companies (e.g. The Wheelers and Luscombe Searelle) and the importation of 
international artists, such as Camillio Urso (a renowned European violinist), among many 
others.157 South African urbanised whites had a thirst for amusement best illustrated by Thelma 
Gutsche’s account in The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in SA, 1895-1940: 
“Appreciation of the zeitgeist of the period is only possible through realisation that the public 
was essentially sensation-minded and acutely responsive to any type of novelty.”158  
The 19th century is recognised as a period of scientific and technological innovation, 
revolutionising industries across the world, including South Africa’s entertainment industry. 
The most profoundly influential technological innovations revolved around the production of 
steam and electricity, hugely multiplying the mechanical power of human/animal capability. 
However, the applications of electric and steam power are not the only developments that 
ultimately shaped the course of the 20th century. Recording technologies such as the photograph 
and phonograph were significant in their own right as they allowed the experiences of the 
present to be captured and made available in the future. The South African public’s sense datum, 
coupled with their appreciation of technological innovation, created an ambience suitable for 
the introduction of a motion picture industry. 159  The entertainment industry would be 
completely transformed by the introduction of Thomas A. Edison’s invention of the 
kinetoscope (1889).160 The technology of the kinetoscope was transferred to Johannesburg on 
4 April 1895, and made available for public use by a Mr Witherell by 19 April 1895  in 
                                                            
156 The discovery of diamonds in Kimberley (1867) and gold on the Witwatersrand (1886) contributed to the 
development of South Africa’s railway networks. South Africa’s railway circuit expanded at an average annual 
rate of 29% and 5,7% between 1875‐1885 and 1885‐1910, respectively. 1885 and 1910. Peter Perkins, Johann 
Fedderke & John Luiz, “An Analysis of Economic Infrastructure Development in South Africa”, South African 
Journal of Economics 73 (2005), p. 215.   
157Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 2. 
158 Ibid., p. 6‐7. 
159 “Motion‐picture industry” and “Film industry” refer to the same concept.  
160 An early motion picture exhibition device that could only be viewed by one person through a window 
(“peep hole”). W. Bernard Carlson, & Michael E. Gorman, “Understanding Invention as a Cognitive Process: 
The Case of Thomas Edison and Early Motion Pictures, 1888‐91”, Social Studies of Science 20 (1990), 398. 
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Herwoods Arcade on Pritchard and President Streets in Johannesburg.161 The invention derived 
from its precursor, the phonograph (also developed by Edison), and was a raree show 
displaying pictures in motion. In August of the same year the South African public was 
introduced to the kinetophone – a device capable of synchronously playing kinetoscope films 
and phonographic music. The popularity of these inventions inevitably declined as they came 
to be regarded as “nothing more than fascinating toys.” 162  Regardless, international 
businessmen realised that the demand for entertainment in South Africa created a penetrable 
market, as was illustrated by the Hyman brothers.  
Constructing an “Uitlander” Cinematic Film Industry 
The Vitascope, invented by Edison in 1895, enabled animated pictures to be cast onto a wall 
by means of a film projector in large theatrical halls, thus being the first institution to resemble 
the modern bioscope. South Africa’s introduction to projected film occurred in May 1896 with 
an exhibition163 at the Empire Theatre of Varieties (Johannesburg) and managed by Edgar 
Hyman.164 From 1896 to 1899 the exhibitions were mostly foreign (British and American) 
films – a trend that continues to this day. Hyman, enthralled by the innovation, acquired a 
camera from Charles Urban (an Anglo-American producer) through his brother Sydney Hyman, 
who acted as his British agent. The Warwick Trading Company, 165  located in London, 
employed Hyman, who shot short films mostly in Johannesburg. 166  These images were 
displayed in Johannesburg and across the globe. The South African War (1899-1902) was 
documented by Warwick with Edgar Hyman acting as the war correspondent. Warwick was 
accompanied by numerous film newsreel companies, but due to the nature of the guerrilla 
warfare, it was virtually impossible to capture military conflict/action on film. Consequently, 
producers in England filmed reconstructions of battles based on events during the war. The 
subjectivity of these recorded scenes may be evident, but it is true that modern documentaries 
still employ this tactic, or “dramatizations”, if actual events could not have been documented. 
What is certain, according to Martin Botha, is that these scenes acted as an influential 
                                                            
161 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 9. 
162 Ibid., p. 10.    
163 Demonstrating the skills of the magician, Carl Hertz.  
164 Edgar Hyman was a Victorian theatrical manager, cameraman and showman. 
165 Henceforth referred to as Warwick. 
166 He is arguably most renowned for shooting a short scene of Transvaal President, Paul Kruger, leaving his 
home in Pretoria in 1898. However, Joseph Rosenthal (Maguire and Baucus Company) stated in an interview 
that he was responsible for the film.  Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University 
of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 21. 
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propaganda medium, as illustrated in post-apartheid productions such as The Feast of the 
Uninvited (2008).167 Evidently, South Africa’s film industry, even at its infancy, shared many 
commonalities with the general socio-economic conditions in South Africa during the end of 
the 19th century. The film industry, like the mining sector, was dominated by foreigners or 
“Uitlanders”, as most Afrikaners were still reluctant to engage in modern economic activities.  
After the conclusion of the South Africa War in 1902, the political and economic reconstruction 
of the country could commence.168 Dramatic and musical performances were declining and, 
apart from the circus, South Africa’s entertainment sector was dominated by the mobile 
bioscope.169 Moving pictures enthralled the nation, subsequently exploited and organised by 
peripatetic impresarios such as W.H. Baker, H. Howard, W. Rees and most significantly W. 
Wolfram, “the pioneer of a considerable body of itinerant showmen.”170 Moving pictures were 
most popular in the Transvaal and Natal, and were exploited by companies such as the SA 
Bioscope Company (which showcased matches played between the Springboks and England), 
the Olympic Bioscope Company (exhibited films of the Olympic Games) and various other 
companies (Marconi Bioscope Co., Royal Bioscope Co. and American Electric Bioscope, to 
name a few).171 The industry in Natal was monopolised by Wolfram and Rees between 1902 
and 1908. Most companies failed to survive for long periods of time as they were financially 
unprofitable, although some companies’ involvement was based on a ‘get-rich-quick-and-leave’ 
mentality - a business endeavour involving only a few shows.172  
The remarkable popularity of motion pictures led to the construction of the first permanent 
bioscopes in South Africa. Unsurprisingly, the demand for film entertainment was exploited 
by an “Uitlander”– an Englishman to be exact. Frederick Mouillot, owner of Electric Theatres 
Ltd, would build the first permanent cinema in Durban. Opened on 29 July 1909, the exhibition 
hall was simply named the Electric Theatre and reserved for white audiences.173 The first 
cinema reserved for black communities was opened by Electric Theatres Ltd on 11 December 
                                                            
167 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 22. 
168 Discussed in previous section.  
169 The number of dramatic and musical performances declined when the Imperial troops were withdrawn and 
the public’s enthusiasm waned after the true nature of the war’s economic consequences became evident. 
Showmen subsequently exploited other forms of the entertainment industry. Thelma Gutsche, The History and 
Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 60. 
170 Ibid.  
171 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 65. 
172 Ibid., p. 61.  
173 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 22. 
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within the same year.174 Also situated in Durban, the cinema attracted mostly Indians. Electric 
Theatres would expand its organised exhibition network to other cities, including Cape Town 
(September 1909), Port Elizabeth (February 1910) and Germiston (July 1910). Electric 
Theatres acquired and circulated films among these bioscopes, functioning in ways reminiscent 
of a distribution company. The initial success of the theatres prompted numerous aspiring 
entrepreneurs to try to penetrate the cinematic market. Exhibition theatres surfaced in the larger 
towns across South Africa, for example, Wolfram’s Bioscope (Cape Town), Tivoli Theatre 
(Pretoria), Fisher’s Elite Bioscope (Cape Town), the Bijou (Johannesburg, Fordsburg and 
Pretoria) and the Vaudette Theatre (East London, Krugersdorp and Kimberley) and numerous 
other less significant bioscopes. By 1910 Johannesburg had nearly twenty exhibition theatres, 
consequently resulting in intense competition amongst cinema owners. Most cinemas however, 
could not sustain profitability as the films exhibited were of poor quality, and admission prices 
were low (6d). At first exhibitors imported films directly from foreign film producers/agencies, 
but the method was deemed to be too expensive. Consequently, South Africa’s first distribution 
companies, such as the African Film Syndicate and the Universal Film Supply Company, were 
established in 1911. Another milestone was achieved in the South African film industry in 1911, 
when The Great Kimberley Diamond Robbery became the first feature produced in South 
Africa by the foreign-owned Springbok Film Company.175 
By 1911 the South African cinematic industry was experiencing financial turmoil, with most 
exhibition theatres maintaining a precarious existence. The causes contributing to the problem 
were fourfold: a bioscope’s high expenses exceeded turnover as income was generated simply 
in “shillings and sixpences”; the demand for cinematic entertainment had reached its climax in 
1910, with theatre attendance declining significantly in the following year;176 the increasing 
length of feature films meant obtaining productions would be more expensive; and lastly, local 
competition prevented exhibitors from increasing the prices of admission tickets.177 Africa’s 
Amalgamated Theatres Ltd, established by Australian born- Rufe Naylor and Edgar Hyman’s 
Empire Theatre Company were the two most prominent exhibition companies in South Africa. 
Both controlled an extensive network of bioscopes across the country. The Empire Theatre 
Company, for example, owned the distribution agency African Film Syndicate. Through it and 
                                                            
174 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 22. 
175André I. Le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 3. 
176 Thelma Gutsche defines this climax as the “bioscope boom”.  
177 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 112. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
to their own benefit, Empire administered the exclusive rights of the most profitable films. 
Fierce competition between Africa’s Amalgamated Theatres, the Empire Theatre Company 
and independent bioscopes, however, once again created an unfavourable environment for 
bioscope owners. In March 1913 Empire Theatres, with its large exhibition circuit, underwent 
provisional liquidation, which unsettled the cinematic industry. 178  Africa’s Amalgamated 
Theatres was also on the verge of being declared bankrupt. If the cinematic industry was to 
succeed, significant reorganisation of local exhibition and distribution would be necessary. 
Reorganisation and Isidore W. Schlesinger’s Cinematic Film Industry 
A successful, New York-born financier, Isidore W. Schlesinger, maintained that the bioscope 
industry179 would only succeed if business interests were consolidated under unified control, 
thus eliminating the biggest threat, namely competition. The absence of competition would 
allow the company to dictate the conditions of the industry (salaries and admission prices), 
whilst providing an opportunity to construct a lucrative network.180 Schlesinger established the 
company African Theatres Trust Ltd, in 1913 and acquired all the assets of Empire Theatres 
(20 May 1913) and in June 1913 incorporated Africa’s Amalgamated Theatres. 181  After 
consulting South Africa’s largest film distributors, i.e. George Smith and H.J. Stodel (along 
with five other firms), Schlesinger successfully negotiated the amalgamation of the distribution 
companies. South African film distribution was monopolised under the control exercised by 
Schlesinger’s African Film Trust. On 5 May 1913 Schlesinger founded the newsreel, African 
Mirror, which was managed by Joseph Albrecht (imported from Britain).182  By 1915 African 
Theatres Trust had reorganised itself to establish three companies, each serving a different 
purpose: African Theatre Trust dealt with administration; African Film Trust acted as the 
import/distribution agency; and African Film Productions would become South Africa’s first 
local film producer. In 1969 The Star’s Financial Editor John Marvin stated:  
                                                            
178 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 116. 
179 “Bioscope” and “cinema” refer to the same phenomenon. “Bioscope” is the term used by many distributors 
and producers in the 20th century.  
180 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 117. 
181André I. Le Roux & Lilla Fourie. Filmverlede, Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 2. 
182 Emma Sandon, “The Life and Times of the South African Newsreel from 1910 to 1948”, Journal of Southern 
African Studies 39 (2013), 668. Joseph Albrecht was a producer, writer and director, known for A Border 
Scourge (1917), Mystery of the Great Zimbabwe (1920) and Copper Mask (1919). 
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“South Africa’s promise was amply fulfilled and ‘I.W.’ had the satisfaction of bringing 
entertainment in many different forms to most parts of the country. At a time when Walt Disney 
was barely out of swaddling clothes, he experimented with cartoon films and was making 
advertising films when they were still in the embryo stage in America”.183    
Local film production continued after the First World War (1914-1918), since the 
circumstances of war had decreased the supply and influx of foreign productions. Furthermore, 
most films exhibited in the Union were developed in the USA, thus allowing American 
distributors to dictate market prices. Schlesinger recognised an opportunity and suggested 
developing South African films for both the local and international market. Film studios were 
subsequently constructed in Killarney, a Johannesburg suburb. By January 1916 production 
commenced before the construction of Killarney Film Studios was entirely completed and the 
first topical feature A Story of the Rand (1916) was produced. 184  Schlesinger employed 
American film producer Lorrimer Johnston, who (along with his wife Caroline Cook)185 wrote 
the script. Like A Story of the Rand, early African Film Productions’ (AFP) films incorporated 
themes based on actual events integrated with fictional romance, thus incorporating 
characteristics reminiscent of a docudrama. Between 1910 and 1925 African Film Productions 
produced no less than 43 features, including epics such as De Voortrekkers/Winning a 
Continent (1916), King Solomon’s Mines (1918) and Allan Quatermain (1919). These features 
attempted to emulate American epics, such as D.W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation (1915) and 
Intolerance (1916). As Andrè le Roux and Lilla Fourie maintain:  
“The first films developed in South Africa were mainly based on the interpretation of preceding 
American films, characterised by the sheer wickedness of villains, the utter heroism of heroes, 
whilst also providing a meaningful, detailed narrative which spans many years”.186  
The emulation is understandable, considering that America’s innovative film applications 
made the USA – more specifically Hollywood – the colossus of the world’s cinematic 
industries.  
The Era of Sound, New Competition and RARO     
                                                            
183 The Star, 30 April 1969, John Marvin, “Multimillion Rand South African Deal”.  
184 André I. Le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 3. 
185 Cook would also star in the film. 
186André I. Le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 3. 
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In 1927 the 14 year monopoly exercised by African Theatres was broken by the arrival of the 
phono film or “talk film”. Kinemas South Africa Ltd, founded by Sydney Hayden,187 utilised 
the media sensation around the phono film, subsequently constructing theatres across South 
Africa that exhibited “talkies” exclusively. Though initially crude and primitive, the 
introduction of sound ushered in a new era of competition – a duopoly – in South African 
exhibition/distribution. Within the space of two years Kinemas managed to add 44 bioscopes 
to their exhibition network.188 Not to be outdone, African Theatres responded by building 
additional large cinemas and smaller bioscopes in the larger towns. The public benefited as 
competition guaranteed a wider selection of films. Despite the economic hardship caused by 
the Great Depression after 1929 and the steady decline of public patronage, the expansion of 
both companies continued until foreign competition penetrated the market. The American 
production and distribution company Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer founded a distribution agency in 
Johannesburg, which distributed their own films in South Africa. The intense parallel 
expansion by African Theatres and Kinemas became commercially unsustainable, coupled 
with the fact that South Africa had not yet recovered from the damage inflicted by the economic 
depression. Competition was once again exhausting the resources of the South African industry, 
considering that the constant expansion of exhibition networks resulted in an excess number of 
cinemas.189 The precarious economic environment brought about the amalgamation of African 
Theatres Trust and Kinemas Ltd in December 1931, subsequently establishing two companies: 
one was African Consolidated Theatres Ltd, which would be responsible solely for 
administration, and the other was African Consolidated Films Ltd, which managed the 
exhibition and distribution interests of the merger.190                    
Economic conditions worsened in the early 1930s and audience attendance continued to decline. 
At this stage three companies dominated South Africa’s exhibition and distribution circuit. 
African Consolidated Theatres/Films managed the bulk of films exhibited and distributed in 
the Union. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) circulated films produced by themselves, British 
and Dominion Films, United Artists and London Films.191 The third party, Union Theatres Ltd, 
                                                            
187 An Australian Exhibitor. 
188 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 205. 
189 Some towns had numerous cinemas, notwithstanding the fact that their populations could barely support 
one.  
190 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 235. 
191 All foreign film‐producing companies.  
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controlled by Schlesinger’s interests, was initially and specially registered (13 October 1931) 
to exhibit ‘talkie’ films produced by MGM.192 The reason was MGM’s dissatisfaction with the 
financial terms provided by African Consolidated Trust/Films. It is worth noting that MGM 
produced the highest-quality and most expensive films at the time, thus making their 
productions the most desirable. “Super cinemas”193 were being built, such as MGM’s Metro 
Theatre (Johannesburg), African Trust’s Coliseum (Johannesburg), the Capitol (Pretoria) and 
the Alhambra (Cape Town). To the relief of the film industry, South Africa managed to recover 
progressively from the economic depression after the Union went off the gold standard194 and 
adopted the fiat monetary system195 in December 1932.196  
South Africa’s cinematic film industry sustained a period of financial prosperity after the 
depression, attracting foreign interests in pursuit of lucrative markets. In April 1937 Otto W. 
Bolle of the Twentieth-Century-Fox Film Corporation visited South Africa to decide whether 
the country could establish a circuit in the country. African Consolidated Films ceased the 
distribution of Twentieth-Century-Fox Films in South Africa. The cinematic industry was 
deemed economically stable197 and as such, Twentieth-Century-Fox Film (SA) Pty Ltd was 
established in May of 1938. Twentieth-Century-Fox rapidly expanded its circuit in South 
Africa (between May 1938 and September 1940 38 cinemas were opened). The company’s 
success can be attributed to its incorporation of commercial social responsibility as the 
institution promoted local employment and its cinemas being built by South African 
enterprises.198 The United Artists Film Company also established distribution offices in SA 
after reaching an agreement to distribute its films through the networks of Twentieth-Century-
Fox’s cinemas.199 The dependence of American producers, distributors and exhibitors on the 
                                                            
192 Thelma Gutsche, The History and Social Significance of Motion Pictures in South Africa, 1895‐1940, (Cape 
Town: Citadel Press, 1972), p. 232. 
193 Theatres which could accommodate a large audience.  
194 A monetary system where a country's currency or paper money (standard economic unit of account) has a 
value directly linked to its gold reserves.  
195 Legal tender is not based on a physical commodity such as gold. Value is calculated according to scarcity. 
The amount of an economy’s money and interest rates can be adjusted, if required. The fiat monetary system 
is currently used by South Africa.   
196 R. Leslie, “South Africa and the Gold Standard”, The Economic Journal 43 (1933), p. 92. 
197 This was after the country adopted the fiat monetary system and recovered from the Great Depression.  
198 Corporative Social Responsibility (CSB) is used as a marketing strategy to attract consumers within an area. 
Twentieth‐Century‐Fox’s use of CSB was profit‐driven as the company promoted its contribution to South 
African employment.    
199 David J. Gainer, Hollywood, African Consolidated Films and “Bioskoopbeskawing”, or Bioscope Culture: 
Aspects of American Culture in Cape Town, 1945‐1960, (Unpublished Phd, University of Cape Town, 2000). 
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South African market increased after the outbreak of the Second World War. Caught up in war, 
Europe’s demand for Hollywood product temporarily declined. 
In 1931 AFP initiated the production of local films with a soundtrack by developing the short 
film Sarie Marie. AFP subsequently produced the first Afrikaans feature, Moedertjie (1931). 
The Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Taal, Lettere en Kuns200 awarded director/producer, Joseph 
Albrecht, a golden medal in honour of the milestone. Forty local productions were produced 
between 1930 and 1956. Famous productions include Geboortegrond (1946), Cry the Beloved 
Country (1951) and Fifty-Vyftig (1953). The bulk of the films were produced in Afrikaans (30) 
and by African Film Productions. The most prominent Afrikaans directors and producers, 
though scarce in number, were Pierre de Wet (created South Africa’s first Afrikaans musical, 
Kom Saam, Vanaand [1949]) and Jamie Uys. Afrikaans productions provided Afrikaners with 
cinematic escapism, typically in the form of melodramas or comedies.201    
As with the general trend of South Africa’s modern economy,202 Afrikaners’ full engagement 
with the film industry, i.e. production, distribution and exhibition, developed gradually and not 
without the assistance of the government and other cultural organisations (as will be expanded 
upon). This thesis argues that the Afrikaans film industry was formally established in the 1950s 
when government subsidisation was introduced; however, a few Afrikaners did venture into 
the industry before then. One earlier endeavour had its origins in the nationalistic movement 
stimulated by the Voortrekker Eeufees (Centenary celebrations) in 1938. 203  In 1935 the 
Minister of Railways and Ports, Oswald Pirow,204 instructed African Film Productions to 
develop a film based on the history of South Africa (1486-1910). The feature was produced in 
English and Afrikaans, directed by Joseph Albrecht, included mass crowd scenes consisting of 
8 000 blacks and 3 500 whites, a cast consisting of approximately 150 people and had a 
production budget of £68 025.205 The intention was to obtain foreign publicity and stimulate 
national consciousness. The first Afrikaans screening of the production – Die Bou van ’n 
                                                            
200 English Translation: The South African Academy for Language, Literature and Art.   
201 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 43. 
202 As discussed in the previous chapter, South Africa’s economy started to modernise at the end of the 19th 
century.  
203 The Voortrekker Eeufees, held in 1938, was a centenary celebration by Afrikaners who commemorated the 
eastern Cape frontier farmers who left the Cape Colony in the 1830s.      
204 Pirow – a Nazi sympathizer, anti‐communist and far‐right nationalist – would hold office as Minister of 
Justice and Minister of Defence in 1929‐1933 and 1933‐1939 respectively. Robert L. McCormack, “Man with a 
Mission: Oswald Pirow and South African Airways, 1933‐1939”, Journal of African History 20 (1979), p. 543‐ 
544, p. 547.   
205 André I. Le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 30. 
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Nasie/They Built a Nation – took place at the Capitol Theatre on 12 December 1938. Dr Hans 
Rompel filmed the centenary celebrations and produced the documentary, ’n Nasie Hou Koers. 
At the time Rompel was playing an integral part in the development of the Afrikaans industry 
and is generally regarded as one of the first formal Afrikaans film critics in South Africa – 
writing for Die Brandwag, Die Huisgenoot and Die Burger.206 The upsurge of Afrikaner 
nationalism emanating from the celebrations, coupled with the Eerste Ekonomiese 
Volkskongres207 (First Economic People’s Congress) held in 1939,208 led to the formation of 
the Reddingsdaadbond-Amateur-Rolprent-Organisasie209 (RARO) in July 1940, with future 
State President Dr Nico Diederichs acting as its first chairperson.210          
Films were produced which emphasised the Afrikaner lifestyle, people and events. RARO 
objected to foreign interests penetrating and dominating South African industries. Under the 
influence of Dr Hans Rompel, RARO judged the foreign dominance of South African screens 
as a configuration of cultural imperialism. RARO served as an alternative industry, producing 
politicized films as both Afrikaner audiences and nationalism grew. In 1941 nationalists 
constructed a distribution circuit by establishing the Volksbioskope Maatskappy Beperk211 
(People’s Bioscopes Pty Ltd). The main objective of the newly established company was to 
distribute RARO’s 16 mm films. Apart from their films being distributed in mainly rural 
theatres, RARO’s motion pictures would be exhibited in 300 schools across the state.212 
However, to sustain continued profitability VOB, despite its nationalistic inclinations, also 
distributed American productions. After the National Party came into power in 1948, RARO’s 
and VOB’s public function was deemed obsolete and both companies consequently 
dissolved.213  
In 1947 the Christelike Afrikaanse Radio en Film Organisasie214 (CARFO) was commissioned 
by the NG church and undertook to produce films infused with a Christian, conservative 
                                                            
206 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 32. 
207 As indicated, the objective of the Eerste Ekonomiese Volkskongres was to provide a framework that could 
mobilise and increase the purchasing power of the Afrikaner.  
208 Herman Giliomee, “Ethnic Business and Economic Empowerment: The Afrikaner case, 1915‐1970”, South 
African Journal of Economics 76 (2008), p. 771.   
209 English Translation: Rescue Action Association Amateur Film Organisation. 
210 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 36. 
211 Abbreviation: VOB.  
212 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 36. 
213 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1986‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 30. 
214 English Translation: Christian Afrikaans Radio and Film Organisation 
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message. A group of pastors acted on the Board of Directors, whilst Ds Willie Alheit became 
CARFO’s first Chief Executive. CARFO’s films were distributed on the circuit of school and 
church halls. Leon van Nierop argues: “Some of CARFO’s films were dismissed as mere 
sermons, although a large number of rural citizens in particular, watched them”.215 Van Nierop 
adds that the establishment of the organisation was significant in the development of Afrikaans 
film productions as it created a connection between the church and industry. “People 
[Afrikaners] were in fact wary of the new ‘unholy’ innovation (bioscope)”.216 The involvement 
of the church perhaps contributed to Afrikaners embracing the industry. CARFO’s scripts were 
mostly written by Ds James Norval, whilst Kappie Botha regularly directed the productions, 
including Ek Sal Opstaan (1959) and Spore in die Modder (1961).217               
Meanwhile, South Africa’s paramount distributors (The “Big Three”) continued their 
aggressive campaign to gain control of the market. African Consolidated Films (ACF) took 
advantage of the rivalry amongst American producers and negotiated long-standing contracts 
with studios, including Warner Brothers, RKO, Disney, Columbia and Paramount, to name a 
few. The distribution circuit of a film would usually last three years and would consist of three 
stages. The first “round” for a film was its distribution in the largest towns with the most 
luxurious and largest cinemas (Empire or Coliseum, for example), after it had been  approved 
by the Censorship Board. This stage would last approximately three to six months. Stage two, 
a period also consisting of three to six months, would see the film circulated in smaller 
European cinemas, as well as the largest non-white cinemas in urban areas (e.g. Star Theatre 
in District Six). Finally, circulation would enter stage three, meaning that a film would be sent 
to the older, smaller cinemas located in the smallest villages and/or non-European urban 
areas.218 Independent cinemas that desired to exhibit ACF films were locked into long-term 
contracts largely dictated by the distributor. For example, independent exhibiters had no control 
over the films that they received from ACF, refunds were not available, and a cinema was 
responsible for the transport costs if a different film was requested.219 If deemed uncooperative, 
                                                            
215 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 60. 
216 Ibid.  
217 Ibid.  
218David J. Gainer, Hollywood, African Consolidated Films and “Bioskoopbeskawing”, or Bioscope Culture: 
Aspects of American Culture in Cape Town, 1945‐1960, (Unpublished Phd, University of Cape Town, 2000), p. 
91. 
219 Ibid., p. 92.  
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an independent cinema owner would be supplied with previously exhibited or substandard 
films.220 
Jamie Uys Filmproduksies and the Advent of the Afrikaans Cinematic Era   
John Schlesinger assumed control of African Consolidated Trusts when his father and its 
founder, Isidore W. Schlesinger, passed away in 1949. ACF, under new authority, continued 
its attempts to expand the local film industry. However, South Africa’s cinematic industry 
would soon be subjugated to American interests.  In 1956 Twentieth-Century-Fox Film Ltd 
bought out the Schlesinger empire, consequently controlling more than three-quarters of South 
Africa’s distribution network. Only a few independent film distributers/exhibitors operated 
outside the duopoly exercised by Fox and MGM, including the Pretoria-based Inrybelange Ltd 
(Inrybelange). Inrybelange would develop into Ster Films/Theatres, specializing in the 
circulation of Afrikaans productions. Sanlam managed the company and – as will be expanded 
upon in the following sections – would revolutionise the local cinematic industry in the 
1960s.221   
During the early 1950s African Film Productions employed a young Afrikaner, Jacobus 
Johannes Uys (better known as Jamie), who would become the pioneer of the Afrikaans film 
producing industry. Uys soon resigned as he maintained that ACF limited writers artistically. 
Uys, when working for ACF, wrote two scripts, Daar Doer In Die Stad and Hensop, but they 
were never turned into films, since Schlesinger thought them too controversial. Consequently, 
Jamie Uys decided to become an independent producer. Uys produced Daar Doer in die 
Bosveld (1951) for Swan Films, whilst operating as the scriptwriter, director, photographer and 
main actor. The production was a complete commercial success as a result of overwhelming 
support provided from the Afrikaner community. Encouraged by success, Jamie Uys – along 
with Johan Daniel Wilhelm Human van der Vijver – registered what would become South 
Africa’s most influential film production company, Jamie Uys Filmproduksies Ltd, on 23 
February 1954.222 The company’s main objective was to develop and expand the Afrikaans 
film industry. The success achieved by Daar Doer in die Bosveld was unprecedented; however, 
Jamie Uys Films still deemed the climate for Afrikaans productions as unfavourable. 
                                                            
220 Termed “killer” films.  
221 Sanlam Archives (SA), Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Rolprentwese 
in Suid‐Afrika”, August 1970, p. 14.  
222 University Stellenbosch Gericke Library Document Centre (GLD), H.B Thom collection (HBT), 191 KAV. 7V.1. 
(1) Background of the company: “Akte van oprigting van Jamie Uys Filmproduksies”, 23 Februarie 1954, p. 1. 
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Understandably, financiers were initially reluctant to invest in the production company. The 
Afrikaans public rather supported foreign productions because of the poor quality associated 
with most local films. 223  By 1956 Jamie Uys Filmproduksies accumulated a loss of 
approximately £16 000.224 As a result, government intervention became a necessity to sustain 
production. On 16 July 1956 the Motion Picture Producers Association (MPPA) was 
established with Uys acting as its chairman.225  
The MPPA, headed by Uys, approached the government to request financial support. Foreign 
competition, the entertainment tax on local films and investors’ lack of trust were regarded as 
impediments for the growth of the Afrikaans cinematic industry.  
“Films imported from America, England and other foreign countries have already regained their 
production costs. Thus the income generated in South Africa is pure profit… Yet local and 
imported productions are equally taxed”.226  
The MPPA’s argument can be justified, as imported productions were taxed on profits, whilst 
local films were taxed on the basis of production costs as well as profits. In 1955 Jamie Uys 
Films produced Geld soos Bossies with a budget of £10 000. The film was distributed by the 
Schlesinger organisation and exhibited in 165 bioscopes.227 According to Uys, the film’s 
popularity exceeded all expectations.228 Nevertheless, the film generated a profit of only £110 
                                                            
223 Defining “Quality” in Cinematic Film and Television Releases: First and foremost, productions are never 
guaranteed to become box office successes. Even films critically acclaimed, such as Man on the Moon 
(released in 1999, distributed by Universal Pictures and nominated for the Golden Globe Award for Best 
Motion Picture – Musical or Comedy), can flop at the box office. However, producers are aware that including 
and combining certain elements and –importantly‐ people into their films could enhance the quality of the 
productions and as such, increase the popularity of films within the targeted market. Numerous factors 
determine a film’s quality, such as cinematographers, the directors, actors (“star power”), screenwriters 
(storytelling), technology (for example cameras and special effects) and musicians (soundtracks) to name a 
few. As these factors are in high demand, acquiring the finest mostly require great financial investments 
particularly in the highly inflated market of the global cinematic film and television industry. This, coupled with 
Hollywood’s use of English, largely contributes to the USA’s stronghold over the global cinematic and television 
industry. Greater financial investments also enhances a film’s marketing ability. Note, this thesis does not 
suggest that productions lacking large‐scale budgets cannot generate high box office revenues. A production 
has to connect with its audience. Examples of low budget cinematic film productions receiving great box office 
revenues include Rocky (1976) and Halloween (1978).   However, large‐scale financial investments enhances 
the probability. 
224 GLD, H.B. Thom collection (HBT), 191 KAV.7v.1. (3/1) Background of the company: “Huidige Samestelling 
van ons maatskappy: Memorandum aangaande Jamie Uys Filmproduksies Beperk”, (n.d.), p. 2. 
225 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 32. 
226 National Archives Repository (SAB), Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary 163 (MES), Addendum: 
H3/5, Volume 2, Correspondence, “Telegram of Jamie Uys Filmsproduksies Ltd: Request for subsidisation”, 
(N.D), p. 2. 
227 Ibid., p. 3.  
228 The exact figures were unfortunately not provided.  
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in 1955 and Jamie Uys Films was obliged to pay approximately £8 000 in entertainment tax 
(£6 119. 13s on production costs).229 Such profit and loss accounts deterred investors from 
financing Afrikaans film producers. Jamie Uys Films stated that the amounts paid to bioscope 
owners were reasonable as local distributors/exhibitors were particularly sympathetic towards 
their product. The MPPA referenced countries (such as Britain) where governments were 
willing to finance producers in the form of subsidies to compensate for the influx of American 
productions. South Africa’s government responded positively and in 1956 established a state 
subsidy scheme administered through the Department of Trade and Industry (a detailed account 
of the scheme will be provided below). Contemporary local producers who were consulted, 
such as Christa Lategan and Franz Marx maintain that subsidisation was essential in developing 
a local product, but that its implementation was incorrect.230 In 1956 the future development 
of the Afrikaans film industry seemed secure, but the industry would no longer function as a 
free enterprise. Though the South African government conceived of the South African 
economy as capitalist, subsidisation was an integral part of the country’s economic structures. 
Subsidisation entrenched state interference. 
 
 
Illustration 1: Jamie Uys231 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the social, economic and political backdrop of the Afrikaans 
film industry before the 1960s. The Afrikaans film industry was shaped by a growing national 
                                                            
229 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary 163 (MES), Addendum: H3/5, Volume 2, Correspondence, 
“Telegram of Jamie Uys Filmsproduksies Ltd: Request for subsidisation”, (n.d.), p. 6. 
230 Franz Marx, interview by Coenraad J. Coetzee, Stellenbosch University, April 15, 2015. Christa Lategan, e‐
mail message to Coenraad J. Coetzee, June 29, 2016. 
231 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, SA Film Weekly Article: 
“Government subsidy – Findings clash”, 24 June 1977, p. 2. 
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consciousness, which manifested itself in the Afrikaners’ socio-economic movement. The film 
industry had to adapt to its environment in order to survive and develop. A business has to 
exploit the environment and public demand to meet the needs of the targeted consumer. During 
the rise of the industry, South Africa’s appreciation of the entertainment arts was 
overwhelmingly exploited by foreigners. Foreign domination of the industry must be attributed 
to a lack of local experience and knowledge, a lack of local financial sources and the intense 
competition within a small market. Simply stated, it was impossible for a local product to 
compete with those offered from abroad. The significance of the size and heterogeneity of the 
South African market should not be understated. South Africa was and still is a culturally 
diverse society. Cultural and economic differences, coupled with separate development, 
restricted the market for an Afrikaans film to penetrate. This was a condition recognised by the 
local industry and government alike, as will be explained below. If separate development did 
not exist, one could understandably argue that the market constraints on the Afrikaans 
cinematic film industry would have been fewer. Unfortunately, historical reflection cannot be 
used to answer “what-if” questions helpfully, as imagined alternative pasts lack historical 
substance or facts/sources to support any statement. In the light of these limitations, the 
development of an Afrikaans film industry required state intervention. The consequent 
collaboration between the government and the local industry (MPPA) produced a subsidy 
scheme which completely transformed the face of the South African film industry. A fully-
fledged Afrikaans cinematic film industry had finally emerged.  
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Chapter Two: Development and Limitations of the Afrikaans Cinematic Film Industry, 
c.1956-c.1970  
 “Yet politics has everything to do with South Africa. Just how the South African industry will define its 
responsibilities in the worsening political context remains to be seen.” – Keyan Tomaselli1 
Introduction 
The implementation of the South African subsidy scheme in 1956 contributed to the expansion 
of the Afrikaans cinematic industry. The number of Afrikaans film producers had effectively 
increased before the introduction of television in the 1970s. However, film subsidisation should 
not be regarded as the only factor that shaped the conditions of the industry. This chapter will 
attempt to elucidate the forces that contributed to the development of the Afrikaans cinematic 
industry between 1956-1970 by discussing the subsidy formula illustrating the effects of 
subsidisation on the industry; the socio-cultural value of Afrikaans films; the requirements of 
South African censorship; the South African and international markets; foreign competition 
and participation in Afrikaans productions; the localisation of South African exhibition and 
distribution; and the relationship between Afrikaans producers and distributors. The aim of this 
chapter is to illustrate how these forces created an unstable local cinematic environment when 
the South African government agreed to introduce SABC-TV. A case study of Jamie Uys 
Filmproduksies Ltd/Kavalier Films Ltd will entail a discussion of its history (1954-1970), its 
influence and the significance of the company as a case study, as well as considering examples 
of productions (Hans en die Rooinek [1961], Debbie [1965] and Hoor My Lied [1967]) relevant 
to this reflection.  
The Construction of an Industry through State Intervention  
Demand, a dynamic influence of the economic market, is socially constructed. Producers are 
highly cognisant of the influences impacting on the perceptions, expectations and appreciations 
of the targeted consumer, exploiting socio-economic circumstances that in turn manipulates 
them. The producer utilises strategies to manufacture and promote a sought-after product that 
reflects social demands. Consequently, agents within an industry will try to shape the desires 
and needs of the public through effective marketing techniques. The producers in an industry, 
however, are amongst several forces that have the ability to influence these needs and desires. 
                                                            
1 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 229. 
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Pierre Bourdieu maintains that “what specifically characterises that demand is, in large part, 
produced by the state.”2   
The state, through its own initiatives and objectives, establishes a socio-economic environment 
that effects both the producer and consumer. Political regulation and legislation, taxation, 
subsidisation, persuasion and nationalisation indicate the (socio-economic and/or political) 
aims of a government; such factors contribute to the nature of an economic market and as such 
determines the equilibrium between supply and demand. The larger companies are paramount 
as their economic contributions can sway political decisions – a consequence “far more 
powerful than mere advertising for shaping that demand.”3 State-constructed markets would 
occasionally provide their cooperation (financial or legislative) to influential 
figures/companies, ultimately for the benefit of their own political, social and economic 
objectives.  
State intervention/regulation, although naturally differing in degree considering economic 
models found in different countries, is a phenomenon encountered in all markets across the 
globe, with few sectors of economic life remaining autonomous. Neville Abraham argues that 
“employers, workers and consumers have come to take much of this for granted” and, as voters, 
should “make even greater demands of their representatives.”4 Regardless of this situation, it 
seems that governments would always have a rationale behind their involvement in an industry 
– whether this be achieving the economic objectives (i.e. battling inflation, unemployment 
and/or an unstable national currency) of the government, or dealing with pressures originating 
from public opinion, corporations or trade unions. The state therefore has the obligation to 
establish economic conditions that expand and sustain their reputation or authority amongst 
voters, whilst simultaneously adhering to their own socio-political principles.  
The integration of state and industry has completely altered our understanding of the nature of 
a corporation. External pressures experienced by a business mean that the purpose behind the 
existence of an enterprise extends beyond simply the accumulation of wealth, but would 
include corporate social investment, for example. Problems which may arise as a result of 
government involvement, however, are twofold: the interests of a company and government 
may conflict with one another; and difficulties faced by government reflect in all areas of a 
                                                            
2 Pierre Bourdieu, The Social Structures of the Economy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), p. 89.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Neville Abrahams, Big Business and Government: The New Disorder (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1974), 
p. 23.  
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country, especially in the economic sector.5 The cooperation and aims developed by state and 
company must be unambiguous and explicit to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding and 
tension.  
Having briefly discussed the concept of state intervention, it is necessary to identify how 
governments are involved in an economy. Governments, particularly since the turn of the 20th 
century, have fulfilled numerous and – what governments would argue – essential functions in 
the economic sector. Neville Abraham, author of Big Business and Government: A New 
Disorder (1974), has identified a number of roles that the state plays in modern economic life, 
although only the most relevant for this reflection will be dealt with here. Firstly, the state acts 
as a supervisor and manipulator (through policymakers) of the economy – a role that 
Abraham’s maintains is the most intrusive and least comprehensible. 6  The expansion of 
government’s involvement in the economic sector over the course of the last century differs 
from the theories propounded by classical capitalist economists, such as Adam Smith. Laissez 
faire, the dominant economic philosophy exercised by most states in the 19th century, for 
example, has gradually been replaced with other economic models. The integration of state and 
economy, once deemed an obstacle to growth, is widely perceived as essential for the 
development of a financial system.7 Agents must be held accountable, for the events of the past 
– economic depressions, extreme poverty, segregation, immigration, wars, and so on  created 
a climate where scholars could develop new economic theories, for example Marxism, 
capitalism and socialism. Many academics have tried to determine which economic philosophy 
would be the most efficient in managing the relationship between the public and private sector 
and, as expected, this has been a topic of continuous dispute and disagreement. The difficult 
question that needs to be answered is how and to what degree governments should intervene.     
Secondly, domestic pressures for government intervention have forced it to pursue economic 
policies, which evidently shape corporate activity. As such, the state may choose to supply 
resources to a particular producer within an industry, assisting in the realisation of certain 
business undertakings. The provision of resources varies in terms of methods, financing, 
facilities and staff.8 The state’s assistance can be direct or through associated organisations. 
                                                            
5 Neville Abrahams, Big Business and Government: The New Disorder (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1974), 
p. 5. 
6 Ibid., p. 23‐24. 
7 Vito Tanzi, The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: a Historical Perspective, working paper prepared 
for the International Monetary Fund, (Brazil, 1997), p. 9.  
8 Ibid.  
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Either way, governments are meticulous in selecting companies/economic sectors to allocate 
their resources. Examples include lending, insurance, taxation schemes, training and 
subsidisation. Promoting and developing sectors of the economy may be problematic and 
controversial, as certain companies or figures may perceive the state’s support as partial. 
Consequently, states are obliged to justify their decisions of expenditures.  
Government intervention is a massive and arduous process as the state is required to ensure 
economic growth whilst simultaneously safeguarding its position of political power, or more 
simply stated, keeping the important voters pleased.9 In theory, and indeed as history has 
sometimes demonstrated, developed economies construct a strong foundation for the social 
upliftment of a population, allowing governments to maintain their position of power.  
However, placing too much emphasis on either economic growth or social upliftment, and not 
maintaining an effective balance, could lead to a deterioration of economic conditions within 
an industry, community or country.  
When political leaders engage with economic development, their competence in these matters 
must be scrutinised carefully. Some politicians may possess an inadequate knowledge of fiscal 
issues, as they come from unrelated disciplines. Vito Tanzi declares these politicians as 
‘unsophisticated’, stating that such figures are naïve, accepting over-simplified notions of 
economic functionality.10 Leaders may rely too heavily on economic theories or successful but 
out-dated policies, some of which have been proven to be obsolete. Individuals may also abuse 
their position of power, whilst manipulating economic policies for their personal interests. 
Lastly, ideological beliefs held by the government itself may ultimately determine the method 
and level of government intervention. The norms and perceptions of the state, expressed in its 
political beliefs, influence the level and methods of economic growth. The success of an 
industry lies in its ability to adapt to its ever-changing environment created by the symbiotic 
triple alliance between state, business and society. Government and society – as well as their 
relationship with one another – are external forces (macro environment), responsible for 
shaping the decision-making process found within the company/industry. Since these external 
forces are constantly changing, like a living organism if you will, adaptation needs to occur on 
a continuous basis. The collection of data on government and the market provides the necessary 
                                                            
9 At least in a state where there is a free market and some sort of voting system.     
10 Vito Tanzi, The Changing Role of the State in the Economy: a Historical Perspective, working paper prepared 
for the International Monetary Fund, (Brazil, 1997), p. 6. 
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cues to exploit the context and maximise profits.11 The rise, development and failure of South 
African industries can be accredited to these interpretations, of which the Afrikaans 
film/cinematic industry is no exception. Every industry is dependent on the system of ideals 
projected by the government, market and leading industry figures, which act as the foundation 
of economic theory/policy. The importance of these actors business principles cannot be 
understated.    
Subsidisation and Film 
Apart from the practice in communist or centrally planned economies, subsidisation - as it 
occurs in film industries - frequently stems from commercial considerations. However, some 
governments also subsidise production to varying degrees, as film projects national prestige as 
well as providing cultural communication. During the 1960s, for example, films produced in 
Argentina were categorized by its Censorship Committee of the National Cinematographic 
Institute (NCI). The NCI, a state organisation, classified each film according to its cultural and 
artistic value. If a production was deemed eligible, the film company would receive a subsidy 
derived from the box-office admissions tax.12 In Belgium the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
subsidised local productions to the amount of 80% of the admissions tax collected during a 
feature’s exhibition run.13  But the United Kingdom provided one of the most prominent 
examples of subsidisation after the British Board of Trade implemented the Cinematograph 
Films Act of 1957. The act stipulated that the levy collected by cinema owners on each seat 
sold during a British film’s exhibition run were to be paid to local producers.14 Governments 
mostly provide subsidies with the aim of stimulating the expansion of an industry until a point 
has been reached that support can ultimately be withdrawn. South Africa, along with many 
other national film industries, utilised subsidisation as a means to protect the interests of local 
producers against foreign domination – Hollywood in particular.15     
Effects of Film Subsidisation on the Afrikaans Cinematic Industry 
The implementation of the subsidy scheme removed many of the financial risks involved in 
film production. As will be expanded upon, government created a subsidy system that 
                                                            
11 Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 50. 
12 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 11, Addendum:  N101/3/1, Volume 2, Study by George C. Vietheer: 
“Foreign Film Subsidies”, March 1969, p. 71. 
13 Ibid., p. 65. 
14 In 1969 the levy was one‐ninth of the amount, if the total gross admission price exceeded 11 pence.   
15 As was the case with 20th Century Fox’s acquisition of the Schlesinger interests.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
addressed the commercial grievances of the MPPA, i.e. entertainment tax and foreign 
competition/control of the “limited South African market”.16 Die Bosvelder (1958), made by 
Jamie Uys, cost R30 00017 to produce, however, the film had to accumulate R48 00018 to 
recover production expenditures as R18 000 (entertainment tax) had to be allocated to 
government.19   Subsidisation provided the Afrikaans industry with an opportunity not only to 
recoup expenses, but, more significantly, to maintain continued profitability. Studies conducted 
by the Department of Trade and Industries illustrated that only 4 out of 88 films would have 
been profitable between 1970 and 1974 without subsidisation.20 The effect of the subsidy 
system was immediate, particularly in the 1960s. The number of production firms and films 
had increased significantly. For example, one film was released in 1956/57, whereas 14 local 
motion pictures were distributed in 1970/71.21 In 1970 South Africa had over 20 local film 
producers, whilst 35 films, produced by 15 firms, qualified for subsidisation during 1967-
1970.22  
Table 4: Total Production Cost, Total Gross Box Office Revenue and Total Subsidy 
Received by 35 Subsidised Films, (1967-1970)23 
  R Value on 29 July 2016 *R 
Total Production Cost 5 398 857 346 947 600
Gross Box Office Revenue 8 496 373 546 003 760
Subsidy Received 3 228 794 207 492 499
 
  
                                                            
16 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1. Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Minutes: 
“Interdepartementele Komitee In Sake Hulp Aan Die Plaaslike Filmbedryf”, 1968, p. 174. 
16 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 41. 
17 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R 2,4 million. 
18 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R 3,9 million.  
19 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Memorandum: 
“Memorandum insake rolprentsubsidie voorgelê deur Jamie Uys”, (n.d.), p. 1.   
20 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 41 
21 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Voorgestelde 
wysigings van die subsideskema vir plaaslike vervaardigde rolprente”, 7 October 1971, p.2.  
22 39 Films were produced in total. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 
1, Minutes: “Voorgestelde wysigings van die subsideskema vir plaaslike vervaardigde rolprente”, 7 October 
1971, p. 3.  
23 Ibid.   
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However, subsidisation attracted individuals who exploited the system in an attempt to generate 
immediate financial gains rather than to contribute to the long-term commercial and artistic 
expansion of the Afrikaans cinematic industry. Or as the prominent Afrikaans producer and 
actor, Franz Marx, put it: subsidisation was “a mechanism for a quick-buck”.24 As a result, most 
of the Afrikaans films produced were of a sub-standard quality compared to imported foreign 
films. The Treasury and Department of Trade and Industries were subsequently forced to 
continuously amend the scheme throughout the period 1956-1970. In short, they attempted to 
rid the industry of sub-standard films and reward productions of a higher quality, thus 
simultaneously enhancing quantity and quality. Subsidisation meant that local Afrikaans film 
production companies/figures were given prominence, apart from AFP (Killarney Films 
Studios), which was later incorporated into Satbel. These Afrikaans film production 
companies/figures included Jamie Uys Filmproduksies Ltd (later Kavalier Films Ltd 25 ), 
Mimosa Films Ltd, Jans Rautenbach and Emil Nofal. Below are two illustrations of the 
abovementioned companies’ income and expenditure from 1967-1970:  
Table 5: Production Costs and Income of Films Released between 1967-1970 of Five 
Companies)26 
Company Number of Films 
Total Production 
Cost *R 
Gross Box Office 
Revenue *R 
Kavalier Films 10 1 920 722 3 351 092
Killarney Films 6 929 587 1 210 998
Jans Rautenbach 1 192 000 142 566
Mimosa Films 2 466 572 917 208
Emil Nofal Films 3 735 813 1 471 691
Total 22 4 244 694 7 093 555
 
                                                            
24 Franz Marx, interview by Coenraad J. Coetzee, Stellenbosch University, April 15, 2015. 
25 Jamie Uys Filmproduksies would become Kavalier Films in 1966, when Jamie Uys retired and established 
Mimosa Films.  
26 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1. Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
rolprentbedryf”, 23 March 1972, p. 16.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
 
Table 6: Production Costs and Income of Films Released between 1967-1970 of Five 
Companies27 
Company 
Subsidy 
Received       
*R 
  Provided by 
Distributors 
*R 
Total Revenue   
*R 
Subsidy as 
Percentage of 
Total 
Revenue % 
Kavalier Films 1 374 689 837 774 2 212 463 62
Killarney Films 411 571 302 750 714 321 58
Jans Rautenbach 53 054 35 642 88 696 60
Mimosa Films 427 188 229 303 656 491 65
Emil Nofal Films 595 888 367 923 963 811 62
Total 2 862 390 1 773 392 4 635 782 
Average = 
61% 
 
Martin Botha has argued that some Afrikaans film productions lacked an aesthetic quality 
because of the prevailing conservative attitudes:  
“This idealistic conservatism was characterised by an attachment to the (pastoral) past, to ideals 
of linguistic and racial purity and to religious and moral norms. The films had to subscribe to 
these conservative expectations in order to be successful at the box office.”28  
The conservative expectations were embedded in the principles of the South African 
government (as manifested in the Publications Control Board) and in social values of the local 
market, as will be expanded upon later. Musicals (Hoor My Lied [1967]), adventure stories 
(Krugermiljoene [1967]), comedies (Oupa for Sale [1968]) and war stories (Majuba [1968]) 
were most popular in the local market.29 Afrikaans film productions were mainly distributed to 
independent cinemas or on the circuits of Ster Theatres, an Afrikaans distribution and 
exhibition company. However, as indicated in Chapter One, the majority of South Africa’s 
network was controlled by Twentieth-Century-Fox. From 1956-1969 Twentieth-Century-Fox 
                                                            
27 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1. Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
rolprentbedryf”, 23 March 1972, p. 16. 
28 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 51. 
29 Andre le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 60. 
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selected films based on their perceived financial merits, thus making Afrikaans film production 
an arduous undertaking, as these films had to compete with foreign films. However, the 
distribution network would be localised in 1969.30     
Subsidy Formula (1956-1970) 
Feature films released on or after 1 April 1956 were eligible for government assistance. Only 
35 mm films were considered. The scheme took the form of a refund of entertainment tax 
accumulated during the exhibition of such productions (approximately 22% of the box office 
revenue).31 Calculations were based on gross box office receipts. The refundable amount would 
not exceed R20 00032 or 50% of the production expenses, whichever was lowest.33 Only South 
African production companies qualified for subsidisation, i.e. they must have been regarded a 
resident in the Union for tax income purposes. Seventy-five percent of the salary and wage 
expenditure must have been allocated to South African citizens (directors, technicians, etc.).34 
To prevent the production of low-quality films, the Department of Trade and Industries made 
several changes to the subsidisation scheme in 1962. The first R10 000 35  received 
(entertainment tax) for a film would not be eligible for a pay-out. However, if a production 
received between R10 000 and R12 500, then the full amount (100%) was paid back to the firm. 
Furthermore, a company would be liable to obtain a 200% refund of entertainment tax if the 
figure of R12 50036 was exceeded.37 The maximum subsidy payable was amended as follows: 
50% of a film’s production expenditure, if costs did not exceed R45 000,38 whilst R22 500 was 
subtracted from the production costs if film expenditure exceeded R45 00039 ([x > R45 000] – 
R22 500).40 Since 1963 16 mm films converted to 35 mm were also included for subsidisation 
                                                            
30 Sanlam and the Schlesinger Organisation acquired Twentieth‐Century‐Fox’s shares in 1969. 
31 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2.1, Minutes: 
“Interdepartementele Komitee In Sake Hulp Aan Die Plaaslike Filmbedryf”, 1968, p. 173. 
32 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R1, 6 million. 
33 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 2, Press Statement: 
“Subsidisation”, 30 August 1957, p. 1. 
34 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Circular: “Die Minister se 
Dossier – Die rolprentbedryf”, 15 July 1968, p. 109. 
35 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R800 000. 
36 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R1, 01 million. 
37 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Voorgestelde 
wysigings van die subsideskema vir plaaslike vervaardigde rolprente”, 7 October 1971, p. 1.  
38 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R3, 66 million. 
39 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Circular: “Die Minister se 
Dossier – Die rolprentbedryf”, 15 July 1968, p. 111. 
40 “X” refers to production costs.  
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purposes.41 The concession was made as the government maintained that these films were not 
necessarily of a lower technical and artistic quality. 
The following amendments applied from 1 July 1964. The changes were brought to effect after 
the provincial entertainment tax regulations of the Cape and Natal had been lowered, and it 
was evident that too many production firms still misused the scheme and hence the intention 
was to enhance the quality of films produced by the industry. Subsidisation would be calculated 
as a percentage of the total gross box office earnings rather than the amount of entertainment 
tax received by the respective provinces.42 A production was not eligible for subsidy payments 
for the first R50 00043 grossed within a threshold of four years. Forty-four percent of the 
amount exceeding R50 000 would be received by the producer.44 The maximum subsidy limit 
remained unaltered from what it was in 1962. The condition that 75% of wages and salaries 
should be allocated to South African citizens was revised as follows: if a company utilises a 
major foreign personality (actor, director, etc.), the expenditure allocated to this person must 
be subtracted from the total production costs before a film could become eligible for 
subsidisation. Seventy-five percent of the remaining salary and wage expenditure had to be 
paid to South African citizens. The same procedure applied if two major foreign personalities 
were employed; however, in that case 80% of salaries and wages had to be allocated to local 
citizens.45  
On 13 February 1968 the Department of Trade and Industry abolished the maximum subsidy 
limit. Government maintained that “even the most knowledgeable foreign producers 
experience unexpected failures” 46  and the abolition “would provide producers with an 
opportunity to receive a larger subsidy on quality films and, as such, should help recover losses 
made by sub-standard films.”47 Furthermore, films that generate an income four years after 
their original release were no longer considered for subsidisation. This period, applying from 
14 August 1968, was introduced since rereleases absorbed funds at the expense of new 
                                                            
41 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2.1, Minutes: 
“Interdepartementele Komitee In Sake Hulp Aan Die Plaaslike Filmbedryf”, 1968, p. 173. 
42 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Memorandum: 
“Memorandum insake rolprentsubsidie voorgelê deur Jamie Uys”, (n.d.), p. 1.   
43 Value in 2016 considering inflation: R4, 07 million 
44 SAB. Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Voorgestelde 
wysigings van die subsideskema vir plaaslike vervaardigde rolprente”, 7 October 1971, p. 3 
45 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2. 1, Minutes: 
“Interdepartementele Komitee In Sake Hulp Aan Die Plaaslike Filmbedryf”, 1968, p. 172. 
46 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Voorgestelde 
wysigings van die subsideskema vir plaaslike vervaardigde rolprente”, 7 October 1971, p. 3. 
47 Ibid.   
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productions. Table 7 illustrates the number of films subsidised from 1957/58 to 1967/68, as 
well as the annual average production cost and subsidy paid. 
 
Table 7: Government's Financial Assistance, 1956/57-1967/6848 
Fiscal Year Number of Films 
Average Production 
Cost *R 
Total Subsidy Paid 
*R 
1956/57 1 50 616 6 379
1957/58 2 34 263 15 313
1958/59 1 41 720 38 927
1959/60 4 30 767 32 222
1960/61 6 37 730 88 911
1961/62 13 36 884 102 494
1962/63 7 51 058 174 556
1963/64 2 130 221 213 176
1964/65 3 201 172 284 728
1965/66 5 139 628 333 751
1966/67 3 154 352 269 447
1967/68 8 149 640 399 916
Total 55 88 170, 92 (AVE)  1 959 820
 
                                                            
48 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Circular: “Die Minister se 
Dossier‐ Die rolprentbedryf”, 15 July 1968, p. 108. 
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In 1969 the Minister of Economic Affairs, Jan Haak, announced additional amendments to the 
subsidisation scheme. Previously films with an Afrikaans and English or bilingual soundtrack 
qualified for an equal subsidy rate. The government, supported by the MPPA, argued that the 
composition of the market consequently meant that films with an Afrikaans soundtrack could 
not compete with those of an English and/or bilingual soundtrack. The Department of Trade 
and Industries therefore increased the subsidy rate from 44% to 55% (gross box office revenue) 
for films with an Afrikaans soundtrack.49 At least 95% of the dialogue had to be in Afrikaans 
in order to qualify for the higher rate. The subsidy rate for films in English remained unchanged. 
The new subsidy rate applied from 1 October 1969.  
Socio-cultural Value of the Afrikaans Film 
Apart from contributing to the expansion of the Afrikaans film industry, state intervention was 
correspondingly encouraged because of the socio-cultural value of a film. In a study for 
government conducted by P.J. Fourie, he identified four basic functions of the communication 
medium, namely entertainment and recreation, socialization and orientation, education and 
influence, and artistry.50 Cinema was utilised to promote the Afrikaans language and culture, 
to encourage and consolidate Afrikaner nationalism, at the very time that external hostility 
                                                            
49 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Press Statement: 
“Persvrystelling”, 2 October 1969, p. 1. 
50 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Summarised study conducted 
by P.J. Fourie (Department of Communication Studies; University of South Africa) : “Die Sosio‐kulturele waarde 
van die Suid‐Afrikaanse speelfilm”, (n.d.), p. 1. 
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towards apartheid was intensifying and film could consequently be used to influence foreign 
viewers.51 Fourie argued that media, such as the press, propagated by means of information. 
What distinguished film was that influence was generated through recreation. Furthermore, 
Fourie perceived film as the primary institution of entertainment that provided the viewer with 
an opportunity to momentarily escape from his or her personal domain. Additionally, cinema 
entertains an individual outside his or her household, meaning that “the collective form of 
recreation undeniably satisfies the urgent needs of an industrialised, urbanised society.”52  
The government was aware that the film is a visual expression of behavioural models, 
providing information regarding the value systems of a production company, whilst 
establishing ideals with which the viewer can identify. P.J. Fourie argues that groups of a 
“lower socio-economic and educational background can commit to a new lifestyle and 
endeavour to pursue the value systems of a higher educational, economic and social class.”53 
As will be illustrated in the subsections, Debbie and Hoor My Lied, Afrikaans films reflected 
an idealistic perception of Afrikaner society. The viewer perceives the realities represented 
through the lens of the film-makers, thus manipulating the observations of the consumer. 
Fourie’s report, drawing inferences from the effects of Nazi propaganda,54 suggested that 
individuals would rather identify with fictional films than institutionalised state propaganda, 
documentaries and educational films.55 
Simply stated, propaganda can be defined as information, expressions or opinions of a 
subjective or misleading nature, utilised to promote a political cause or perception. Questions 
often arise regarding the degree of influence projected by motion pictures. The impact depends 
on the social, political and economic context of the period, which creates the circumstances for 
the vulnerability of the general public. In short, the more vulnerable a society, the more likely 
a film is to have an influence, as demonstrated by the infamous German propaganda film The 
Triumph of the Will (1935). Leo C. Rosten argues that the “situation” in which the viewer 
                                                            
51 This will be considered further in the films discussed later in this study. 
 SAB. Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
Rolprentbedryf”, 24 May 1972, p. 9. 
52 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Summarised study conducted 
by P.J. Fourie (Department of Communication Studies; University of South Africa) : “Die Sosio‐kulturele waarde 
van die Suid‐Afrikaanse speelfilm”, (n.d.), p. 3. 
53 Ibid., p. 4.  
54 The titles of the German films were not provided in the source.  
55 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Summarised study conducted 
by P.J. Fourie (Department of Communication Studies; University of South Africa): “Die Sosio‐kulturele waarde 
van die Suid‐Afrikaanse speelfilm”, (n.d.), p. 6. 
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“consumes” the product determines the degree of “sensitivity” amongst the public.56 The 
psychological manipulation exercised by a film elicits emotions, occasionally overwhelming 
rationality. The power of this evocation is embedded in the actors, cinematography and music’s 
ability to enhance the narrative’s message. Rosten maintains that propaganda is a deliberate 
attempt to influence mass attitudes and perceptions through the use of symbols rather than 
force.57  
The Publications Control Board 
Film censorship was utilised by the South African government as a means to ensure the 
continued existence of the socio-political status quo. As indicated, the government demanded 
that local and imported films reflect “traditional cultural and moral values.” 58  The 
Entertainment Act of 1931 stipulated that local films required censorship clearance before local 
exhibition. From 1931 to 1962, censorship was mostly applied to foreign films as South African 
producers rarely contravened the regulations of the Act.59 The Publications and Entertainments 
Act, No. 26 of 1963 formalised the provision that locally produced films had to be approved 
for screening by the Publications Control Board (PCB).60 Sub-article 10, paragraph c of the 
Act declared that the PCB must reject the exhibition of a production if a film provides a 
belligerent/offensive representation of the religious convictions of any racial or cultural 
community, or propagates the promotion of communism (as defined in the Suppression of 
Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950).61  Furthermore, sub-article 10, paragraph c stated that 
rejection became a formality if a film provides an offensive representation of the Prime 
Minister/State President, polemical or international politics, public figures, scenes of violence 
involving whites and non-whites, death, alcohol and drug misuse, love scenes, violence against 
women and children, and racial mixing between whites and non-whites.62 An appeal against 
the Board’s decision had to be directed to the Minister of Internal Affairs within 30 days of the 
                                                            
56 Leo C. Rosten, “Movies and Propaganda”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
254 (1947), p. 117. 
57 Ibid., p. 118.  
58 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Correspondence between the 
Secretary of Internal Affairs and the Publications Control Board: “Bevording van die Afrikaanse rolprent”, 14 
October 1968, p. 90.  
59 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 14. 
60 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Act No 26 of 1968: “Wet op 
Publikasies en Vermaaklikheid”, 1968, p. 115‐116. 
61 Ibid., p. 115.  
62 Ibid., p. 115‐116.  
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verdict. Subsequently, as was the case with Debbie (1965)63 and Katrina (1969), the Minister 
(or a delegated individual) had to investigate and determine the future of the film. The 
constraints applied by the PCB limited a producer regarding possible subject matter. This 
conformity to conservative values made Afrikaans films superficial in nature and unappealing 
to viewers who did not espouse the nationalistic ideologies of state. SA Film Weekly, a journal 
clearly opposed to the implementation of censorship, went as far as to state that the PCB “raped” 
the film industry.64 
Katrina (1969) 
In 1969 Emil Nofal Films released the then controversial film, Katrina, based on Basil 
Warner’s play Try for White. The production was directed by Jans Rautenbach, whom wrote 
the script with Emil Nofal. The story is of a white pastor, Alex Trewellyn (Joe Stewardson), 
who falls in love with a famous singer Katrina September (Jill Kirkland), unaware of the fact 
that she is a coloured woman “trying for white”. The reason is that Katrina looked and lived as 
a white woman posing as Catherine Winters. Meanwhile, Paul September (Carel Trichardt), 
Katrina’s son, becomes romantically involved with a young Afrikaner girl, Alida Brink 
(Katinka Heyns). The total production expenditure of Katrina amounted to R300 00065 and it 
grossed over R900 000,66 whilst employing 35 people.67 Before production was completed, 
however, media statements made by Emil Nofal and Jans Rautenbach regarding the content of 
the film were noted by the government. Nofal and Rautenbach had already faced government 
criticism for films such as Die Kandidaat (1968), a film which was a thinly veiled critique of 
the Broederbond. In an interview Emil Nofal commented on Katrina:  
“But as in our previous picture, Die Kandidaat, we approached an important point of struggle in 
our society with honesty. The director, Jans Rautenbach, and I only tried to provide a true 
reflection of [South African] life”.68  
                                                            
63 Will be used during the Jamie Uys Filmproduksies/Kavalier Films case study.  
64 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 11, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, SA Film Weekly (Vol. 10, No 
4): “Critics refuse to judge”, 27 January 1972, p. 1.  
65 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R 19,2 million. 
 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Newspaper Article (Not 
specified): “Katrina kan S.A. se groot rolprent word”, 6 March 1969, p. 212. 
66 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film. (London: Routledge, 1989), 
41 
67 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Newspaper Article (Not 
specified): “Katrina kan S.A. se groot rolprent word”, 6 March 1969, p. 212. 
68 Ibid.  
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Before production was completed, the PCB and the Minister of Internal Affairs, S.L. Muller, 
and Minister of Economic Affairs, J.F.W. Haak, requested Katrina’s script. S.L. Muller argued 
that the proposed film must be labelled as “political dynamite” as the dialogue contains 
resentful remarks aimed at the racial dispensation of South Africa.69 The PCB’s investigation 
of a production was atypical, since censorship clearance or rejection usually occurred after a 
film’s completion. Notwithstanding this, the PCB demanded an alternative ending to the film. 
Initially, Nofal and Rautenbach intended Katrina to conclude with the characters emigrating to 
a foreign country. Upon the request of the PCB, however, Emil Nofal Films was forced to 
provide an alternative ending, one that cannot be “misused as distasteful propaganda.”70 
Ultimately, Father Trewellyn rejects Katrina because of their ethnic and social differences, and 
she commits suicide. The PCB had ultimately succeeded.   
 
Illustration 2: Image of Jill Kirkland, who played the title role in Katrina.71  
Market  
Before the advent and establishment of local TV services in the 1970s, Afrikaans producers’ 
target market consisted primarily of Afrikaners, whilst including white English-speaking South 
Africans and the international market to a lesser extent (the Black market [for “Bantu films”] 
was penetrated after the institution of the “B-scheme”). 72 The country’s white population’s 
appreciation of entertainment, coupled with the socio-economic upliftment of Afrikaners, 
created a demand for an Afrikaans film industry. However, the white population consisted of 
only 3.6 million citizens, including English-speaking South Africans. The heterogeneity of the 
                                                            
69 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Correspondence between S.L. 
Muller and J.F.W. Haak: “Rolprentsubsidieskema: Mnre. Emil Nofal Films”, 3 February 1969, p. 133. 
70 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Correspondence between 
J.F.W. Haak and S.L. Muller: “Rolprentsubsidieskema”, 16 January 1969, p. 120.  
71 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Newspaper Article (Not 
specified): “Katrina kan S.A. se groot rolprent word”, 6 March 1969, p. 212. 
72 Films developed for the black market will be discussed in a later chapter.   
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local and international market produced complications regarding the development of films. 
Furthermore, each group could be separated according to tastes and preferences. The industry 
tried to satisfy the lowest common denominator of the market with the provision of 
entertainment aimed at the whole household, better described as “Gesinsvriendelikheid”.73 
Studies conducted by Ster Adfilms and Market Research Africa (Pty) Ltd calculated the 
potential market, created by the entire white local population including the Afrikaner, to be 2 
million and 1.1 million respectively. The market was valued at R550 000 for a single 
production in 1970.74 According to Kavalier Films Ltd, a motion picture had to attract at least 
1 million people to guarantee successful box-office revenue. 75  As such, producers were 
effectively reluctant to develop films that did not reflect the prevailing conservative strategy. 
As stated by Kavaliers: “One or two experiments can result in the collapse of a company and 
three or four unsuccessful experiments can lead to the decline of an entire industry. Our 
[Afrikaner] industry therefore cannot afford experimentation.”76   
The South African government maintained that the local market did not necessarily value a 
film according to its artistic merit. Some local producers regarded the so-called ‘art film’ as 
too intellectually complex for the general market.77 South African audiences – particularly the 
Afrikaner – demanded that local motion pictures must reflect a certain level of conservatism. 
Prolific Afrikaans film director/producer Andre Scholtz78 maintained: “Developing films with 
‘controversial’ topics was never a problem for me, since these risky scenes weren’t popular 
amongst the Afrikaans viewer”.79 This conservative conformity obstructed the development of 
Afrikaans film as an art and communication medium.  
The cinema of apartheid would produce a handful of locally developed films aimed at the 
international market in which some productions – though exceedingly rare – managed to 
generate a profitable turnover (Hear My Song/Hoor My Lied (1967), for example). Both 
                                                            
73 “Family‐friendly” films. GLD, HBT collection, 191 KAV.7.v.4.(4) Memorandums: “Memo‐Debbie”, 20 May 
1965, p. 1. 
74 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Report No. 1330 (Board of 
Trade and Industries): “Ondersoek na die rolprentbedryf”, 20 July 1970, p. 5.  
75 Ibid. 
76 GLD, HBT collection, KAV.1.4.8 Agendas: “Memorandum: Byeenkoms oor die bespreking van verhale en 
draaiboeke”, 21 August 1967, p. 2. 
77 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Summarised study conducted 
by P.J. Fourie (Department of Communication Studies; University of South Africa): “Die Sosio‐kulturele waarde 
van die Suid‐Afrikaanse speelfilm”, (n.d.), p. 6. 
78 Producer of You Must Be Joking! [1986], Sweet and Short [1991] and ’n Paw‐Paw vir my Darling [2015] to 
name but a few.    
79 André Scholtz, e‐mail message to Coenraad J. Coetzee, June 13, 2016.   
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government and the larger production firms realised that the size of the external market would 
provide an opportunity to further expand the local industry. Figures indicate that in 1964 South 
Africa’s annual cinema attendance was around 50 million, whilst annual attendance in England, 
for example, was approximately three times that.80 The Hollywood market consisted of some 
3 billion individuals.81 Government and local firms however, would not be as naïve as to 
consider that South African pictures could generate the same levels of profits obtained by 
American producers. Boet Troskie (Mimosa Films) stated in 1988 that this could be attributed 
to a lack of finance and consequently the quality of a film, publicity, marketing and 
employment of renowned international actors.82 Nonetheless, local production, if managed 
correctly, could penetrate foreign markets. Afrikaans film producers exploited the 
government’s agenda to promote South Africa’s political policies in an endeavour to counter 
foreign antipathy. Adapting to the needs of government would enhance the relationship 
between state and producer, thus sustaining financial support. In 1964 Kavalier Films 
maintained that the motion picture was one of the most powerful instruments to promote the 
“true, yet concealed” image of South Africa.83  
Foreign Competition and Participation in Production 
The United Kingdom and in particular the United States of America provided the most serious 
competition for Afrikaans film producers, considering the small South African market, the fact 
that admission tickets for local and international films were equally priced and the massive 
budgets and often high quality of foreign films. Figures suggest a definite market for foreign 
productions when referencing the number of films imported between 1966 and 1971. The PCB 
approved 608, 600 and 576 films for distribution in 1967, 1968 and 1969 respectively.84 An 
average of approximately 600 productions were required to fulfil the demands of the South 
African market. During this period (1967-1969) South African filmmakers managed to produce 
only 24 films.85 In other words, local producers obtained only 1,3% of the total market share. 
                                                            
80 GLD, HB Thom collection (HBT), 191 KAV.7v.1.(3/2) Memorandums: “Inligting i.s. die rolprentbedryf”, 11 
March 1964, p.1 
81 Ibid.  
82 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 10, Summit of the State President, 
P.W. Botha, with the Film Industry (Tuynhuis, Cape Town): “Toespraak gelewer deur Boet Troskie in verband 
met die bemarking en verspreiding van rolprente”, 30 March 1988, p. 3.   
83 GLD, HB Thom collection (HBT), 191 KAV.7v.1.(3/2) Memorandums: “Inligting i.s. die rolprentbedryf”, 11 
March 1964, p.1. 
84 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Report No. 1330 (Board of 
Trade and Industries): “Ondersoek na die rolprentbedryf”, 20 July 1970, p. 5. 
85 Ibid. 
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Kavalier Films estimated that foreign production, distribution and exhibition companies 
accumulated an average annual revenue of approximately R10 000 00086  in South Africa 
during the 1960s.87   
Despite the introduction and adaptation of the subsidy scheme, foreign participation in South 
African film production failed to meet expectations.88 The lack of cooperation was a source of 
great concern for the South African government. Most local producers, including Mimosa 
Films and Kavalier Films, maintained that collaborations were essential for the advancement 
of the industry:  
“Cooperation between South Africa and foreign film producers requires encouragement as it’s 
the fastest and best method to obtain the necessary experience regarding film production”.89 
 Apart from the accumulation of experience, such cooperation also offered the necessary and 
natural impetus to expand film facilities and artistic talent In South Africa. However, most 
significantly, the assistance by foreign producers would have made the access to the 
international market much easier.  This lack of cooperation therefore requires some explanation. 
The natural scenery and cheaper working conditions (including taxation) in South Africa 
attracted foreign producers. Research conducted by the Department of Trade and Industries in 
1970 (Report No. 1330) indicated that local producers maintained that foreign filmmakers 
should only be permitted to film in South Africa if they collaborated with the country’s 
producers or employ local technicians and/or actors. Cooperation, however, was dampened by 
local producers’ lack of capital. The production expenses of foreign – particularly Hollywood 
– producers far exceeded the available budgets of local filmmakers. Additionally, requests for 
subsidy pay-outs would become invalid, since collaboration did not comply with the 
requirements of the scheme. In 1970 Ster Theatres and the Kinekor Group,90 which supported 
cooperation, maintained that foreign producers would be encouraged to engage in 
collaborations if adjustments were made to the scheme. The distributors maintained that the 
                                                            
86 R 718 235 294,12 taking inflation into consideration. 
87 GLD, HBT collection, 191 KAV. 4. (1/7) Annual Reports: “Voorsittersredes”, (n.d.), p. 4.  
88 At its peak during the 1960s only 20% of films developed in South Africa were collaborations with foreign 
producers. Examples include: The Hellions (1961), Sanders of the River (1964), Table Bay (1964) and 
Mozambique (1966).  
89 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Report No. 1330 (Board of 
Trade and Industries): “Ondersoek na die rolprentbedryf”, 20 July 1970, p. 8. 
90 Originally Twentieth‐Century‐Fox before the company sold its shares.   
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formula (which was based on gross box-office receipts) should be replaced to read net box-
office revenue/earnings.91  
The “Verafrikanisering” of the South African Exhibition and Distribution Network  
At the beginning of the 1960s South Africa’s distribution and exhibition network was virtually 
in foreign control, with Twentieth-Century-Fox managing three-quarters of the market share. 
Afrikaans productions, averaging approximately four a year between 1956 and 1964, were rare, 
despite Afrikaners’ increased financial wealth and consequent theatre attendance (a weekly 
figure of an estimated 750 000 Afrikaners). 92  By 1965 South Africa had 481 cinemas 
(including drive-ins [72]);93 cinemas attracted a monthly audience of approximately 4 450 000 
people; South Africa imported an average of 400 films a year; persons between the ages of 16 
to 28 years were the most avid cinema attenders; and Afrikaans films constituted roughly two 
percent of all films displayed locally.94 A census of “Motion Picture Theatres” initiated by the 
Department of Industries determined that the monetary value of exhibitors’ properties and 
equipment was calculated at R12 million, whilst cinemas provided job opportunities for 
approximately 6 000 people.95 The lack of Afrikaans films was a source of concern for cultural 
bodies such as the Genootskap vir die Handhawing van Afrikaans (GHA),96 which argued that 
the “surplus of liberal foreign films” threatened the “special, exceptional traditions and morals” 
of the Afrikaner.97 Excluding-Twentieth Century-Fox, 14 firms distributed imported and local 
films – one of these was to become South Africa’s paramount distributor by the end of the 
1960s.           
                                                            
91 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Report No. 1330 (Board of 
Trade and Industries): “Ondersoek na die rolprentbedryf”, 20 July 1970, p. 9. 
92 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 7, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 4, Genootskap vir die Handhawing 
van Afrikaans’ Annual meeting: “Presentation made by J.W. Albie”, 23 February 1973, p. 2.     
93 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Report No. 1330 (Board of 
Trade and Industries): “Ondersoek na die rolprentbedryf”, 20 July 1970, p. 3. 
94 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Correspondence between 
the Genootskap vir die Handhawing van Afrikaans and the Minister of Internal Affairs: “Facts of the South 
African film industry”, 15 May 1968, p. 154.  
95 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 1, Report No 04‐51‐01: “Census of 
Cinemas, Café Bioscopes and Drive‐in Theatres, 1964‐1965, December 1969, p. 11.   
96 Society for the Preservation of Afrikaans. 
97 Like the Israelites in the Old Testament and stemming from a fundamentalist form of Calvinism, many 
Afrikaner nationalists perceived themselves as a chosen people selected by God. André du Toit, “No Chosen 
People: The Myth of the Calvinist Origins of Afrikaner Nationalism and Racial Ideology”, The American 
Historical Review 88 (1983), p. 920.  
 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 7, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 4, Genootskap vir die Handhawing 
van Afrikaans’ Annual meeting: “Presentation made by J.W. Albie”, 23 February 1973, p. 1.     
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When Twentieth-Century-Fox acquired ACT’s film interests in 1956 – consequently 
monopolising the industry – a group of Afrikaners, including André Pieterse,98 established a 
local exhibition company. Inrybelange (Pty) Ltd was founded and built its first drive-in theatre 
in 1957.99 Within a period of four years Inrybelange introduced four drive-in theatres as well 
as a conventional cinema. As previously mentioned, Inrybelange reached an agreement with 
Jamie Uys Filmproduksies to distribute and exhibit the latter’s productions. To ensure financial 
gains, Inrybelange also negotiated the importation of foreign films. In 1960-61 financial 
obligations, coupled with intense competition from Twentieth-Century-Fox, halted the 
expansion of the newly founded distributor. Sanlam’s Die Fakkel stated: “But suddenly it 
looked like the company [Inrybelange] had indeed succumbed to foreign interests as there was 
no more money left”.100 During Inrybelange’s period of financial turmoil, the insurance giant 
Sanlam already had interests in the local cinematic industry through an investment in Jamie 
Uys Filmproduksies. In 1962 Sanlam assumed control of Inrybelange after acquiring the 
distributor’s shares and completing negotiations with other shareholders. Apart from 
commercial advantages, the reasons for Sanlam’s procurement of Inrybelange were twofold: 
to avoid a local business submitting to foreign interests and to intensify its contribution in the 
industry’s advancement. Rationalisation followed and Ster Theatres (Pty) Ltd, an exhibitor, 
and Ster Films (Pty) Ltd, which distributed films between its theatres, were registered.101   
Though Ster Theatres acted as the largest distributor and exhibitor of local Afrikaans films, 
Sanlam’s entry into the cinematic industry was not without difficulties. In 1965 the Minister of 
Public Works P.W. Botha introduced a policy that strictly regulated the building of cinemas. 
The Ster Organisation was on the threshold of collapse, as it could not obtain quality foreign 
productions. The supply produced by local producers was far too small to meet the public 
demand. The largest American producers such as Paramount were reluctant to grant Ster 
Theatres the distribution rights of their films, since Ster’s indoor cinemas offered “too few seats 
for their pictures.”102 Although the Ster Theatres circuit consisted of numerous drive-in theatres, 
                                                            
98 Pieterse, a pioneer in the South African distribution industry, would later become the Executive Vice‐
President of Metro‐Goldwyn‐Mayer International Inc., Executive Vice President of Columbia Theatres, Inc. and 
founder of Ma‐Afrika Films (Pty) Ltd. More information on Pieterse will be provided in Chapters 4 and 5. 
99 It was known as the Wonderboom Drive‐in Theatre in Pretoria. Sanlam Archives (SA), documents provided 
by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Rolprentwese in Suid‐Afrika”, August 1970, p. 14.  
100 Sanlam Archives (SA), documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Rolprentwese 
in Suid‐Afrika”, August 1970, p. 14. 
101 Ibid., p.14‐15. Referenced as Ster Theatres from this point.  
102 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Memorandum: “Voorgenome 
ontwikkelingsplan: Bioskoopondernemings”, 9 January 1970, p. 1.  
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American producers still declined contract negotiations, since the filmmakers refused to use 
drive-in theatres as a criterion. The local distributor was in dire need of assistance and as such 
directly approached the Department of Community Development to initiate talks on the 
possibility of property/cinema expansion. In 1966 the Minister of Community Development 
W.A. Maree, who sympathised with the local distributor, approved Ster Theatres’ proposed 
circuit development.103 This led to the building of the prominent ‘Sterland’ complexes in 
Johannesburg and Pretoria. Sanlam, acting as the controlling shareholder, oversaw the large-
scale development of cinema properties in other areas such as Durban and Cape Town. Ster 
Theatres, after the successful procurement of government support, became Twentieth-Century-
Fox’s largest local distribution competitor. By 1967 Ster Theatres’ exhibition circuit consisted 
of 30 cinemas, whilst films were also distributed to independent cinema owners.104 Sanlam 
initiated the largest expansion programme ever undertaken by a South African film company. 
After researching foreign cinematic industries, Sanlam announced the construction of multi-
unit cinema complexes (such as Ocean City in Durban). To demonstrate SterTheatres 
unprecedented development, one only has to note that in 1969 eleven cinemas were opened in 
a period of ten weeks, including Ster cinemas in Orange Grove and Parow.105 Sterland, in 
Johannesburg, housed four theatres, the largest consisting of more than a thousand seats.  The 
immediate expansion resulted in Ster Theatres securing the distribution rights of productions 
developed by prominent American production companies Columbia Pictures and Paramount. 
By 1970 Ster Theatres employed 1 300 employees, distributed films to 300 cinemas and owned 
20 indoor cinemas and 23 drive-in theatres.106    
                                                            
103 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Memorandum: “Voorgenome 
ontwikkelingsplan: Bioskoopondernemings”, 9 January 1970, p. 1. 
104 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Rolprentwese in Suid‐Afrika”, 
August 1970, p. 15. 
105 Business historian Anton Ehlers vividly recollects his time spent at the Ster cinema in Parow. “I was in Grade 
Eight [high school]… and I can especially remember two films that I watched: Paint Your Wagon (1969) with 
Lee Marvin and Clint Eastwood as main actors, and Love Story [1970] with Ryan O’Neal and Ali MacGraw...” 
Whilst watching Love Story with his mother, aunt and the latter’s children, Ehlers states that tissues were 
handed out in the cinema, since many became emotional. However, the screening of Paint Your Wagon was 
one of his first experiences in which he became aware of Afrikaner class divisions ‐ even within families. “My 
aunt wanted to sit at the back of the cinema, since the film had too much movement [on the screen]. My 
mother wanted to sit at the front, as we could not afford the expensive tickets for the seats at the back. We, 
ultimately, landed [in seats] three throws from the front with my aunt complaining after the film that her neck 
was stiff from looking up from the front rows.” At the time Ehlers’ father (carpenter) and his aunt’s husband 
(Assistant Manager: Personnel) both worked at Ster’s parent company, Sanlam. Anton Ehlers, e‐mail message 
to Coenraad J. Coetzee, March 6, 2017. 
106 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Rolprentwese in Suid‐Afrika”, 
August 1970, p. 15. 
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Though John Schlesinger sold the distribution and exhibition interests to Twentieth-Century-
Fox in 1956, the Schlesinger organisation still managed a range of businesses in South Africa, 
including African Film Productions (African Mirror and Ons Nuus). Twentieth-Century-Fox 
attempted to acquire AFP in 1959, renaming it South African Screen Productions; however, as 
a result of the financial failure of the movie Cleopatra (1963), which cost the company very 
dearly, the Schlesinger Organisation regained AFP after a non-payment. Yet Twentieth-
Century-Fox still controlled the largest chain of theatres up until 1969, consisting of 110 outlets, 
of which 22 were drive-ins.107 On 30 April 1969 an announcement was made that the Sanlam 
Group and the Schlesinger Organisation had bought the principal interests of Twentieth-
Century-Fox in Southern Africa.108 These interests included all open-air and indoor cinemas, 
Killarney Film Studios and cinema catering. Twentieth-Century-Fox would be renamed 
Kinekor Ltd, whilst its shares were divided equally amongst Sanlam and the Schlesinger 
Organisation. An amount of approximately R34 million was paid for Twentieth-Century-Fox’s 
main interests in South Africa.109 The combined interest of Ster and Kinekor allowed the new 
partners, and more importantly South Africans, to obtain control of 76% of the South African 
distribution network.110 By 1970 Kinekor’s organisation comprised of 118 cinemas (including 
22 drive-in theatres and 18 café-cinemas), two companies which specialised in film 
advertisements (Alexander Films and Filmlets) and South Africa’s largest distribution network, 
which imported films from Twentieth-Century-Fox, Warner Bros, Rank, United Artists, Walt 
Disney, Anglo EMI, Universal Studios, Cinema Centre and Cinerama Incorporated. Other 
interests included a 50% interest in Irene Film Laboratories (South Africa’s only film 
developer), a 75% share of Chemix (a company that printed most of South Africa’s film posters) 
and a 50% share of Gallo-Fox (a company that provided audio-visual aids for educational 
purposes).111 Ster and Kinekor would jointly own 161 theatres and 100 properties, whilst 
employing 5 500 people in 1970.112  
                                                            
107 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 1, Newspaper Article (The Star) 
written by John Marvin: “Multimillion rand South African deal”, 30 April 1969, p. 3.  
108 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Rolprentwese in Suid‐Afrika”, 
August 1970, p. 17. 
109 R 2,3 billion, taking inflation into account. SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die 
Fakkel, “Sanlam in huge cinema take over”, June 1969, p. 3. 
110 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010. (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 50. 
111 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Rolprentwese in Suid‐Afrika”, 
August 1970, p. 13. 
112 Ibid.  
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Consequent upon the take-over of the Twentieth-Century-Fox Organisation of Southern Africa, 
the Sanlam Group effectively acquired and controlled the largest share of the local cinema 
industry. Afrikaners finally had the means to manage the industry according to their own 
financial, cultural and social interests:  
“A major reason for the acquisition of the Twentieth-Century-Fox Group was that one of the 
most important communication media of South Africa was being controlled by a foreign 
company whose orientation and business policy was not directed in the interests of the cinema 
industry in this country, but more toward a policy of maximising short term profits of the foreign 
owners.”113  
Prior to the acquisition, Sanlam already controlled the largest shares of the Ster-Theatres Group.  
However, Sanlam, as I.W. Schlesinger had argued in the early 20th century, maintained that the 
cinema industry required immediate transformation. 
 
Illustration 3: Cartoon, by Richard Smith, representing Sanlam and the Schlesinger Organisation’s 
acquisition of Twentieth-Century-Fox’s cinematic interests in South Africa.114    
                                                            
113 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Memorandum: “Memorandum 
on the proposed rationalisation of the cinema undertakings controlled by the Sanlam Group through its 
investments in S.A. Teater Belange (Pty) Ltd and Sanso (Pty) Ltd”, December 1969, p. 2. 
114 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Sanlam in huge cinema take 
over”, June 1969, p. 4. 
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The framework of rationalisation was established by the institution of two investment holding 
companies: Suid-Afrikaanse Teater Belange (Eiendoms) Beperk 115  (Satbel) and Sanso 
(Proprietary) Ltd (Sanso). Satbel was established to administer the Ster Group and the Kinekor 
Group, thus functioning as an investment holding company. Sanlam and the Schlesinger 
Organisation reasoned that Ster and Kinekor, although subsidiaries of Sanlam, must operate as 
separate and contending organisations “in view of their exhibition commitments under supply 
contracts with overseas film producers.”116  The Monopolies Act (1955) also prevented a 
company/organisation from exercising control of a market, product or service.117 Sanso, a 
property holding company, developed and managed major properties of the group during 
rationalisation. Satbel, headed by Dr A.D. Wassenaar,118 would be managed by Sanlam, whilst 
the Schlesinger organisation owned an interest of 30%. Sanso comprised of an equal 
partnership between Sanlam and the Schlesinger Organisation. M.D. Moross, from Schlesinger, 
acted as Sanso’s chairman. Rationalisation would prove to be beneficial for both Ster and 
Kinekor.119  
 
Illustration 4: Dr A.D. Wassenaar (Chairperson of Satbel)120 
In spite of the tendency towards over-seating in the Republic,121 the Ster Organisation wished 
to enlarge its distribution network as Ster possessed a profusion of unreleased productions. The 
Kinekor Group, which managed an established and widespread circuit, sustained a decline in 
                                                            
115 South African Theatre Interests (Pty) Ltd. 
116 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Memorandum: “Memorandum 
on the proposed rationalisation of the cinema undertakings controlled by the Sanlam Group through its 
investments in S.A. Teater Belange (Pty) Ltd and Sanso (Pty) Ltd”, December 1969, p. 1. 
117Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 159.  
118 Wassenaar also acted as the Chairperson and MD of Sanlam. J.P. Scannell, Uit die Volk Gebore; Sanlam se 
Eerste Vyftig Jaar, (Kaapstad, Nasional Boekhandel, 1968), p. 97.   
119 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, “Sanlam in huge cinema take 
over”, June 1969, p. 3. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Too many theatres for South Africa’s small white population.  
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financial growth as a result of over-seating and South African censorship prohibiting the 
screening of controversial American productions.122 Ster Theatres’ largest product suppliers, 
Columbia Pictures and Paramount, encouraged the transformation as they argued that 
Twentieth-Century-Fox’s (Kinekor Group) demands regarding the distribution of their films 
were inequitable. Furthermore, the popularity of drive-ins, especially amongst Afrikaner 
households, increased, whilst the conventional four wall cinemas 123  were losing their 
attractiveness. Afrikaners encouraged by the datum that Ster Theatres distributed local 
Afrikaans productions, which (as demonstrated above) promoted “Gesinsvriendelike” 
entertainment, regarded the drive-in as a family entertainment venue. General over-seating 
coupled with the growing popularity of drive-in theatres would have motivated Kinekor to 
close uneconomic cinemas. However, this was prevented as there was a threat of Ster acquiring 
these premises and jeopardising the Kinekor circuit. Many of the Kinekor theatres located in 
the large city centres were 30 years old and lacked modern facilities (e.g. air conditioning) and 
were too large (more than thousand seats), whilst central property was inefficiently managed, 
leaving the company incapable of paying economic rent.124 Lastly, Sanlam and the Schlesinger 
organisation were cognisant and wary of the increasing likelihood of the introduction of 
television. Sanlam reasoned that “suitable preparation and reduction of over-seating should be 
undertaken in advance of the arrival.”125  
Sanso’s arranged cinema rationalisation and redevelopment programme had been divided into 
four distinct stages: immediate redevelopment; short-term rationalisation; pre-television 
preparation; and post-television rationalisation.126 Firstly, the problem of over-seating was 
addressed and alleviated by the complete removal of outdated and uneconomic central city 
theatres (e.g. Plaza and Opera House in Pretoria), whilst certain theatres would be replaced by 
modern cinemas (e.g. Adelphi Theatre in Sea Point). Certain cinemas required redevelopment; 
however, Sanso halted proceedings to wait for the government’s verdict regarding the 
                                                            
122 The number of these ‘controversial’ American productions was increasing.  
123 Mayfair Cinema (Johannesburg), for example. Drive‐ins mushroomed all over South Africa even in more 
remote rural areas such as the North West of the Cape Province. The first drive‐in in Upington, for example, 
opened in May 1963. Die Gemsbok, 3 May 1963, “Opening 3 Mei van Kalahari Inryteater” as quoted in Anton 
Ehlers, “Renier van Rooyen and Pep Stores Limited: The Genesis of a South African Entrepreneur and Retail 
Empire” South African Historical Journal 60 (2008), 435.  
124 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Correspondence between 
Sanlam’s industry advisor (W.J. de Villiers) and J.F.W. Haak: “Rasionalisasie van die teaterbedryf in Suid‐
Afrika”, 14 January 1970, p. 1.  
125 Ibid. This last point will be expanded upon in the following chapter.  
126 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Memorandum: “Memorandum 
on the proposed rationalisation of the cinema undertakings controlled by the Sanlam Group through its 
investments in S.A. Teater Belange (Pty) Ltd and Sanso (Pty) Ltd”, December 1969, p. 5‐7. 
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introduction of television. Stages three and four will be discussed in the following chapters. 
The distributor/exhibitor and the local Afrikaans film producer benefited from the 
rationalisation and redevelopment of cinematic properties. A smaller exhibition network would 
cut the unnecessarily high expenses of the surplus cinemas, 127  thus ensuring cheaper 
distribution of local film productions. The rationalisation of local cinemas into modern, but 
more significantly smaller, theatres meant that a property could accommodate more cinemas 
and wider range/diversity of films. This allowed more Afrikaans film productions to be selected 
for distribution and exhibition. Martin Botha argues that “Afrikaner capital, thus, became a 
significant factor in the film industry when Sanlam acquired this major interest in Ster Films, 
a distribution company with the explicit intention to provide cinema predominantly for white 
Afrikaner patrons.” 128  In an interview conducted with Die Transvaler H. de G. Laurie 
(Sanlam’s general manager of investments and co-director of Satbel) argued that the takeover 
of the distribution and exhibition industry in South Africa would contribute in the quantity of 
Afrikaans productions;  
“Ster has always maintained a more sympathetic attitude towards the Afrikaans film and public 
than could be expected from foreign firms… The prospects of the Afrikaans film industry have 
improved with the amalgamation. Yet ultimately the supply and advancement of the Afrikaans 
film is dependent on the public’s support and particularly from the demand for films created by 
the Afrikaner.”129     
 
Illustration 5: The Adelphi Theatre in Sea Point in the 1960s130 
                                                            
127 Wages, maintenance of cinemas etc.   
128 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 50. 
129 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 1, Newspaper Article (Die 
Transvaler): “Rolprentreus vir Suid‐Afrika nou op pad”, 1 May 1969, p. 25. 
130 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Die Fakkel, May 1970, Cover page.  
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Relationship between Afrikaans Producers and Satbel  
When considering all the South African distributers and exhibitors, Afrikaans producers were 
primarily dependent on the Ster Theatres and Kinekor circuits. In 1969 the Department of Trade 
and Industries, under Minister J.W. Haak, investigated the relationship between producers and 
distributers/exhibitors in the industry. 131  The department concluded that the relationship 
sustained was generally salutary for all parties involved as Satbel (Sanlam) wished to contribute 
to the advancement of local production. Notwithstanding, problem areas were identified with 
producers – especially the smaller companies – maintaining that South African distribution was 
monopolistic in nature. P.J. Fourie argued: “The acceptance of a motion picture for exhibition, 
as well as the place and time of exhibition, is frequently dependent on the opinion of a single 
individual”.132 
The fact that producers were prepared to invest considerable funds in the development of a 
picture demonstrates that each filmmaker expected his film to be accepted for distribution. 
Naturally, producers desired their films to receive the finest treatment in terms of release 
(period and place) and publicity. Regarding the return on capital, filmmakers insisted their 
product be displayed as soon as production was completed. Prominent producers, such as 
Kavalier Films, Brigadiers Films and Emil Nofal, which managed to sustain a healthy flow of 
productions would not be as alarmed at a delay between completion and exhibition, unlike 
producers with fewer resources. Dr W.J. de Villiers (Sanlam’s Industrial Advisor) considered 
Afrikaans producers, who were developing products only for the local market, to be in an 
exceptional position, as opposed to producers who developed films aimed at local and external 
markets: “The commencement of their income flow is dependent on the release of the product 
in this country, whilst foreign films133 are shown locally only after they have been released in 
other countries.”134 Distributors attempted to rectify the problem by making a pre- payment to 
producers obtained from distribution income. 
                                                            
131 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Correspondence between 
Sanlam and The Department of Trade and Industries with an attached memorandum: “Die Verhoudinge van 
Kinekor en Ster met Suid‐Afrikaanse Film Produsente”, 15 December 1969, p. 1.  
132 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Summarised study conducted 
by P.J. Fourie: “Die Sosio‐kulturele waarde van die Suid‐Afrikaanse speelfilm”, (n.d.), p. 8. 
133 He is referring here to local productions aimed at foreign markets. 
134 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Correspondence between 
Sanlam and The Department of Trade and Industries with an attached memorandum: “Die Verhoudinge van 
Kinekor en Ster met Suid‐Afrikaanse Film Produsente”, 15 December 1969, p. 2. 
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The main purpose of the exhibitor is to increase the turnover generated by ticket sales. The 
industry is unique as exhibitors are the only retailers to sell all products according to one fixed 
price, regardless of quality. “Productions which cost R100 000 are displayed at the same 
entrance fee as films which cost R1 million or more.”135 As such, South African exhibitors 
were meticulous in the management and selection of films, the release dates, the timespan of 
exhibition and publicity. South African circuits aimed to establish a socio-economic 
equilibrium as the most profitable Afrikaans films (according to their budgets) were approved. 
This is one reason why potential non-white producers found it challenging to develop films. 
The lack of finance made filmmaking an almost impossible task as these productions would 
not be approved for distribution and/or exhibition. The common goal shared amongst Afrikaans 
producers, exhibitors and distributors was to increase profits by means of maximising ticket 
sales. Thus, the commonality of interests ensured cooperation within the white cinematic 
industry.  
Weekly cinema attendance fluctuated according to the time of year. For example, Afrikaans 
producers, exhibitors and distributors realised that admission sales were highest during the 
December school holidays and, as such, exploited the market by providing family-friendly 
entertainment at that time. The product’s release date was meticulously selected according to 
market obtainability. Consequently, the release date of a film was expedited or delayed. 
Satbel’s central city cinemas (in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Pretoria and Durban) would host 
the first exhibitions of only the largest local productions to recoup the costs of the expensive 
monthly-fixed operative costs. The economic duration of a film’s exhibition cycle (as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter) was monitored according to a predetermined “hold-over” 
income136 – a minimum turnover amount generated within a certain timeframe.137 Exceeding 
the “hold-over” income figure would lengthen the film’s period of exhibition (“round”). The 
quality, type or merits of a film would dictate the production’s release pattern in, for example, 
a drive-in theatre or a central city cinema. Promotion of films (via flyers, press books, magazine 
                                                            
135 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 7, Correspondence addressed to 
the Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism (P. Wolmarans): “Ondersoek na die Suid‐Afrikaanse 
Rolprentverspreidings‐ en Vertoningsbedryf”, 7 April 1981, p. 11.   
136 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Correspondence between 
Sanlam and The Department of Trade and Industries with an attached memorandum: “Die Verhoudinge van 
Kinekor en Ster met Suid‐Afrikaanse Film Produsente”, 15 December 1969, p. 3. 
137 “Hold‐over” Income = Operating costs + Film Hire + Pre‐established Profit. 
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articles etc.) needed pre-release publication – usually seven or eight weeks in advance of the 
releases.138 
Satbel, a company that monopolised South African exhibition and distribution, albeit through 
two organisations, based its film-selection criteria on a number of factors: previous 
experiences/records of box-office revenues generated by comparable films; the quality of the 
product; the quality of other films available during the same timeframe; the content and/or 
themes of the film correlating with a specific time of year (for example, school holidays and 
festive seasons); the environment of exhibition (drive-ins, rural areas, city theatres and art 
theatres); and of course, an estimate of the possible revenue that could be generated by the 
production.139 Producer, Emil Nofal, supported Satbel’s selection policies and stated:  
“They [Satbel] are also running a business and they have to run it to the best of their ability. If 
your picture is good it is going to get better distribution than if it is not good. Unfortunately, 
every filmmaker thinks his picture is the most beautiful baby in the world.”140 
Sanlam reasoned that Satbel (Ster Theatres and Kinekor) had an obligation to distribute and 
exhibit local films maintaining a high standard (although some South African film historians 
[e.g. Blignaut en Botha] might argue that the pool of local films available were of a sub-
standard quality). The public – and especially the Afrikaner – demand for local productions 
was substantial and consequently motivated Satbel to establish a salutary relationship with 
local film producers. However, according to Sanlam, public demand exceeded the supply of 
locally produced films (maintaining an applicable standard) and stated that the entire industry 
would collapse if foreign films were not imported: “Nothing would be as catastrophic for the 
industry if most of the films displayed aren’t of a high quality.”141 In 1969, for instance, 254 
films were displayed weekly on the Kinekor distribution circuit.142  In comparison, South 
African firms managed to produce only seven films in the same year.143 Satbel encouraged 
                                                            
138 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Correspondence between 
Sanlam and The Department of Trade and Industries with an attached memorandum: “Die Verhoudinge van 
Kinekor en Ster met Suid‐Afrikaanse Film Produsente”, 15 December 1969, p. 3. 
139 Ibid.  
140 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Summarised study conducted 
by P.J. Fourie: “Die Sosio‐kulturele waarde van die Suid‐Afrikaanse speelfilm”, (n.d.), p. 8. 
141 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 2, Correspondence between 
Sanlam and The Department of Trade and Industries with an attached memorandum: “Die Verhoudinge van 
Kinekor en Ster met Suid‐Afrikaanse Film Produsente”, 15 December 1969, p. 4. 
142 Ibid.  
143 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum:  N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report No 1753: “Ondersoek 
na die Rolprentbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p. 5.  
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Afrikaans film producers to establish relations with foreign producers to increase co-operation 
and consequently enhance the quantity and quality of South African produced motion pictures. 
Overview of Jamie Uys Filmproduksies Ltd/Kavalier Films Ltd’s History (1954-1970)144 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the climate for local film production was immensely 
unfavourable when Jamie Uys Filmproduksies (Jamie Uys Films) was established in 1954. 
However, the film company managed to sell shares valued at R50 000 (R4,07 million in 2016), 
allowing the company to operate successfully from 1954 to 1959. 145  The 
Nywerheidsontwikkelingskorporasie van SA Bpk 146  (NOK), founded in 1940 to promote 
industrial and economic growth, a self-financing institution retained by the state and supervised 
by the economic development ministry, acquired shares valued at R10 000.147  The cultural 
body, Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK), invested R20 000 in the firm.148 
A quote from the FAK’s General Secretary, D.J. Viljoen, best summarised the objective of the 
organisation’s involvement:  
“In conclusion, we [FAK] whole-heartedly accept the premise that film production is a cultural 
activity. The Afrikaner has always maintained that culture and the economy, cultural striving and 
the economic struggle go hand in hand. Therefore, many of our economic institutions were born 
in the cultural delivery room. It consequently becomes necessary that the assets of the economic 
institutions must be reinvested in the cultural domain. We regard it as significant that the current 
Managing Director [T.W.S. Meyer] was the former General Secretary of the FAK. Herein lies a 
guarantee that the construction of the Afrikaans film industry would not only contribute to the 
Afrikaans language, but would also showcase the beauty of our land and the majesty of our own 
history.149          
By 1961 Jamie Uys Films produced several successful films (with the support of the 
subsidisation scheme), such as Geld Soos Bossies (1955), Die Bosvelder (1958), Satanskoraal 
(1959) and Rip van Wyk (1960), thus allowing the company to repay its debt of R16 000.150 In 
                                                            
144 Reminder: The History of Jamie Uys Filmproduksies/Kavalier Films –and examples of its films‐ are discussed 
as the company was considered a leading Afrikaans cinematic film producer and reflected the state of the 
Afrikaans cinematic film industry before and after SABC‐TV was introduced in 1976.  
145 GLD, HB Thom collection (HBT), 191 KAV. 7V.1 (1) Background of the company: “Huidige Samestelling van 
Ons Maatskappy: Memorandum aangaande Jamie Uys Filmproduksies Bpk”, (n.d.), p. 1.   
146 Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). 
147 R814 000 when taking inflation into account. GLD, HB Thom collection (HBT), 191 KAV. 7V.1 (1), Background 
of the company: “Huidige Samestelling van Ons Maatskappy: Memorandum aangaande Jamie Uys 
Filmproduksies Bpk”, (n.d.), p. 1.   
148 GLD, HBT, 191. KAV. 4. (1/1), Annual Report: “Voorsittersverslag”. 24 February 1962, n.p. 
149 GLD, HBT, 191. KAV. 4. (1/10), Annual Report: “Voorsittersverslag: P.J. Viljoen”, (n.d.), p, 1. 
150 R1, 3 million taking inflation into account.  
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line with the general approach of the production industry in the 1960s, the number of motion 
pictures produced by Jamie Uys Films increased after the affiliated company, Jamie Uys 
Studios Ltd, was registered on 15 August 1960.151 In 1961 Jamie Uys Films, in collaboration 
with the British company Warwick Films, produced The Hellions.152 The Hellions would 
become the most expensive production undertaken by Jamie Uys Films as costs exceeded 
R600 000 (R48,8 million in 2016).153 Uys then wrote, directed and produced Doodkry is Min 
(1961). Commissioned by the FAK, Doodkry is Min is a cultural and historical documentary 
that celebrated the development of Afrikaans since 1860. The film premiered at the 
amphitheatre located at the Voortrekker Monument in Pretoria on 29 April 1961 and was 
attended by the State President at the time, C.R. Swart. History was made as an audience 
consisting of 40 000 people attended the premiere, a world record at the time.154  
In the following year Jamie Uys, together with T.W.S (Tommie) Meyer, successfully 
convinced Sanlam, Bonuskor,155 Santam and the Ekonomiese Instituut to invest R70 000156 in 
Jamie Uys Films.157  The films produced by the company were generating turnovers that 
exceeded the company’s expectations. The films included Doodkry is Min (1961), Kimberley 
Jim (1963) and Dingaka (1964). Both Kimberley Jim and Dingaka were distributed 
internationally. The board of directors of Jamie Uys Films maintained that the company’s 
strategy for maximising turnovers was producing a large number of films in as short a time as 
possible.158   Although the method produced unprecedented success for the local producer, the 
tempo of films produced placed the company’s chairperson and founder Jamie Uys under 
immense pressure. Apart from being the production company’s chairperson (responsible for 
administration and management), Uys also acted as director, scriptwriter, actor and cameraman 
for most of the films produced. The pressure sustained by Uys increased when directors Jans 
                                                            
151 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV 3. (1/1), Financial Statements: “Eerste Konsep”, 10 November 1961, p. 2.  
152 Coenraad J. Coetzee, Aspekte van die Geskiedenis van Jamie Uys Film Produksies/ Kavalier Films Beperk, c. 
1969‐1979: Kommersiële Opportuniste of Kultureel/Ideologiese Entrepreneurs? (Ongepubliseerede Honneurs, 
Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 2014), p. 7. 
153 The costs would be divided equally amongst Warwick films and Jamie Uys Films. The latter had never 
previously produced a film which exceeded R60 000.  GLD, HBT, 191. KAV. 4. (1/1), Annual Report: 
“Voorsittersverslag”, 24 February 1962, n.p.  
154 GLD, HBT, 191. KAV. 4. (1/1), Annual Report: “Voorsittersverslag”, 24 February 1962, n.p. 
155 Bonus Beleggingskorporasie (Bonuskor), an Afrikaner investment company, managed the investments of 
policyholders’ bonuses in Sanlam. Grietjie Verhoef, “Nationalism and free enterprise in mining: the case of 
Federale Mynbou 1952‐1965”, South African Journal of Economic History 10 (1995), p. 92.      
156 R5,7 million in 2016. 
157 GLD, HBT, 191. KAV. 4. (1/1), Annual Report: “Voorsittersverslag”, 24 February 1962, n.p. 
158 Coenraad J. Coetzee, Aspekte van die Geskiedenis van Jamie Uys Film Produksies/ Kavalier Films Beperk, c. 
1969‐1979: Kommersiële Opportuniste of Kultureel/Ideologiese Entrepreneurs? (Ongepubliseerde Honneurs, 
Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 2014), p. 7. 
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Rautenbach and Emil Nofal left Jamie Uys Filmproduksies to establish their own production 
companies. Furthermore, Jamie Uys’s filmmaking approach differed from that of the rest of 
the company’s management, which limited not only the cost-effectiveness of a film but also its 
artistic value. Uys argued that a “thorough and intimate”159 approach would guarantee quality 
and, consequently, box office successes. In short, he argued that quality supersedes quantity in 
film production.160 In May 1966 Jamie Uys announced his resignation as chairperson and 
director.161 The company, along with its Board of Directors, was reorganised and consisted of 
Schalk J. Botha (Chairperson),162 H.A. Louw, M. Muravitz, P.R. Nel (future Mayor of Pretoria), 
Prof. H.B. Thom, Prof. B van Deventer, Tommie Meyer (Managing Director).163 Under new 
leadership and as its main strategy the company endeavoured to produce at least three films per 
year.164   
Before his departure, Jamie Uys, along with the rest of management, suggested that the 
company name, Jamie Uys Filmproduksies, should be changed. An “impersonal” brand would 
eliminate the possibility of confusion around future productions, whilst simultaneously 
providing the company’s directors with an opportunity to better expand their own reputation.165 
Apart from the reorganisation of management, a change in the company’s name had other 
implications such as increased competition with Jamie Uys’ new production company, coupled 
with the loss of the experience, knowledge and popular branding offered by such a prominent 
filmmaker. Management ultimately decided, as will be seen, that the best means of establishing 
a new brand with the public was to associate the name of the company with a highly marketed 
film.  
In contrast with the most recently established firms, Jamie Uys Films had the capital to invest 
in extensive production and publicity. On 29 July 1966, during a special meeting held by the 
board of directors, it was agreed upon that the new production company would be renamed 
                                                            
159 Mimosa Films, “... sage and screen ... Jamie Uys (1921‐1996)”. Access 2 July 2016: 
http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/jamie1.aspx.  
160 Uys’s theory would be proven right as will be seen.  
161 Coenraad J. Coetzee, Aspekte van die Geskiedenis van Jamie Uys Film Produksies/ Kavalier Films Beperk, c. 
1969‐1979: Kommersiële Opportuniste of Kultureel/Ideologiese Entrepreneurs? (Ongepubliseerde Honneurs, 
Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 2014), p. 8. 
162 Botha served as a director of over thirty companies (including Santam and Saambou) and was an Afrikaans 
cultural leader. For example, he acted as the secretary of two organisations endeavouring to promote 
Afrikaner interests in urbanised areas, i.e. the Johanna Ziervogel and the Pieter Neethlingsfonds. He was also a 
member of the Broederbond and the F.A.K. C.J. Beyers & J.L. Basson, Suid‐Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek: 
Deel V, (Pretoria: Raad van Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 1987), p. 78‐79.    
163 GLD, HBT, 191. KAV. 4. (1/13), Annual Report: “Voorsittersverslag”, 30 June 1968, p. 3. 
164 Ibid., p. 1.  
165 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV.5 (3/22), Minutes: “Dagbestuurvergadering”, 25 May 1966, p. 1‐2. 
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Kavalier Filmproduksies Ltd.166 The launch of the new name would coincide with the release 
of a new film with a similar name. Die Kavaliers is an adventure film produced in 1966, written 
by Fanus Rautenbach, Jan Perold, Elmo de Witt, Piet Schreuder and Pierre Fourie; it was 
directed by Elmo de Witt and filmed by Manie Botha and Louis de Witt. The film is set in the 
South African War. General Christiaan R. de Wet instructs Boer soldier and Kavalier leader, 
Chris Botha (Leon le Roux), along with a hundred of his best soldiers, to infiltrate and destroy 
the ammunition held in the British camps. Chris Botha was transferred to the Cape, acting as a 
spy to explore enemy territory. Ster Theatres distributed Die Kavaliers; its first official release 
was screened at the Voortrekker Monument on 24 September 1966, with the collaboration of 
the FAK and the Rapportryers.167 Kavalier Films would remain the company’s name until its 
dissolution in 1978 as will be explained in the following chapters.  
 
Illustration 6: Kavalier Films’ Logo168  
Kavalier Films as a Case Study 
The existence of Jamie Uys Filmproduksies/Kavalier Films (1954-1978) reflected the context 
of the Afrikaans film producing industry during the apartheid era. The South African 
government, Afrikaans media, distributors, exhibitors and the public considered Kavaliers as 
an industrial leader. This is understandable, as Kavaliers films was responsible for more than 
                                                            
166 Kavalier Films or Kavaliers. 
167 The Federasie van Rapportryerskorpse (Federation of Rapportryers) can trace its roots back to 1949, i.e. the 
inauguration of the Voortrekker Monument. Each Rapportryer (messenger/rider) brought messages of support 
from a particular region of the country symbolised by the state flag. In the early 1950s the riders held a 
reunion and the first korps (band) was established. The idea became popular with bands established across the 
country. These bands eventually held a congress in 1961 that led to the establishment of the federation. The 
federation developed into an organisation aspiring to protect the Afrikaner’s national interest, culture, lifestyle 
and Christianity. Andrew Crampton, “The Voortrekker Monument, the birth of apartheid, and beyond”, 
Political Geography 20 (2001), p. 235. Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, “12 Augustus”, Accessed: 6 
March 2017: http://www.afrikanergeskiedenis.co.za/12‐augustus/.               
168 GLD, HBT collection, 191 KAV.1.4.91 Agendas, “Direksievergaderingsnotule“, 25 November 1977, Front 
Page. 
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40% of all locally produced motion pictures from 1960-1975.169 Apart from the quantity of 
films distributed, Kavaliers managed to exert direct control over the most important film bodies 
such as the MPPA or the Vereniging van Vollengte Rolprentvervaardigers van Suid-Afrika 
(discussed in Chapter One).170  Jamie Uys, acting as co-founder and chairperson, laid the 
foundations for the financial successes maintained by the company, even after his departure in 
1966. The company’s endeavour to establish itself as a profitable company in a relatively new 
industry was balanced with the elevated ambition of “expanding the local cinematic 
industry.”171 The relatively small South African market, coupled with the frequently changing 
political, social, economic and technological context, made the pursuit of Kavaliers’ ambitions 
particularly challenging. However, Kavaliers’ business, cultural and political network, 
supported by prominent figures in its management, allowed the exploitation of the filmmaking 
environment.  As the firm’s Script committee explained: “We [Kavalier Films] are not 
commercial opportunists; the aim is to expand an industry. We must use our contacts to full 
effect and not disappoint the confidence placed in the company.”172 
It is necessary to note at this point that, despite the organisation’s nationalist inclinations, not 
all individuals employed by Kavaliers, such as Franz Marx, Emil Nofal and Jans Rautenbach, 
were conservative Afrikaner nationalists. However, the company’s most influential figures, 
such as chairperson, Schalk J. Botha, Tommie Meyer (Managing Director), Ben Vlok (future 
chairperson) and H.B. Thom, were all members of the Broederbond.173 As will be demonstrated, 
Jamie Uys produced films that incorporated both entertainment value and advanced the socio-
political objectives of the state. Kavaliers’ system of filmmaking, as mentioned, applied 
enormous pressure on its scriptwriters and directors to complete a film’s production. As a result, 
Kavaliers established the Draaiboekkomitee (script committee) in 1967. Former Broederbond 
chairperson (1952-1960) and rector of Stellenbosch University (1954-1969), H.B. Thom, who 
served on Kavalier’s board of directors from 1961, was appointed chair of the script committee. 
Kavaliers justified Thom’s position: “Every sign points to the fact that Thom is suitable to 
become chairman, since he carries a comprehensive knowledge of the Afrikaner and his 
                                                            
169 GLD, HBT collection, 191 KAV.1.4.83, Agendas: “Direksievergaderingsnotule”, 15 October 1976, p. 118. 
170 Union of Film Producers of South Africa 
171 GLD, HBT collection, 191 KAV.1.4.80, Agendas: “Direksievergaderingsnotule”, 25 June 1976, p. 99. 
172 GLD, HBT collection, 191 KAV.1.4.51, Agendas, 1966‐1978: “Direksievergaderingsnotule”, 30 May 1974, p. 
183.  
173 Ivor Wilkins & Hans Strydom, The Super Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond, (Jeppestown: 
Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012), p. A1‐A155.  
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interests.”174 H.B. Thom and the script committee would determine whether a script could or 
should be converted into a film, subsequently communicating their decision to the board of 
directors. Thom argued that the narrative and script served as the “single most important facet” 
of film production as it ensured the films told the “correct and most valuable” stories.175 He 
stated that Kavaliers’ objective was to “produce films which are culturally powerful, films 
which offer South Africa and its people quality and morally sound entertainment, and possibly 
project the image of South Africa abroad, whilst having a definite entertainment value in 
foreign countries.” 176  The Gesinsvriendelike themes incorporated by the producer should 
reflect the demands of state, the market and, naturally, the PCB. The gesinsrolprent, 177 
Kavaliers maintained, must embody a culture with which the market could identify, whilst 
expressing the standards associated with the condition of the Afrikaner people: 
“This policy is adopted because we [Kavaliers] want to provide a lasting service to our people 
considering that the power of the household, which is largely responsible for the stability in our 
country, should be expanded”.178      
Apart from the financial prospects, Kavaliers converted a script into a film if the narrative 
satisfied the following criteria: defamatory and robust language must be avoided, if possible; 
scenes of violence, sexual intercourse and drug use must be limited (if not for educational 
purposes); the explicit statements of government officials and cultural leaders should not be 
undermined; and lastly, scenes which promoted social integration between different racial 
communities must be avoided.179 These conditions noted by Kavaliers limited the availability 
of potential stories and scripts. Martin Botha and Johan Blignaut attributed the superficiality 
of most Afrikaans film productions to these criteria, which limited the industry’s expansion. 
The production company was also meticulous in selecting its actors as “they unknowingly serve 
as a symbol for our entire [South African] population.”180 Although Kavaliers maintained that 
a there was no “definite recipe” for film production, most motion pictures developed would 
incorporate historical themes, albeit as filtered through the company’s own perspective:  
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“The materiality of a theme, as well as its humanity, can be regarded as the prerequisite of 
success, for example, stories situated within the South African goldmines, terrorism, boycotts, 
the Middle Eastern crises and other cases of actual interest.”181            
Hans en die Rooinek (1961)  
After the Sharpeville massacre (21 March 1960), the South African government intensified its 
endeavours to eliminate the forces that threatened the jurisdiction of the apartheid state. The 
Unlawful Organisations Act 34 promulgated on 7 April 1960 banned political movements, 
including the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress, while anti-apartheid activists such as the 
leaders of uMkhonto we Sizwe (the military wing of the African National Congress) were taken 
into custody (1963) and security measures intensified (Sabotage Act of 1963).182 Though racial 
segregation was intensified, the state encouraged the social unity between the Afrikaner and 
English-speaking whites. The National Party (NP) deployed this strategy as a measure to 
reinforce its political power within the parliamentary system. The NP’s official political 
opposition between 1948 and 1970, namely the United Party (UP), obtained substantial support 
from the English-speaking public and media. During the general election held on 16 April 1958, 
the UP, led by Sir de Villiers Graaf, obtained 53 seats, whilst the NP, headed by Dr Hendrik F. 
Verwoerd, won 103 seats.183 UP supporters identified with the liberal inclinations of the party 
as well as with its policy of preserving strong diplomatic ties with Britain.184 In 1958 Dr 
Verwoerd attempted to secure the English vote by means of appointing English-speaking 
whites to his cabinet, emphasising the socio-economic threats posed by African nationalists 
and communists (“Swartgevaar”) and utilised the media (including Jamie Uys Filmproduksies) 
to promote white domination and the social ties between Afrikaners and English South Africans. 
South Africa, as will be explained in the subsection Hoor My Lied, experienced an economic 
upsurge after it became a republic in 1961, thus tempering concerns amongst some English 
voters about the negative economic effects of South Africa’s exit from the British 
Commonwealth and the growing international lobby against apartheid. The general election 
held on 30 March 1966 indicated that the methods utilised by the NP were successful. One 
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point three million South Africans voted in the 1966 election. The NP won 126 seats, whilst 
the UP obtained 39 seats.185 The NP’s socio-political influence expanded significantly.  
Responding to the needs of the state, Jamie Uys Filmproduksies produced a comedy Hans en 
die Rooinek in 1961 with the intention of eliminating the social antipathy between the country’s 
two white population groups. Hans en die Rooinek, along with its English version which was 
distributed internationally, Sidney and the Boer, was written and directed by Jamie Uys; it was 
edited by Elmo de Witt and Sam Sklair provided the production’s music.186 The film, through 
a comical narrative, demonstrated that hostilities between Afrikaners and English-speaking 
whites can be eradicated as cooperation ensured a harmonious existence. Hans Botha, an 
Afrikaner played by Jamie Uys, and Sidney Spring, an Englishman played by Bob Courtney, 
are caught up in an argument caused by language differences during a bus tour. A fellow 
traveller challenges Hans and Sidney to walk from Wilderness to Johannesburg. The journey 
would ultimately decide whether an Afrikaner or an Englishman is superior. The men accepted 
the challenge despite appeals from their female companions, Martie (Emsie Botha) and Ann 
(Wynona Cheyney). The challenge was aimed at establishing a relationship between the pair, 
since cooperation would make the journey much easier. However, the men chose to ignore one 
another, subsequently arriving in Johannesburg after an arduous experience. Upon their arrival, 
however, they encountered Martie and Ann, and Hans falls in love with the English women 
and Sidney with the Afrikaner. The film’s box office success exceeded the expectations of the 
company. For example, financial statements indicated a revenue of R17 050 for November 
1961 – R7 050 more than what was expected.187 Encouraged by the success of the film, Jamie 
Uys would produce two further comedies based on the same premise, Lord Oom Piet (1962) 
and All the Way to Paris (1967) produced by Jamie Uys Filmproduksies and Mimosa Films 
respectively. Uys argued:  
“The good-natured mockery was apparently equally popular amongst Afrikaans speakers and 
English speakers, and made an important contribution towards promoting a healthy relationship 
between the two language groups.”188   
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188 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV.4 (1/3), Annual Reports: “Negende Jaarverslag: Voorsittersrede“, 4 November 1963, p. 
1.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
Debbie (1965) 
Debbie, a screen adaptation of Tryna du Toit’s novel, Groen Koring, was produced by Jamie 
Uys Films in 1964-65 and directed by Elmo de Witt.189 The production serves as an example 
of how film production companies were restricted by traditional Afrikaner Christian values. 
The Publications Control Board, under the instruction of its chairperson Jannie Kruger, 
considered the themes of the film as contentious and controversial, notwithstanding the fact 
that “Debbie’s presentation was terribly sentimental with absolutely no explicit scenes.”190 As 
such, the controversy around the production requires elucidation. The narrative is based on the 
life of a young Afrikaner teenager, Debbie, played by Suzanne van Oudtshoorn, whose 
relationship with her first love Paul (Leon le Roux) results in an unexpected pregnancy.191 This 
disrupts the lives of the families involved, as the unborn child is the product of a sexual 
relationship outside of marriage. 
Portraying sexual intercourse outside of a marital relationship was a source of great concern to 
the apartheid state, the Reformed Churches and the Publications Control Board, as such 
behaviour did not conform to Afrikaners’ conservative values. Even though the 1960s is 
renowned for the upward social mobility of the volk, effected through economic mobilisation, 
urbanisation and skills development, most Afrikaners still adhered to strict Protestant doctrines. 
The NP, along with the Afrikaans churches, maintained that the conservative Afrikaner family 
was the core of social and political stability in apartheid South Africa. The Publication Board 
feared that Debbie would encourage pre-marital sexual intercourse amongst Afrikaner youths, 
or even worse, lead to Afrikaners adopting other liberal characteristics such as ‘racial mixing’ 
or homosexuality.192 The NP’s political support relied on a staunch Afrikaner conservatism and 
accordingly an age restriction of 4-16 years was imposed on the production.193 
Jamie Uys Filmproduksies immediately protested the age restriction imposed by the board, 
since its source of income was dependent on its features being viewed by Afrikaner households, 
particularly in drive-in theatres. The gesinsvriendelike entertainment guaranteed the desired 
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box office revenues as the film penetrated the biggest possible market. However, the imposed 
restriction effectively reduced the market, since many Afrikaners regarded cinema attendance 
as a family activity. Film distributers and exhibitors would, as a result, rather distribute and 
display films with fewer financial risks, regardless of Jamie Uys’s past successes.  
The board of directors of Jamie Uys Filmproduksies (Jamie Uys Films) drafted a memorandum, 
which stated the policies of the production company and the objectives of the film, and sent it 
to the Deputy Minister of the Interior.194 They argued that  Debbie was based on the novel, 
Groen Koring, which was in the FAK selection of Afrikaans books and was a prescribed text 
in libraries across schools in the Transvaal (the novel was published by Voortrekker Pers Ltd, 
a company renowned for publishing reading material aimed at the entire Afrikaner household); 
195 the popular Afrikaans director Elmo de Witt –who was dubbed the “Quiet Man” of the South 
African film industry 196  – would guarantee an aesthetically pleasing production as he 
“maintains the highest moral standards”;197  Hollywood productions such as Fanny (1961) and 
Parrish (1961) incorporated the same themes, were tastefully developed and received a positive 
response from the American public;198 the most prominent church and cultural leaders, youth 
leaders, school principals and women organisations were consulted199 before the production of 
the film; and lastly, the media were requested to avoid writing sensational reports on the 
development of the film.200 Jamie Uys Films stated that a rough-cut version of Debbie was 
shown in Pretoria on 30 March 1965 and was attended by prominent figures from the world of 
economics and politics, as well as the Director of Education.201 The general response was that 
the film had educational value, since Debbie dramatized the unintended consequences of sexual 
intercourse before marriage; Paul’s father, Chris Hugo (Gert van der Berg), arranged for the 
adoption of Debbie’s child, whilst her own father, Mr Malan (Siegfried Mynhardt), forbids her 
from living in his house.202   
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Jamie Uys Films was optimistic that the age restriction would be lifted as the memorandum 
asserted that Debbie should not be perceived as controversial but as educational. However, the 
Deputy Minister and the Publication Board initially disregarded the filmmaker’s appeal. 
Disappointment was subsequently followed by outrage, when the Publication Board decided 
that a more stringent age restriction of 4-21 years should be imposed on the film.203 Jamie Uys 
Films decided to utilize its connections in the media, which in turn guaranteed positive reviews 
of the production. The endeavour was successful as Jamie Uys Films arranged a screening of 
Debbie, which would be attended and evaluated by individuals appointed by the Deputy 
Minister.204 After much deliberation, Jamie Uys Films’ appeal was ultimately accepted and the 
imposed age restriction was lifted by the Publication Board.205 According to Schalk J. Botha, 
Debbie became the producer’s most profitable film.206  
Debbie indicates how an Afrikaans film producer had to adapt to the constraints of the social 
and political context. Even a company as prominent as Jamie Uys Films – which had ties with 
the Broederbond and media – had to adhere to the regulations established by the state to 
generate a profit. Undoubtedly the influential figures within Jamie Uys Films enabled the 
company to manipulate the state to some extent; however, Debbie proves that the government 
acted as a crucial agent in the construction and development of the market. The artistic 
restrictions imposed by censorship ensured that Afrikaans films were superficial, as they could 
not include themes that reflected the true social and political nature of apartheid South Africa.  
Hoor my Lied (1967) 
Historians such as Albert Grundlingh justifiably label the 1960s as a golden era for the 
Afrikaner nationalist. 207  He attributes this to the unprecedented economic growth and 
prosperity of the time, the establishment of the Republic of South Africa in 1961, and the 
confirmation of the political dominance of the Afrikaner volk under Verwoerd’s government 
(1958-1966). By 1961 75% of the entire Afrikaner community were urbanised and determined 
to obtain employment that offered stable financial prospects.208 Direct foreign investment grew 
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from $3 billion in 1960 to nearly $8 billion by the end of the decade.209  Technological 
advancements in agriculture, manufacturing and the mining sector, the establishment and 
development of tertiary learning institutions, and the exploitation of cheap black labour ensured 
that South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product rose from $7.36 billion in 1960 to $28.45 billion 
in 1973.210 South Africa’s Gross External Debt remained relatively low at $3.2 billion.211 
Forty-eight thousand white, skilled immigrants moved to SA from 1960 to 1966, providing 
new labour and capital.212 South Africa’s economy as a result grew at an unprecedented annual 
rate of 5.5% from 1960 to 1970.213 The National Party was determined to use any means 
necessary to demonstrate that the country was a modern, Westernised state. This perception 
would guarantee and strengthen diplomatic ties with other Westernised states, contributing to 
the economy in terms of tourism and white immigration. However, more significantly, the 
capitalist connections with the West would ensure the protection of South Africa’s social and 
political status. 
Hoor My Lied (Hear My Song) was released for distribution on 6 November 1967; it was 
developed by Tommie Meyer, directed by Elmo De Witt and distributed by Sterfilms, and 
promoted the economic and technological prosperity of the modern Afrikaner.214 Hoor My Lied 
premiered at the Voortrekker Monument on 24 September 1967. Fifty-thousand people 
attended the premier, thus exceeding the previous world record held by Doodkry is Min.215 The 
musical was produced and marketed for both the local and international market, reflecting 
South Africa as a tourist utopia with a highly modernised economic industry. Renowned for 
being the first Afrikaans film to generate box office revenues exceeding R1 million,216 the 
production was highly praised, particularly by the Afrikaans media.217 Naspers suggested that 
the production projected a ‘Hollywood’ ambience, since many of the scenes were filmed in 
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New York. The Transvaler, for example, argued that the success of Hoor My Lied could be 
attributed to its emulation of both Afrikaans and international film characteristics.218 The 
production surpassed The Sound of Music (1965) as the most successful film ever exhibited in 
South Africa, making 1967/68 Kavaliers’ most profitable financial year (R137 531 profit).219     
Hoor My Lied is centred on the lives of Dr Dawid Retief (Gè Korsten), who practises at Groote 
Schuur Hospital, and his daughter Marietjie (Lindie Roux).  They were both involved in a 
serious car accident and suffered serious injuries; Marietjie was paralysed, whilst Dawid 
sustained a head injury that would render him blind in the space of two years. Lydia de Graaf 
(Helga van Wyk), a nurse also employed at the hospital, was deemed responsible for the 
accident and engulfed in feelings of guilt. De Graaf subsequently decided that she would 
provide emotional support for Dawid and Marietjie. Dr Retief, seeking specialised medical 
help and accompanied by De Graaf, took Marietjie to New York in an attempt to get her 
walking again. However, Marietjie’s medical care is expensive and Dr Retief’s eyesight was 
worsening. Left with no alternative, Retief concluded that the best means of generating an 
income was by singing in concerts. During a concert Marietjie was overwhelmed by shock 
when her father completely lost his vision. The extent of her shock was so great that she rose 
from her chair, thus regaining her ability to walk.220   
As discussed in Chapter One, the modernisation of the South African economy led to the 
urbanisation and potential upward social mobility of the Afrikaner. These idealistic aspirations 
of the volk were reflected in Hoor My Lied. Dr Dawid Retief symbolises the new professional 
identity and socio-economic mobilisation of the Afrikaner. A globalised atmosphere is 
projected in the film since many scenes are located in New York. Initially situated in Cape 
Town, the film portrays the city as a utopia embodying the integration of economic modernity 
and traditional Afrikaner values. Eustacia J. Riley argues that this balance is achieved by scenes 
emphasising the serenity of Cape Town’s outdoor activities.221 Hoor My Lied, for example, 
utilises the Cape landscape such as Table Mountain, the sea and Cape flora to construct this 
sense of tranquillity. This is a fairly uncommon feature as the urban environment is usually 
depicted as a bustling, even dangerous, milieu, as seen in films such as Scarface (1932), Citizen 
                                                            
218 Die Transvaler, December 31, 1966. “Kavalier‐Films Gaan in VSA Skiet“, p. 2. 
219Approximately R9,9 million in 2016.GLD, HBT, 191. KAV. 4. (1/13), Annual Report: “Voorsittersverslag”, 30 
June 1968, p. 2. GLD, HBT, 191. KAV. 4. (1/12), Annual Report: “Voorsittersverslag”, 30 June 1968, p. 1. 
220 Andre I. Le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Pretoria, 1982), p. 93. 
221 Eustacia J. Riley, From Matieland to Mothercity: Landscape, Identity and Place in Feature Films set in the 
Cape Province, 1947‐1989 (Unpublished PhD, University of Cape Town, 2012), p. 75. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
Kane (1941) and as late as Gangs of New York (2002). Hoor My Lied reflects an optimistic and 
idealised perspective of South Africa as it deliberately avoids depicting the actual levels of 
poverty and tension – particularly in the African communities in the social and political 
discourse of the races. In fact, the absence of any form of black political agency in Hoor My 
Lied is evident. For instance, Caeser (a black South African) is employed as a 
gardener/housekeeper serving in the Retief household. 222  The film identifies the new 
independent republic as a peaceful Westernised state, endorsing South Africa as a society 
which assures employment opportunities for all and a glamorous lifestyle. White leisure culture 
in Cape Town is shown in numerous seaside scenes (driving on speedboats, for example).223 
One’s attention is also focused on the country’s modern infrastructure and architecture (Groote 
Schuur Hospital, Hospital Bend and Settler’s Way), 224  emphasising economic and 
technological development. The representation of Cape Town promotes South Africa as a 
tourist destination, whilst simultaneously encouraging Afrikaner urbanisation and white 
immigration. 
Hoor My Lied conveys the relationship between Afrikaner traditional values and industrial 
advancement in an economically transitional society. In 1981 the Vereniging van Vollengte 
Rolprentvervaardigers van Suid-Afrika 225  maintained that Hoor My Lied is a “subtle yet 
effective propaganda-weapon… it stimulates [Afrikaans] culture and music [and] provides 
financial, cultural and political advantages.”226  
Conclusion 
Government subsidisation provided the necessary capital for the industry to expand. The 
subsidy amendments made by the Department of Trade and Industries suggests that the 
government wanted the Afrikaans film to compete with foreign productions. It is undeniable 
that subsidisation was an absolute necessity, considering the size and heterogeneity of South 
Africa’s market. The possibility of expansion increased when Sanlam (Satbel) and the 
Schlesinger Organisation acquired Twentieth-Century-Fox’s film interests. The localisation of 
South Africa’s distribution interests made the circulation of Afrikaans films an aspect of 
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corporate social responsibility. Furthermore, the size and nature of the Afrikaans market 
encouraged conservative entertainment, as endorsed by the Publications Control Board, since 
Afrikaans film producers deemed films aimed at the entire household (and the lowest common 
denominator) as most profitable. However, these factors, i.e. the socio-cultural forces, 
subsidisation, localisation of the distribution and exhibition industry, censorship and the market, 
created an unstable cinematic environment. The South African cinematic environment 
encouraged quantity rather than quality (Jamie Uys’ resignation from Kavaliers serves as a 
prime example). This had to do with the impact of the PCB as well as of the market. Censorship, 
coupled with the conservative inclinations of the market, discouraged Afrikaans film producers 
from exploring a wider range of possible topics such as addressing significant themes that 
reflected the true nature of South Africa. This is not to suggest that the inclusion of 
controversial themes (whether liberal, communist, etc.) is the only criterion of a quality film; 
however, censorship and the market limited what the film companies could produce and made 
Afrikaans films superficial.  
An additional factor can be attributed to the distribution and exhibition of Afrikaans films. 
Twentieth-Century-Fox only distributed films according to their potential financial merits, 
regardless of the country of origin. The profitability of a film determined its selection. Satbel, 
encouraged by the socio-economic demands of the government and the market, felt it had a 
social responsibility to increase the distribution of Afrikaans films. Finally, though 
amendments were made, state subsidies were exploited by companies whose main objective 
was to generate a profit rather than to contribute to the expansion of a viable industry.  
Lastly, Kavaliers, an industry leader, mirrored the context of the South African film producing 
industry. The company aimed to produce as many films as possible within the shortest practical 
timeframe, thus setting a poor example for aspiring producers to follow. Consequently, the 
Afrikaans cinematic industry failed to establish an appropriate equilibrium between quantity 
and quality before the advent of television services in South Africa. 
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Chapter Three: The Lead-up to South Africa’s Television Services, c.1924 - c.1971 
 “The experience that many Afrikaner churches and cultural leaders obtained abroad was that television was an 
untamed wild horse… who would put South Africa in the saddle?” – P.J. Meyer (Former Chair of the SABC)1     
Introduction 
The Afrikaans cinematic film industry had developed significantly since the introduction of the 
subsidy scheme in 1956. However, whilst quantity increased, critics continuously maintained 
that most Afrikaans productions lacked artistic quality. This should be attributed to limitations 
stemming from factors such as the exploitation of subsidisation, censorship, the localisation of 
the distributing and exhibition industry and the market. From a corporate perspective, the 
industry was economically unstable. However, in 1971 the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications, Matthys van Rensburg, made an announcement that rattled the very core 
of the Afrikaans cinematic film industry: a television service was to be introduced in South 
Africa. This chapter aims to provide the reader the backstory of SABC-TV, i.e. economic, 
technical and political factors which ultimately shaped the preparation, qualities and 
characteristics of local Television broadcasts and the latter’s influence on local cinema. This 
section reflects on the lead-up to the introduction of South Africa’s television services from 
1924 to 1971 by looking at the early development of television (TV) and TV broadcasting, the 
reasons for South Africa not immediately adopting a television-service, and the formation and 
expansion of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). The history of the SABC’s 
radio services during South Afric’s pre-TV era necessitates a discussion as the statutorily-
controlled television service was integrated into the broadcaster’s existing radio service. This 
will be followed by a discussion of the influence of politics in delaying the introduction of 
television and the factors which ultimately contributed to the government’s decision to 
implement the service. This chapter does not provide a detailed account of the extensive and 
drawn-out debate on the decision to introduce South Africa’s TV services (particularly between 
the ruling NP and the opposition party, the UP).2 Only the most significant contours are 
reflected upon in this thesis, such as the effects of SABC-TV, rather than the process of its 
introduction. The operations of the Meyer Commission, responsible for investigating and 
                                                            
1 P.J. Meyer, Nog nie vêr genoeg nie: ‘n Persoonlike rekenskap van vyftig jaar georganiseerde Afrikanerskap, 
(Johannesburg: Perskor, 1984), p. 144. 
2 For a more comprehensive discussion of the debates, see Carin Bevan’s Putting Up Screens: A history of 
Television in South Africa, 1929‐1976 (2008), P.J. Meyer’s Nog nie vêr genoeg nie: ‘n Persoonlike rekenskap van 
vyftig jaar georganiseerde Afrikanerskap (1984) and Ivor Wilkins & Hans Strydom’s The Super Afrikaners: Inside 
the Afrikaner Broederbond (2012).  
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reporting on the most economic and politically effective TV system to adopt (an element which 
contributed to the popularity and, therefore, success and impact of SABC-TV), will be 
discussed. A section will consider what the Meyer Commission thought about how television 
would affect the South African cinematic film industry.  
“Little Black Box”3 
The German engineer Paul Gottlieb Nipkow invented the first device foreshadowing the 
modern-day television in 1884.4 His apparatus, named the electromechanical television, was 
able to scan and send images over short distances (photoconductivity). In 1923 Vladimir 
Zworykin (a Russian inventor and engineer) developed the iconoscope (a camera tube), a 
significant milestone as the device was the first that could be utilised for broadcasting.5 In the 
same year Zworykin engineered the kinescope,6 a cathode-ray tube used in TV receivers. 
However, according to the reports of the SABC, the name synonymous with pioneering 
television broadcasting is the one of Scottish inventor, John Logie Baird. Baird experimented 
with Nipkow’s scanning apparatus in an endeavour to develop the invention into a broadcasting 
medium. In February 1924 Baird illustrated to Radio Times (a British radio programme listings 
magazine) that a mechanical apparatus was capable of transmitting silhouette pictures.7 On 25 
March 1925 the inventor provided the first public demonstration of this.8 On 26 January 1926, 
with The Times present, Baird demonstrated his invention to members of the Royal Institution 
of Great Britain.9 The first long-distance television transmission,10 initiated by the American-
based group, AT&T Bell Labs, was made in April 1927, with pictures telecasted from 
Washington D.C. and received in New York.11 A month later and not to be outdone, Baird 
transmitted a signal 705 km between London and Glasgow by means of a telephone line. After 
                                                            
3 A metaphor for television used by Dr Albert Hertzog, who resisted its introduction.   
4 J.B. du Toit, Televisieskyn en Werklikheid: Die omstrede medium, (Kaapstad: Tafelberg Uitgewers, 1994), 109. 
Coenraad J. Coetzee, Aspekte van die Geskiedenis van Jamie Uys Film Produksies/ Kavalier Films Beperk, c. 
1969‐1979: Kommersiële Opportuniste of Kultureel/Ideologiese Entrepreneurs?, (Ongepubliseerde Honneurs, 
Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 2014), p. 41.  
5 Robert Thomas, “Vladimir Zworykin, Television Pioneer, Dies at 92”, New York Times, 1 August 1982, 
Accessed: August 5, 2016: http://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/01/obituaries/vladimir‐zworykin‐television‐
pioneer‐dies‐at‐92.html.      
6 Not to be confused with Thomas Edison’s kinetoscope. Also known as telerecording. 
7 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Historic Figures: John Logie Baird (1888‐1946)”, Accessed: August 2, 2016: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/baird_logie.shtml.        
8 In London. Ibid.  
9 A London‐based institution for scientific research and education. British Broadcasting Corporation, “Historic 
Figures: John Logie Baird (1888‐1946)”, Accessed: August 2, 2016: .         
10 Approximately 320 km.   
11 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC, 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 99. 
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establishing the Baird Television Development Company Ltd (Baird’s TV Company), Baird 
oversaw the first transatlantic transmission (London to New York) in 1928. On 3 July 1928 the 
inventor demonstrated the first colour transmission.12 In the same year WGY,13 a radio outlet 
of the multinational American conglomerate company, General Electric, obtained the first 
license to operate an experimental broadcasting station in the USA.14 During 1929-1932 the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) experimentally transmitted television programmes by 
means of the Baird broadcasting system.15 In 1930 the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) 
and Columbia Broadcasting Services (CBS) erected the second and third stations, respectively, 
in the USA. The world’s first official, regularly scheduled television transmissions were 
broadcast by the BBC in 1936.16 NBC’s radio outlet, W2XBS,17 was the first American station 
to transmit a regular programme in 1939.18  
Television Broadcasting in South Africa  
 
Illustration 7: The SABC’s Television Park in Auckland Park, Johannesburg19  
                                                            
12 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Historic Figures: John Logie Baird (1888‐1946)”, Accessed: August 2, 2016: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/baird_logie.shtml.          
13 Abbreviation for Wireless General Electric in Schenectady.  
14 Michael, Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the 
SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 99. 
15 The broadcast images received were made up of thirty lines.  
16 The Baird system was ultimately replaced with the all‐electronic system developed by EMI‐Marconi under 
the leadership of the Russian, (later Sir) Isaac Schoenberg.  Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, 
The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 99.  
17 Later known as WNBT.  
18 The BBC and NBC would adopt the electronic broadcasting television‐system, invented in the late 1930s. The 
electronic system was technologically superior to the outdated mechanical system. Michael Theunissen, Victor 
Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent 
Graphics, 1996), p. 99. 
19 Coenraad J. Coetzee, Photo of the SABC’s Television Park, Auckland Park (Johannesburg), 2016.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
94 
 
The first TV demonstration in South Africa was presented in Cape Town, 1929, by the Vice-
President, Angus Kennedy, and other representatives of Baird’s TV Company.20 However, the 
chairperson of African Broadcasting Corporation (at the time, South Africa’s only radio 
broadcaster), I.W. Schlesinger, stated that, as a result of economic and broadcasting conditions 
in South Africa (to be discussed in more detail below), the country could not introduce and 
maintain a television service. Later, both the government and the SABC maintained that 
television services could only commence in South Africa once local radio broadcasting had 
achieved its full technological potential.21   
For reasons that will be explained, the state reasoned that the South African TV industry had 
to be managed by a public operator. The introduction of television services in South Africa had 
been investigated as early as 1937. On 12 May 1937 Rene Caprara, a former Director-General 
of the SABC, visited the BBC to research the possibility of a television service. But because 
of the difficulties around expenditure (maintenance) of such a service and the distribution of 
programmes, the introduction of television services was postponed. TV was again considered 
during the 1950s but postponed again, as the communication medium was deemed not 
affordable. The paramount factor that had to be taken into consideration was the 
audience/market. The SABC and the government had to decide whether enough South Africans 
had an interest in television, and/or could afford to acquire a television set. For example, the 
number of viewers required for a successful TV launch was over a quarter of a million, whilst 
a TV license and set would cost £5 and £10022 respectively.23 The BBC, for instance, had 
established a public television service on 22 August 1932.24 By 1935 only 2000 televisors were 
in use.25 A modified and cheaper service26 was introduced in 1936, but the BBC managed to 
sell only 3 000 TV sets in two years.27  Considering the nature of South Africa’s economic 
development up until the 1960s, coupled with the costs of acquiring a TV set and paying the 
license fee, the success of South African television was dependent on the country’s small white 
                                                            
20 However, though the demonstration had been a success, the equipment needed for the demonstration had 
been damaged in transportation. Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: 
The Sixty Year History of the SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 98. 
21 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 1.  
22 These figures apply to the 1950s.  
23 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC, 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 102. 
24 BBC News, “How did broadcasting begin?”, 22 March 2001, Accessed: 8 March 2017: .  
25 The price of a TV was equivalent to that of a small car.    
26 The Marconi/EMI system replaced the Baird Televisors.   
27 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC, 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 99. 
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minority. The socio-economic rise of the Afrikaner during the first half of the twentieth century 
and the increased availability of electricity28 played a significant role in the growth of a 
technological consumer society in South Africa and, as such, the delay of TV’s introduction. 
One has to refrain from stating, at least from a corporate perspective, that the postponement of 
the introduction of a South African television service had a “purely political” basis,29 though 
this was a most significant factor (particularly after the 1950s). Furthermore, the necessary 
technological experience to establish a TV network had to be obtained. For example, South 
Africa’s average population density was low and communities were widely spread across the 
country. Technologies had to be developed in order to effectively distribute television 
broadcasts to white South Africans – and later, the black communities. Wide-spread 
communication, according to the SABC’s Chairperson P.J. Meyer (1959-1981), would be 
achieved only after South Africa’s radio service had fully developed. South African radio 
broadcasting, in terms of technical considerations (as will be seen), was regarded as the 
blueprint or basis “for the much more limited and much, much more expensive TV service.”30 
When the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Matthys van Rensburg, officially commissioned 
an inquiry into South African television in December 1969, he stated that the proposed service 
had to be integrated with the existing radio services.31  
Formation of the SABC, 1924-1936 
The commonalities between radio and television can be explained in the form of an overview 
of broadcasting history in South Africa. Broadcasting in South Africa commenced in 1924, 
before the formation of the SABC. The first commercial radio broadcast in the world was made 
on 2 November 1920 by the KDKA station (headed by Dr Frank Conrad) in Pittsburgh, USA.32 
The principal manufacturers of radio apparatus in the United Kingdom formed the British 
Broadcasting Company Ltd in 1922.33 John Reith, a Scottish Calvinist and an important figure 
                                                            
28 The electricity public utility, the Electricity Supply Commission (currently known as Eskom), was established 
only on 1 March 1923 through the Electricity Act of 1922.   
29Jack Boddington, “The Wonderful Phenomenon of Television”, Nexus 73 (2013), 
http://oasisretirementresort.co.za/wp‐content/uploads/2013/07/Nexus‐Newsletter‐July‐2013‐PDF.pdf.       
30 P.J. Meyer, Nog nie vêr genoeg nie: ‘n Persoonlike rekenskap van vyftig jaar georganiseerde Afrikanerskap, 
(Johannesburg: Perskor, 1984), p. 143. 
31 South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the 
SABC, 1969, p. 9. (See bibliography for information provided by the SABC)  
32Radio was used before as a one‐to‐one method of communication, especially in the First World War (1914‐
1918), but had never been used commercially. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): 
“Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 21 September 1956, p. 1. 
33 BBC News, “How did broadcasting begin?”. 22 March 2001, Accessed: August 10, 2016:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/1146543.stm.    
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in the establishment of the SABC, was appointed General Manager of the BBC in December 
1922.34 Meanwhile in South Africa, experimental broadcasts (licensed by the Postmaster-
General) commenced in Johannesburg in 1923 under the auspices of the South African 
Railways Broadcasting Committee, supported by the Western Electric Company.35 Conditions 
for commercial broadcasting in South Africa were regulated by the Postmaster-General and the 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in cooperation with the Governor-General.36 Radio listeners 
had to obtain a license from the Postmaster-General to install a receiving set and also needed a 
contract from the broadcaster. The fees – private residences were charged a maximum of £2 
per set for the service – were payable directly to the broadcaster.37  
By 1924 three independent radio broadcasters operated in the metropolitan areas of the Union: 
Johannesburg (A.S. & T. Broadcasting Company Ltd), Cape Town (Cape Peninsula Publicity 
Broadcasting Association Ltd) and Durban (Durban Corporation). However, as with the South 
Africa cinematic industry, common broadcasting difficulties emerged (expenditure, small 
market and the large size of the country) and required immediate attention and joint action. A 
formal conference, attended by representatives of the abovementioned broadcasters, was held 
on 20 November 1924. The South African Broadcasting Council was created.38 Mr J.S. Dunn, 
a Cape Town representative, was elected as the council’s chairperson.   From 1924-1927 the 
three radio broadcasting companies continued to sustain critical financial losses. A.S. & T. 
Broadcasting reasoned that the inability to make sufficient revenue to meet the expenditure 
should be ascribed to “radio pirates”– those who owned radio sets yet did not pay the license 
fees required. A.S. & T. Broadcasting generated a profit of £15.6s.4d in its first year of 
existence. In 1925, however, the company sustained a loss of £4,495. Within a space of two 
years the number of licence holders dropped from 9 000 to 5 613.39 Consequently, the Radio 
Act, 1926 became law and prohibited the use of a radio without a licence from the Postmaster-
General.40 The Act permitted the Postmaster-General, or those authorised by him, to inspect 
                                                            
34 British Broadcasting Company, “History of the BBC‐ Beginnings: Sir John Reith”, Accessed: August 2, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/historyofthebbc/research/culture/reith‐1.     
35 An American electrical engineering and manufacturing company. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, 
Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 21 September 1956, p. 1.  
36 Act No 10 of 1911.  
37Regulations and amendments made to the licensing fees would appear in the Government Gazette. The  
Postmaster‐General could withdraw a license of the listener if he perceived the act as in the interest of the 
public. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was 
created”, 21 September 1956, p. 4. 
38 Ibid., p. 6. 
39 Ibid., p. 14. 
40 Ibid.  
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the licences and apparatus of radio users on demand. If found guilty, a user could be fined a 
maximum of £5, the apparatus could be confiscated and/or the person could be prohibited from 
obtaining a licence for a specified period. The press, including newspapers such as the Rand 
Daily Mail, published and circulated articles which warned the public that the industry could 
collapse if wireless-set users failed to pay the licences.41 
But this failed to make a difference. On 31 January 1927 A.S. & T. Broadcasting was forced 
to cease its operations because of financial difficulties. The government, including the Minister 
of Posts and Telegraphs, Walter Madeley, considered nationalising the broadcasting industry 
as in the United Kingdom. When the British Broadcasting Company Ltd was established, sales 
failed to meet expectations, since listeners bought unlicensed sets or even constructed their 
own receivers. Subsequently, the British Royal Charter founded the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) on 1 January 1927.42 The BBC, a public service broadcaster, took over the 
operations of the British Broadcasting Company Ltd. 43  However, the South African 
government was reluctant to nationalise the industry, considering that the total local 
listenership did not exceed 15 000 in 1927 (less than 1% of South Africa’s white population at 
the time), compared to the United Kingdom’s 2,3 million.44 The state reasoned that the industry 
first had to develop. 
The African Broadcasting Corporation, 1927-1936 
A.S. & T. Broadcasting, before its closure, approached Walter Madeley to transfer the 
broadcast license to a figure who had revolutionised the South African cinematic film industry, 
Isidore W. Schlesinger. The state considered that South African broadcasting should be 
centralised under the management of the Schlesinger Organisation, since the company “was 
the only one which could afford immediate assistance with the talent and resources at its control 
and start broadcasting at the earliest possible date.”45 On 1 March 1927 Minister Madeley 
informed I.W. Schlesinger that the South African state would issue a broadcasting license to 
the Schlesinger Organisation, if certain conditions were met. Some of the terms included that 
Schlesinger must operate a public broadcasting organisation known as African Broadcasting 
                                                            
41 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 15. 
42 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 1. 
43 John Reith would act as Director‐General. 
44 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 20. 
45 Ibid., p. 24.  
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Company Ltd (ABC); the government can nominate two Directors to the Board; ABC was 
required to construct a more powerful broadcasting station in Johannesburg; 90% of the profits 
made should be divided equally between the state and company whilst the residue (a non-
cumulative dividend of 10%) should be allocated to shareholders; and government will 
consider transferring the Cape Peninsula Broadcasting Company and the Durban Corporation’s 
licenses, if desired, to ABC. Schlesinger approved the terms and conditions and ABC was 
established in Johannesburg (1927) with capital valued at £50 000.46 Broadcasting services 
commenced on 1 April 1927. 
I.W. Schlesinger, however, maintained that ABC’s operations would be uneconomical if the 
Durban Corporation and the Cape Peninsula Broadcasting Company (CPBC) broadcast 
independently. In May 1927 both the Durban Corporation and CPBC willingly accepted 
Schlesinger’s proposal to be purchased by ABC as the companies could not sustain any further 
losses. ABC managed to effectively centralise, as happened with the film industry, South 
African radio broadcasting within a space of a few months. However, from 1927 to 1929 the 
total local listenership increased from 13 114 to only 17 225.47 The minimal increase, coupled 
with the erection of a station (10 KW medium-frequency transmitter) in Maraisburg and the 
increased transmitter power in Johannesburg, resulted in a financial deficit of £15 000 at the 
end of the 1928/29 fiscal year.48 The financial situation was problematic as ABC aimed to 
construct transmitter stations in Pretoria and Bloemfontein. Operating the proposed stations 
would require a minimum expenditure of £52 000 for the first three years and £47 000 per 
annum thereafter. 49  ABC approached the government for financial assistance (proposed 
subsidies) but failed in the endeavour. As a last resort, ABC deployed a strategy known as the 
Blue Free Voucher Scheme.  
The Blue Free Voucher Scheme was an arrangement between ABC and wireless radio set 
dealers. Radio dealers added an amount to the radios’ selling prices, which accounted for a 
listener’s license fee. The agreement also contracted radio dealers to pay ABC in bulk 
periodically. T.G.F Rhodes50 stated: “(NB) There was nothing ‘free’ about this ‘Blue Free 
                                                            
46 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 28‐31. 
47 Ibid., p. 33 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., p. 34 
50 An important figure in South African radio broadcasting who would serve on the SABC’s Board of Directors.  
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Voucher Scheme’, except the name…”51 The scheme eliminated piracy as it was impossible 
for an individual to purchase a radio set unlawfully. The scheme was a success as the number 
of license holders increased from 17 225 in 1929 to 132 283 in 1936.52 As a result, South 
African radio broadcasting expanded considerably. When ABC assumed control of radio 
broadcasting in 1927, South Africa had three medium-frequency transmitters in Johannesburg 
(1 KW), Cape Town (1½ KW) and Durban (1½ KW). ABC constructed new 1 KW stations in 
Maraisburg (as mentioned), Milnerton (1934)53, Grahamstown (1934)54 and Pietermaritzburg 
(1935);55 a 200-watt transmitter in Pretoria (1928)56 was installed; and a 1-KW station in 
Bloemfontein (1931). 57  During the negotiations between Minister Madeley and I.W. 
Schlesinger in 1927, the former stressed that ABC’s broadcasting license would only be 
renewed (in 1932) if power improvements were made to broadcasting stations in Johannesburg, 
Cape Town and Durban. Furthermore, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs stated that 
Schlesinger’s control of South African broadcasting would not exceed 10 years – in other 
words, his management would cease in 1937. However, the expansion achieved by ABC’s 
Board was a source of deliberation in the government. The state had to decide whether ABC’s 
broadcasting license should be renewed for an additional five years (1937-1942) or to 
nationalise South Africa’s radio broadcasting industry. The value of nationalising South 
African broadcasting was threefold, according to the newly appointed Minister of Posts and 
Telegraphs, Senator C.F. Clarkson and Postmaster-General Lenton: broadcasting could be 
utilised as a means of entertainment and instruction; radio was a speedy and economical source 
of communication between government and South African citizens; and the potential of 
broadcasting could be misused if operated by a private enterprise.58 However, on the other hand, 
ABC was financially stable and the broadcasts satisfied the majority of listeners.  
Minister C.F. Clarkson argued that if South African broadcasting was to be nationalised, the 
nationalisation process in the United Kingdom was the most suitable to adopt, “if adapted to 
                                                            
51 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 35. 
52 Ibid., p. 37. 
53 On the outskirts of Cape Town. 
54 To serve the Eastern Province.  
55 In Natal.  
56 The station was closed down in October of the same year, since ABC thought that the 10 KW station in 
Johannesburg was adequate. However, service in Pretoria resumed in 1930.  
57 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 40‐42. 
58 Ibid., p. 46‐47. 
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meet South African conditions.” 59  In May 1934 Prime Minister General J.B.M. Hertzog 
requested Director-General of the BBC, John Reith, to advise on the future of South African 
broadcasting. After his arrival and examination of local broadcasting, Lord Reith provided a 
report on his conclusions on 21 March 1935.60 Paragraph 12 of the report summarised his 
judgements: 
“But the service is capable of immense improvement, to a standard in fact out of recognition with 
the present, and both with respect to coverage and programme content. This observation is not a 
reflection on the present Company; I [Reith] believe Mr. Schlesinger himself would agree with 
it. He might say that he was not having a fair chance; I would reply that he never could have. 
And it is not that I overlook the radically different conditions which obtain in the Union and in, 
say, Great Britain or Germany.”61 
John Reith’s report encouraged J.B.M. Hertzog, Senator Clarkson and the majority of the 
government to nationalise the South African broadcasting industry. A public service was 
considered the most effective option as profits would be invested in the broadcaster with aim 
of enhancing and expanding the corporation’s service.62 ABC’s broadcasting license was not 
renewed when it expired on 31 March 1937.63 Schlesinger’s African Broadcasting Company 
was replaced by a public utility organisation, 64  named the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), when ABC’s operations ceased on 31 July 1936.65  Schlesinger, it must 
be stated, did not contest the governments’ intentions. The SABC commenced its broadcasting 
services on 1 August 1936 when the Broadcasting Act of 1936 (Act No. 22 of 1936) came into 
effect.66 ABC and its assets were purchased for £150 000.67 The SABC’s Board of Directors 
was appointed by the Governor-General in Council. Prof M.C. Botha (Secretary of Education) 
was elected Chairperson, H.R. Soloman (Solicitor) Vice-Chairman, and Rene Caprara (former 
                                                            
59 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 46‐47. 
60 Ibid., p. 49. 
61 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 50. 
62 In a private enterprise the main objective is accumulating profits.   
63 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, p. 53. 
64 A public organisation founded by Statute.  
65 Though ABC’s license would expire in 1937, Schlesinger stated that the new organisation could start its 
broadcasts on the date that the SABC’s board found most convenient.  
66 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1937, p. 1. 
67 Price fixed by arbitration. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1937, p. 3. 
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General Manager of ABC) Director-General of the SABC.68 One of the first ambitions of the 
SABC’s Board of Directors was to further expand South Africa’s broadcasting capabilities by 
constructing transmitters in the country’s rural communities. Table 8 indicates the number of 
listener’s licenses issued between 1926 and 1937.  
Table 8: South African Radio Listeners Licenses, 1927-193669 
Year  Company Number Increase 
1927 ABC 15 509   
1928 ABC 16 380 871
1929 ABC 17 225 845
1930 ABC 25 121 7 896
1931 ABC 39 689 14 568
1932 ABC 50 644 10 995
1933 ABC 66 611 15 967
1934 ABC 98 562 31 951
1935 ABC 132 283 33 721
1936 ABC & SABC 161 767 29 484
 
 
                                                            
68 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1937, p. 3. Michael Theunissen, Victor 
Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC (Johannesburg: Advent 
Graphics, 1996), p. 21.  
69 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, (n.p).  
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Overview and Expansion of the SABC, 1936-1969  
When the SABC assumed control of South African radio broadcasting in 1936, its Board of 
Directors (Board) had to address the issue of the language policy of the public broadcaster. 
Article 14 of the Broadcasting Act stipulated that the SABC’s radio broadcasts must 
accommodate “the interests of both the English and Afrikaans culture.”70 However, a study 
conducted by the corporation indicated that Afrikaans listeners formed only 20% of the total 
white listenership.71 The Board initially decided, to the dissatisfaction of many listeners, that 
transmission could not be separated according to language as the required expenditure was 
prohibitive. Afrikaans was therefore only used during programme announcements until 
October 1937.72 In 1937 a broadcast system with two services was established. The “A-Service” 
provided English programming and the “B-Service” (known today as Radio Sonder Grense) 
broadcast in Afrikaans.73 Upon formation of the SABC, the Board agreed to prohibit the 
broadcasting of political speeches, commercial advertising and controversial religious services. 
Censorship was strictly applied as all broadcast material was meticulously examined before 
each broadcast so as to “avoid the possibility of offending any listener group.” 74  
The financial statements of the SABC’s first annual report (1 August 1936-31 July 1937) 
indicate a total expenditure of £248,271.0s.3d, whilst the year-end surplus amounted to 
£18,814.9s.2d.75 Income over expenditure increased by 24% (compared to 1937) by the end of 
the 1938 financial year as the year-end surplus amounted to £24,712.14s.6d.76 South Africa’s 
radio listenership increased to 249 199 in 1939.77 
Ministerial Control of an Autonomous Corporation  
During the twentieth century broadcasting systems across the world were classified in three 
ways. In the USA, for example, broadcasting was managed through private initiatives.78 At the 
other end of the spectrum were the state broadcasting services located, for instance, in the 
                                                            
70 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1937, p. 12. 
71 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1937, p. 13. 
72 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 21. 
73 Arguably, the two most popular programmes in English and Afrikaans were Barry Davis and his Radio Rebels 
and Stywe Lyne respectively.  
74 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1937, p. 16. 
75 Ibid., p. 43‐44. 
76 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1938, p. 39. 
77 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 
21 September 1956, (n.p). 
78 NBC and Columbia Broadcasting Service.  
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Reichsrundfunk in Germany before the Second World War and in the Soviet Union. The third 
category is “met halfway between the two extremes of state broadcasting and private 
initiative”, 79  namely, the public utility company which was especially prominent in 
Commonwealth states.80 The SABC fits into the last category. According to the Broadcasting 
Act of 1936, the SABC could technically be considered an autonomous organisation,81 though 
the state still exercised a level of authority by means of ministerial control. As indicated, the 
Governor-General (later the State President after South Africa became a Republic) appointed 
the members of the Board of Governors with their respective job descriptions.82 As such, the 
Governor-General had the authority to elect the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the SABC. 
According to Article 2(3) of the Broadcasting Act, the Governor-General had the power to 
discharge a member if he thought that the latter was guilty of improper conduct and/or was 
incapable of effectively completing his/her responsibility. The State President acts according 
to the instructions of cabinet and the Prime Minister.83 Therefore, the final decisions, such as 
the election of the SABC’s Chairperson, were made by cabinet in the name of the Governor-
General, and later the State President. Yet cabinet was not identified as the institution of control, 
but rather the minister under whom the SABC resorts, i.e. the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 
and, after 1970, the Minister of National Education.84 The minister in fact had the authority to 
appoint and/or discharge a Board member of the SABC. Article 15(3) of the Act of 1936 
dictates that the Postmaster-General, in collaboration with the minister under whom the SABC 
resorts, had the authority to suspend the corporation’s broadcasting license.85 If the SABC 
failed to meet its broadcasting objectives, the service could be taken over by the state. With 
regard to television, Article 12 of Act 22 stipulated that the introduction of a television service 
had to be approved by the Governor-General/State President, in effect, the Minister of Posts 
and Telegraphs.86 During the course of its 80-year existence the public utility had often faced 
                                                            
79 Gideon Roos, Die Uitsaaiwese in Diens van Ons Samelewing, (Johannesburg: Suid‐Afrikaanse 
Uitsaaikorporasie, 1957), p. 2. 
80 Including the BBC. 
81 The SABC had its own independent Governing Board. According to Article 3(3), the Board had no 
responsibilities towards the ruling party or executive authority.   
82 An Act to Provide Control of Broadcasting within the Union, to Establish the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation, to Define its Function, Powers and Duties, to Amend further the Radio Act, 1928, and to Provide 
for Other Incidental Matters, Statutes of the Union of South Africa 22 (1936), p. 202. 
83 Ibid., p. 203. 
84 The change of departments will be explained below.  
85 An Act to Provide Control of Broadcasting within the Union, to Establish the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation, to Define its Function, Powers and Duties, to Amend further the Radio Act, 1928, and to Provide 
for Other Incidental Matters, Statutes of the Union of South Africa 22 (1936), p. 211. 
86 Ibid., p. 208. 
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criticism from civil society and opposition parties that it has acted as a political mouthpiece for 
a ruling party, whether the United Party, National Party or the African National Congress. The 
Second World War (1939-1945) serves as an exemplar of this situation.   
Inter Arma Silent Leges Era, 1939-1945 
On 3 September 1939 the South African Press Association (SAPA)87 received notification (at 
10:45 am) that Britain and its allies may declare war on the Axis powers.88 A programme plan, 
previously prepared for such an occurrence, was immediately put into action. As a result, Prime 
Minister Neville Chamberlain’s declaration of war (12:15 pm) was recorded and broadcast to 
the South African public by the SABC.89 The public broadcaster’s Board immediately offered 
their support for the Union’s war effort: “The board considered it their duty to cooperate on 
any means necessary to help government bring the struggle to a favourable conclusion.”90 
Upon request from the state, a daily slot was granted to the Government Information Officer 
to communicate and reflect on the status of the war.91 Speeches by political parties were still 
prohibited; however, propaganda in support of the war effort was permitted. Future Director-
General of the SABC, Gideon Roos, stated: “Inter arma silent leges,92 and in [periods of] war 
or emergencies the broadcasting service, by nature, has to temporarily abandon its traditional 
impartiality.”93 The SABC’s support of the Union’s involvement (under Smuts and the UP) in 
the Second World War in collaboration with Great Britain was met with intense resistance from 
Afrikaner nationalists (such as J.B.M Hertzog and D.F. Malan).94 As a safety precaution, 
subsidiary radio broadcasts were suspended for the duration of the war, including from studios 
located in Bloemfontein and Stellenbosch.95 Examples of programmes broadcast that promoted 
the war included The Shadow of the Swastika, We Fight On, Die Volkere Sing, Land Van Ons 
Vaders and Uit Eie Krag.96  
                                                            
87 SAPA (Suid‐Afrikaanse Persvereniging in Afrikaans), established in 1938 by major newspapers, was a non‐
governmental organisation which facilitated the circulation of national and international news.  
88 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1939, p. 3. 
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid., p. 4.  
91 The source did not specify the length.  
92 Latin Phrase for “For [among] in times of arms, the laws fall mute”.   
93 Gideon Roos, Die Uitsaaiwese in Diens van Ons Samelewing, (Johannesburg: South African Broadcasting 
Corporation, 1957), p. 9. 
94 Discussed in Chapter One.  
95 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 27. 
96 The Announcer, Gideon Roos, would become Director‐General of the Corporation.  
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In 1940 the SABC, in collaboration with the Department of Native Affairs, experimentally 
broadcast news programmes in three black languages: Xhosa, Zulu and Sotho.97 However, the 
introduction of a fuller service aimed at the black population was unhurried as the SABC 
maintained that further experimentation was required. In 1942 the Board yet again discussed 
the introduction of a local television service.98 It was considered that a TV service could be 
established if future profits are allocated to such a procedure. The decision was postponed, 
however, because of the Second World War. From 1939-1945 the SABC experienced 
considerable financial growth. The expansion can be attributed to a number of reasons, 
including the public’s interest in the war, the economic empowerment of the Afrikaner and, 
significantly, the technical development of the “A and B Services”. For example, by the end of 
1941, £211 612 was allocated to the Development Fund of the SABC and utilised to acquire 
modern broadcasting equipment, develop local talent and to enhance broadcast techniques.99 
Table 9 indicates the growth of the SABC by showing the number of listener licences issued, 
the revenue generated and profits accrued during 1939-1945.  
Table 9: Expansion of the SABC during the Second World War, 1939-1945100 
Year* Licenses Issued by Year  Revenue '£' Profit '£' 
1939 249 199 351 151 51 696
1940 283 119 442 471 74 614
1942 342 497 496 112 126 563
1943 352 654 508 093 62 138
1944 365 244 528 987 115 997
1945 373 411 550 207 87 870
 
 
                                                            
97 The service was provided as a war measure by means of special closed‐circuit broadcasts to black 
compounds. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1942, p. 7. 
98 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1942, p. 15. 
99 Ibid. 
100 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1939‐1945.  
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(*1941 is intentionally excluded from the table as that year’s revenue could not be traced. Licenses issued by 
1941 numbered 311 051)   
Commercial Broadcasting, 1945-1958  
In 1945 the Board became increasingly alarmed at the prospect that future profits could reach 
a financial ceiling 101  as broadcasting expenditure (salaries and equipment) continued to 
increase. For example, on 31 December 1944 the SABC’s staff consisted of 487 employees, a 
25% increase since 1939. The licenses issued in 1945 amounted to 8 167 as compared to 36 285 
issued in 1939.102 An increase of listener licenses fees could have been initiated as a possible 
strategy; however the SABC introduced a much more profitable option, commercial 
broadcasting.103 The Board maintained that the introduction of commercial broadcasting would 
produce quality programming, adequate salaries for broadcast staff, encourage the 
development of local talent and provide additional programming for the listener at no extra 
cost. Director-General Caprara investigated the possible prospects of local commercial 
broadcasting (known as the C-service) by observing broadcasts in Australia and New 
Zealand.104 After the government approved the introduction of commercial broadcasting and 
newly elected Director-General, Gideon Roos, had investigated broadcasting in Europe and the 
Americas in 1948, the SABC ultimately launched Springbok Radio (alternatively known as the 
                                                            
101 Evident from Table 7 (1945 compared to 1944 and 1942).  
102 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1944, p. 22. SABC, Radio Park, SABC 
Media Library, Report (T.G.F. Rhodes): “Broadcasting before the SABC was created”, 21 September 1956, (n.p). 
103 Commercial broadcasting refers to a service that collects its revenue by means of advertisements rather 
than licenses.  
104 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1946, p. 6.  
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C-service) on 1 May 1950.105 The most popular programmes were comedies (Taxi), record 
releases (Radio Juke Box), sport programmes, request programmes, quiz programmes and Eric 
Egan’s breakfast show. By December 1951 the SABC employed 1 005 staff members, the 
station’s transmitters increased from 3 in the Transvaal to 11 transmitters that broadcast to all 
densely populated areas in South Africa, approximately 600 000 licenses were issued, whilst 
the annual excess of income over expenditure amounted to £184 916 (compared to £87 870 in 
1945).106 Springbok Radio broadcast for 55 years until its dissolution on 31 December 1985. 
The dissolution was a direct result of the introduction of television broadcasts in 1976. 
Companies preferred advertising through the television medium and, as such, Springbok 
Radio’s service was rendered obsolete. Table 10 shows the growth of the SABC (1950-1958) 
after the introduction of South Africa’s commercial radio service. 
Table 10:107 Growth of the SABC after the Introduction of Springbok Radio, 1950-
1958 
Year Licenses Issued  Revenue '£' 
Commercial 
(Springbok) 
Revenue '£' 
1950 554 863 1 029 056 205 439
1952 620 085 1 482 313 559 234
1954 707 622 1 685 412 597 246
1956 779 428 1 832 965 640 180
1958 907 417 2 177 218 799 284
  
                                                            
105425 advertising contracts were signed within the first year. Cameron McClure managed Springbok Radio. 
30% of all programmes were produced by South African citizens by 1951. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media 
Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1950, p. 26.  
106 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1951, p. 37. Michael Theunissen, Victor 
Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC (Johannesburg: Advent 
Graphics, 1996), p. 33. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1951, p. 5. SABC, 
Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1945, p. 38.  
107 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1950‐1958. 
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P.J. Meyer, VHF-FM Transmissions108 and Radio Bantu,109 1959-1969 
P.J. (Piet) Meyer, Chair of the Afrikaner Broederbond, was elected as the SABC’s Chair of the 
Board of Governors in 1959.110 Meyer’s selection by Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Dr 
Albert Hertzog, was not without contention. Meyer recollects;  
“My appointment as Chair of the SABC on 1 August 1959 was greeted with a wild and relentless 
storm of words against myself by the [more liberal] English press… as frontrunner of the attacks, 
this newspaper [Sunday Times] wrote: ‘Dr P.J. Meyer, leading Broederbonder, once an admirer 
of Hitler’s Nazi regime, and now one of Dr Verwoerd’s right-hand men, has been given supreme 
control of the SABC.’”111    
Notwithstanding, Piet Meyer, would play a significant role in introducing television to the 
South African public, as will be explained. Though commercial radio broadcasts contributed 
to the SABC’s revenue, expenditures simultaneously increased as a result of an increase in staff 
salaries and lands purchased in Auckland112 and Brixton.113 As a response, Meyer enforced the 
reorganisation of the SABC’s management configuration with the “final objective of ensuring 
effective performance and control of its branches.”114 The management of the SABC was 
divided into five departments, i.e. External (Foreign) and Commercial Services, Administration, 
                                                            
108 FM is radio broadcasting using frequency modulation (FM) technology. It provides high‐fidelity sound 
regarded superior to AM transmissions. FM stations use Very High Frequencies (VHF) in their broadcasts.  
109 Generic term for radio broadcasts aimed at black South Africans.  
110 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1959, p. 3. 
111 P.J. Meyer, Nog nie vêr genoeg nie: ‘n Persoonlike rekenskap van vyftig jaar georganiseerde Afrikanerskap 
(Johannesburg: Perskor, 1984), p. 103. 
112 This site would be reserved for the SABC’s new and larger headquarters.  
113 The VHF‐FM Albert‐Hertzog tower would be constructed on this property.  
114 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1960, p. 8. 
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Finance, Planning and Development, and Programmes. 115  With reorganisation came the 
introduction of a staff training system, the finance department was enlarged and statistical 
analysis was intensified. 116  The rationalisation of the SABC centralised control of the 
Corporation’s operations. According to Graham Hayman and Ruth Tomaselli, the Director-
General Gideon Roos117 was forced out of operations by Meyer’s deployed reorganisation.118 
Fellow Broederbonders, such as Jan Swanepoel and Douglas Fuchs, had been promoted to 
fulfil roles previously managed by Roos. The External and Commercial Service (a non-
significant area, as FM services were yet to be introduced) was managed by Roos; however his 
power had been severely reduced, which ultimately led to his resignation on 31 May 1961.119  
 
Illustration 8: P.J. Meyer – Chairperson of the SABC from 1959-1981120 
Meyer accumulated executive power as the position of Director-General was abolished. Under 
Meyer’s executive control, the SABC’s programme policy differed from Roos’s. Roos 
maintained:  
“In a system like this, the broadcaster’s stance has to be objective and unbiased in cases of a 
polemic [political] nature. It does not mean, however, that all controversies should be ignored.”121  
                                                            
115 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1960, p. 8. 
116 Ruth Tomaselli, Keyan Tomaselli & Johan Muller, Currents of Power: State Broadcasting in South Africa, 
(Bellville: Anthropos, 1989), p. 62. 
117 The Director‐General originally had the last word on all operations.  
118 Ruth Tomaselli, Keyan Tomaselli & Johan Muller, Currents of Power: State Broadcasting in South Africa, 
(Bellville: Anthropos, 1989), p. 62. 
119 Ibid.  
120 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1959, p. 3. 
121 Gideon Roos, Die Uitsaaiwese in Diens van Ons Samelewing, (Johannesburg: South African Broadcasting 
Corporation, 1957), p. 8. 
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Under Roos, the SABC allocated programme time for political discussions between South 
Africa’s two white communities. Meyer, in line with the aims of state,122 prohibited such 
discussions in order to enhance the relationship between the Afrikaner and English-speaking 
whites. This resulted in the exodus of a number of senior staff members. The substantial 
reduction in staff neutralised the increase of salary expenditure. Reorganisation, coupled with 
the raising of salaries, increased broadcasting productivity.               
After the appointment of Dr P.J. Meyer the SABC immediately endeavoured to further expand 
broadcasting in South Africa to cater for the needs of rural and black listeners.123 Most of the 
broadcasting transmitters (medium-wave frequency system) were located near the larger towns 
in South Africa, leaving country listeners dissatisfied with the radio service provided. As a 
result, the SABC scheduled to establish a VHF-FM system in South Africa when the cheaper 
transistorised, portable battery-operated FM receiver (radio) was invented in the late 1950s, 
and the government approved the Corporation’s proposal in 1960.124 The Minister of Posts and 
Telegraphs, Dr Albert Hertzog, announced the introduction of the new broadcasting system on 
6 December 1960.125 From 1960 to 1967 127 transmitting stations and over 500 transmitters126 
were constructed in South Africa, including the Albert Hertzog FM Tower127 in Brixton, 
Johannesburg. 128  The majority of South Africans then gained access to the SABC’s 
broadcasting service. The VHF-FM (“Special FM Service”) broadcasting system was utilised 
by Radio South Africa129 and allowed the building of South Africa’s first regional radio 
broadcasting stations such as Radio Highveld, Radio Good Hope and Radio Port Natal.130    
                                                            
122 Discussed in Chapter Two.  
123 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1959, p. 3‐4. 
124 Portable radios (vacuum tube) were made before transistor radios, but they consumed more power 
(requiring several large batteries), were bulky and much more fragile. Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & 
Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 
1996), p. 39. 
125 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1960, p. 6. 
126 Compared to 18 transmitters at the end of the Second World War. Government provided the SABC with 
loans to establish the VHF‐FM system – approximately R40 million in total.  
127 Completed in September 1962, it was the tallest structure in Africa.  
128 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 39. 
129 National radio broadcast using FM transmission, established on 1 September 1964.  
130 Radio Highveld: Also inaugurated on 1 September 1964, covering Pretoria and the Witwatersrand. Radio 
Good Hope was established on 1 July 1965 to cover the Cape. Radio Port Natal was inaugurated on 1 May 1967 
to provide a service for Natal. The name was later changed to East Coast Radio. All the new FM stations 
broadcast commercials. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1964, p. 29. SABC, 
Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1965, p. 7. Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & 
Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 
1996), p. 50. 
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On 8 August 1952 the SABC initiated experimental broadcasts known as the Rediffusion 
Service aimed at South Africa’s black communities.131 The first broadcasts were received in 
the black township, Orlando (Johannesburg), in three native languages: Xhosa, Southern Sotho 
and Zulu. The Rediffusion Service served a dual purpose: to provide entertainment in the black 
communities’ households, thus contributing “towards the prevention of crime;”132 secondly, 
the SABC argued that the service could be utilised as an educational medium. Within the first 
year 5 650 black citizens subscribed to the service, exceeding initial estimates.133 As a result, 
the service was expanded to Orlando’s neighbouring townships Jabavu, Dube, Mofolo and 
Zondi by 1959.134 The Rediffusion Service would last until its dissolution in 1967.135 In 1959, 
after appointing P.J. Meyer as Chairman, the Board endeavoured to establish a national black 
Service. On 1 January 1960 Radio Bantu was established initially broadcasting in Xhosa, Zulu 
and South Sotho over the medium-wave frequency transmitters of the Afrikaans and English 
services. 136  By 1969 seven black radio services had been introduced on the VHF-FM 
transmitters, including Radio Zulu (1962), Radio SeSotho (1962), Radio Setswana (1962), 
Radio Lebowa (1962), Radio Tsonga (1965), Radio Venda (1965) and Radio Xhosa (1967). A 
country-wide survey undertaken by the SABC indicated that an estimated 2 million people 
listened to Radio Bantu in 1966. 137  The expansion of the black service transpired 
simultaneously with the implementation of legislation confirming the NP’s dedication to 
‘separate development’ in South Africa. In 1951 the Bantu Authorities Act was passed, 
establishing ‘homelands’ allocated to the country’s black ethnic groups. Under Hendrik 
Verwoerd’s premiership, the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 was passed – enabling 
homelands to establish themselves as quasi-independent, self-governing ‘states’. The Black 
Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 formally designated blacks, irrespective of whether they 
lived in other parts of South Africa, as citizens of these homelands.138 The SABC expanded its 
                                                            
131 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1952, p. 36. 
132 Ibid.  
133 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1953, p. 32. 
134 It was estimated that 60 000 citizens listened to the service in these townships; 12 443 households 
(averaging five people each) subscribed for the service. Receiving the Rediffusion Service differed from the 
conventional system (licenses). The programmes were provided by the SABC, but Orlando Rediffusion Co (Pty) 
Ltd distributed the service to households that subscribed to the service. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, 
Annual Reports of the SABC, 1955, p. 16. 
135 This was due to the increase of black radio broadcasts made with FM transmissions.   
136 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 75. 
137 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1966, p. 36. 
138 Pierre E.J. Brooks & Christiaan J. Thomas, “Statutory background to the economic development of the black 
homelands and peripheral areas in South Africa”, The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern 
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services to South West Africa in 1969 and broadcast in Windhoek and Oshakati in Ovambo, 
Damara and Herero.139 The Treaty of Versailles had declared South West Africa (now Namibia) 
a League of Nations Class C Mandate territory after the First World War, consequently granting 
South Africa the responsibility to administer the territory’s affairs. After the Second Word War 
Jan Smuts objected to South West Africa becoming a United Nation’s Trust Territory and 
subsequently an independent country. Instead, South Africa wished to incorporate the territory 
as a fifth province of the Union in 1946. These ambitions never materialised. However, the 
amendment of the South West Africa Affairs Act in 1949 gave representation to South West 
African whites in South Africa’s Parliament.140 Apartheid laws extended to South West Africa, 
including implementation of South African authorities’ policies of separate development and 
homeland dispensation for different ethnic groups. In accordance with the “Odendaal 
Commission/Plan”, 10 Bantustans, similar to those found in South Africa, were established.141 
Similar to all SABC services, the programmes broadcast in South West Africa were designed 
not only for entertainment purposes, but to “guide, to instruct.”142      
As stated, the FM network had to be established, developed and utilised to facilitate the 
introduction and expansion of local TV services.143 The reason is that FM masts provided 
additional space for TV aerials and most of the transmission sites could accommodate and be 
utilised as TV stations. Meyer, as a result, estimated that R8 million144 could be saved in 
expenditure if a TV service were to commence in South Africa.145 Tables 11 and 12 show the 
growth of the SABC during 1960-1969; the figures indicate how the expansion of the 
                                                            
Africa, 10 (1977), p. 133‐134. Brian H. King & Brent McCusker, “Environment and Development in the Former 
South African Bantustans”, The Geographical Journal 173 (2007), p. 7‐9.    
139 These black programmes were subsidised by the state. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual 
Reports of the SABC, 1969, p. 12. 
140 John Dugard, The South West Africa/ Namibia Dispute: Documents and Scholarly Writings on the 
Controversy between South Africa and the United Nations, (California: University of California Press, 1973), p. 
122‐125. 
141 Reinhart Kössler, “From Reserve to Homeland: Local Identities and South African Policy in Southern 
Namibia”, Journal of Southern African Studies 26 (2000), p. 456.  
142 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1969, “Programme Services for the 
Native Peoples of South West Africa”. 
143 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 1. 
144 Value in 2016 taking into account  inflation: R518 million.  
145 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 1. 
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Corporation placed the SABC on a sufficiently stable financial and technical footing 
[experience in broadcasting] to introduce a television service in South Africa.146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
146 1969 was the year that the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Matthys van Rensburg, officially 
commissioned an inquiry into the introduction of a television service.   
147 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1961‐1969. 
Table 11:147 Growth of the SABC since the Introduction of FM Transmission and 
the Black Radio Broadcasting Services, 1960-1969 
Year Licenses Issued Revenue 'R' 
1961 1 050 551 5 438 582
1964 1 279 986 9 364 178
1967 1 588 739 14 591 904
1969 1 770 486 17 215 285
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Table 12:148 The Growth of Staff in the SABC, 1937-1967 (End of Financial Year: 
March) 
Year Staff Members 
1937 209
1947 672
1957 1 308
1967 2 260
 
 
Politics and Television 
The Broadcasting Act of 1936 stipulated that the introduction of TV was a parliamentary matter. 
In 1960 Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd declared that television would not be introduced in 
South Africa. Apart from socio-political reasons, Verwoerd argued that technical factors were 
to blame, for example, he stated that colour TV had yet to be effectively developed.149 The 
official stance adopted by the SABC, as determined by Act 22 of 1936, was that the 
introduction of a local television service should continuously remain an objective. The SABC 
generally considered that the technological development of South African radio, i.e. frequency 
modulation broadcasting, was the final technical step necessary to consider before the 
implementation of TV services.150 Whilst the decision remained prerogative of the government, 
however, the SABC refrained from public debate. Throughout the 1960s the SABC explored 
the issue by means of attending international conferences 151  and launching special 
                                                            
148 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1937‐1967.  
149 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 1. 
150 Ibid.  
151 The source did not specify which ones.  
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investigations in 1962, 1965, 1967 and 1969.152 Regardless of these investigations, Cabinet’s 
approval was still required.          
The National Party’s Objections to Television  
The figure generally perceived as the sternest opponent of the introduction of television to 
South Africa was the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Dr Albert Hertzog (“Dr No”),153 
responsible for overseeing South African broadcasting from 1958 to 1968. Son of former Prime 
Minister and founder of the National Party, J.B.M. Hertzog, Albert Hertzog (former Minister 
of Health [1954-1958]) feared that television (and particularly imported films) would influence 
the public by depicting, among other things, miscegenation. Furthermore, Hertzog stated that 
the impact of television could result in black South Africans questioning their socio-economic 
and political position in the country and that the service was deemed to threaten the very nature 
of the Afrikaner household:  
“When television is introduced into a home and the children are continually seeing acts of 
violence, crime, sex crimes and immorality, it must of necessity have an adverse effect on those 
children.”154  
During the 1966 national elections the United Party (UP)155 campaigned for the introduction 
of television services in South Africa. Naturally, right-wing NP members (headed by Minister 
Albert Hertzog) strongly opposed the UP’s objective. During the election campaign the NP 
summarised the motives for the objection of TV after addressing the following question:  
“Why is the UP so serious about introducing Television in South Africa – and this whilst the 
Government is accused by the same UP of using the radio service for National Party 
propaganda?”156  
Television was deemed an influential communication medium threatening the traditional, 
nationalistic inclinations of conservative Afrikanerdom and, as such, the NP’s control of South 
                                                            
152 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 1. 
153 Bernard Cros, “Why South Africa’s Television is Only Twenty Years Old: Debating Civilisation, 1958‐1969”, 
Alizés: Revue Angliciste de La Réunion 12 (1996), p. 118.   
154 Statement made by Albert Hertzog, Hansard, Assembly Debates, 23 May 1963, as quoted by Bernard Cros, 
“Why South Africa’s Television is Only Twenty Years Old: Debating Civilisation, 1958‐1969”, Alizés: Revue 
Angliciste de La Réunion 12 (1996), p. 120.   
155 Official opposition to the National Party. Their slogan during the 1966 campaign: “Want TV? Vote UP!”  
156 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence 
from J.A. Marais (NP Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur 
Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 April 1966, p. 1.  
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Africa. The paramount concern was a possible inability to regulate the visual material projected 
by television, particularly from foreign producers. Television, according to the NP, promoted 
racial integration, would dismantle the sense of identity of South Africa’s ethnic groups and 
jeopardise the policy of separate development. Member of Parliament and far-right politician 
Jaap Marais stated that these considerations provided the “explanation for the UP’s strange 
behaviour” regarding television.157 He continued by quoting the famous English poet and 
social commentator, T.S. Eliot:  
“Television is a power that breaks the spiritual individuality and the individual thoughts of people 
and nations to the ground – a power so strong that attacks the true core of social orders.”158  
Right-wing NP members regarded television as a “ubiquitous and omnipotent hypnotist” 
through which a consumer loses his/her critical ability.159 The socio-political risks involved 
were considered too great in relation to the financial costs of establishing a local network. 
These NP members argued that the basic policy of effective governance was to govern 
according to the religion and traditional conventions of the volk. TV was thought to be an 
obvious and “hostile strategy” to undermine apartheid. 160         
Contributing to the NP’s delay to establish a local TV service was the sense of novelty 
surrounding the contentious communication medium in South Africa. By 1966 a level of 
uncertainty was evident in television industries throughout the world with regard to techniques 
and standards. For example, the USA and Britain broadcast on an NTSC system, Germany 
utilised the PAL system, and France and Russia the SECAM system.161 The NP argued that 
these states are desirous of expanding their respective systems to foreign countries as these 
countries’ television transmitters could be fed with programmes that promoted their own 
                                                            
157 Jaap Marais discussed the contentious subject during the election campaign. Marais would leave the NP in 
1969 after BJ Vorster authorised the presence of Maori players and spectators during the New Zealand rugby 
tour in 1970. He led the Herstigte Nasionale Party from 1977‐2000. SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private 
Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence from J.A. Marais (NP Parliamentarian) with 
an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 April 1966, p. 1.   
158 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence 
from J.A. Marais (NP Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur 
Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 April 1966, p. 6.   
159 Ibid., p. 10.  
160 Ibid.   
161 NTSC: National Television System Committee. It displays 60 half‐frames per second and each frame contains 
525 lines. PAL: Phase Alternating Line. It displays 50 half‐frames per second and each frame contains 625 lines. 
The PAL system is a variation of the SECAM system.  SECAM: Sequential Colour with Memory. It displays 50 
half‐frames per second and each frame contains 625 lines. It was developed in France. SAB, Minister of Home 
Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence from J.A. Marais (NP 
Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 
April 1966, p. 2.   
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interests. Countries without television would consequently be placed under immense pressure 
to adopt a particular system. According to the NP, African states that succumbed to such 
pressures and established a national TV service could not economically afford – much less 
utilise – a national service.162  
In 1966 the NP calculated that capital valued at approximately R60 million163  would be 
required to establish a local black-and-white TV service, plus an annual expenditure of R50 
million164 to maintain that service.165 Colour TV broadcasts, according to a study conducted by 
H.B.C Casimir, would prove to be six times as expensive.166 Since South Africa was an 
industrialised and aspirational Westernised country, the NP maintained that if a TV service was 
to be established, its quality had to be equivalent to British standards. However, as with the 
Afrikaans film industry, the nature of the local market was a cause for concern. The NP 
government was fully aware, because of South Africa’s socio-economic make-up, that the 
maintenance and expansion of the service was dependent on white consumers (approximately 
700 000 families in the late 1960s). 167  Furthermore, the National Party argued that the 
implementation of TV would add R200168 to these white families’ annual living expenses in 
the form of taxation and retail prices.169 Geographical issues were continuously raised: “You 
cannot compare this country to Britain. We nearly have a half million square miles and the 
introduction of television would cost this country, with its small [white] population, a 
                                                            
162 African states that introduced national TV services before 1966 included Nigeria (1959), Egypt (1960), 
Congo, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe [1961]) (1962), Morocco (1962), Gabon (1963), Cote d’Ivoire (1963), 
Kenya (1963), Sierra Leone (1963), Sudan (1963), Uganda (1963), Ethiopia (1964) and Ghana (1965). Nwulu 
Nnamdi I., Adekanbi Adeyemi , Oranugo Tochukwu & Adewale Yemi, “Television broadcasting in Africa: 
Pioneering milestones”, Paper Presented at Telecommunications Conference (HISTELCON): Second IEEE Region 
8 Conference on the History of Broadcasting, Madrid, 2010, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5735315&tag=1. SAB, Minister of Home 
Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence from J.A. Marais (NP 
Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 
April 1966, p. 2.   
163Value in 2016 taking inflation into account: R 4, 3 billion.  
164 Value in 2016 taking inflation into account: R 3, 6 billion. 
165 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence 
from J.A. Marais (NP Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur 
Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 April 1966, p. 3.   
166 Ibid., p. 4.   
167 Considering that maintaining the service would cost South Africa R300 million a year. SAB, Minister of 
Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence from J.A. Marais (NP 
Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 
April 1966, p. 5.   
168 Approximately R14 300 in 2016.   
169 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence 
from J.A. Marais (NP Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur 
Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 April 1966, p. 5.   
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fortune.”170 The government realised that, as with Springbok Radio, income could be generated 
by means of advertising revenue, yet argued that only the largest franchises could afford 
advertising expenses.171 Smaller enterprises could suffer financial losses, thus affecting the 
economy. Unfortunately, the government document did not specify to what degree these 
businesses could suffer financially.  
A Political Turning Point  
However, after the assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd in September 1966 and the consequent 
inauguration of B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister, the prospects of introducing a television service 
reached a turning point. Two different wings of political thought manifested within the ranks 
of the National Party, generally termed as a struggle between the “Verkramptes” (arch-
conservatives) and the “Verligtes” (progressive nationalists).172 Verkramptes strongly opposed 
the introduction of television and their movement was spearheaded by the Minister of Posts 
and Telegraphs (later Telecommunications), Albert Hertzog, and Chairperson of the SABC, 
Piet Meyer (appointed as Chair by Hertzog). Verligtes, who perceived that Afrikaner adaptation 
to the global spectrum was a necessity to guarantee the continuity of white political 
domination,173 were led by the Minister of Justice B.J. Vorster and supported by figures such 
as Gert Claassen (Natal Provincial Council) and Nico Malan (Administrator of the Cape 
Province). 174  Succeeding Verwoerd as Prime Minister, Vorster’s appointment led to the 
Verligte political body gaining prominence. 175  As such, policies were introduced which 
consequently infuriated the NP’s far-right members. For example, in 1968, Vorster stated that 
multiracial foreign sports teams would be permitted to travel in South Africa.176 Furthermore, 
Vorster adopted a foreign policy which aimed to strengthen diplomatic relations with other 
African countries (a topic discussed in the next chapter).  
                                                            
170 Van der Merwe, Debatte van die Volksraad (Hansard), Tweede sitting – Tweede Parlement, (Elsiesrivier: 
Nasionale Handeldrukkery Beperk, 22 May 1963), p. 6839.  
171 In 1966 TV broadcasts cost R10 000 per hour in Britain (ITV). Six minutes were granted for advertisements 
within each hour. 
172 Terms coined by academic, Willem de Klerk. Hermann Giliomee, “’Broedertwis’: Intra‐Afrikaner Conflicts in 
the Transition from Apartheid”, African Affairs 91 (1992), p. 343.    
173 This adaptation would attract the support of the generally more liberal English‐speaking white South 
Africans.  
174 Carin Bevan, Putting Up Screens: A history of Television in South Africa, 1929‐1976, (Unpublished Magister 
Hereditatis Culturaeque Scientia [MHCS], University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 106.   
175 Vorster was initially supported by both factions within the NP.  
176 Ivor Wilkins & Hans Strydom, The Super Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond, (Jeppestown: 
Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012), p. 185. 
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Tensions arose within the NP and Vorster’s working relationship with Albert Hertzog 
deteriorated as a result. In February 1968 Hertzog was removed as Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications and succeeded by the more progressive Matthys (Basie) van Rensburg.177 
After being removed from Cabinet in August 1968, Hertzog, along with a few other prominent 
NP members, formed the ultra-conservative Herstigte Nasionale Party [Re-established 
National Party] (HNP) in 1969.178 Piet Meyer, despite his dissatisfaction with the political 
policies adopted, offered his support for the NP and Vorster. Both Vorster and Meyer (acting 
as Chair) were Broederbonders, an organisation devoted to sustaining the National Party and 
its policies. Vorster confronted Meyer to choose between the policies of the Verkramptes or 
the National Party during an annual conference in 1968.179 Meyer consequently elected to 
support the ambitions of the NP. Figures of a poll conducted by The Cape Times in 1969 
demonstrated that the majority of Afrikaners and English South Africans were in favour of 
television (59% and 75% respectively). 180  The emergence of the Afrikaner middle-class 
through urbanisation and subsequent integration with the more liberal English communities are 
generally regarded as the reasons for the volk’s increased approval of political and 
technological advancements, including television.181  
Satellite Development, the Moon landing and the Question of Modernity 
Satellite television was officially launched in 1962, when the Telstar satellite relayed 
broadcasts from Europe to North America (viewed by over 100 million people).182 By 1967 a 
network of Telstar satellites was orbiting the globe that could distribute signals across the 
Americas, Europe, Asia and, most significantly, Africa. A receiving station was required if a 
country wished to receive TV signals. However, after the invention of the personal satellite 
                                                            
177 Ivor Wilkins & Hans Strydom, The Super Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond, (Jeppestown: 
Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012), p. 183. Carin Bevan, Putting Up Screens: A history of Television in South Africa, 
1929‐1976, (Unpublished MHCS, University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 107.   
178 The Albert Hertzog Tower in Johannesburg was later renamed the Brixton Tower and then the Sentech 
Tower. Ivor Wilkins & Hans Strydom, The Super Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond, (Jeppestown: 
Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012), p. 184‐185. 
179 Dan O’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948‐1994, 
(Randburg, Ohio University Press, 1996), p. 162. 
180 From the Cape Times, 17 March 1969, statistics used in Bernard Cros, “Why South Africa’s Television is Only 
Twenty Years Old: Debating Civilisation, 1958‐1969”, Alizés: Revue Angliciste de La Réunion 12 (1996), p. 127.   
181 Bernard Cros, “Why South Africa’s Television is Only Twenty Years Old: Debating Civilisation, 1958‐1969”, 
Alizés: Revue Angliciste de La Réunion 12 (1996), p. 127.   
182 Launched by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the USA. The Science News‐
Letter, “Telstar TV Satellite Launched”, 82 (1962), p. 37. Christopher Klein, “The Birth of Satellite TV, 50 years 
Ago”, History Channel, 23 July 2012. Accessed: September 1, 2016. http://www.history.com/news/the‐birth‐
of‐satellite‐tv‐50‐years‐ago.   
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dish,183 a base station was no longer a requirement. The fact that users only needed to acquire 
a television set and a satellite dish was a cause of great concern amongst NP members. Apart 
from the cinematic film industry, government’s ability to regulate imported broadcasting 
material had been eliminated. This forced the state to consider implementing a local service, 
thus satisfying the South African demand for TV, whilst simultaneously ensuring that the 
images received were regulated according to the demands of the government.  
The South African public’s interest in TV increased when the American spaceflight (Apollo 
11) landed the first humans (Neil Armstrong [commander] and Buzz Aldrin [Lunar Module 
Pilot]) on the moon on 20 July 1969 (20:18 UCT).184 Approximately six hours later (21 July 
1969 [02:56 UCT]), Armstrong would become the first to step on the lunar surface and he 
uttered the words which marked the technological advancement of humankind: “That’s one 
small step for [a] man, one giant leap for mankind.”185 Though these images were televised 
across the world, South African listeners had to rely on live radio broadcasts and the press.186 
In retrospect, the technological development of South Africa and the rest of the world – 
particularly the USA – seemed antithetical, as the global community had sent a man to the 
moon, while South Africa had yet to introduce a television service. As The Sunday Times stated: 
“The situation is becoming a source of embarrassment for the country.”187 Questions within 
the country and abroad on the level of South Africa’s modernity intensified. Questions on this 
issue surfaced even before the moon landing, but the National Party responded that such 
questions were pure propaganda and “sales pitches”.188 Nevertheless, NASA’s lunar expedition 
further isolated South Africa within the Westernised world. On 7 August 1969 The Cape Argus 
announced the results of a poll, which indicated that 96% of its readers thought that TV should 
be introduced in South Africa. 189  With domestic and foreign pressures intensifying, an 
                                                            
183 Received data transmissions and broadcasts at a user’s home.  
184 John M. Sarkissian, “On Eagle’s Wings: The Parkes Observatory’s Support of the Apollo 11 Mission”, 
Astronomical Society Australia 18 (2001), p. 287. 
185 Ibid.  
186 Some South Africans did witness a visual account of the lunar expedition. For example, a South African 
electronics company, Teledex, in association with The Rand Daily Mail, held special screenings. According to 
Carin Bevan, author of Putting up screens: a history of television in South Africa, 1929‐1976, the production 
attracted nearly 70 000 people in its first week.  
187 From the Sunday Times, 7 July 1969, quoted in Bernard Cros, “Why South Africa’s Television is Only Twenty 
Years Old: Debating Civilisation, 1958‐1969”, Alizés: Revue Angliciste de La Réunion 12 (1996), p. 128.   
188 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence 
from J.A. Marais (NP Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur 
Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 April 1966, p. 2.   
189 Carin Bevan, Putting Up Screens: A history of Television in South Africa, 1929‐1976, (Unpublished MHCS, 
University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 118.   
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Afrikaner middle class emerging to prominence; the NP’s Verligte wing gaining the 
ascendancy, technological developments advancing and the the SABC expanding, the State 
President J.J. Fouché (through Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, Basie van Rensburg) 
finally appointed the Commission of Research Regarding Matters Relating to Television 
(Meyer Commission) on 15 December 1969.190 P.J. Meyer, still acting as Chairperson of the 
SABC, was appointed head of the Commission.191  
The Meyer Commission192 
The objective of the Commission was to determine whether a television service was socially 
and economically viable in South Africa, taking the following discussion points into 
consideration:193 the heterogeneity of the country’s demographics; the possible moral damage 
that could be inflicted on the population, especially the youth; the cost of introducing and 
maintaining the service and its influence on the national economy; the effects of technological 
developments on a proposed service; 194  selecting a system that was economically and 
technically most suitable for South Africa;195 whether South Africa could develop an adequate 
number of programmes to satisfy the needs of local consumers; and the possible adverse effects 
of the service on the other media and (most important to this discussion) the South African 
cinematic film industry. 196  The Commission’s conclusions had to meet the following 
conditions: television must be a statutorily-controlled service; a bilingual service had to be 
established for the Afrikaans and English-speaking communities and a multilingual service for 
African groups; the service should not be independently operated from the radio service, i.e. it 
had to be integrated with the existing radio service; broadcasts had to be of an educational and 
cultural nature meticulously regulated by the Board, and, crucially, television broadcasts 
should not be a service that adopts cinematic film or any entertainment industry.197  The 
requirement that TV should not be an extension of the cinematic industry re-emphasises the 
importance of that industry for government. However, it was difficult to predetermine the 
actual influence of local TV services. The first meeting of the Meyer Commission was 
                                                            
190 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence 
between the SABC and the National Film Board’s chairman, F.J. de Villiers, 11 February 1970, p. 21.  
191 Ibid.  
192 Commission of Research Regarding Matters Relating to Television.  
193 Ten factors were listed; however, only those most relevant to this thesis will be discussed.  
194 For example, the possible adoption of satellite transmission stations.  
195 For example, the adoption of the PAL, SECAM or NTSC system.  
196 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. vi. 
197 Ibid.  
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scheduled for 10 February 1970 during which a questionnaire was designed within the 
framework of the abovementioned conditions.198 The questionnaire was distributed to 125 
selected institutions deemed appropriate for the investigation (including cultural organisations, 
the South African Academy for Science and Art, churches, all universities, the English 
Academy, the film industry [Satbel and Kavaliers, for example], the media, the SABC, 
agricultural and women’s organisations, the advertising industry, state departments, and unions 
and organisations representing the trade industry). 199 The organisations were invited to reflect 
on the introduction of a television service in South Africa by submitting a memorandum to be 
considered and discussed by the Commission.200  
Television’s Impact on South Africa 
After evaluating the received memoranda, the Commission concluded that the introduction of 
TV could have a positive influence on South African society in terms of the development of 
the country’s religious, cultural, social and economic dimensions. Local TV services were 
deemed to be potential instruments to counteract the images received from abroad (through 
satellite broadcasts) to guarantee “the strengthening of [South Africa’s] unique spiritual roots, 
to promote the esteem and love of the unique spiritual heritage, and to carry out and protect the 
South African lifestyle.”201 Furthermore, the Commission concluded that TV should be utilised 
as a learning mechanism within and outside of educational institutions to promote self-
development. In retrospect, it could halt the integration of South African communities and 
protect Afrikaner nationalism and preserve white political domination. The Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC), 202 in collaboration with the SABC, was instructed to research the 
prospects and possible effects of TV on South African society if and after government were to 
approve establishing a local service. Examples of the HSRC’s research areas included the 
short-term influence of television on the personal, household, social and formal relationships 
of Standard 8 boys and girls,203 and – significant for this discussion – the content and quality 
                                                            
198 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. vi. 
199 Ibid., p. 1. 
200 95 memoranda were received.  
201 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 16. 
202 Die Raad vir Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing (RGN).  
203 The key conclusions that, according to the author of the HRSC, could be drawn was that girls who watched 
TV had a greater desire to socially engage with a specific person of the opposite sex, and that boys from a 
higher and lower socio‐economic class and girls from the lower socio‐economic class who watched TV 
maintained, to a lesser extent than those who were not exposed to TV, that their behaviour matched the 
accepted norms of society. P.C. van Zyl, Die korttermyninvloed van televisie op die persoonlike, Huislike, Sosiale 
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of a sample of South African films before the introduction of local television (this will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter).204  
Technical Aspects and Financial Considerations 
The Commission concluded that the colour television system, PAL, should be used in South 
Africa.205 The reason was that if a “black-and-white” service was to initiate the service and 
later be transformed into a colour system (after seven years), the additional expenditure would 
amount to approximately R24,5 million.206 However, the service adopted had to accommodate 
black-and-white TV appliances in terms of visual and sound quality. As such, those dependent 
on cheaper sets – particularly the black communities – could also benefit from the service. The 
planning of the introduction of South African TV services was divided into two phases. Phase 
one entailed that one bilingual (Afrikaans and English) channel, known as the “white service”, 
should be transmitted largely for the white, the Coloured and Asian communities, broadcasting 
for 37 hours a week.207 Planning for a service aimed at the black communities would then 
commence. The Commission recommended that one channel should be transmitted to the 
Witwatersrand in Zulu and Sotho. It was estimated that the capital required for phase one208 
was R32 256 000209  and R16 500 000210  for the “white service” and the “Bantu service”, 
respectively.211 Revenue would be generated by a license fee (R21 per annum p/TV set),212 
excise and importation tax, sales tax on receiving equipment and advertisements (however, no 
programme was permitted to be sponsored).213  Phase two included the introduction of a 
separate service in Afrikaans and English, whilst the “Bantu service” had to be expanded to 
Durban and a Xhosa service introduced in the Eastern Cape. The Commission suggested that 
                                                            
en Formele verhoudinge van standerd agt‐seuns en ‐meisies, (Pretoria: Suid‐Afrikaanse Raad vir 
Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, Instituut vir Kommunikasienavorsing, 1979), p. 14. 
204 G. Puth, Die Inhoud en Gehalte van ‘n Steekproef Suid‐Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van Televisie, 
(Pretoria: Raad van Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, Instituut vir Kommunikasienavorsing, 1976). 
205 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 21. 
206 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R1,6 billion. SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary 
(MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake 
Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 17. 
207 Ibid., p. 21. 
208 A colour TV system that would be introduced after 3‐4 years after government’s approval. 
209 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R2 089,849 263.16. 
210 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R1 069 026 315.79. 
211 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 17. 
212 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R1 360.  
213 10% of the total broadcast time would be filled by advertisements. SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private 
Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake 
Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 17. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
124 
 
further phases could be implemented according to future electronic developments, such as 
cable TV, for example. The Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) in the USA 
and the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), of which South 
Africa was a member, were largely responsible for the development of satellite broadcasts in 
1970. As such, the Commission recommended that a satellite base station be constructed in 
phase one of the preparation for television. The base station would assist the SABC in 
monitoring imported broadcasts. The suggested capital required was estimated at R1,5 
million. 214  According to the Commission’s investigation, the SABC’s personnel had to 
increase by a thousand to accommodate phase one.215 It was expected that within the first five 
years 700 000 TV sets (350 000 colour and 350 000 black-and-white sets) would be purchased 
at a total value of R245 million; sales tax (20%) on imported appliances would amount to R24 
million, and excise and importation tax (25%) would amount to R5,25 million. The financial 
figures for phase two were not provided as the Commission thought it too early to gauge these.         
The Possible Impact on the South African Cinematic Film Industry 
The Meyer Commission was under no illusions that television would result in a decrease in 
cinema attendance and that film producers, distributors and exhibitors would consequently 
experience financial losses. Distributors and exhibitors could also sustain an economic loss as 
a result of the decline in advertising revenue.216 However, the Commission maintained that the 
South African film production industry had to be involved in the productions of TV 
programmes.217 Rather than harming the industry, the Commission believed the introduction 
of television could be a source of new opportunities if a production house wished to expand its 
business activities. Regarding the local film distribution and exhibition industry, the 
Commission suggested introducing measures to support exhibitors and distributors. Firstly, 
television broadcasts and advertising times had to be limited to the bare minimum.218 The 
Commission also considered TV a novelty, suggesting that cinema attendance would 
eventually stabilise, as had happened with film industries abroad.219 However, the Commission 
                                                            
214 Value in 2016, taking into account inflation: approximately R98 million. SAB, Minister of Home 
Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag van die Kommissie van 
Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 17. 
215 Ibid., p. 31.  
216 If companies perceived advertisements on TV to be more effective.  
217 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 41. 
218 As indicated, 37 hours a week and 10% of the total broadcasting time, respectively.  
219 A topic which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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stressed that the drive-in industry would suffer most significantly as families were expected to 
prefer TV entertainment. The Meyer Commission instructed local distributors and exhibitors 
to introduce a “strict rationalisation programme”, as implemented by Satbel, to soften the 
economic damage inflicted by the TV industry. 220  Keeping rationalisation in mind, the 
Commission strongly advocated that government’s decision to introduce a television service 
should be implemented promptly, whilst a period of at least three years had to be allowed 
between the state’s announcement and the introduction of TV; circumspection was required 
when granting building permits for the construction of additional theatres; increased cinema 
admission prices had to be permitted; and lastly, the state had to allow concessions in South 
Africa’s entertainment tax.221  
The Meyer Commission completed its report on 4 November 1970.222 As television was 
deemed a vehicle for education, South African broadcasting was relocated to the jurisdiction 
of the Department of National Education and, as such, the Minister of National Education, 
Senator J.P. van der Spuy.223 The report of the Commission of Research Regarding Matters 
Relating to Television was approved by government and on 27 April 1971 Minister van der 
Spuy officially announced that a statutorily-controlled television service, integrated into the 
SABC’s existing radio broadcasting service, would be introduced in South Africa.224  
Conclusion       
The postponement of the introduction of South African television could be attributed to a 
combination of technological, economic and – most paramount – political factors. Though 
often criticised, the formation of the SABC as a public broadcaster had arguably been the most 
effective option, considering the financial struggles sustained by private enterprises, including 
Schlesinger’s ABC, and the socio-economic context of the early twentieth century. The reason 
is that a public utility generates revenue to invest in the expansion of its services, whilst a 
private enterprise is largely influenced by the prospects of profitability. Taking this into 
account, the SABC was, as determined by the Broadcasting Act of 1936, immediately tasked 
to improve and expand radio broadcasts to all parts of South Africa, whilst being assured of 
                                                            
220 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 41. 
221 Ibid. 
222 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Correspondence 
from J.A. Marais (NP Parliamentarian) with an attached memorandum: “Die Verenigde Party en Televisie deur 
Jaap Marais, LV.”, 25 April 1966, p. 1.   
223 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1971, p. 6.  
224 Ibid.   
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government support.  One would struggle, taking the socio-economic and political environment 
created by government into consideration, to underplay the broadcasting achievements of the 
SABC since its inception in 1936 up until the introduction of regional and FM services in the 
1960s. Whilst P.J. Meyer was criticised for his conservative, nationalistic inclinations, his 
appointment (yet again considering the political context) proved to be significant as his 
reorganisation of the SABC increased productivity and as such contributed to radio 
broadcasting’s advancement, subsequently placing the SABC in a stable favourable position to 
implement television services. 
However, whereas Meyer and the National Party contributed to the advancement of local radio 
broadcasting, their political concerns simultaneously contributed to the delay in introducing a 
television service in South Africa. Act 22 of 1936 ensured indirect state control of the SABC, 
whilst giving the government the authority to decide on the future of South African TV. As 
such, the role played by the Verligtes (i.e. B.J. Vorster and Basie van Rensburg) should not be 
understated. Their stance on political adaptation, coupled with technological developments in 
television (satellite-broadcasts), the emergence of the Afrikaner middle class and the 1969 
moon landing, contributed towards Cabinet’s decision to convene the Meyer Commission. 
Subsequently, the introduction of TV was announced in 1971. In retrospect, the integration of 
TV broadcasts with the existing radio service of the SABC benefitted the Afrikaans cinematic 
film industry (producers, distributors and exhibitors). As a public utility, semi-controlled by 
the state, measures were considered to soften the financial damage inflicted by the TV service. 
However, as TV had yet to be introduced and South Africa had a unique political, economic 
and social context, the true effects remained to be seen. Though the Meyer Commission 
remained optimistic and the announcement of the introduction of TV sparked excitement across 
South Africa, the cinematic industry realised that strategies had to be created through which to 
counteract the possible financial losses caused by television. 
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Chapter Four: The Afrikaans Cinematic Film Industry and its Preparation for 
Television, c.1970 - c.1975 
“Although television was only officially launched in January 1976, test transmissions began in May 1975 – and 
South Africa was hooked.”1 
Introduction 
The Afrikaans cinematic film industry continued to expand during the 1970s and, in terms of 
the quantity of locally produced films, ultimately reached its peak in 1975, the year before the 
SABC’s television service commenced officially. Amendments were continuously made to the 
government subsidy scheme, whilst competition within South Africa’s distribution and 
exhibition industry intensified, thus threatening the monopolistic control exercised by Ster 
Films and Kinekor. Apart from the industry’s advancement, South Africa was also preparing 
for the introduction of the SABC’s television broadcasts. Therefore, the objective of this 
chapter is to illustrate how the Afrikaans cinematic film industry developed from 1970 to 1975 
and how this prepared it for the introduction of South African television. First, an overview of 
the SABC and government’s preparation for the introduction of South African television will 
be provided – factors which ultimately shaped SABC-TV’s broadcasts in and post-1976 as well 
as its impact, followed by a consideration of the influence of television on cinematic film 
industries abroad. The local cinematic film production industry will be discussed next by 
focusing on state support, profitability and censorship, and reflecting on how the industry 
prepared itself for television. Kavalier Films will once again be utilised as a case study. The 
further development of South Africa’s film distribution and exhibition industry, which involves 
its preparation for local Television services, will be expanded upon.  
Preparing for the Introduction of South African Television (SATV), 1971-1975 
Following the announcement that SATV would commence in the Republic, the SABC 
immediately convened a team of consultants to advise the public on when preparing for the 
introduction of the television service. A document containing the Meyer Commission’s 
findings was sent to 32 local and foreign TV experts and manufacturers, which in return 
evaluated the Commission’s recommendations.2 Secondly, the Television Project Committee,3 
a group consisting of members of the SABC’s Board of Directors, was established to plan and 
                                                            
1 Michael, Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC, 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 102. 
2 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1971, p. 7.  
3 Project Committee in short.   
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administer the launch of the service.4 The Project Committee was responsible for overseeing 
the appointment and training of personnel (447 persons were employed in 1972 and a TV 
training facility was completed on 1 May 1973), the establishment of an economic broadcasting 
network and the construction of a television studio complex. 5  Furthermore, a Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC) was founded at the request of government. The TAC, with J.N. 
Swanepoel (Director General and Chair of the SABC’s Executive Committee) acting as 
Chairperson, provided information to SABC management and (through the SABC’s Governing 
Body) to government regarding the “scientific, financial and technical aspects” of television.6  
The TAC’s first responsibility was to investigate the Meyer Commission’s recommendation to 
adopt the PAL system.7 The TAC supported the Commission’s finding, as the PAL system was 
deemed technically superior in comparison to the other colour systems. The PAL system was 
also most suitable for South Africa’s sparsely distributed population and its terrain and, since 
most industrialized countries utilized the system, offered the most manufacturing support.8 On 
28 October 1971 the Minister of National Education finally confirmed that South Africa would 
adopt the PAL system.9 Various other sub-committees of the TAC were appointed to determine 
the economic implications of SATV, the training of personnel, the cable systems required, the 
manufacturing and importation of receiving apparatus, and the socio-cultural makeup of South 
Africa before the introduction of TV.10 Most of the topics had already been reflected upon by 
the Meyer Commission, but what distinguishes the TAC from the Commission is that the 
former evaluated and consequently implemented the findings of the Commission. Carin Bevan 
                                                            
4 The Project Committee consisted of the following figures: D.H. Mills (Director of Technical Services), J.H.T. 
Schutte (Director of Television Programmes), G.A. de Bruyn (Director of Administration) and G.J. Yssel (Director 
of Personnel, Planning and Automation). Both Schutte and Yssel were members of the Broederbond. Ivor 
Wilkins & Hans Strydom, The Super Afrikaners: Inside the Afrikaner Broederbond, (Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, 2012), p. A1‐A139. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1971, p. 6. 
5 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1972, “Personeel aangeleenthede” and p. 
8.    
6Prominent figures within the TAC included: J.T. van Wyk (Secretary of the Department of National Education), 
L. Rive (Postmaster‐General), M.A. du Plessis (Secretary of the Department of Industry), G.J.J.F. Steyn 
(Secretary of the Department of Trade) and A.A. Middlecote (Director of the Department of Physics and 
Electronic Engineering. The TAC also consisted of members of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR/RGN), the IDC/NOK and the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS). SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media 
Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1971, p. 7. 
7 The other possibilities were the NTSC system (used in the USA) and the SECAM system (used in France).  
8 Carin Bevan, Putting Up Screens: A history of Television in South Africa, 1929‐1976, (Unpublished MHCS, 
University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 140.   
9 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1971, p. 7. 
10 Ibid., p. 7‐8. 
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provides a clear distinction in Putting Up Screens: A History of Television in South Africa, 
1929-1976:   
“The Meyer Commission’s report was intended as a research project … on how a South African 
service ‘could’ and ‘should’ look and operate. The TAC’s research was an active planning 
process that laid the groundwork for how South African Television actually ‘would’ look.”11  
Providing a television service for the black population was perhaps the most significant 
example of a divergence from the Meyer Commission’s recommendations. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, the Meyer Commission suggested that Phase one should involve the 
introduction of a TV service that catered for both white, and black communities,12 whilst Phase 
two entailed broadcasting separate channels in English and Afrikaans, and an extension of the 
black service. 13  Following a request from the government, the SABC conducted an 
investigation into the proposed black TV service and submitted an official report in 1973.14 
The conclusion was that the proposal to include the black TV service into phase one would be 
impractical and, as such, should be postponed until phase two had commenced.15 Five main 
reasons for the postponement included the issue of the training of black staff,16 the supply of 
suitable programmes for the black communities, 17  the economic position of the black 
population, the absence of electricity in black communities,18 and a lack of manufactured TV 
sets.19 Phase one therefore entailed the planning and implementation of a white service, whilst 
                                                            
11 Carin Bevan, Putting Up Screens: A history of Television in South Africa, 1929‐1976, (Unpublished MHCS, 
University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 140.   
12 A channel consisting of Afrikaans and English programmes, and a channel in Zulu and Sotho for the 
Witwatersrand area.   
13 Expanding the black service to Durban and the Eastern Cape.   
14 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 305, Addendum H5/2/3/2, Minutes: “‘n 
Televisiediens vir die Bantoe “, August 1973, p. 1. 
15 Ibid. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1974, p. 8. 
16 The SABC maintained that a service for a black audience required the training of black personnel. At that 
stage the SABC’s television training facility accommodated white trainees who were being taught by foreign 
specialists. In addition, the public broadcaster proposed that white South Africans had to train the black 
personnel, even though many of the former had yet to complete the training course themselves.  
17 The programmes that were produced and accumulated by the SABC were largely intended to satisfy the 
tastes of the white market. The SABC, which regarded the white and black populations as distinctly separate 
niche markets, argued that there was a lack of programmes suitable for black audiences. The broadcaster and 
government alike were reluctant to import films as they feared that their narratives and images might 
promote integration between different racial groups.    
18 During the early 1970s only 7% of black households (excluding Coloureds and Asian South Africans) had 
electricity.  
19 Carin Bevan, Putting Up Screens: A history of Television in South Africa, 1929‐1976, (Unpublished MHCS, 
University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 142‐145.   
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phase two was largely reserved for the preparation of a black (at the time called a ‘Bantu’) 
television service.      
The SABC aimed to start experimental broadcasts in the southern region of the Transvaal, 
scheduled to commence in 1975, and launch the official national service in January of 1976.20 
Production of television-programmes (i.e. documentaries, TV series, interviews etc.) by key 
SABC staff members began in 1972 already, since the Board deemed the process to be an 
opportunity for personnel to gain experience and, of course, to have sufficient programme 
material available once the service was ultimately introduced. By 1973 more than 50% of phase 
one had been completed, whilst 45% of the television studio complex had been constructed in 
Auckland Park, Johannesburg (the headquarters of the SABC).21 Radio facilities in Cape Town 
and Durban were renovated to accommodate the TV service, whilst regional TV facilities were 
being constructed in Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth and Polokwane (then Pietersburg).22 The 
installation of electronic equipment, valued at R14,5 million23  and sourced from 11 different 
countries, commenced.24 Eighteen TV transmission stations were constructed by 1974, whilst 
seven high-power transmitters, along with low-power transmitters, were erected in 1975.25 The 
result was that 80% of the white population, 63% of the Coloured population, 84% of the Asian 
population and 39% of the Black population (“Bantu”) were able to receive TV broadcasts.26 
In the same year the emphasis of the preparation shifted from the technical aspects that would 
provide the service to the programme material of the proposed service. The TV training 
programme, a course provided by the SABC College focusing on technological issues such as 
filming, sound, film editing, was attended by 40 students when it began in May 1973.27 In June 
1973 20 students joined the programme that focused on the production of TV programmes, 
ranging from directing to production assistance. As a result, 40 television programmes were 
completed by 10 December 1973.28 As indicated by the Meyer Commission, the SABC had to 
involve the local film production industry to compensate for the losses they would sustain when 
SATV became established. Furthermore, considering the number of programmes required to 
                                                            
20 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1972, p. 8. 
21 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1973, p. 7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R713 400 000. 
24 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1973, p. 7. 
25 Carin Bevan, Putting Up Screens: A history of Television in South Africa, 1929‐1976, (Unpublished MHCS, 
University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 149.   
26 Volkshandel, February 1975, “TV 75: ‘n Spesiale Volkshandel‐oorsig”, p. 96.  
27 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1973, p. 69. 
28 Ibid.  
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provide a complete service, it would be beneficial to involve members of the private sector as 
they had knowledge and experience of filmmaking. As such, film producers in the private 
sector, as well as the National Film Board,29 were approached by the SABC for documentary 
production purposes, while the acquisition of foreign programmes increased.30  Acquiring 
foreign programmes was deemed a necessity by the SABC’s Project Committee as a TV service 
consisting of only local productions would be too expensive. The main reason was that, 
considering that the first TV studio complex had yet to be completed, South Africa lacked the 
facilities required to produce TV programmes. 31  Local productions were dependent on 
traditional methods of filming, which were far more expensive. 32  To maintain quality 
programming, the SABC argued, required finding an equilibrium between foreign and 
domestic productions, reminiscent of the policy adopted by Satbel.  
In 1974 the SABC launched an intensive campaign to locate and asses local and foreign 
programme material. For example, 200 persons were assessed for participation in quiz shows, 
programmes specifically designed for children and women, talk shows and documentaries, 
whilst local writers were trained and involved in the production of 23 TV series.33 Two outdoor 
broadcasting vehicles were acquired, whilst two more were expected to be delivered at the start 
of 1975. These vehicles were utilised for filming the biggest sporting events of the year. 
Foreign TV producers also assisted the SABC in the development of documentaries, which 
included co-productions with Belgische Radio en Televisie, and the Nederlandse Christelijke 
Radio Vereniging. Furthermore, 76 foreign programmes were acquired in 1974 that were all 
provided with an Afrikaans soundtrack.34 The Minister of National Education announced that 
purchasing a TV licence would cost R36 a year, while TV advertisements would be permitted 
from 1 January 1978.35 The SABC’s expenditure on television in the preparation period was 
largely financed by loans which, for example, amounted to R30,8 million in 1974.36 The SABC 
was advised by the Department of National Education and Finance, as well as the South African 
                                                            
29 An organisation discussed in the next chapter.  
30 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1973, p. 7. 
31 As a point of interest, the first American sitcom to be screened in South Africa was The Brady Bunch. The 
programme made its debut whilst TV broadcasts were still being tested from May 1975 to January 1976. 
Michael, Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC, 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 102. 
32 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1973, p. 8. 
33 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1974, p. 7. 
34 Ibid., p. 8  
35 In this announcement the Minister also stated that advertisements would be allowed in the Black TV service.    
Big‐T Hamburgers was the first company to be advertised on SATV. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, 
Annual Reports of the SABC, 1974, p. 14. 
36 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1974, p. 14. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
132 
 
Reserve Bank, in determining the arrangement of loans. Total capital expenditure37 for phase 
one (“white service”) amounted to R65,4 million 38  by 31 December 1975, whilst total 
establishment expenditure39 for the same period amounted to R29,9 million.40 Whilst the 
groundwork for phase one was nearing completion, preparation for phase two, namely the 
planning of a ‘Bantu’ TV service, commenced – a topic reserved for the next chapter. 
The SABC’s experimental South African television service commenced on 5 May 1975, 
broadcasting in the areas of Johannesburg and Pretoria (later extended to other parts of the 
country).41 The SABC’s first news bulletin,42 airing on the same day as the launch, made a 
debut that, from a broadcaster’s perspective, was most favourable as it covered the Fox Street 
Siege.43 TV test transmissions were initially broadcast for an hour per day (from 1 pm to 2 pm), 
but because of the popularity of the broadcasts, transmissions were extended by an hour from 
1 October (7:30 pm to 8:30 pm).44 Not only had the experimental broadcasts ensured that a 
technological foundation was laid for the establishment of the official national TV service, it 
also provided the TV programme staff with much needed experience, promoted the sales of 
TV sets, and allowed the public an opportunity to familiarise themselves with television as 
medium. This achieved by means of individuals/households who were privileged enough to 
witness the broadcasts, but also through the South African press. For example, the February 
1975 edition of Volkshandel provided a special overview of the preparation and eventual 
introduction of SATV, which discussed the size of the market, the influence of TV on South 
African industries, technological and financial statistics, 45  the roles of various state 
departments and the Post Office, the SABC’s training facilities, whilst also providing 
commercial advice (for instance, whether one should purchase or rent a TV set or what 
                                                            
37 This included the TV broadcasting studio complex in Johannesburg, the training studio in Johannesburg, the 
outside broadcasting vehicles and transmission stations.      
38 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R2,5 billion.  
39 Establishment costs included TV staff salaries, interest, training costs, and the accumulation and production 
of TV programmes.   
40 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R1,14 billion. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media 
Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1975, p. 15. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Kobus Hamman was appointed Head of the Television News division. Hans Strydom, famous Afrikaans actor 
(currently stars as At Koster in the Afrikaans TV soap Binnelanders) became South Africa’s first TV 
commentator during the test period. Die Burger, May 6, 1975, “Hoë lof vir TV – ondanks waarskuwing”, p. 3. 
43 David Protter, a security guard at the Israeli Consulate‐General, took several hostages from the Israeli 
Embassy. He handed himself over to the Bureau for State Security nineteen hours later, but at the cost of four 
lives. 
44 Michael, Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the 
SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 103. 
45 For example, the cost of TV transmission stations was estimated at R2,4 million.   
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procedures should be followed if a TV service problem arose).46 Significant public events were 
broadcast during the experimental period, such as the inauguration of State President Nicolaas 
Johannes Diederichs. Various documentaries on prominent figures (including Isidore W. 
Schlesinger) in South Africa were produced by the SABC in 1975. However, in 1975 the 
emphasis of production fell on the making of local TV dramas which included Willem, Jordan, 
Keertyd 11:30 and The Villagers.47 Two magazine programmes, i.e. Kamera 1 and Looking In, 
and two interview programmes, Kollig and Profile, were presented weekly.48 Film producer, 
Jamie Uys, was amongst those interviewed in 1975. The TV test broadcasts were much admired 
by the press. Die Transvaler, for example, headlined with “SABC-TV passes its baptism of 
fire.”49 Die Burger argued that the SABC “set a very high standard and therefore awakened an 
interest [in television] amongst the public.”50 By the end of 1975 more than 200 000 television 
sets had been sold in South Africa. 51 It therefore became immediately clear, due to the 
popularity of television – even during SATV’s infancy - that the Afrikaans cinematic film 
industry would have to adapt its operations to face the challenges which would be presented 
post-1976. This argument is further justified when looking at the statistics presented in foreign 
case studies.  
 
Illustration 9: Hans Strydom, South Africa’s first Afrikaans news commentator52 
Influence of Television on Cinematic Film Industries Abroad 
                                                            
46 Volkshandel, February 1975, “TV 75: ‘n Spesiale Volkshandel‐oorsig”, p. 85‐119. 
47 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1975, p. 56‐58. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Die Transvaler, May 6, 1975, “SAUK‐TV slaag in vuurdoop”, p. 1. 
50 Die Burger, May 6, 1975, “Hoë lof vir die TV‐ ondanks waarskuwing”, p. 3.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Rapport, Mei 11, 1975, “Rika se kans op TV: SAUK waag met vrou”, p. 7.  
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The introduction of television services had profound effects on cinematic film industries across 
the globe, although to varying degrees. Therefore, the timing of SATV’s introduction was 
beneficial for the local industry as film producers, exhibitors and distributors, as well as 
government, could utilise industries in other countries as case studies/models to best prepare 
for television services in South Africa. This was an option that many other industrialised 
Western countries (such as the USA or Europe) did not have. In 1948 four networks, i.e. the 
Dumont Television Network,53 the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the Columbia 
Broadcasting Service (CBS) and the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC), along with 25 
stations were established in the United States.54 In the same year effective commercial TV 
services were launched which gave the industry unprecedented prominence.55 Before this 
broadcasting companies had relied on token charges made for experimental transmissions. The 
American TV industry realised that substantial revenue could be generated through advertising. 
Commercial rates were increased by 40% and the quality of programmes rose accordingly.56 
What followed was a boom in the American TV industry. By 1950 the USA had 104 TV 
stations and was broadcasting to more than 1 million TV-sets (an incredible figure, considering 
that NBC had sold only 400 sets after its first five months on air in 1939/40).57 The introduction 
of the USA’s commercial services completely shook the foundations of Hollywood. By the end 
of the 1950s the number of TV sets in use increased to approximately 50 million. Television, 
according to Douglas Gomery, surpassed cinema as America’s leading mass medium. 58 
Between 1945 and 1947 annual cinema attendance averaged 3,658 million.59 From 1948 to 
1958 annual cinema attendance in the USA decreased to 1,550 million – in other words, a 
decline of 58%. From 1963 to 1968 the number fell by a further 474 million. Despite a 35% 
increase in the USA’s population, annual cinema attendance dropped by 71% within twenty 
years.60 The socio-demographic structure of the USA after the Second World War contributed 
                                                            
53 Operations ceased in 1955.  
54 Michael, Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the 
SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 101. 
55 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1A, Memorandum provided to 
the Meyer Commission: “Mankor Beleggings Bpk: Verslag namens Kinekor en Ster Organisasies”, March 1970, 
p. 1. 
56 Michael, Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the 
SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 100. 
57 Ibid., p. 99. 
58 Douglas Gomery, “The Coming of Television and the ‘Lost’ Motion Picture Audience”, Journal of Film and 
Video 37 (1985), p. 5.  
59 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1A, Memorandum provided to 
the Meyer Commission: “Mankor Beleggings Bpk: Verslag namens Kinekor en Ster Organisasies”, March 1970, 
p. 1. 
60 Ibid.  
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to the immense drop in numbers as more young couples lived in newly constructed suburbs 
and preferred entertainment in their homes.61       
Although the BBC had launched regular scheduled TV programmes in 1936, the true effects 
of TV in the United Kingdom could be calculated only after 1945. In 1939-1945 British 
transmissions were interrupted because of hostilities posed during the Second World War.62 
From 1946 to 1954, when commercial TV services were prohibited, cinema attendance 
declined by 18,1%.63 The Television Act of 1954, designed to break the TV monopoly held by 
the BBC, subsequently led to the launch of Independent Television (better known as ITV) in 
1955 and as such, it became Britain’s first independent commercial TV service.64 Additional 
commercial TV stations would be established in the years to come. The introduction of 
commercial TV services had a catastrophic impact on the British cinematic film industry as 
theatre attendance dropped by a further 55,2% by 1962 and by 31% by 1969.65 The large drop 
in cinema attendance after 1955 can be attributed to the quality of television programmes, 
which were naturally reliant on the availability of funds (similar to the cinematic film industry). 
From 1946 to 1954 the BBC made a financial loss of £10 million and therefore could not 
produce programmes that could compete with the cinema experience. 66  However, the 
introduction of ITV not only offered British viewers a larger variety of programmes, but also 
forced the BBC to increase the quality of its products so as to compete with ITV. The BBC 
subsequently garnered much praise and was awarded a second channel (BBC 2) in 1962. BBC 
2 became the first European channel to broadcast regularly in colour from 1 July 1967.67  
In West Germany, a similar pattern was manifested after the introduction of commercial TV 
services in 1953. Cinema attendance dropped by 43% after a decade and a further 32% by 
                                                            
61 Gerben Bakker, “The Economic History of the International Film Industry”, EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by 
Robert Whaples, February 10, 2008. Accessed: September 8, 2016: https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the‐economic‐
history‐of‐the‐international‐film‐industry/.      
62 Michael, Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the 
SABC, (Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 99. 
63 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1A, Memorandum provided to 
the Meyer Commission: “Mankor Beleggings Bpk: Verslag namens Kinekor en Ster Organisasies”, March 1970, 
p. 1‐2. 
64 Stuart A. Shorenstein, “Does Public Television Have a Future?”, The Wilson Quarterly 5(1981), p. 72. 
65 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1A, Memorandum provided to 
the Meyer Commission: “Mankor Beleggings Bpk: Verslag namens Kinekor en Ster Organisasies”, March 1970, 
p. 2. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Richard G. Elen, “TV Technology 8. Britain In Colour ‐ and UHF”, Screen Online, Accessed: October 5, 2016:  
http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tv/technology/technology8.html.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
136 
 
1968.68 The number of TV sets increased from 8,4 million in 1963 to 13,4 million in 1978. In 
Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), which introduced commercial TV in 1961, cinema and drive-in 
attendance fell by 56% and 64%, respectively, by 1969.69 A decrease in cinema attendance 
affected not only film exhibitors and distributors, but also film producers as distributors would 
become more selective about the films they utilized for circulation. MANKOR Beleggings 
Ltd70 argued:  
“It becomes clear that the effect of the introduction of a commercial TV service71… would be 
very serious; however, the degree would in actuality be determined by the popular public impact, 
the quality and schedules of [South Africa’s] television programmes.”72  
The early 1970s were uncertain and nervous times for many local film producers. One of the 
reasons was that most local filmmakers simply did not know what their role would be once 
SATV arrived. Many producers, including Pax Morgan (Killarney Films), Emil Nofal and Jans 
Rautenbach, as well as the National Film Board (NFB), accused the SABC of failing to clarify 
what could be expected from a South African film producer. Pax Morgan maintained that “we 
[local film producers] know as much as the public regarding the matter … we must think of 
studios and training, the type of film that should be created and the costs.”73 Jamie Uys, on the 
other hand, was less suspicious and suggested that the SABC would involve the film producing 
industry “when it [the SABC] was ready” and that preparation by producers should not be done 
too hurriedly. However, it must be stated, Uys chose to avoid making productions for television.  
“Apart from the fact that I do not like TV; it is a medium that moves too quickly [and is] too 
journalistic in a certain way. I prefer spending more time and consideration on a [cinematic] film. 
I am not interested in creating TV motion pictures.”74          
The Local Cinematic Film Production Industry, 1970-1975  
                                                            
68 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1A, Memorandum provided to 
the Meyer Commission: “Mankor Beleggings Bpk: Verslag namens Kinekor en Ster Organisasies”, March 1970, 
p. 3. 
69 Ibid.  
70In 1964 Sanlam obtained a controlling interest in Maganese Corporation Ltd. The company managed 
Sanlam’s industrial activities. Its name was changed to MANKOR Beleggeings Ltd. Randall Adams, Die ver‐Suid‐
Afrikanisering van die Suid‐Afrikaanse ekonomie: ’n Studie van SANLAM (1918‐1980), (Ongepubliseerde M.A., 
Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 2011), p. 84. 
71 SATV generated income through TV license fees and commercials.   
72 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 12, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1A, Memorandum provided to 
the Meyer Commission: “Mankor Beleggings Bpk: Verslag namens Kinekor en Ster Organisasies”, March 1970, 
p. 3. 
73 Rapport, May 30, 1971, “Filmbase agterdogtig oor SAUK”, p. 11.   
74 Ibid.    
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At the start of the 1970s the most successful South African motion picture producers were 
Mimosa Films, Emil Nofal Film Productions, Kavalier Films and Killarney Films.75 These 
production companies, however, deployed differing strategies as a means of generating box 
office successes. Mimosa and Emil Nofal’s productions relied on quality over quantity, whilst 
Killarney and particularly Kavaliers produced films at a rapid tempo to ensure that if a film 
was unsuccessful, the next production could make up for the financial losses sustained. On 27 
October 1971 the Board of Trade and Industry launched an investigation to determine whether 
the “nature” and “scope” of the subsidy scheme (which had been amended in 1969) was most 
“effective” and could be “justified” considering that the NP tried to minimise government 
expenditure (approximately R5 million76 had been paid in subsidies since the introduction of 
the scheme).77 The study, completed in March 1972, investigated the 35 South African films 
that were produced in 1967-1970. The need for government subsidy remained undisputed, as 
the report again emphasised the local films’ cultural and political (diplomatic) value. 78 The 
Board reported:  
“In the absence of such [local] entertainment, [South Africa] will inevitably revert to the 
volksvreemde79 to the detriment of [our] unique development.”80  
Furthermore, South African films made a considerable economic contribution; for example, 
the admission fees (of the abovementioned 35 films) paid by the South African public 
amounted to approximately R8,5 million, thus representing a substantial saving in foreign 
exchange.81 Thirdly, keeping in mind that South African films would not be profitable without 
state intervention, the state considered the possible impact that South African television could 
                                                            
75 Mimosa Films, formed in 1964; Bill and Boet Troskie, along with Jamie Uys, would make some of the most 
successful films to be produced in South Africa. Not only would Mimosa find success locally, but films such as 
Dirkie/Lost in the Desert (1971), Beautiful People (1974) and Funny People (1976) would enjoy international 
success. According to Keyan Tomaselli, Katrina grossed approximately R900 000 (R58 million in 2016). Keyan 
Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 41.  
Some of Killarney’s films include Taxi (1970) and The Men from the Ministry (1971). SAB, Home Affairs: Film 
Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Correspondence from L.J. Visser: “Staatshulp aan die 
rolprentbedryf”. 31 August 1972, p. 1. 
76 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R320 million.  
77 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
Rolprentbedryf”, 24 May 1972, p. 1 and p. 10. 
78 Even though very few South African productions were circulated internationally.   
79 Lit. “what is foreign to the nation”; dependence on foreign product would mean that that people will be 
exposed to foreign values and images.  
80 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
Rolprentbedryf”, 24 May 1972, p. 8. 
81 Ibid.  
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have on the survival of the cinematic film industry.82 The government concluded that an 
abolition of, or drastic reduction in, subsidy pay-outs would impair the industry’s preparation 
for SATV as the state wished to involve local film producers in the production of TV 
programmes. The Board of Trade and Industry elaborated on this:  
“A situation can easily emerge in which the [local] TV service, as with early cinematic 
entertainment,83 could be overwhelmed by foreign productions to the detriment of our country’s 
traditions, language and culture.”84 
Though the number remained vastly less than the influx of foreign productions, the quantity of 
local motion pictures had increased significantly. However, questions around the quality of 
Afrikaans films persisted. Critics (e.g. SA Film Weekly, arguably the toughest) argued that local 
films lacked quality as the scheme continued to attract inexperienced filmmakers and business 
opportunists. For example, in 1974 Michael Venables wrote in a review in Showmail85 entitled 
“Why Subsidise this Rubbish?” expressing the view that “as a taxpayer, I am disgusted that the 
state should be wasting money on subsidising this sort of trash. On this evidence anyone who 
hadn’t seen an Afrikaans film recently would think no progress had been made for 25 years.”86 
The solution, critics believed, was to ease censorship regulations, whilst the qualification figure 
of R50 000 (in GBO revenue) had to be significantly increased. However, counterarguments, 
made by figures such as H.J. Terblanche (Chair of the Gennootskap vir die Handhawing van 
Afrikaans), suggested that critics attached an “exaggerated significance” to a few poorly 
executed films and that art and/or entertainment would always be of  fluctuating quality.87 
Though the Board concluded that a drastic change in the subsidy scheme would be erroneous, 
an amendment was still required to minimise state expenditure and to enhance the quality of 
South African productions. An amendment, the government argued, had to be introduced which 
was least demanding in terms of costs and administration.88 Increasing the GBO qualification 
figure was discarded as an option. In the period 1967-1970 only 4 out of 39 South African 
productions failed to qualify for government subsidies. Had the qualification figure been raised 
                                                            
82 This point will be expanded upon below.  
83 Before the subsidy was introduced.  
84 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
Rolprentbedryf”, 24 May 1972, p. 9. 
85 He was reviewing the Afrikaans film, Suster Teresa (1974). 
86 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 7, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 5, Newspaper article in Showmail: 
“Why subsidise this rubbish?” (N/D), (n.p.). 
87 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report 1753 of the Board of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p. 10. 
88 Ibid., p. 11. 
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to R100 000 (during this period), a further 4 motion pictures would have failed to meet the 
requirements for subsidy regulations.89 The government felt that the increased number of films 
failing to qualify of too little significance considering the risk involved, i.e. placing a damper 
on the tempo of South Africa’s film production.  
Table 13:90 Films that would not Qualify for Subsidy if GBO qualification was raised to 
R100 000, 1967-1970  
Name Producer GBO revenue *R Subsidy Received *R
Vrolike Vrydag Heyns-Advert Films 55 323 2 820
 
Die Onwettige Huwelik Protea Film Produksies 66 461 9 746
 
Satan’s Harvest Killarney Film 77 439 13 132
 
The Jackals Killarney Film 80 651 13 242
 
The state, therefore, concluded that subsidies should be paid according to a film’s net box office 
revenue (NBO) rather than its GBO. 91  The amendment was deemed to eliminate the 
administrative hassle of dissimilar taxation tariffs in different parts of South Africa. 92 
Furthermore, calculating subsidies according to NBO revenue prevented producers’ subsidy 
returns to differ from possible future amendments in recreation and/or cinematographic taxes.93 
According to the Board, the new scheme would save the Department of Trade and Industry an 
estimated 15% in subsidy payments.94 In the interests of quality, the Board of Trade and 
Industry suggested that the subsidy qualification figure should be increased from R50 000 in 
                                                            
89 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report 1753 of the Board of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p. 12. 
90 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
Rolprentbedryf”, 24 May 1972, p. 13. 
91 Both GBO and NBO were listed in the returns of exhibitors that were presented for subsidy purposes. SAB, 
Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Correspondence: “Ondersoek na die 
winsgewendheid van die plaaslike rolprentbedryf”, 30 September 1973, p. 1. 
92 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
Rolprentbedryf”, 24 May 1972, p. 12. 
93 Ibid.  
94 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Correspondence: 
“Ondersoek na die winsgewendheid van die plaaslike rolprentbedryf”, 30 September 1973, p. 1. 
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GBO revenue to R50 000 in NBO returns.95 Amendments to the subsidy scheme applied from 
1 April 1973 and within the first year saved government between 17% and 18% in film subsidy 
payments.96 Table 14 demonstrates the actual profits generated by three local filmmakers (from 
1967-1970) versus the profits they would have generated if calculated according to NBO 
returns.97 
Table 14:98 Actual Profits of Three Local Film Producers, 1967-1970 (In Rand) 
Company 
Total 
Films 
Total 
Production 
Costs 
Total 
Income 
Net Profit Subsidy Received 
Amount 
% of 
Production Amount 
% of 
Production 
Kavalier Films 10 1 920 722 2 214 463 291 741 15,1 1 374 689 71,6
Mimosa Films 2 466 572 656 491 189 919 40,7 427 188 91,6
Emil Nofal 
Produksies 3 735 813 963 811 227 998 30,1 595 888 81,0
Profits of Three Local Film Producers if based on Net Box Office Revenue, 1967-1970 (In Rand) 
Company 
Total 
Films 
Total 
Production 
Costs 
Total 
Income 
Net Profit Subsidy Received 
Amount 
% of 
Production Amount 
% of 
Production
Kavalier Films 10 1 920 722 2 147 063 226 341 11,8 1 309 289 68,2
Mimosa Films 2 466 572 588 418 121 846 26,1 359 115 77,0
Emil Nofal 
Produksies 3 735 813 928 986 193 173 26,3 561 063 76,3
 
The Vereniging van Vollengte Rolprentvervaardigers van Suid-Afrika (VVRSA) 
                                                            
95 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
Rolprentbedryf”, 24 May 1972, p. 20. 
96 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Correspondence: 
“Ondersoek na die winsgewendheid van die plaaslike rolprentbedryf”, 30 September 1973, p. 1‐2. 
97 Table 14 illustrates the figures which ultimately convinced the government to amend the subsidy scheme. 
98 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 1, Minutes: “Staatshulp aan die 
Rolprentbedryf”, 24 May 1972, p. 15‐16. 
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On 30 September 1972 the Department of Trade and Industries (DTI) distributed circular N. 
101/3/1 to notify the industry of the amendments made to the subsidy scheme. 99  Some 
filmmakers were dissatisfied with the reduction of subsidy pay-outs and as a response, founded 
the Vereniging van Vollengte Rolprentvervaardigers van Suid-Afrika (VVRSA) on 17 October 
1972.100 The VVRSA was established to serve as a channel of communication between state 
and local filmmakers in which producers could effectively reflect on the subsidy scheme and 
voice any objections, if required. Ben Vlok, Managing Director of Kavalier Films, was 
appointed Chairman of the Association.101 Reacting to government’s circular, the Association 
made the following suggestions: the qualification figure of R50 000 in NBO revenue had to be 
increased to R100 000; the subsidy rates for Afrikaans and English films should be increased 
from 55% to 65% and 44% to 52% respectively; government needed to consider an increased 
subsidy bearing in mind the introduction of SATV; and lastly the government had to consider 
a substantial subsidy for locally produced films distributed in foreign countries.102  These 
suggestions, as indicated, did not materialise. However, though the VVRSA failed in its initial 
efforts, the Association would become a body of great influence after local television services 
commenced in South Africa. 
Profitability and Expenditure of the Cinematic Production Industry  
On 30 April 1975 the Minister of Home Affairs Connie Mulder requested the Board of Trade 
and Industry to investigate the efficiency of government’s incentives in expanding the film 
industry.103 The profitability of the cinematic industry was based on 60 randomly selected films 
released from 1970 to 1974.104 Approximately 66% of locally produced films were profitable, 
whilst 26% generated profits exceeding 50%.105 Remuneration for labour accounted for the 
largest share of production expenditure: 29,8% to permanent employees and 5,9% to part-time 
labour. Actors’ and actresses’ salaries amounted to 3,4% while the technical and production 
                                                            
99 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Memorandum provided by 
the Vereniging van Vollengte Rolprentvervaardigers: “Memorandum insake finansiële hulp aan die plaaslike 
rolprentbedryf”, 25 October 1972, p. 1. 
100 Association of Feature Film Producers of South Africa. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 01. 
Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Memorandum provided by the Vereniging van Vollengte 
Rolprentvervaardigers: “Memorandum insake finansiële hulp aan die plaaslike rolprentbedryf”, 25 October 
1972, p. 1. 
101 Ibid., p. 4.  
102 Ibid., p. 1‐4.  
103 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report 1753 of the Board of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p. 1. 
104 The names of these films were not specified.  
105 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report 1753 of the Board of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p. 1. 
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staff, regarded as “most essential in film producing” and accounting for 133 of a total of 244 
employees, received 17,6% of total expenditure. 106  Production artists and the 
development/print of film constituted 5,3% and 16,9% respectively. The remaining 
expenditure components amounted to less than 5% each regarding production expenses.107 
Government considered the profits and number of Afrikaans films produced since the 
introduction of the first subsidy scheme as “entirely satisfactory.”108 The profitability of film 
production companies was measured in relation to production costs rather than fixed assets. To 
reduce the financial risks involved, most Afrikaans producers preferred renting film equipment 
and studio facilities, whilst permanent employment was kept to a bare minimum. Calculating 
the industry’s profitability according to fixed assets would therefore provide an impractical 
conclusion. A study conducted by the Association valued the average GBO revenue generated 
by a South African production at R280 000,109 whilst the revenue of foreign films distributed 
in SA was estimated to be R70 000.110 The Board of Trade and Industry claimed that local  
productions earned 17% of the total GBO revenue in South Africa.112  
                                                            
106 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report 1753 of the Board of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p. 6. 
107 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report 1753 of the Board of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p. 7. 
108 Ibid., p. 6.  
109 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R11,8 million.  
110 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R3 million. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry 
(BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report 1753 of the Board of Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die 
Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p. 13. 
111 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report 1753 of the Board of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 21 December 1976, p.7. 
112 Ibid.  
Table 15:111 Profits as Percentage of Expenditure, 1970-1974  
Size-Group (%) Number of Films 
100 to 165 8 
50 to 99 6 
20 to 49 11 
10 to 19 8 
0 to 9 2 
(-) 9 to 0 1 
(-) 19 to (-) 10 1 
(-) 39 to (-) 20 7 
(-) 99 to (-) 40 9 
Results unknown 7 
Total Films 60 
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Despite the adjustments made to the subsidy scheme that were introduced in April 1973, 
subsidy payments did increase from 1974 to 1975. Two reasons largely account for this. After 
the international success of Dirkie/Lost in the Desert (1971), Jamie Uys, in association with 
Mimosa Films, produced the highly successful feature, Beautiful People (also known as 
Animals Are Beautiful People). Beautiful People was filmed as a wildlife documentary in the 
Kalahari, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia.  According to Mimosa,113 Beautiful People 
(1974) demonstrates “how the wild kingdom and the human world mirror each other. Part 
comedy, part drama, part adventure, part tragedy, part romance, part action, part educational – 
the picture, essentially, is a combination of genres.”114 Production lasted 18 months, costs 
amounted to over a million dollars and over 800 000 meters of film was used to capture the 
wildlife scenes.115 Jamie Uys, in association with the American company, Paramount Pictures, 
edited the film to produce a final product which was 3 000 meters in length, and Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer distributed Beautiful People in the international market.116 By 1975 the filmed 
grossed over R3 million in South Africa: 117 “At just one South African bioscope it sold more 
tickets than an average Afrikaans movie grosses nationally.”118 Success, however, was not only 
limited to South African audiences; for example, the motion picture set an attendance record 
in Bangkok; Beautiful People’s GBO revenue was twice that of Star Wars (1977) in Hong 
Kong; within a space of three weeks the film made $525 000 in Los Angeles; and by 1980 it 
had earned approximately $15 million in total.119 In 1974 Beautiful People was awarded the 
Golden Globe for Best Documentary by the Hollywood Press Association.120  
                                                            
113 Currently known as Mimosa Film Group. 
114 Mimosa Film Group, “Beautiful People (aka Animals are Beautiful People)”, Accessed: October 10, 2016: 
http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/Archive/Film/76/beautiful‐people‐aka‐animals‐are‐beautiful‐people‐.    
115 Ibid. Andre le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 147. Mimosa Film Group, “Beautiful People (aka Animals are Beautiful 
People)”, Accessed: October 10, 2016: http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/Archive/Film/76/beautiful‐people‐aka‐
animals‐are‐beautiful‐people‐.    
116 Andre le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 147. 
117 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R127 million.  
118 Mimosa Film Group, “Beautiful People (aka Animals are Beautiful People)”, Accessed: October 10, 2016: 
http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/Archive/Film/76/beautiful‐people‐aka‐animals‐are‐beautiful‐people‐.     
119 Ibid.  
120 Andre le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 147. 
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Illustration 10: Mimosa’s film studio in Johannesburg in the 1960s.121 
 
Illustration 11: Jamie Uys filming Beautiful People.122 
The unprecedented success of the film, however, caused temporary panic amongst local film 
producers. According to Keyan Tomaselli, Beautiful People received a subsidy pay-out of over 
R700 000 – an unexpected amount that government had failed to budget for.123 Consequently, 
the Board of Trade and Industry, under its Chairman, Basjan Kleu, was forced to freeze subsidy 
payments until the Budget of 1975.124 Ben Vlok, head of the VVRSA, subsequently stated that 
“bankruptcy is everyone’s fate” and as such, immediately organised negotiations with the 
state.125  An article which appeared in the Afrikaans newspaper Rapport, however, was less 
sympathetic, suggesting that Afrikaners’ (and the Afrikaans press) were becoming more critical 
when it came to the quality of Afrikaans films. A section of the article reflects on the freezing 
of subsidy pay-outs in 1974:  
                                                            
121 Mimosa Film Group, “Welcome to Mimosa Films”, Accessed: 15 March 2017: 
http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/.  
122 Mimosa Film Group, “Feature Films – Beautiful People (aka Animals are Beautiful People)”, Accessed: 15 
March 2017: http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/Feature/76/beautiful‐people‐aka‐animals‐are‐beautiful‐people‐.  
123 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R29,7 million. 
Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 
36. 
124 Rapport, 3 November 1974, “Rolprente”, p. 14.  
125 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 7, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 5, Newspaper Article in the 
Rapport: “Filmbase gered uit penarie”, 10 November 1974, p. 23.  
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“Yet it would be good if this step led to a little self-examination. In recent years, it seems, the 
accumulation of a ‘quick-buck’ has become the principal objective for some of our film 
producers… Even the most credulous public can only tolerate so many dud works before losing 
their confidence in the entire industry.”126  
Before the 1970s most major newspapers opted not to be critical of South Africa’s film 
production industry in its entirety. According to Tomaselli, the Afrikaans press did not reflect 
on themes in depth, whilst English newspapers purposefully avoided condemning Afrikaans 
films to avoid accusations of what Robert Greig (The Star) described as “boerehaat” (hatred 
of Boers/Afrikaners).127 The Board of Trade and Industry responded positively to the requests 
of the VVRSA. Surplus money accumulated from other departments were utilised to subsidise 
local films until the next state budget.128 The total subsidy paid in 1974/75 was R2,57 million, 
i.e. a million rand more than was originally appropriated.129 
The second cause for the increased subsidisation of local films was the extraordinary upsurge 
regarding the quantity of Afrikaans and English motion pictures released in 1974/75 (28 films) 
and 1975/76 (26 films). Leon van Nierop argues in his book Daar Doer in die Fliek that the 
increase of locally produced films should be attributed to the advent of SATV: “The 1970s 
were characterised by the fact that many directors were preparing for television and 
subsequently used films as a place of training.”130 On the other hand, since the influence of 
television could only be speculated, some local filmmakers sought to secure as much revenue 
as possible to be in a strong financial position once SATV had eventually arrived. Table 16 
shows the number of local Afrikaans and English films produced from 1969 to 1975. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
126 Rapport, 3 November 1974, “Rolprente”, p. 14 
127 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 102. 
128 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 7, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 5, Newspaper Article in the 
Rapport: “Filmbase gered uit penarie”, 10 November 1974, p. 23. 
129 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 7, Addendum: N101/3/1 Volume 3, Circular: “Rolprente Vrygestel”, 
1983, (n.p). 
130 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 186. 
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Table 16:131 Films in Circulation, 1969/70-1975/76 
Fiscal 
Year  
Number According to Language Subsidy Paid to all 
Locally Produced 
Films (Rand) Afrikaans English Total 
1969/70 9 3 5
12
18
23
13
28
26
741 961
1970/71 5 7 1 364 383
1971/72 11 7 963 087
1972/73 18 5 1 450 860
1973/74 9 4 1 513 732
1974/75 24 4 2 566 590
1975/76 20 6 2 900 637
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Influence of Censorship on the South African Production Industry   
Chapter One discussed the PCB broadly, whilst the films Debbie (1965) and Katrina (1968) 
were utilised as case studies to provide an example of how government influenced what South 
Africans could see on the silver screen. Another case study, Kavalier Films’ The Liberators 
(1972), will be used as an example below. However, what follows is an account of the impact 
of censorship on South African films in the period 1972-1974 to demonstrate the conservatism 
(regarding themes) that manifested in film production, derived from various ideological aspects 
of apartheid during South Africa’s pre-TV era. This section is included as these conservative 
                                                            
131 Table 16’s purpose is to illustrate the increase in films produced by the local industry as they prepared for 
SATV, despite the amendments made which lessened government’s subsidy payouts. SAB, Home Affairs: Film 
Industry (BNF), 7, Addendum: N101/3/1 Volume 3, Circular: “Rolprente Vrygestel”, 1983, (n.p). 
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attitudes continued post-1976 and played an integral part in limiting the industry regarding the 
formulation of strategies to counter the financial threats posed by SABC-TV as will be 
expanded upon in Chapter Five. This will be evaluated in four categories, i.e. sexual intercourse, 
crime, violence and race relations/integration. The information is derived from a study 
conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council’s (HSRC/RGN): Die inhoud en gehalte 
van ‘n steekproef Suid-Afrikaanse rolprente voor die instelling van Televisie in 1976.132 The 
investigation was undertaken on the instructions of the Meyer Commission in 1971 (paragraph 
141 and repeated in paragraph 411).133 Seven local films produced in 1972, seven local films 
produced in 1973 and ten local films produced in 1974, were randomly selected for 
examination.134  
The results provided were extremely detailed, particularly regarding scenes depicting sexual 
intercourse. From 1972 to 1974 the HSRC established that there were zero sexually explicit 
scenes in local films; however, in 1974 three scenes (out of 24 films) contained images which 
were deemed “risky”.135 A point of interest is that there were no scenes of, or references to, 
homosexuality, categorised under sexual intercourse, in any of the films selected for 
investigation. References to sex were few: 13 scenes in total.136 What South African censorship 
had prohibited in the 1970s is in complete contrast in comparison to what is accepted in local 
films produced in the new millennium. For example, the Afrikaans teen comedies Poena is 
Koning (2006) and Bakgat (2008)137 would never have been allowed distribution during the 
apartheid period. The HSRC/RGN reported that none of the films produced in 1972-1974 
contained any scenes in which racial integration were promoted.138  The following tables 
                                                            
132 “The content and quality of a sample of South African films before the introduction of television.” 
133 SAB, Minister of Home Affairs/Private Secretary (MES), 163, Addendum: H3/5, Volume 3, Report: “Verslag 
van die Kommissie van Ondersoek Insake Aangeleenthede Betreffende Televisie”, 4 November 1970, p. 47. 
134 G. Puth, Die Inhoud en Gehalte van ‘n Steekproef Suid‐Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van Televisie, 
(Pretoria: Raad van Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 1976), p. 27. 
135 This does not suggest scenes of intercourse or nudity. G. Puth, Die Inhoud en Gehalte van ‘n Steekproef 
Suid‐Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van Televisie, (Pretoria: Raad van Geesteswetenskaplike 
Navorsing, 1976), p. 36. 
136There were five references to sex outside marriage, five to sex before marriage and 3 to sex during a 
marriage.  G. Puth, Die Inhoud en Gehalte van ‘n Steekproef Suid‐Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van 
Televisie, (Pretoria: Raad van Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 1976), p. 36. 
137 Poena is Koning depicts scenes of nudity and has sexual references from the beginning. Poena (Robbie 
Wessels), the main character, is a school pupil who in one scene wishes to have sexual intercourse with his 
teacher (she also appears nude in the scene). In Bakgat there is a simple hand gesture that would have caused 
controversy, as two young school pupils, celebrating a situation, yell “Skêr‐Kwagga!” (Scissor it buddy!) whilst 
using a hand gesture depicting sexual relations between two females.        
138 G. Puth, Die Inhoud en Gehalte van ‘n Steekproef Suid‐Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van Televisie, 
(Pretoria: Raad van Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 1976), p. 32. 
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indicate the level of violence (Table 17) and criminal activities (Table 18) depicted in films 
produced in South Africa. 
Table 17:139 Violence Depicted in Locally Produced Films, 1972-1974. 
Year 1972 1973 1974 Total
Number of Films 7 7 10 24
Number of Scenes 46 27 61 134
Average per film 6,6 3,9 6,1 5,6
 
 
A conclusion can be drawn that censorship, along with market taste, had made violence and 
criminal activities more acceptable than scenes portraying sexual intercourse and racial mixing 
– the latter being most threatening to Afrikaner nationalism and, as such, white rule in South 
Africa. The investigation once again illustrated the importance of family-friendly 
entertainment (“Gesinsvriendelikheid” and age restrictions, discussed in Chapter Two) for 
producers of Afrikaans productions. For example, the study indicated that 44,4% of English 
                                                            
139 G. Puth, Die Inhoud en Gehalte van ‘n Steekproef Suid‐Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van Televisie, 
(Pretoria: Raad van Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 1976), p. 37. 
140 Ibid.  
Table 18:140 Criminal Activities Depicted in Locally Produced Films, 1972-1974 
Year 1972 1973 1974 Total
Number of Films 7 7 10 24
Number of Crimes 1 15 24 46
Average per film 1 2,1 2,4 1,9
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films produced depicted criminal activities as opposed to the 6,7% in Afrikaans films.141 
However, the level of violence and criminal activities reflected in the results has to be read 
against the context of South Africa in the 1970s. The violence and crimes depicted in the highly 
praised film District 9 (2009), for example, would have been deemed too robust for the South 
African market, as indicated by the Publications and Entertainments Act, No 26 of 1963 (Sub-
article 10, paragraph c).142 The strict regulations imposed on South African films still limited 
producers in converting acceptable scripts into motion pictures. This constraint, coupled with 
the fact that by 1975 South Africa had only a few experienced screenwriters (such as Willie 
van Rensburg and C.F. Beyers-Boshoff) made the development of scripts a constantly 
demanding challenge.         
Contracts between the SABC and Local Film Producers 
Film producers, as indicated, were reassured by the Meyer Commission and the TAC that the 
SABC would involve local filmmakers in the development of SATV’s programmes. 
Consequently, local producers adapted their operations to prepare for the introduction of 
television, so this was a factor contributing to the increase of local film production in 1975. 
The greatest advantage of producing a film for South African television, as opposed to cinemas, 
was that there were fewer financial risks involved. Income generated through cinemas was 
dependent on GBO figures (in other words attendance). In contrast, a contract between a 
producer and the SABC guaranteed the filmmaker a predetermined income.143 The producer, 
consequently, had to formulate a budget according to the revenue in terms of the SABC’s 
contract. However, many film producers felt dissatisfied with the level of involvement. For 
example, by 31 December 1974 the SABC had failed to approach a single local film producer 
regarding the production of TV dramas and/or entertainment series.144  Local filmmakers, 
though few in number, were only contracted for the production of TV documentaries. The 
reason was that the SABC utilised its own production facilities as well as producers from 
abroad for financial reasons and their television experience, whilst also providing existing 
                                                            
141 G. Puth, Die Inhoud en Gehalte van ‘n Steekproef Suid‐Afrikaanse Rolprente voor die Instelling van Televisie, 
(Pretoria: Raad van Geesteswetenskaplike Navorsing, 1976), p. 37. 
142 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 4, Addendum: N101/3/4/1, Volume 2, Act No 26 of 1968: “Wet op 
Publikasies en Vermaaklikheid”, 1968, p. 116‐115.  
143If ‘X’ refers to total income, ‘a’ to income per minute, ‘b’ the length of the film (in minutes) and ‘c’ the total 
amount of episodes, then total payment can simply be calculated as: X= a(b) * c. For example, if a producer 
received a R100 p/minute for 7 one hour programs then the value can be determined as: x= 100(60) * 7. 
Therefore, ‘X’ equals R42 000.  
144GLD, HBT, 191 KAV 7V. (5/3) Report, “Verslag oor S.A. Televisie en die S.A. Rolprentbedryf”, December 1974, 
p.1.   
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foreign TV productions with Afrikaans soundtracks. According to Kavalier Films, local film 
producers which were employed were disappointed by the payments received from the SABC: 
“Only their expenses are covered, whilst no profits can be shown.”145  
Killarney Film Studios, a subsidiary of Satbel, produced six episodes of 15 minutes each- 
receiving R300 per minute.146 The documentaries’ investigated South African achievements, 
for example Chris Barnard’s successful heart transplant. The production house, Films of Africa, 
received R280 per minute147 for the production of 13 scientific documentaries of 30 minutes 
each.148 Themes ranged from the study of prehistoric humans to hail and lightning. Both 
Killarney and Films for Africa only managed to recover their respective film production 
expenditures. The National Film Board (NFB) produced a series of documentaries on the 
locations of South African heritage. Each program was 20-30 minutes in length and the NFB 
also received R300 per minute.149 Heyns Films received a total of R50 000150 for six half-an-
hour programmes (R8 500 per episode) which discussed the history of towns such as 
Potchefstroom and Bloemfontein.151 Both Heyns Films and the NFB sustained financial losses. 
During this period a few filmmakers began to realise the true nature of the financial damage 
that could be inflicted by the introduction of SATV as employment by the SABC was not 
guaranteed and incomes were not as large as those offered by film production for the cinema. 
A question which concluded a 1974 report of Kavalier Films (Verslag oor S.A. Televisie en die 
S.A. Rolprentbedryf), adequately summed up a local cinematic film producer’s uncertainty:  
“If this really is the case, can we [filmmakers] come to the conclusion that there will be no place 
whatsoever for the South African [cinematic] film industry in television?”152        
Kavalier Films, 1970-1975   
Kavalier Films was in its strongest financial position at the start of the 1970. All overdue 
dividends on preference shares were paid, whilst the company was also able to pay its first 
                                                            
145 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV 7V. (5/3) Report, “Verslag oor S.A. Televisie en die S.A. Rolprentbedryf”, December 
1974, p.1.   
146 Value in 2016 considering inflation: Approximately R12 700. 
GLD, HBT, 191 KAV 7V. (5/3) Report, “Verslag oor S.A. Televisie en die S.A. Rolprentbedryf”, December 1974, 
p.2.   
147 Value in 2016 considering inflation: Approximately R11 900. 
148 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV 7V. (5/3) Report, “Verslag oor S.A. Televisie en die S.A. Rolprentbedryf”, December 
1974, p.2.   
149 Ibid.  
150 Value in 2016 considering inflation: Approximately R2,1 million.  
151 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV 7V. (5/3) Report, “Verslag oor S.A. Televisie en die S.A. Rolprentbedryf”, December 
1974, p.2.   
152 Ibid. The NFB will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
151 
 
dividend in terms of common shares. This consequently enabled Kavalier Films to exceed its 
objective of releasing three films a year (the films released in 1970 included Lied in My Hart, 
Sien Jou More, Die Drie van der Merwes, Vicky and A New Life). Kavalier Films’ preparation 
for SATV, although the Meyer Commission’s report had yet to be completed at that stage, 
already began in 1970.153 In the same year Kavalier Films launched an investigation into the 
possible effects of SATV by sending director, Elmo de Witt,154 to a number of countries that 
had television services in place, including the USA, England, the Netherlands, Germany, 
France, Switzerland and Italy.155 Upon his return De Witt strongly suggested that Kavalier 
Films had to incorporate the production of TV programmes into its future operations (which 
included the modification of its film studios), a close relationship with the SABC had to be 
upheld, and the field of producing advertisements and children’s programmes (i.e. animation) 
had to be considered as an option.156 Kavalier Films subsequently adapted its older films to be 
compatible for television broadcasts and a project was launched to accumulate stories and/or 
scripts which could be converted into programmes suitable for television. Furthermore, upon 
the instructions of Chairperson, Schalk J. Botha, Kavalier Films maintained its speed of 
production as a means of building up television experience, whilst also allowing the company 
to be in a “stable financial position” once SATV arrived.157  
These strategies differed entirely from those adopted by Jamie Uys (Mimosa Films) as he was 
adamant that Afrikaans cinematic film producers should continue production by focusing on 
quality rather than quantity. This approach would enhance the chances of international 
distribution, as demonstrated by Lost in the Desert and Beautiful People. However, the 
disappointing box office returns on films such as The Hellions, coupled with Kavalier Films’ 
failure to promote and market its products internationally in 1969 and 1970, convinced its 
Board of Directors to focus the bulk of its attention on the production of films aimed at the 
South African market.158 Exceptions were, nonetheless, made when stories or scripts were 
obtained that were deemed to be of international quality. In 1975, for example, Kavalier Films 
                                                            
153GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 4. (1/20) Chairman’s Report: “Voorsitterverslag vir die jaar gerverslag vir die jaar 
geëindig”, 30 June 1970, p. 2.    
154 He retired from Kavalier Films in 1973.  
155 Italy at the time had yet to introduce a colour TV system. GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 7V. (5/5) Meeting between 
Board of Directors: “Verslag van Televisie‐toer”, 25 September 1970, p. 1‐9.  
156 Ibid., p. 9‐10.  
157 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 4. (1/20) Chairman’s Report: “Voorsitterverslag vir die jaar gerverslag vir die jaar 
geëindig”, 30 June 1970, p. 2.    
158 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 4. (1/22) Chairman’s Report: “Voorsitterverslag vir die jaar gerverslag vir die jaar 
geëindig”, 26 November 1971, p. 1.    
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bought the film rights to Wilbur Smith’s The Diamond Hunters.159  Feeling optimistic and 
wanting to exploit the film’s full economic potential, the Board of Directors employed 
international actors, Hayley Mills, David McCallum and Jon Cypher. The feature, directed by 
Dirk de Villiers, was released as Diamond Hunters in South Africa, whilst being internationally 
distributed as The Kingfisher Caper by the Cinema Shares International Distribution 
Corporation.160  
On 23 February 1975 Kavalier Films celebrated its 21st anniversary.161 Schalk J. Botha, whilst 
praising not only the company but also the Afrikaner’s engagement in the economy, stated:  
“In addition to the fact that the country had experienced unprecedented economic growth within 
this [21-year] period, it was also a time in which the Afrikaans-speaking section of our population 
had for the first time taken a leading role in the business world of our country … Looking back 
at the past twenty-one years, I can boldly state with pride that Kavalier Films also made an 
important contribution to the economic aspirations of the Afrikaner.”162  
A large portion of Kavalier Films’ success should be attributed to its close connection with the 
government. During the 1970s Kavalier Films maintained its relationship with government – 
a period, according to Leon van Nierop, known for local productions dealing with South 
African military themes. 163  But this also meant that some production were completely 
discarded as their contents diverged from the political ambitions of government.  
“Die Storie op dun ys!”164 and Ses Soldate165 (1975)  
The screenplay for The Liberators was never filmed as government feared that its subject 
matters could damage South Africa’s diplomatic relations with other African states. Ivan Hall, 
screenwriter and a director of Kavaliers, provided a summary of the film in 1972: a president 
from an African state (not specified) is captured by communists in an effort to establish a new 
ideological regime in place of the existing capitalist dispensation. Five South Africans are 
                                                            
159 Smith was a renowned South African novelist. The internationally acclaimed film Gold (1975) was based on 
his work. 191 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 4. (1/22) Chairman’s Report: “Voorsitterverslag vir die jaar gerverslag vir die 
jaar geëindig”, 26 November 1971, p. 1.    
160 A US company.  
161 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 4. (1/32) Chairman’s Report: “Voorsitterverslag vir die jaar gerverslag vir die jaar 
geëindig”, 28 November 1975, p. 1.    
162 Ibid.     
163 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 185. 
164 “The story is on thin ice!” The quote refers to a statement made by H.B. Thom on the controversy around 
The Liberators.  
165 Six Soldiers. 
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instructed to rescue the president and effectively restore capitalism in the country, subsequently 
resulting in a reversal of the communist initiative. Hall defined the film as depicting a “struggle 
between imperialism and communism.”166 However, submitting the proposal to management, 
Kavalier’s Board of Directors felt the Publications Control Board might deem the film as being 
too controversial in the political context of the 1970s, when South Africa’s foreign policy 
towards African states was being reconsidered by then Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster. The 
Liberators depiction of the attempted halting of communism’s expansion was not the source 
of controversy. P.R. Nel, Vice-Chairman of Kavaliers and future mayor of Pretoria, explained 
the actual problem: “We would be blamed for making a mockery of the African countries and 
I suggest that the script should be submitted to the government.”167 
The 1970s was a politically complicated decade for the NP government as foreign hostility 
towards apartheid increased. The world had been shifting ideologically since the end of the 
Second World War, with Western states being committed to ending colonialism and the 
systematic violation of human rights; the establishment of intergovernmental organisations 
such as the United Nations in 1945 serves as an example.168 As a result, South Africa sharpened 
its defensive strategies in an endeavour to justify apartheid in a changing and increasingly 
liberal climate in order to ensure and maintain foreign relations and investments. However, 
foreign pressure intensified after the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and this played an 
increasingly significant role in undermining the apartheid political-economy in the 1980s. Even 
though internal and external pressures were escalating, hostility towards apartheid did not 
affect the country’s economic performance in absolute terms before the oil embargo applied 
by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973.169  
The lack of effect was reinforced in 1962 when the United Nations failed to impose economic 
and other sanctions against South Africa. The UN General Assembly passed a non-binding 
resolution (1761) to establish the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. However, Western 
states did not support these suggested sanctions, ultimately boycotting the committee. Other 
examples include the failure of the UK-based Anti-Apartheid Movement, which arranged an 
international conference in London in April 1964 – the International Conference for Economic 
                                                            
166 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV.1.4.49 Agendas: “Direksievergaderingsnotule”, 4 October 1972, p. 49. 
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Sanctions Against South Africa. However, the conference failed to persuade the British 
government to enforce sanctions and by 1965 the movement had lost its momentum. Britain’s 
rejection was premised on the fact that economic sanctions could risk its economic interests in 
South Africa. South Africa’s economy had also recovered from the crisis caused by the 
Sharpeville protest. Initially, investors lost their confidence in the NP’s ability to sustain 
political stability with the gold and exchange reserves decreasing by 50%, whilst the capital 
outflow was over $16.8 million per month in 1960-61.170 By 1965 confidence in South Africa’s 
economy seemed to be restored, with large sums of capital entering the country. South Africa’s 
annual GDP reflected this change: from 1950-1963 and 1962-1964, the average annual increase 
stood at an estimated 4.9% and 7.5% respectively an average increase of 2.6%.171 Thus by the 
time of the production proposal for The Liberators South Africa’s government still held the 
view that it could uphold positive relations with Westernised states and as such ensure 
economic prosperity. By 1965 South Africa had recovered from the economic turmoil of 1960-
61; most English-speaking whites accepted South Africa as a republic; the sanctions and 
boycotts had little to no effect on South Africa’s economy; internal liberation 
movements/uprisings seemed to lose their momentum; and lastly, the country was building up 
the largest military power on the continent.      
After the assassination of Hendrik Verwoerd on 6 September 1966, however, Prime Minister 
BJ Vorster (in office from 1966-1978) maintained that South Africa must adapt to the 
transitioning international political climate – but on its own terms. Jacobus A. du Pisani argues 
that “in the changed climate after the period of decolonisation it was no longer possible to talk, 
as Hertzog was still able to do, of the “backlogs” of black people compared to white people”172 
Instead, B.J. Vorster’s cabinet emphasized that separate development is premised on the 
differences amongst blacks and whites rather than racial ‘inequalities’. Vorster would develop 
a new foreign policy, which was contested by many within the National Party’s inner circle. 
However, the structures of the NP guaranteed the Prime Minister extraordinary power, thus 
allowing Vorster to implement these policies/strategies. The PM concluded that healthy 
diplomatic relations with other African states must be sustained, whilst simultaneously acting 
as the USA’s strongest ally in Africa during the Cold War (1947-1991).  
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If the African states could be persuaded to approve of South Africa’s domestic policies, other 
countries might relax their hostility towards the policy of separate development in South Africa. 
Early in his term as Prime Minister Vorster focused the attention of cabinet on the needs of 
African states, offering economic co-operation after countries such as Lesotho, Botswana and 
Swaziland gained independence. This orientation was a response founded on South Africa’s 
deteriorating balance of trade. In 1970 the state experienced a trade deficit of nearly $571 
million and hence required a stable potential market for South African exports.173 To establish 
ties with other African states (through large-scale trade) would prove to be an arduous 
undertaking because of South Africa’s racial legislation. The government, therefore, developed 
a strategy through means of dialogue focusing on states such as Malawi, the Malagasy Republic 
and particularly the Ivory Coast. Firstly, the state argued that South Africa should be regarded 
as a country rooted in Africa. As David C. Dalcanton argues: “Here was the realization that 
South Africa was not in Africa but of Africa.”174 Secondly, South Africa emphasized the point 
of mutual understanding. If South Africa is to offer economic co-operation, both parties must 
adopt a policy of non-interference thus safeguarding trade regardless of a state’s internal 
policies. South Africa, an economic and mineral giant of the continent, utilized its leverage to 
achieve diplomatic results. As such, the diplomatic objectives meant that the South African 
government needed to avoid damaging the image of African states this the reason for Kavaliers’ 
reluctance to produce The Liberators. 
Kavalier Film Production’s script committee scheduled a meeting for 30 November 1972 to 
discuss the possibility of turning the script into a film. 175  The general reaction was 
overwhelmingly negative as Managing Director, Ben Vlok, explained:  
“The script in its current form cannot be filmed as the language and action scenes are too robust; 
the cruelty will not be approved by the Publication Board; and the South African government 
might be sensitive about the contents of the script and, as such, might respond negatively for fear 
that international relations could be disturbed.”176 
However, the script was not completely discarded as Kavaliers’ secretary T Winterbach argued 
that there was still a possibility of box office success because of the controversy. On the 30 
March 1973 Kavaliers held a decisive board meeting to ultimately resolve the future of The 
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Liberators after consulting both the government and the South African Defence Force. The 
South African military was a key role player if the film was to be produced, since it possessed 
the essential military equipment for such a production. Vlok argued that numerous state 
departments, including the Department of Trade and Industry, resisted the production and 
consequently would not provide their support. Colonel Kiro-Smith labelled the script as 
“completely unacceptable” and would not provide the military equipment needed to film the 
production.177 Left with no alternative, Kavaliers finally decided to abandon the production of 
The Liberators, yet again illustrating the power that the state exercised over the film industry.          
In April 1974 Kavaliers discussed the possibility of producing a film revolving around the 
South African Defence Force and its involvement in the South African Border War (1966-
1989), preliminarily entitled Weermagstorie.178 Experience, however, indicated that a narrative 
involving the South African military required the approval and support of the Minister of 
Defence, P.W. Botha. Bertand Retief, who was appointed director of the motion picture, 
provided a draft summary to the Minister and reported that Botha permitted the production on 
condition that “certain conditions must be met. The issue is currently being investigated by the 
army and, if the case has merit, then there would be no objections regarding the filming of the 
story. Once the green light has been given, attention will be given to the screenplay.”179 
Kavaliers realised a film dealing with themes related to the war and the South African military 
required extensive planning since the border war was perceived as paramount in safeguarding 
the Afrikaner nationalists’ White Laager.  
The South African Border War/Angolan Bush War (1966-1989) was a 23-year conflict fought 
in South West Africa and Angola. South Africa and its allied forces, such as the National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), engaged in war against the South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO), the independent Angolan government (MPLA and 
FNLA),180 Cuban forces, and the ANC’s military wing uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK). The causes 
of war were threefold: a human rights struggle against the apartheid policy of institutionalised 
racial discrimination against blacks; an anti-colonial war of liberation against South Africa’s 
political occupation; and a confrontation within the framework of the political and economic 
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ideological dispute (communistic Bloc vs the free/democratic Western states) of the Cold 
War.181 
The first years of the Border war (1966-1974) could best be described, according to Leopoldt 
Scholtz, as a “low-intensity-conflict” by the time the proposal for Weermagstorie (later Ses 
Soldate) was submitted.182 Angola’s independence (November 1975), the start of the Angolan 
Civil War and South Africa’s first large-scale military invasion of Angola in 1975/76 were yet 
to transpire. Although the war was yet to reach its fighting climax, a film propagating the 
strength of the South African Defence Force and the controversial conscription campaign was 
deemed a necessity by the government. Since the end of the Second World War South Africa’s 
military power had declined as a result of the large-scale exodus of experienced English-
speaking officers. Minister of Defence, Frans Erasmus (1948-1959) should be held responsible 
for this, as his ambition was to rid the military of any “British influence” by retrenching 
English-speaking officers and appointing Afrikaners in their place. In addition, the military’s 
weaponry was largely outdated since they were used in the Second World War.183 Hence by 
the 1960s South Africa was attempting to strengthen its Defence Force by means of enforced 
military conscription and modernisation of its weaponry. The Defence Amendment Bill, passed 
on 9 June 1967, stipulated that all white South African males between the ages of 17-65 years 
had to serve in the SADF or SAP for a period of at least nine months (compulsory national 
military service was extended to 12 months in 1972).184 The need for military conscription 
could not be underestimated from a nationalist’s point of view. Compared to most Western 
powers, South Africa’s white population (1 700 000 males) was too small for a voluntary 
system to be effective. According to Leopold Scholtz, the country’s military was “converted 
into a highly mobile and experienced” unit in a space of a few years. 185  South Africa 
immediately positioned itself as the strongest military force on the continent and would 
subsequently form a diplomatic partnership with the USA in an effort to stem the expansion of 
communism in Africa. Understandably, the legislation was a cause of dismay, particularly 
amongst English-speaking males, with organisations such as the End Conscription Campaign 
(1983) established in years to follow to resist incorporation into the Defence Force. The state 
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therefore had to justify its aims regarding conscription and the anti-liberation war to guarantee 
white political support. A memorandum drafted by the VVRSA later stated:  
“SA is the one country in which the making of [military] films is a complete necessity, 
considering that war is being waged on our own doorstep [‘voorportaal’].”186       
The proposed production replicated the experiences of soldiers in the South African Defence 
Force and the latter’s involvement in the war against the guerrilla forces on the northern border. 
The film’s main objective was to motivate young South Africans to accept and support military 
conscription during the war by promoting a sense of camaraderie amongst South African 
soldiers. Renowned film writer, Leon van Nierop (Daar Doer in die Fliek [2011], Wolwedans 
in die Skemer [2012] and Ballade vir ‘n Enkeling [2015]) says that he marvels at how Ses 
Soldate distorted a soldier’s actual experiences in the SA army:  
“my military training, in the same bungalow where the film was shot and on the same parade 
ground where we were nearly drilled to death, was never as funny, enjoyable, encouraging, 
pleasant or merry as depicted in Ses Soldate.”187  
The narrative is based on the experiences of four South African recruits, Richard ‘Soutie’188 
Henderson (Richard Loring), Gottlieb ‘Liebling’ van Lieres (Lieb Bester), ‘Tiny’ Smit (Ken 
Hare) and Petrus ‘Poepies’ Pansegrau (Friedrich Stark), who are conscripted at the Danie 
Theron Combat school in Kimberley. Whilst in intensive training under ‘Sergeant’, played by 
Barry Trengove, the conscripts form an enduring friendship. The recruits, including the 
Sergeant-Major, all volunteer for border duty, where they are accompanied by a black tracker 
Chico (Sydney Chama) and sent on patrol. The soldiers come across a horrific scene as they 
arrive at a Namibian farm where a whole family was brutally murdered by the enemy. Enemy 
fire destroyed their radio, disconnecting the soldiers from base camp and military support. The 
six soldiers are ultimately required to track their way back to the camp, whilst having to 
withstand severe attacks from the enemy. They eventually do arrive at the camp, but some have 
died in the skirmishes.              
On 30 May 1974 Chairman of the script committee, H.B. Thom, stated to the Board of Directors 
that he had the opportunity to discuss the future of the production of the film with PW Botha 
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and Commandant General Hugo Bierman of the SADF. Both Botha and Bierman reasoned that 
the film could be politically beneficial and supported continued production, provided that 
Kavaliers construct a message that “promotes the [South African] military amongst the 
public.”189 A screenplay, initially called the “Die Vyf Soldate” but later retitled Ses Soldate, 
was produced and released in 1975 as a docudrama, directed by Bertand Retief, distributed by 
Ster Films and sponsored by Sanlam. Producing Ses Soldate as a docudrama meant that it could 
be used as an effective propaganda medium as it blends fact and fiction, offering a dramatized 
re-enactment of actual events. Tom W. Hoffer and Richard A. Nelson describe a docudrama as 
a “catalyst for social awareness”. 190  The reason is that, in comparison to traditional 
documentaries, the emphasis in a docudrama is on narration and personality. By incorporating 
themes based on actual events, whilst providing dramatic embellishment, producers can reach 
an audience beyond those who watch traditional documentaries.  
A docudrama’s power lies in its ability to manipulate the emotions of the viewer by means of 
connecting the individual with actuality or the “historical substance of pre-filmic events.”191 It 
serves the same purpose as a biographical novel. Schindler’s Ark, written by Thomas Keneally, 
published in 1982 and later converted into the film Schindler’s List (1993), demonstrates the 
levels of psychological influence when historical details are reimagined to fit the 
artistic/cinematic needs of the writer/producer.  The historical substance of a docudrama allows 
the audience to reason that though the events depicted are not based on actual events, similar 
scenarios could have existed. This can make the film form effective, yet dangerous, depending 
on the fairness and interpretation of the presentation. The scene in Ses Soldate, for example, 
which depicts the six South African soldiers coming across a family brutally murdered by the 
enemy would reconfirm fears triggered by the threat of communism.  This would consequently 
support continuous military engagement, whilst simultaneously encouraging white nationalists 
to distance themselves from South African and SWA liberation movements. Ses Soldate 
demonstrates Kavaliers’s aptitude in exploiting the socio-political environment to remain 
financially viable. As H.B. Thom exalted: “We [Kavalier Films] must use our contacts [in 
government] to full effect and not disappoint the confidence placed in the company.”192         
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However, Kavalier Films’ symbiotic ideological relationship with government did not 
safeguard them against the impact of the introduction of television in South Africa. Kavalier 
Films’ 21st anniversary celebration was, therefore, short-lived. Despite engaging in talks with 
the SABC, Kavalier Films still felt uncertain about what its exact role would be once SATV 
had been introduced, a feeling (as indicated) shared amongst most local film producers at the 
time. The Board of Directors consequently decided that a division dedicated to the development 
of TV programmes would be established after the official TV service had commenced.193 
Concern amongst filmmakers only increased after the SABC’s experimental broadcasts began. 
Kavalier Films’ research estimated that cinema attendance had dropped by approximately 20% 
from May 1975 to December 1975 and that cinema attendance could decrease by a further 45% 
in 1977. 194  Kavalier Films, in conjunction with the Vereniging van Vollengte 
Rolprentvervaardigers, argued that the government subsidy system should be amended after 
1976, so as to enhance support and protection against the threat posed by the South African 
television service.195         
Distribution and Exhibition, 1970 - 1976 
After Satbel acquired Twentieth-Century-Fox’s South African cinematic film shares in 1969, 
it reorganised its interests, which were categorised into four phases.196 Phase three, simply 
known as “Preparation before Television”, commenced immediately after the government’s 
announcement that SATV would be introduced. 197  Satbel’s preparation entailed an 
investigation into foreign case studies, a significant reduction of cinema seats, the modification 
of cinemas, and the horizontal integration of its cinematic film interests.198 Satbel remained 
realistic – at least in the light of the foreign models – in the sense that it recognised that SATV 
would have significant consequences and that recovery would require effective preparation. 
For example, the average annual cinema attendance in the USA declined by 71% (as indicated) 
from 1948 to 1968, whilst the industry recovered (in terms of GBO revenue) only after the mid-
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1970s.199 The degree of SATV’s impact on the exhibition industry was largely dependent on 
the number of TV sets available, the nature and quality of the programmes (foreign experiences 
seemed to indicate that commercial TV often increases quality), the novelty of the TV-service 
and the cost (the TV set and licence fee), and the time at which certain TV programmes were 
broadcast. MANKOR Beleggings Ltd. (Mankor) estimated that Ster Films’ and Kinekor’s 
cinema attendance could drop to 50% for conventional in-house cinemas and to 50% for drive-
in theatres after 18 months if 500 000 TV sets were sold locally (depending, of course, on the 
quality of programmes and the number of feature films played on SATV), admission prices 
and tax laws remained unchanged, and there was no rationalisation. 200  Based on these 
calculations, the combined profits of Ster and Kinekor would decrease by 98-138%, meaning 
the companies would operate at a loss.201   
After investigating the foreign examples, the most obvious measure to mitigate the damage 
inflicted by SATV was to allow a period for distributors to circulate a feature film across South 
African cinemas; only after exploiting the film’s full economic, cinematic potential, should the 
SABC be permitted to incorporate the feature into their programming. Some foreign producers 
and distributors allowed TV services to exhibit a feature film only if it was ten to fifteen years 
old.202  However, Satbel maintained that these examples were too extreme and would be 
harmful to the early development of South Africa’s television industry. Cinematic rights in 
South Africa generally lasted three to five years (depending on the contracts negotiated 
amongst producers, distributors and exhibitors). SABC-TV, which foreign producers labelled 
as “free TV”, could only obtain broadcasting rights two to three years after South African 
cinemas.203 The Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA) extended the period to eight years 
after the launch of M-Net. Satbel and Sanso argued that the high monthly fixed costs involved 
in managing a cinema made the reduction of the number of cinemas the most effective option 
as supply, in the current situation, would exceed demand in the country.204 Furthermore, the 
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“outdated and old-fashioned theatres with high numbers of seats” had to be replaced by modern, 
smaller and luxurious cinemas that allowed Satbel to charge higher admission prices, thus 
neutralising a decline in cinema attendance.205 Approximately R10 million,206 for example, 
was spend on modifying Kinekor’s cinemas. 207  Though the number of Satbel’s cinemas 
decreased, Kinekor and Ster still functioned as separate and competing operations until 1977.   
Satbel (like Sanlam) was vertically integrated between 1970-1975, managing business 
subsidiaries,208  including, for example, screen advertising companies. At the time, screen 
advertising was the only audio-visual advertisement medium available in South Africa. 
Revenue gained from cinema commercials was calculated according to annual cinema 
attendance. As such, when commercial TV was introduced, the revenue of screen advertising 
decreased significantly as television provided businesses with a new and – very important – 
popular audio-visual mechanism to advertise their products. According to Mankor, in foreign 
countries commercial TV services received up to 50% of their total revenue from 
advertising.209  Mankor estimated that if Satbel failed to reorganise its screen advertising 
interests, then screen advertising revenue would drop by 75%.210 Consequently, Satbel’s screen 
advertising companies, i.e. Ster Adfilms, Alexander Films and Filmlets, were merged in 1971 
to create Cinemark.211 According to Keyan Tomaselli, Satbel expected the merger, without 
increasing the screen advertising staff, to provide enhanced screen access to the advertiser.212 
Satbel further diversified its operations as a countermeasure for the introduction of SATV in 
1976. In 1973, for example, Satbel entered the South African music industry by establishing 
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the Record and Tape Company (Pty.) Limited.213  Meanwhile, in 1974 Anglo-American Life 
acquired the Schlesinger Organisation’s interests in both Satbel and Sanso.214                     
Apart from the introduction of SATV, Satbel had to reorganise its cinematic film interests as 
local competition within the South African distribution and exhibition industry intensified. 
“Stronger competition within the industry” emerged when André Pieterse, a key contributor to 
the establishment and development of the Afrikaans cinematic film industry, left Ster Films as 
a managing director and established Film Trust. Pieterse would also produce one of the few 
internationally acclaimed South African feature films, E’lollipop or Forever Young, Forever 
Free, in 1975.215 By 1970 MGM managed three Metro cinemas (which were owned by Sanso); 
however, these properties were later demolished. MGM subsequently merged with Film Trust, 
which provided Pieterse’s company with the exclusive rights to distribute and exhibit MGM’s 
films before its competitors. Pieterse later became Executive Vice-President of MGM 
International Incorporation. By 1975 Film Trust had constructed 18 Metro cinemas across 
South Africa.216 However, MGM’s film production had decreased significantly and in 1973 
MGM sold its foreign interests to Cinema International Corporation (CIC), a company 
established by Universal Studios and Paramount Pictures. Cinema International was, therefore, 
a 50% shareholder of Film Trust and also guaranteed playing time at CIC Film Trust’s 
cinemas.217 This manoeuvre meant that Satbel did not have exclusive rights in distributing 
motion pictures produced by Paramount Pictures or Universal Studios. In summary, Cintrust, 
owned by Film Trust (50%) and CIC (50%), which was a holding company for the Metro 
cinemas, obtained the right to exhibit productions of Paramount Pictures, Universal Studios, 
MGM and later Warner Brothers International218  by January of 1976. Prominent foreign 
companies that were contractually aligned with Satbel included Twentieth-Century-Fox, 
Anglo-EMI, United Artists, the Rank Organisation and the Walt Disney Company. Table 19 
                                                            
213 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Meeting between Sanlam’s Board of 
Directors: “Satbel”, 23 January 1974, p. 14.  
214 Anglo‐American, therefore, obtained 30% shares of Satbel and 50% of Sanso. SA, Documents provided by 
Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Meeting between Sanlam’s Board of Directors: “Satbel, FVB en Kersaf”, 19 
September 1984, p. 1.  
215 The film was distributed internationally as Forever Young, Forever Free by Columbia‐Warner. Andre le Roux 
& Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: Universiteit van Suid‐
Afrika, 1982), p. 159. 
216 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 162. 
217 Ibid., p. 164.   
218 Concluded a distribution contract with CIC.  
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illustrates the number of cinemas and drive-in theatres owned by Satbel, Cintrust and 
Independent cinema owners. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19:219 Number of In-door Cinemas and Drive-In Theatres owned by Satbel, 
Cintrust and Independent Cinema Owners in January 1976 
Company In-door Cinemas Drive-in Theatres Total 
Ster (Satbel) 38 21 59
Kinekor (Satbel) 70 23 93
Cintrust 20 1 21
Independent 344 134 478
 
Conclusion  
Preparation for television was especially crucial within the South African context considering 
that the continued existence of the local cinematic film industry was heavily dependent on the 
country’s small white audience – a market targeted by the SABC and that had the economic 
means to acquire or at least rent a TV set. What becomes evident when studying the South 
African cinematic film industry from 1970 to 1975, however, is that film producers were far 
less certain of how to prepare for SATV than local distributors and exhibitors were. This 
uncertainty was manifested despite the industry’s opportunity to examine foreign cinematic 
industries as case studies – an option that many Western, industrialised countries did not have. 
In hindsight, the film production industry – or at least those whose future operations were 
dependent on the cooperation of the SABC in and after 1976 – found it difficult to prepare 
since they were uncertain of what their exact roles would be once SATV was introduced. Local 
distributors and exhibitors, on the other hand, who were far less dependent on government 
                                                            
219 From the Financial Mail, 30 January 1976, p. 219, cited in Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race 
and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 169. 
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support and on the SABC, had a much clearer framework within which to prepare (illustrated 
by Satbel’s reorganisation). However, as SATV had yet to be implemented and considering 
that all countries have unique socio-economic contexts, distributors and exhibitors could, just 
like local producers, only speculate on the true impact of television. The local film production 
industry, despite its uncertainty, nonetheless attempted to prepare for television (substantiated 
by the number of local films produced in 1975). Yet what becomes abundantly clear is that the 
most significant challenges which faced the film production industry during the 1960s were 
still evident in the following decade. Apart from a few exceptions (such as films produced by 
André Pieterse and Jamie Uys), the impact of, for example, the government subsidy scheme 
and government control, the themes incorporated into the films, the size of the niche market, 
censorship and consequent lack of scripts), and the financial resources of production companies 
led to most South African feature films being of an inferior quality compared to foreign 
productions. All these factors, in conclusion, meant that South Africa’s cinematic distribution 
and exhibition industry were much better prepared than local cinematic filmmakers were. This 
condition became even more evident during and after 1976, considering the decrease in the 
number of Afrikaans films produced and selected for cinematic distribution and exhibition. 
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  Chapter Five: The Influence of South African Television on the Afrikaans Cinematic 
Film Industry, c.1976 – c.1986 
“Theories of action, by definition, are abstractions that simplify in the interest of action. The content of the 
abstractions derives from socialization experiences that reflect the ideology of the organization” – Karl E. 
Weick1 
Introduction 
After discussing the socio-economic and political conditions in which the Afrikaans cinematic 
film industry was established and developed, the history of the SABC and the preparation for 
SATV (by both the public broadcaster and the local cinematic industry), and its advent, the 
influence of television can finally be investigated and reflected upon. Chapter Five is divided 
into three sections. First, the advancement of SATV will be demonstrated within two 
timeframes: 1976 to 1980, and 1981 (when the “Bantu” TV service was introduced) to 
September 1986, i.e. the last month before the launch of M-Net. The aim of this section is to 
expand on SABC-TV’s broadcasts and the forces that shaped the former in an attempt to 
demonstrate why the Afrikaans cinematic film industry was so greatly influenced. The attention 
will focus on programme content, and financial and technical aspects. This will be followed by 
a consideration of the immediate effects of television on the Afrikaans cinematic film industry. 
Covering the years 1976 and 1977, this section particularly highlights the amendment of the 
subsidy scheme, the relationship between the SABC and local producers, the role of the 
Vereniging van Vollengte Rolprentvervaardigers and Satbel’s implementation of phase four. 
The third section deals with the timeframe 1978-1986 and looks at the role and effectiveness 
of the state’s intervention, a case study expanding on the struggle between the private sector 
and the National Film Board (of which a short history is provided) to demonstrate the financial 
distress experienced by the Afrikaans cinematic film industry post-1976, the function fulfilled 
by Afrikaners in the rise of South Africa’s “Bantu” or ethnic cinema as ethnic cinema became 
increasingly prominent as a result of Television’s influence, the effects of SATV on Kavalier 
Films, the continued international success experienced by Mimosa Films despite SATV’s 
introduction, the incorporation of TV programmes into Afrikaans cinematic productions, and 
whether Satbel recovered from the effects of Television. A discussion of the films Broer Matie 
(1984) and Boetie gaan Border toe (1984) ends this section and the chapter.           
The Introduction and Development of South African Television, 1976-1980  
                                                            
1 Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (London: SAGE Publications, 1995), p. 123. 
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Prime Minister B.J. Vorster officially opened South Africa’s national television service 
(SABC-TV) on 5 January 1976.2 The TV service schedule devoted equal broadcasting times 
for Afrikaans and English programmes and broadcast for 37 hours per week (18:00 to 23:00 
CAT).3 Considering the “dangerous times” of the late 1970s, the SABC broadcast programmes 
designed to educate the South African public through entertainment, while emphasising the 
importance of South Africa’s “spiritual, economic and military resilience.”4  Examples of 
programmes which promoted the ambitions of the government, included a broadcast of CBS’s 
Face the Nation in which B.J. Vorster addressed questions on the political policy of South 
Africa, documentaries on the South African Navy and Hendrik Verwoerd, and journal 
programmes (such as Kamera 1, Galaxy and Looking In) discussing, for instance, the South 
African Defence Force and economic affairs. Reminiscent of the views in Jamie Uys’s films, 
Hans en die Rooinek and Lord Oom Piet, the SABC maintained that broadcasting English and 
Afrikaans programmes on a single channel enhanced the relationship between, and social 
cooperation amongst, South Africa’s white communities.5 The first local movie specifically 
designed for SATV, produced by Manie van Rensburg6 and written by Pieter de Bruyn, was 
Oom Willem en die Lord was broadcast on 9 January 1976 at 21:00 CAT.7 Films such as Oom 
Willem en die Lord are known as “TV movies” as they were not produced for cinematic 
distribution and exhibition.8 Other examples of TV movies produced in the 1970s included 
Nicolene (1978) and Elsa se Geheim (1979). Interviews, journal programmes and 
documentaries designed to promote the historical heritage of South Africa’s different racial 
groups, for instance, included 1820 and All That (English-speaking South Africans), A Sense 
of Destiny (Afrikaners), Under the Southern Cross (“Coloureds”), as well as celebrations of 
the Transkei’s independence in 1976. Transkei was one of two “homelands” (the other being 
Ciskei) created by the South African government for Xhosa-speaking Africans in the Cape 
Province (now Eastern Cape) granted nominal autonomy in 1963; this was opposed by the 
                                                            
2 Presenters Heinrich Maritz and Dorianne Berry welcomed South African viewers to the SABC‐TV’s first 
national broadcast.  
3 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 92. 
4 The increase in foreign hostility towards South Africa, the Border War and the country’s internal political 
turmoil, to name a few. SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 16. 
5 Ibid., p. 92.  
6 Manie van Rensburg, an Afrikaans director and writer, would become renowned for feature films of a 
progressive nature, with Taxi to Soweto (1991) arguably the most famous.   
7 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 106. 
8 These films will be referred to as “TV movies” to avoid confusion between films specifically designed for 
television and films which were made for and distributed in cinemas, and broadcast on SATV at a later stage.    
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ANC (banned at the time) as it consolidated the interests of apartheid-oriented separate 
development.9  Programmes designed to educate South Africa’s children included Wielie-
Walie, Everywhere Express and the ever-popular Haas Das se Nuuskas. 10  Examples of 
religious programmes included Oordenking and Thy Kingdom Come. The All Blacks Rugby 
tour,11 the 1976 Olympic Games and the Grand Prix are a few examples of sporting events 
broadcast by the SABC at this time. Examples of programmes devoted to music included 
Musiek vir Almal and Pop Shop.12  
American TV productions, such as Dallas, Magnum P.I. and Who’s the Boss accounted for the 
largest share of programmes purchased abroad, largely as a way of counteracting the British 
Equity Ban. Equity, a British Actors’ Union, protested the policies of apartheid by refusing 
their members permission to perform in South Africa if multiracial audiences were prohibited 
from their respective performances. In February 1977 Equity extended the protest to include 
TV programmes.13  The protest lasted nearly twenty years, as the ban was lifted only in 
November 1993.14 Providing dubbed Afrikaans soundtracks to productions acquired from 
foreign countries continued (such as Heidi, Girl of the Alps, an animated series originally 
produced in Japan), as did co-productions with foreign TV producers (such as Groot Veldslae 
van die Verlede, a co-production with the French production company, Pathé). Meanwhile, 
local producers were involved to varying degrees in the creation of TV programmes, for 
example, 91 programmes in 1976 and 83 programmes in 1977.15 Dubbele Alibi, starring Nic 
de Jager and Sybil Coetzee, was the first Afrikaans drama to appear on SATV.16  Other 
examples of popular local TV series included Ko-operasiestories and Nommer Asseblief. The 
Villagers was the first locally produced soap opera. Local productions (the bulk of which were 
                                                            
9 The O’Malley Archives, “1963. Transkei Constitution Act No 48”, Accessed: November 11, 2016: 
https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01828/05lv01829/06lv01911.htm.   
10 Riaan Cruywagen, an individual synonymous with the SABC’s Afrikaans News, starred as the voice actor for 
the character, Haas Das. Cruywagen presented his first news bulletin during the SABC’s experimental TV 
broadcasts in November 1975.  
11 New‐Zealand’s rugby team is referred to as either the Kiwis or the All Blacks.  
12 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 93‐94. 
13 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 106. 
14 Ibid., p. 120.  
15SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 96. SABC, Radio Park, SABC 
Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1977, p. 56. 
16 Michael Theunissen, Victor Nikitin & Melanie Pillay, The Voice, The Vision: The Sixty Year History of the SABC 
(Johannesburg: Advent Graphics, 1996), p. 105. 
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produced by the SABC’s own facilities) accounted for 60% of SATV’s programme material 
during the 1970s.17  
 
Illustration 12: SABC-TV’s Logo.18 
Technical and Financial Aspects 
The construction of the SABC’s television transmitter network and studio facilities at the 
Broadcasting Centre in Auckland Park were completed to a degree that allowed the 
introduction of SATV in January 1976. Thirteen high-power transmitters were erected in areas 
such as Hartbeesfontein, Glencoe, Oudtshoorn, Zeerust, Bethlehem, Kuruman and Piketberg 
in the same year, whilst modifications were made to the TV broadcasting centre in 1977 to 
accommodate the introduction of television commercials in 1978.19 By December 1978 the 
SABC’s TV network had expanded to 40 TV stations, whilst 26 additional stations were 
commissioned for construction in 1979.20 In 1979 the SABC started its preparation for the 
construction of a second Broadcasting Centre in Cape Town. 21  The SABC’s television 
transmitter network had expanded to such an extent that by 1981 91% of the white population, 
                                                            
17 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1977, p. 14. 
18 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1975, p. 55. 
19 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 97. SABC, Radio Park, SABC 
Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1977, p. 109. 
20 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1978, p. 18. 
21 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1979, p. 106. 
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83% of the Coloured population and 87% of the Asian population could receive TV 
broadcasts.22 
The popularity of SATV exceeded the SABC’s expectations as 650 000 TV licences had been 
issued by December 1976,23 whilst its audience averaged approximately 1,69 million viewers 
per evening.24 Income generated by means of TV licence fees amounted to R30,13 million25 
and R35,2 million26 in 1976 and 1977, respectively (an increase of 17%).27 In 1977 the SABC 
focused its operations on the introduction of advertisements, which commenced on 2 January 
1978. After the SABC consulted the interests of the advertising industry, commercial rates 
were determined at the beginning of 1977. Total TV income generated in 1978 amounted to 
approximately R80 million,28 of which commercials accounted for R38,9 million or 49%.29 
The popularity of TV advertising amongst companies continuously increased and by 1979 
advertisements became the SABC’s largest source of revenue from both radio and television 
services. In 1980 R58,5 million30 had been generated through TV advertisements (50% more 
than 1978).31 As a result, the timeframes allocated for advertisement as percentage of the total 
broadcasting time were increased by 0,75% (6,5% in total) as the number of applicants 
continuously grew.32 The following tables provide a percentage representation of SATV’s 
programme schedule according to category; TV licences issued; and the annual income 
generated by SATV through TV licences and commercials; and the SABC’s annual income 
from 1976 to 1980.  
  
                                                            
22 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1981, p. 123. 
23 The Meyer Commission predicted that 700 000 TV sets would be sold within five years.  
24 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 92. 
25 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R1,03 billion. 
26 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R1,2 billion.  
27 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 18. SABC, Radio Park, SABC 
Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1977, p. 18. 
28 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R2,08 billion.  
29 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1978, p. 17. 
30 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R1,24 billion.  
31 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1980, “Die Handels aspekte van 
Televisie”.  
32 Ibid.  
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33 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 96; 1978, p. 58; 1980, 
“Persentasie Programinhoud – 1980”.    
34 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1990, p. 10. 
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Table 20:33 Percentage Representation of Programme Types, 1976-1980 (excluding 
Advertisements) 
Category  1976 1978 1980
News, Journal and Magazine 25 20 19
Drama 21 24 33
Documentaries 11 15 11
Variety 11 12 8
Sport 14 14 11
Youth  7 7 10
Religious 6 4 5
"Serious" Music 5 4 3
Total 100 100 100
Table 21:34 Television Licences Issued, 1977-1980 
Year Licences (Million) 
1977 0,774
1978 1,038
1979 1,098
1980 1,251
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The conclusion that can be drawn from these tables, considering that the number of TV licences 
issued during the period 1976-1980 were almost double the expectations of the Meyer 
Commission and reached near saturation of the white market, is that the demand for television 
amongst South Africa’s population was far greater than what the local cinematic film industry 
could have anticipated. A number of concurrent factors could explain this. First, SATV’s 
transmitter network covered a vast geographical area, thus catering for its targeted consumers. 
Second, the delayed introduction of SATV only enhanced the novelty of the SABC’s TV 
broadcasts. The press played a vital role in this regard; for example, Volkshandel in 1975 
published the article “TV – the new status symbol”, which argued that South Africa’s patience 
will be rewarded by “[possibly] the best and most proven TV setup in the world”, and it 
correctly predicted that, due to “the hunger for television”, the “medium would quickly be 
admitted into South African homes.”36  Third, SATV’s niche markets (phase one) had the 
financial means to obtain the television service during the 1970s. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that 71,8% of the adult white population, 44,6% of the Coloured population and 54,3% of 
the Asian population tuned into the Monday to Friday TV broadcasts by 1981.37 The last and, 
perhaps, most significant factor concerns the content broadcast by SATV, i.e. its variety and (a 
theme reflected upon throughout this discussion) high quality of its content. Simply stated, 
increased variety and higher quality unquestionably increase entertainment value. When 
analysing SATV’s percentage representation of programme types from 1976 to 1980, it 
becomes clear that the SABC endeavoured to offer a product which would cater to the widest 
range of interests possible. What also becomes evident is that more emphasis was placed on 
                                                            
35 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1976, p. 18; 1978, p. 18, 20, 29; 1980, p. 
20‐21.     
36 Volkshandel, February 1975, “TV 75: ‘n Spesiale Volkshandel‐oorsig”, p. 88.  
37 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1981, p. 122. 
Table 22:35 Television Income (Licences and Commercials), Total Income and Total 
Profit Generated by the SABC, 1976-1980 
Year 
Income: 
Licences (R 
Million) 
Income: 
Commercials (R 
Million) 
The SABC's 
Total Income 
(R Million) 
Total Profit 
(R Million) 
1976 30,1  - 89,3  - 13,3
1978 41,0 38,9 133,7 21,3
1980 49,0 58,5 171,5 51,0
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entertainment with SATV’s development, considering that the representation of News, Journal 
and Magazine programmes dropped 6% within the space of five years as oppose to, for example, 
the 12% increase of Dramas. Unsurprisingly, the variety offered by SATV particularly 
threatened the future existence of the local drive-in and Afrikaans film production industry, as 
both industries targeted the South African household. When asked the reason why the drive-in 
industry failed in South Africa, Franz Marx responded:  
“Well… Television! Drive-Ins, to a larger extent, were most suitable for a family culture. The 
father, mother, child in a car. In other words, it’s family entertainment. That’s what it [the drive-
in cinema] was known for. Television offered the same… with the added benefit of not having 
to drive to a theatre, of course!”38  
Furthermore, Tables 18, 19 and 20 indicate that SATV’s ability to maintain quality 
programming was created through a mutually reinforced economic cycle. The novelty, content 
and variety of TV programmes enhanced the demand for SATV, illustrated by the increase of 
TV licences. Consequently, more companies wished to advertise their products on the new 
audio-visual medium. As indicated, SATV commercials proved to be so popular that Springbok 
Radio was forced to dissolve in 1985, thereby demonstrating the significance of Satbel 
consolidating its screen advertising interests.39 Income generated through TV advertisements 
provided the SABC with the financial means – considering that its total revenue and profits 
increased by 92% and by 483% in 1976 and 1980 respectively – to maintain these high 
standards, which further increased demand – thus ensuring the continuation of the cycle if 
managed correctly. It seems as though television advertising would play a paramount role, as 
was the case with foreign industries. This, of course, raised the questions of how the local 
cinematic film industry was affected and able to adapt to SATV’s unanticipated desirability, as 
well as of the degree and nature of government support, seeing that the state was provided with 
a new and popular audio-visual mechanism to communicate its socio-cultural objectives. 
Expansion of SABC-TV, 1981-1986  
                                                            
38 Franz Marx, interview by Coenraad J. Coetzee, Stellenbosch University, April 15, 2015. 
39 Commercials were still broadcast on regional FM stations, such as Radio Highveld, Radio Good Hope and 
Radio Port Natal.   
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The SABC entered a new era in the 1980s. Dr P.J. Meyer’s two-decade tenure as Chairman of 
the SABC ended on 31 March 1980.40 He was replaced by Prof W.L. Mouton.41 In addition, 
two new television services, TV2 and TV3, were opened on 31 December 1981. TV2 
transmitted in Nguni (Zulu and Xhosa) and TV3 in Sotho (South Sotho, Tswana and North 
Sotho). Initially, TV2 and TV3 shared one channel, which broadcast for 27 hours per week. 
However each service would receive its own channel in January 1983, with 31 hours of 
transmissions per week. SABC-TV’s original channel was subsequently known as TV1. 
Commercials ran from the onset on the “Bantu” channels.42 The prospect of introducing a 
service which specifically catered to Black South Africans formed part of phase two and this 
was officially announced on 15 August 1979.43 Programmes which, according to the SABC, 
“capture [Black] traditional habits and customs on film” were selected as broadcast material.44 
Several indigenous drama series were broadcast – Shaka Zulu (directed by William C. Faure 
and starring Henry Cele as the main actor)45 being the most famous example, as it enjoyed both 
local and international acclaim. Two news bulletins, one in Sotho and the other in Nguni, were 
broadcast for 35 minutes per day. The timeframe was doubled when TV3 operated on a separate 
channel.46 Examples of entertainment aimed at the youth included Muwlana la Multa, whilst 
programmes such as Spiderman and Thunderbirds were dubbed into African languages.47 
Further details on TV2/3 (statistics) will be provided when discussing their influence on the 
“Bantu cinematic film industry”. Meanwhile, SABC-TV (later TV1) remained popular 
amongst South Africans as illustrated by the number of companies seeking to advertise their 
products on the service; 750 commercials were broadcast in 1981. However, the SABC soon 
discovered that the amended timeframe could not satisfy the demand for advertising time in 
South Africa and increased advertising slots were made available as illustrated in Table 23. 
  
                                                            
40 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1980, p. 1.  
41 Professor Wynand Mouton, who had served on the SABC Board since 1979, was a distinguished scientist and 
former principal of the University of the Orange Free State. The Argus, June 11, 1981, “Mouton and PM in talks 
of future status”, p. 5.   
42 The first commercial, for OK Bazaars, aired on 31 December 1981. The company paid R21 500 which was 
donated to charity.  
43 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1981, “TV1 en TV2 programme”.  
44 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1978, p. 12.  
45 The series was based on the chief of the Zulu tribe, Shaka, who reigned from 1816 to 1828.  
46 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1982, “TV2 en 3 Nuus”.  
47 Carin Bevan, Putting Up Screens: A history of Television in South Africa, 1929‐1976 (Unpublished MHCS, 
University of Pretoria, 2008), p. 170.   
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TV1’s transmission hours were extended in April 1984 (by one and a half hours per day). The 
audience for TV1 did increase after 1981, but not at the same rate witnessed from 1976 to 1978 
seeing that the white market was already near saturation point, whilst living costs became 
increasingly expensive. For example, 76% (or 2,656 million) white South African adults tuned 
into the weekly TV1 broadcasts in 1985 – 481 000 more than in 1980. 49 Income generated 
through advertisements remained paramount as the SABC faced serious financial challenges 
during the 1980s, similar to those experienced throughout South Africa’s general economy. 
The recession of the early 1980s and international economic sanctions imposed in protest 
against apartheid, for example, resulted in the rand losing its value, the gold price dropped and 
inflation increased as illustrated by the following graph:  
           Illustration 13: South African Inflation, 12 December 1977- 30 June 1982 (%)50  
 
                                                            
48 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1982; 1983; 1984, “TV1”.  
49 Ibid., “Finansies”.  
50 Trading Economics, “Statistics South Africa: South African Inflation Rate”, Accessed: December 3, 2016: 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south‐africa/inflation‐cpi.    
Table 23:48 Total Broadcast Time devoted to Commercials on TV1, 1982-1984 
Year Percentage Representation (%)  Number of commercials Income  
1982 7 1005 R87,8 million
1983 8 1163 R122,5 million
1984 8 N/A R149,7 million
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General production costs and the cost of the establishment and expansion of TV2/3 (and later 
TV4) increased. Consequently, the SABC’s annual reports indicated either an operating deficit 
(twice) or a small margin of profit in the period 1981-1984.51 Despite the difficult economic 
conditions in which the SABC operated, standards maintained in programmes never declined, 
as suggested in the 1982 annual report: “During the year surveyed TV1 made a special 
endeavour to extend the scope and raise the quality of indigenous programmes.”52 Production 
expenditure, for example, grew by 34% from 1982 to 1983.53  However, increased production 
by the SABC itself consequently led to a reduction in funds made available for programmes 
produced by the private sector. Popular productions (Drama series and TV movies) made 
within this timeframe included Vyfster, Westgate II, Brood vir my Broer, The Settlers and Die 
Perdesmous.    
On 30 March 1985 the SABC introduced a new TV service called TV4. The objective was to 
provide additional viewing material “with the emphasis falling on entertainment.”54 Broadcasts, 
starting at 21:00 CAT, were relayed on TV2/3’s transmitters after services closed down. 
Examples of popular programmes include Dynasty, M*A*S*H and – significantly – live sport 
transmissions. An average of 1,7 million adults tuned into weekly broadcasts made within the 
first year, which the corporation deemed as successful.55 Additional entertainment introduced 
by TV4 was a cause for concern in the Afrikaans cinematic industry as emphasised by the 
South African press. Die Vaderland, for example, estimated that TV viewership amongst the 
white population would increase to 80%, that could possibly lead to a further decline in cinema 
attendance. 56  Despite the expansion of the TV service, the SABC’s financial difficulties 
intensified in and after 1985 – when P.W. Botha made his infamous Rubicon speech. The 
SABC operated at a loss of R27,1 million57 in 1985 and R27,9 million58 in 1986.59 South 
Africa’s unstable political and economic conditions (which contributed to low consumer 
spending and confidence) were held most responsible for this. The country’s inflation rate 
                                                            
51 8,9% profit in 1983 was the largest.  SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 
1981; 1982; 1983; 1984, “Financial Results”. 
52 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1982, “TV1 programmes”.  
53 Ibid., p. 14.   
54 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1985, p. 7.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Die Vaderland, March 28, 1985, “TV4 het ook sy nadele”, p. 13. 
57 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R315 million. 
58 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R271 million.  
59 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1985; 1986, “Finance”.   
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reached its peak of 20,9% in January 1986.60 The number of annual licences did not decline 
and fees were raised by 30% in 1986. However, the fees had remained unchanged from 1976 
to 1985, despite the dramatic increase in inflation. As a result, the consumer – in real terms – 
had been paying 60% less for the service. In addition, the adverse economic climate had 
detrimental effects on advertising, which accounted for approximately two-thirds of the 
SABC’s total income.61 For example, in 1986 South Africa’s total expenditure on all media 
advertising increased by only 7% (i.e. a real decrease of approximately 30%). In September 
1986 (M-Net was officially launched on 1 October 1986), TV1’s and TV4’s audiences stood 
at 4,072 million and 1,393 million, respectively.62  Table 24 indicates the number of TV 
licences issued annually from 1981 to (September) 1986 to illustrate its popularity amongst 
South African viewers: 
 
Table 24:63 Number of TV licences issued, 1981-1986 
Year Licences issued (Millions) 
  1981 1,420
1982 1,513
1983 1,660
1984 1,756
1985 1,877
1986 1,90 
 
                                                            
60 Trading Economics, “Statistics South Africa: South African Inflation Rate”, Accessed: December 3, 2016: 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south‐africa/inflation‐cpi.     
61 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1986, “Finance”.   
62 This includes Whites, Coloureds and Asians. Die Vaderland, March 26, 1986, “M‐Net sal pure plesier bied”, p. 
2. 
63 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1986, p. 19.  
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The Immediate Damage Inflicted on the Cinematic Film Industry by SATV, 1976-1977 
According to a study conducted by the VVRSA, in the early 1970s white South Africans were 
some of the most avid cinema goers in the world – averaging 26 cinema visits per individual 
each year.64 The introduction of SATV, within its first year and without advertisements, led to 
an immediate and substantial decline in cinema attendance in South Africa. On 30 April 1975 
the Board of Trade and Industry launched an investigation with the aim of determining the 
severity of the reduction by comparing statistics of 20 drive-in theatres and 33 (“four 
wall”/indoor) cinemas in 1975 and 1976.65 On average, 80% of an Afrikaans films’ revenues 
were accumulated through drive-ins.66 Drive-in attendance decreased by 40,1% as opposed to 
the 22,6% decrease for indoor cinemas for South African productions.67 Consequently, the 
number of English and Afrikaans films produced dropped from 26 in 1975/76 to 15 in 
1976/77.68  Notable works produced by Afrikaans companies in 1976 include: Vergeet My Nie 
(Elmo De Witt Films), Ridder van die Grootpad (CARFO), Karate Olympia (Kavalier Films), 
Daar kom tant Alie (Tommie Myer Films), Liefste Madelein (Brigadiers Filmproduksies) and 
Funny People (Mimosa Films). In the United States increased competition from television led 
to the rehabilitation of cinemas/drive-ins. The number of feature films produced in the USA 
decreased, but the average quality of each production increased considerably. In addition, 
feature films were produced which incorporated more scenes of a sexual and/or violent nature 
– content that could not be broadcast on American television as a result of its far stricter 
regulations. Cinema attendance consequently recovered to the same levels seen in 1948, as 
illustrated in Table 25.  
  
                                                            
64 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report of the Department of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika (Verslag No. 1753)”, 21 
December 1976, p. 9. 
65 December 1976 was excluded as the report was finished in that month.  
66 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1A, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 3, T.W.S. Meyer’s response to the 
subsidy amendments (Correspondence): “Kommentaar op verslag nr. 1753 (21 Des. 1976) van die Raad van 
Handel en Nywerheid”, 1977, p. 2.  
67 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report of the Department of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika (Verslag No. 1753)”, 21 
December 1976, p. 1, 5 and 9. 
68 The state’s fiscal years as indicated in the previous chapters. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 7, 
Addendum: N101/3/1 Volume 3, Circular: “Rolprente Vrygestel”, 1983, (n.p.). 
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Censorship regulations in South Africa meant that Afrikaans cinematic film producers could 
not rely, unlike their foreign counterparts, on sex and/or violence (or any factors which 
enhanced “shock value”) to attract more consumers – restrictions which the Department of 
Trade and Industry also felt necessary. The government, therefore, argued that the only way 
South African cinematic film production could be sustained was to amend the subsidy system 
so as to increase the quality of local productions. The amendment was also made in the light 
of other factors that only enhanced the impact of television. First, multiracial audiences were 
prohibited in South African cinemas, despite frequent requests from the country’s major 
distributors from 1975 to 1985 to allow exemption.70 Second, films could be shown on only 
six days of the week (reinforced by the Prohibition of the Exhibition of Films on Sundays and 
Public Holidays Act of 1977, which stipulated that “no person shall exhibit any film on any 
Sunday in or at any place to which admission is obtained” unless consented thereto [by the 
government]). 71  Third, as indicated, adverse economic conditions led to an increase in 
production costs. Lastly, the SABC’s demand for local productions still did not provide 
sufficient opportunities for South African cinematic filmmakers, as the SABC utilised its own 
production facilities for most of the TV content, whilst government research indicated that 
                                                            
69 Note that 1948 (i.e. the 100%) is the baseline of the table and that the subsequent years are represented as 
percentages in relation to the 1948 figures. The figures, therefore, do not represent the percentage of 
Americans who attended cinema exhibitions in the respective years. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, 
Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report of the Department of Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die 
Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika (Verslag No. 1753)”, 21 December 1976, p. 9. 
70 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 64. 
71 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, South African Film Weekly 
Article: “Industry loses millions while fast asleep”, June 1976, p. 2. South Africa, Department of the Prime 
Minister, 1977, Prohibition of the Exhibition of Films on Sundays and Public Holidays, 1977 (Act No. 16 of 
1977), To prohibit the exhibition of films on Sundays and certain public holidays in certain circumstances and 
to provide for matters connected therewith, Government Gazette No. 141: 5448 16 March, p. 2.    
Table 25:69 USA's Cinema Attendance represented as Percentages, 1948-1975 
Year Attendance Index (%) 
1948 100
1958 42
1968 29
1975 100
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filmmakers felt that the compensation – which averaged between R280 and R300 per minute 
– was “completely inadequate”. Filmmakers claimed that the cost of a TV production averaged 
R333 per minute. The SABC responded by stating that most of its TV content consisted either 
of live broadcasts or programmes created before the introduction of SATV, and the TV 
schedule allowed only two hours per day during which to broadcast TV movies, short films 
and documentaries. The production facilities erected, according to the broadcaster, did not 
duplicate any existing production facilities. The conventional methods of cinematic film 
production were deemed, for technical reasons, to be unfit for the demands of modern 
television. In addition, the SABC maintained the compensation paid was reasonable as salaries 
were based “on strict scientific calculations”.72 The SABC’s monopoly of SATV allowed the 
broadcaster to dictate the times allocated for local productions and the amount of compensation 
paid to producers. The challenges faced by cinematic film producers would continue until the 
introduction of M-Net.  
The continuation of the subsidy scheme was justified by the government’s investigation:  
“Despite the existence of television, the demand for film to satisfy certain cultural needs will 
always remain… the demand will completely be satisfied by foreign products, if allowed”.73 
The Board of Trade and Industry based the amendments of the subsidy scheme on eleven 
successful films (GBO of approximately R300 000 or more) produced in 1974 and 1975 as it 
was perceived that only motion pictures of a high quality could compete with television. 
Figures were adjusted to indicate these films’ revenues, received subsidies (based on the 
scheme at the time), production expenditures and profits, if cinema attendance (drive-ins and 
indoor) declined by 30%. The calculations are demonstrated in Table 26. 
  
                                                            
72 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report of the Department of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika (Verslag No. 1753)”, 21 
December 1976, p. 32‐33. 
73 Ibid., p. 18.  
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Subsidy for Afrikaans and English films was consequently increased from 55 to 65% and 44 
to 52%, respectively. In this regard, the combined profits of the eleven films (after a 30% 
reduction) would increase to R190 329. 75  Although 90% less than the actual figure, 
government felt that the subsidy scheme was designed to assist producers in recovering costs 
rather than to provide extraordinary profits. The Board recommended that the maximum 
payable subsidy should be based on a percentage (70%) of a film’s production cost so as to 
encourage large-scale productions, whilst simultaneously limiting government spending. 
However, the subsidy threshold remained at R50 000 (NBO) despite a rise in inflation.76 The 
government, however, argued that television (i.e. additional audio-visual competition) 
automatically eliminated productions of an inferior quality.77 
The Board of Trade and Industry’s recommendations were strongly opposed by the VVRSA. 
The VVRSA maintained that the method of using only 11 successful feature films as samples 
created a false impression of the conditions in the industry and that the Board failed to use 
cumulative figures in arriving at its statistical conclusions.  After T.W.S. Meyer consulted 
Herman Visser (Distribution Manager at Ster-Kinekor), the Association argued that cinema 
                                                            
74 Note that the hypothetical production costs were adjusted to account for the increase in the Consumer Price 
Index.  SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report of the Department 
of Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika (Verslag No. 1753)”, 21 
December 1976, p. 15. 
75 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R6,5 million.  
76 R50 000 in 1964: Value in 2016 taking into account inflation = approximately R3,9 million. R50 000 in 1976: 
Value in 2016 taking into account inflation = approximately R1,7 million.  
77 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report of the Department of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika (Verslag No. 1753)”, 21 
December 1976, p. 23. 
Table 26:74 Combined Decrease of GBO, Subsidy, Production Expenditure and Profit 
of 11 Feature Films, if Cinema Attendance dropped by 30% 
  
Actual Figures 
(Rand) 
 Hypothetical Figures 
(Rand) 
GBO 3 906 661 2 733 962
Subsidy 1 847 761 1 201 179
Production Cost 1 520 241 2 030 514
Profit 1 787 909 -27 379
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attendance had dropped 50% by April 1977 – 20% more than what was considered as the basis 
for the subsidy amendments.    Kavalier Films calculated that the subsidy rate had to be 
increased to 172%, if incomes were to match those generated during the pre-television era.  
However, realising this to be unrealistic, the VVRSA requested that the rate had to increase to 
80% for Afrikaans films and 70% for English films, if they generated income between R95 000 
and R450 000. To discourage exploitation, the association suggested that the subsidy threshold 
should be increased to R90 000 or R100 000.78  
The Department of Trade and Industry itself disputed the conclusions drawn by the Board. The 
average GBO received by the eleven films was R355 000, whilst the Department regarded films 
which received R200 000 GBO as successful. It was also suggested that only three of the eleven 
films would have made a profit with the amended scheme after television. Similar to the 
argument made by the VVRSA, the Department argued that the eleven films misrepresented 
the industry, whilst claiming the 50% decline in cinema attendance as maintained by the 
VVRSA to be more realistic.79 After numerous meetings, correspondence with the VVRSA 
and a consultation with Jamie Uys and Boet Troskie (Mimosa Films), amendments to the 
subsidy scheme were finalised. Subsidy pay-outs were still based on NBO; however, a sliding 
scale was introduced to limit government expenditure to R300 00080 per production, which 
applied from September 1977 (Table 27). 
  
                                                            
78 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: between R3 million and R3,3 million. SAB, Home Affairs: Film 
Industry (BNF), 1A, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 3, Correspondence of the VVRSA: “Kommentaar oor verslag 
nr. 1753 (21. 12. 1976) van die Raad van Handel en Nywerheid en Wysigings. Voorgestel deur die Vereniging 
van Vollengte Rolprentvervaardigers”, 13 May 1977, p. 3. 
79 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1A, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 3, Department of Trade and 
Industry comments regarding the Board’s Report (1753): “Ondersoek na die Rolprentbedryf: RHN verslag nr. 
1753”, 3 August 1977, p. 2.  
80 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R9,8 million.  
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The subsidy scheme’s formula was based on 22 Afrikaans films released between March 1973 
and December 1974. The NBO of these films ranged from R157 000 to R460 000, whilst eight 
films produced within this timeframe were not considered as their revenues were too low. 
Government maintained that too few English films were produced to base calculations upon.82 
The subsidy threshold was raised to R100 000. English films received a smaller subsidy pay-
out up until an NBO of R500 000 was generated from a larger market. It was government’s 
perception that a R60 000 pay-out after more than R500 000 was earned in NBO would 
enhance the quality of these productions.83 Seventeen Afrikaans and English feature films were 
                                                            
81 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1A, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 3, Minutes (Department of Trade 
and Industry): “Gewysigde subsidie‐skema vir plaaslik vervaardigde rolprente”, 26 October 1977, p. 1. 
82 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 1A, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 3, Department of Trade and 
Industry comments regarding the Board’s Report (1753): “Ondersoek na die Rolprentbedryf: RHN verslag nr. 
1753”, 3 August 1977, p. 3 and 7. 
83 Ibid.  
Table 27:81 Subsidy Scheme which Applied from September 1977 
Afrikaans Feature Films 
NBO (Rand) Tariff Subsidy (Rand) 
< 200 001 70% 140 000
200 000 to 300 000 60% 60 000
300 001 to 400 000 50% 50 000
400 001 to 500 000 40% 40 000
500 001 to 533 333 30% 10 000
Maximum Payable 300 000
English Feature Films 
NBO (Rand) Tariff Subsidy (Rand) 
< 200 001 60% 120 000
200 000 to 300 000 50% 50 000
300 001 to 400 000 40% 40 000
400 001 to 500 000 30% 30 000
500 001 to 800 000 20% 60 000
Maximum Payable   300 000
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released in 1977, including Netnou hoor die Kinders (Brigadiers Filmproduksies), Winners II 
(Elmo de Witt Films), Golden Rendezvouz (Film Trust) and Crazy People (Kavalier Films).84 
The Merger of Ster Films and Kinekor due to a drop in Cinema Attendance 
By June 1976 Satbel, CIC-Warner (Pty) Ltd (CIC-Warner) and United Artists Corporation SA 
(Pty) Ltd (United Artists) exercised dominance over the South African distribution network. 
Cinintercorp, an associate company of CIC-Warner, acquired Film Trust’s shares in Cintrust. 
Apart from the larger distributors, a number of smaller companies established a local circuit, 
including Hollywood Film Distributors (Pty) Ltd, Walt Disney Productions, Focus Films (Pty) 
Ltd, Romay Film Productions (Pty) Ltd and Mimosa Film Productions (Pty) Ltd. Ster, Kinekor 
and CIC-Warner had the largest shares in the exhibition industry. Satbel distributed 98% of 
local productions, 79% of imported films and 82% of all films exhibited in South Africa. CIC-
Warner distributed only 2% of locally produced films, whilst circulating 12% of foreign films 
imported. United Artists would only distribute 6% of foreign produced films. The combined 
South African interests of CIC-Warner and United Artists amounted to 16% of the total market 
share. In 1975-76, the total box office revenue generated by 530 South African theatres was 
approximately R53 million.85   
 
Table 28:86 Costs of Films Hired for Distribution in South Africa, 1 July 1975- 30 
June 1976 
Company South African Films Imported Films Total
  R' 000 R' 000 R' 000
Satbel 3,849 13,572 17,421
CIC-Warner 62 2,140 2,202
United Artists  - 1,440 1,440
Total R 3,911 R 17,152 R 21,063
 
                                                            
84 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 266‐267. 
85 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R2,25 billion. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry 
(BNF), 3, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 7, Memorandum attached to correspondence sent to the Minister of 
Industry, Trade and Tourism: “Ondersoek na die Suid‐Afrikaanse rolprentverspreidings en vertoningsbedryf”, 7 
April 1981, p. 6‐7. 
86 Ibid.  
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On 15 October 1975 the Minister of Economic Affairs launched an investigation to evaluate 
the effects of SATV on South Africa’s distribution and exhibition industry. Forty percent of all 
South African cinemas were researched. The average weekly indoor cinema attendance, taking 
into account screenings of both foreign and local cinematic productions, dropped from 251 154 
persons in 1975 to 180 153 persons in 1976, whilst the average weekly GBO dropped from 
R303 398 to R217 625. Average weekly attendance of drive-ins dropped from 216 134 in 1975 
to 120 386 in 1976. The average weekly GBO decreased from R145 000 to R84 108.87 William 
Pretorius, who was a proprietor of the independent Marwil Drive-In in Newcastle (KwaZulu-
Natal) and had contracts with both Ster and Kinekor, described his own situation by stating: 
“Prior to TV we used to average R1 000 per week for [a] film rental… Now we’re crawling 
between R200 and R400 per week.”88 As a result, many exhibitors doubled the number of 
features played in a year to include more variety than offered by TV, further reducing the screen 
time and income of local producers.89    
Phase four of Satbel’s rationalisation of its cinema interests commenced after 1975. Ster Films 
and Kinekor’s average weekly (drive-ins and indoor) cinema attendance decreased from 
467 288 for the period January 1975 to December 1975 to 300 479 for January 1976 to 
December 1976 – or by 36%.90 By 1977 Ster Films and Kinekor’s cinema circuit had been 
reduced and modernised to counter the effects of SATV, comprising of 102 indoor cinemas, 
45 drive-ins and even two ice rinks in multiplex buildings.91  Cinemas were integrated into 
large-scale leisure and retail developments, as is common practice today, as seen in the 
Tygervalley Mall (Durbanville), the Eikestad Mall (Stellenbosch), Brooklyn Mall (Pretoria), 
Carnival City Casino and Entertainment World (Brakpan) and the V&A Waterfront (Cape 
Town) to name a few.92 In March 1977 Satbel announced the amalgamation of Ster and 
Kinekor to establish a new organisation, Ster-Kinekor (Pty) Ltd (Ster-Kinekor). The 
government permitted the merger because of the substantial decline in cinema attendance and, 
                                                            
87 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 7, Memorandum attached to 
correspondence sent to the Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism: “Ondersoek na die Suid‐Afrikaanse 
rolprentverspreidings en vertoningsbedryf”, 7 April 1981, p. 18. 
88 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, SA Film Weekly Article: “Weekly 
Forum”, 10 June 1977, p. 2.  
89 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 4. (1/35) Chairman Report: “Voorsitterverslag vir die jaar geëindig“, 26 November 1976, 
p. 1. 
90 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 8, Correspondence from Ster‐
Kinekor: “Rolprentsubsidieskema”, 14 October 1983, p. 2.  
91 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, SA Film Weekly Article: “Ster and 
Kinekor Merger”, 4 March 1977, p. 1.  
92 All of them have Ster‐Kinekor cinemas operating within them.  
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consequently, losses in film rentals. Operating as one organisation in challenging economic 
conditions had multiple benefits, including increased administrative efficiency, operational 
savings, a feature no longer had to be exchanged between two groups, which led to a better 
utilised product and a better balanced and complete network of cinemas. Herman Visser acted 
as Executive of Distribution, Phillip MacDonald as Executive of Ster-Kinekor’s exhibiting 
network, whilst Charl de Kock managed Ster-Kinekor’s finances.93   
 
Illustration 14: From correspondence sent in 1983 from Ster-Kinekor (the company’s logo after the 
merger) to the Department of Industry, Trade and Tourism, with statistics to indicate Ster-Kinekor’s 
weekly cinema attendance attached.94  
Adapting, trying, dying, 1978-1986  
1978 commenced with a sense of idealism throughout the industry. In addition to the amended 
subsidy system, box office returns for December/January 1977/78 suggested that the South 
African cinematic producing industry might have been able to recover. Jeremy Birkett (a 
Director of Satbel) revealed that cinema attendance in December 1977 was 52% higher than in 
December 1976.95 The positive outlook prompted Satbel’s aim to inject R7 million96 capital 
into the production industry within a space of three years. However, optimism was soon 
replaced with realism as, for example, Satbel’s own Witblitz and Peach Brandy (1978) 
                                                            
93 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, SA Film Weekly Article: “Ster and 
Kinekor Merger”, 4 March 1977, p. 1. 
94 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 8, Correspondence from Ster‐
Kinekor: “(Geagte Mnr Lombard…) Rolprentsubsidieskema”, 14 October 1983, p. 1. 
95 Die Suid‐Wester, January 31, 1978, “Groot inspuiting vir filmbedryf”, p. 2. 
96 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R221 million.   
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ultimately failed at the box office.97  Furthermore, the industry was increasingly subjected to 
criticism in newspaper reports, and from members of the public as well as figures within the 
production industry, as mentioned in an article from South African Airways’ Flying 
Springbok/Vlieënde Springbok:  
“It is said too that after 50 years of film-making, South Africa is still churning out (with rare 
exceptions)98 an endless stream of painfully mushy melodramas and inane comedies.”99  
The Star’s analysis of Diamante en die Dief (1978), a film that received better reviews from 
the press, further emphasised this point in its headline alone: “Local film not torture to 
watch.”100 Twenty-one feature films received subsidies within two years of the scheme’s 
amendment, whilst eight films could not qualify – for example, Kavalier Films’ Billy Boy 
(1978), J.J.M. van Zyl’s Decision to Die (1978) and Lindie Films’ Charlie word ‘n Ster (1979). 
Out of the 21 films which did qualify for subsidy, only 11 (which included Winter Films’ ‘n 
Seder Val in Waterkloof [1978] and Brigadiers Films’ Kootjie Emmer [1978]) were 
profitable.101 This means that approximately 62% could be deemed box office failures.  
The average weekly cinema attendance for indoor theatres and drive-ins declined from 
approximately 14% to 5% between 1977 and 1979.102 To counter the drop in cinema attendance, 
South African exhibitors frequently increased admission fees. According to the Department of 
Statistics, the average admission fees for indoor cinemas and drive-ins were increased from 
R1,20 and R0,67 in 1976 to R2,60 and R0,94 in 1979 (Table 29). 
 
 
                                                            
97 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 43. 
98 Some examples will be reflected upon in the section “The Diamonds in the Rough”. 
99 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Flying Springbok/Vlieënde 
Springbok article: “Close up on the South African Film industry”, 11 January 1978, p. 11.  
100 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 219. 
101 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 2, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 6, Memorandum: “’n Oorsig van 
die doelmagtigheid van die gewysigde skema sedert 1 September 1977”, 17 April 1980, p. 4, Appendix A and 
Appendix B.  
102 Research conducted by government that investigated 40% of all South African exhibitors. SAB, Home 
Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 7, Attached memorandum to a correspondence 
send the Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism: “Ondersoek na die Suid‐Afrikaanse rolprentverspreidings en 
vertoningsbedryf”, 7 April 1981, p. 18. 
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Table 29:103 Figures (Represented by Percentages) of Weekly Average Attendance and 
GBO, 1975-1979  
Indoor Cinemas 
Year Attendance (%) Income (%) 
1975 100 100
1976 72 72
1977 76 111
1978 76 139
1979 65 139
Drive-ins 
1975 100 100
1976 56 58
1977 50 57
1978 50 62
1979 48 67
 
 
 
The dramatic increase in admission fees, 117% total in the case of indoor cinemas, was adopted 
from a strategy utilised in countries abroad. This increase led to an enquiry from government 
                                                            
103 Note that 1975 (i.e. the 100%) is the baseline for the table and that the subsequent years are represented 
as percentages in relation to the 1975 figures. The figures, therefore, do not represent the percentage of South 
Africans who attended cinemas in the respective years. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum: 
N101/3/1, Volume 7, Attached memorandum to a correspondence send the Minister of Industry, Trade and 
Tourism: “Ondersoek na die Suid‐Afrikaanse rolprentverspreidings en vertoningsbedryf”, 7 April 1981, p. 18. 
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as the average increase of 21% per year was 7,6% higher than the average increase in general 
consumer prices at the time. Local exhibitors, however, defended their actions by simply 
stating that admission fees in other countries were still more expensive. A question which 
immediately rises when studying the table is why drive-ins did not raise their prices at the same 
rate as indoor cinemas. The rate in which drive-in attendance declined (52% in the period 1975-
1979) forestalled such action as the exhibitors could not risk a steep increase in entrance fees 
for a commodity and activity families already had available and enjoyed in their own homes.   
The National Film Board: A Struggle between the Private and Public Sector 
The National Film Board (NFB) is utilised as a case study to indicate the degree of financial 
distress experienced by the Afrikaans production industry after local TV-services commenced. 
The private sector endeavoured to eliminate what was deemed unfair competition from a state-
controlled film producer (NFB) within an environment that became increasingly difficult. The 
creation of the National Film Board originated from government’s demand to produce public 
information films during and after the 1940s. The demand, according to government, could not 
be satisfied by the private sector at the time as South Africa “lacked the necessary production 
facilities.”104 Consequently, film production units were established within the then Department 
of Education, Art and Science, and later the Department of Defence and the State Information 
Office. In 1949 John Grierson – who had been involved in the establishment of the Canadian 
National Film Board – suggested that a similar board be introduced in South Africa. An official 
investigation followed, but it was only in September 1955 that the De Villiers Committee 
researched the distribution and production of films designed for various state departments 
and/or state supporting organisations. 105  The findings of the De Villiers Committee 
corresponded to some extent with those previously made by Grierson, subsequently leading to 
the founding of the National Film Board on 1 April 1964.  
Article 9 of the National Film Board Act (Act 73 of 1963) summarised the paramount 
objectives of the public body, i.e. the coordination of state films, the production and distribution 
of films designed to educate the South African public according to the needs of government, 
and the acquisition,106 storage and preservation of films which were deemed to have archival 
                                                            
104 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 185, Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 13, Report of the Department 
of National Education: “Verslag van die Komitee van Ondersoek na die Nasionale Filmraad”, 11 August 1978, p. 
4. 
105 Ibid., p. 5. 
106 Reminiscent of the policies drafted by the SABC and therefore will not be discussed in detail.  
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value. Examples of NFB productions included recruitment films designed for the South African 
Police, soil conservation, combating diseases, etc. Significantly, the NFB also aspired to 
promote the expansion of the South African film industry by providing practical experience to 
individuals producing films (its personnel increased from 112 employees in April 1964 to 393 
employees in Mei 1977), whilst also allowing the private sector to use its film studio for 
cinematic film production.107 Furthermore, during the promulgation of the Act, government 
suggested that 60% of the films required by state should be channelled to the private sector.108   
The NFB initially utilised the production facilities of the film service provided by the 
Department of Education. Construction of a new studio complex in Weavind Park (Pretoria) 
got underway as the demand for productions increased. However, before its completion the 
government announced the introduction of South Africa’s TV service. The new studio and its 
facilities were subsequently adapted to accommodate the production of films for television. 
The cost of the new complex ultimately amounted to R3,2 million,109 whilst a further R2,7 
million110 was allocated to production equipment. The NFB accumulated the bulk of its funds 
from the State (either through loans or services) and later the SABC. Prior to the announcement 
of SATV, the NFB operated with profits continuously increasing from R119 000 in 1968/69, 
for example, to R128 000 in 1970/1971. However, profits decreased to R96 000 the following 
year with the NFB subsequently operating at a loss after 1972/73 (R61 000) which amounted 
to R931 000111 in 1977/78. This financial position could be attributed to a lack of planning, 
coordination and regulation of expenses. For example, production costs increased dramatically 
in the 1970s as a result of higher salaries and wages paid after 1973 (increased 209% from 
1972/73 to 1977/78) and the operating costs created by the NFB’s new studio complex and 
facilities. However, whilst expenditure increased, income decreased. For instance, production 
in 1977/78 yielded R330 000112– in other words R423 000 less than in 1970/71.113 The decrease 
                                                            
107 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 185, Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 13, Report of the Department 
of National Education: “Verslag van die Komitee van Ondersoek na die Nasionale Filmraad”, 11 August 1978, p. 
11. National Film Board Act, Statutes of the Republic of South Africa (1963), p. 862. 
108 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 185, Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 13, Report of the Department 
of National Education: “Verslag van die Komitee van Ondersoek na die Nasionale Filmraad”, 11 August 1978, p. 
15. 
109 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R120 million.  
110 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R100 million.   
111 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R29, 4 million.  
112 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R13,4 million.  
113 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 185, Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 13, Report of the Department 
of National Education: “Verslag van die Komitee van Ondersoek na die Nasionale Filmraad”, 11 August 1978, p. 
10‐12 and “Bylae E”.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
191 
 
in profit was yet again the result of television as SABC-TV offered state departments an 
additional audio-visual medium to promote their interests. 
Whilst the NFB was facing serious financial problems, pressure on it from the private sector 
simultaneously intensified. The initial call by government to allow the private sector to produce 
60% of its films never materialised. Only 33% of the NFB’s output was channelled to the 
private sector from 1964 to 1977, since the number of films required by government was less 
than expected, coupled with the fact that the NFB was financially unstable – thus forcing the 
NFB to produce as many films as possible itself.114 Desperate for additional income, the NFB 
also sought to produce programmes for SABC-TV as the “television service offered one of the 
biggest opportunities for the Board to fully utilise its facilities.”115 An example of an NFB 
production is the series Historiese Suid-Afrika/Historic South Africa, which consisted of 12 
half-hour documentaries (six in Afrikaans and six in English) for which the SABC paid R8 000 
per film, or R96 000 in total.116 However, the lack of work channelled to the private sector and 
the NFB’s attempt to produce films for the SABC – a field that many Afrikaans producers 
could not exploit – caused friction between the NFB and the private sector.  
On 28 March 1977 the Minister of National Education – P.G.F. Koornhof – instructed his 
department to investigate the NFB’s business operations, financial viability, modes of 
financing and future survival. The report, spearheaded by N.H. Botma (Chief Accountant of 
the Treasury), was completed on 11 August 1978.117  The investigation, which consulted 
production and distribution bodies such as Brigadiers Films, Elmo de Witt Films, Kavalier 
Films and Satbel, to name a few, concluded that the private sector regarded the NFB as “just 
another production house” which created unfair competition.118 There were three main reasons 
for this view. The NFB was exempt from customs and import tariffs, and from sales and income 
tax, hence being directly supported by the government and having the privileged position of 
                                                            
114 When the NFB was created, government projected that 200 films would be needed annually. In reality, 
however, the most required were 104 films in 1964/65. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 183, 
Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 10, Correspondence between the NFR and the Secretary of National Education: 
“Deurstuur van werk na die privaatsektor”. (n.d.), p. 2.  
115 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 183. Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 10, Board Meeting: “Twaalfde 
Jaarverslag vir die Tydperk 1 April 1975 tot 31 Maart 1976”, 23 November 1976, p. 6. 
116 SAB, Nasionale Filmraad (NFR), 353, Addendum: 37/2, Volume 1, Contract between the NFB and the SABC: 
“Ooreenkoms aangegaan tussen die Suid‐Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie en die Nasionale Filmraad: Historiese 
Suid‐Afrika”, October 1974, p. 2. 
117 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 185, Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 13, Report of the Department 
of National Education: “Verslag van die Komitee van Ondersoek na die Nasionale Filmraad”, 11 August 1978, p. 
i. 
118 Ibid., p. 16.  
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choosing what films it wished to produce and which it would channel to the private sector. 
Furthermore, the private sector found no evidence of the NFB’s policy of providing training to 
aspiring filmmakers. The private sector representatives claimed that their respective companies 
provided the necessary practical experience, as did the Pretoria Technical College which at the 
time was the only institution that provided a formal, technical course for students aspiring to 
be involved in the cinematic film industry. It seems in retrospect that the statement is rather 
contradictory to previous claims made by the Afrikaans production industry. As previously 
indicated, many filmmakers – when consulted on amendments to the subsidy scheme – 
suggested that a significant reason for the South African industry’s failure to expand was the 
lack of experience. Their statement, therefore, indicates that the introduction of SATV had 
consequently shifted the focus of the production industry from developing South African 
filmmaking to one of survival.   
The Committee for the Investigation of the National Film Board, which drafted the report, 
formulated 17 conclusions, which – for the sake of avoiding repetition – will be summarised 
here. The financial difficulties experienced by the NFB were a result of inadequate planning 
and management, and the NFB did in fact represent unfair competition with South Africa’s 
film production industry.119 Upon investigating the report’s findings, Cabinet determined that 
the activities of the NFB would gradually be phased out to allow a timeframe in which 
personnel could find employment elsewhere.120 In 1979 film production was transferred to the 
private sector and the assets and, as such, the financial responsibilities of the NFB were taken 
over by the state. However, the archival service – which were fully subsidised by the state, 
initially known as the South African Film Institute and later changed to the National Film 
Archive (NFA) – continued its operations. In 1982 (with the NFB now defunct) the National 
Archives and Record Service incorporated the NFA, and its name was changed to the National 
Film, Video and Sound Archives (NFVSA) in 1985; it currently still operates under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Arts and Culture.121                
Utilisation of the “B-scheme” 
                                                            
119 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 185, Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 13, Report of the Department 
of National Education: “Verslag van die Komitee van Ondersoek na die Nasionale Filmraad”, 11 August 1978, p. 
21‐22. 
120 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 185, Addendum: N101/3/5, Volume 13, Special meeting held by 
members of the Board (Minutes): “Notule van ‘n spesiale vergadering van die Raad gehou in die Raadsaal, 
Kamer A100, Filmraadgebou…”, 30 October 1978, p. 3.  
121 National Archives and Records Service, “National Film, Video and Sound Archives”, Accessed: November 16, 
2016: http://www.national.archives.gov.za/.  
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The financial blow that the introduction of television dealt the film industry gave impetus to a 
new initiative which came to dominate South African cinematic film production. Known as the 
“Bantu cinematic film industry”, cinematic film production for the black market was 
increasingly exploited by white South African producers after a new subsidy scheme was 
introduced in 1973 and the launch of SATV. The number of “Bantu” feature films that received 
subsidy payments, for example, increased from one in 1974 to 90 films (produced by 45 
production companies) in 1985. The introduction of the “Bantu” (black) subsidy scheme can 
be traced back to a business proposition made by the Bantu Film Trust (Pty) Ltd (a company 
within the Film Trust Group) to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development in 
1970. André Pieterse, referencing the successes achieved by Radio Bantu, argued that “most 
Bantus, just like any other race, preferred to be entertained in their own medium … and a 
[cinematic] film industry and TV service which does not acknowledge or respect this will 
become a nonentity while becoming a disservice to the community.”122 Pieterse’s claim that 
South Africa, even though the majority of the country’s population was black and even with 
the subsidy scheme in place, failed to produce a Black cinematic film industry was fully 
justified. In its 74-year existence the local cinematic film industry produced only a handful of 
films aimed at the black market, of which all were produced by whites, and provided with an 
English soundtrack. Examples include Zonk (1950) and Song of Africa (1951) produced by 
African Film Productions, and Anthony Handley’s Film Knockout (1970).123 At the time South 
Africa had 178 exhibition locations (many were community halls) designed for black, Coloured 
and/or Asian communities – in other words 312 fewer than the number of white cinemas.124   
 
                                                            
122 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 9, Report by Bantu Film Trust: 
“Die Ontwikkeling van ‘n Bantoe‐rolprentbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, April 1970, p. 2. 
123 Andre le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 42. 
124 Statistic provided in April 1970. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 9, 
Report by Bantu Film Trust: “Die Ontwikkeling van ‘n Bantoe‐rolprentbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, April 1970, p. 7. 
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Illustration 15: Bantu Film Trust’s Logo125 
Government, therefore, proposed to introduce a subsidy scheme for a black cinematic film 
industry based on a number of assumptions: the number of black cinema-goers was far less 
than of whites, as these communities were not in a financial position to pay the same admission 
fees; there were relatively few recreation facilities for blacks; cinematic film production 
provided black actors and technicians with opportunities for training; and the films could be 
utilised as a propaganda medium to influence both South Africans and foreigners.126 On the 
last point, for example, A.G. Jackson (Department of Bantu Administration and Development) 
stated:  
“the image that the film Knockout (for which assistance was requested) gives of the Bantu is that 
he is a sophisticated person with his own house, car, etc. – a favourable image is therefore 
conveyed.”127 
Since existing statistics regarding the average cost and potential income of black films were 
not available, government relied on figures formulated by the private sector. For example, Film 
Trust and Kinekor both estimated the potential average GBO of these films to be in the region 
of R40 000 to R43 000.128 After consultations, the government drafted estimates which are 
illustrated in Table 30 (figures for films designed for the white market are included to provide 
perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
125 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 1, Correspondence from the 
Film Trust Group to the Department of Industries: “Subsidie Bantoefilms”, 26 April 1973, p. 1. 
126 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 1, Meeting of the 
Department of Bantu Administration and Development: “Besprekings in verband met rolprente vir die 
bantoemark bestem”, 16 February 1970, p. 3.  
127 Ibid., p. 5. 
128 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 1, Concept proposal: 
“Bykomstige aansporing t.o.v. rolprente vir die bantoemarkvervaardig”, 13 March 1970, p. 30.  
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Table 30:129 Average Cost, GBO, Cost of  Admission Fee per Ticket, Attendance and 
Potential Market (Persons) of Films designed for the Black Market   
Audience White Black ("Bantu") 
Cost R200 000 R40 000
GBO R310 000 R36 000
Admission Fee p/Ticket 47 cents 17 cents
Attendance 700 000 200 000
Potential Market (Persons) 1,4 million 0,3 million
 
A state-appointed committee – headed by Dr J. Adendorff (Chairperson of the Bantu 
Investment Corporation [BIC]) – subsequently devised a subsidy system according to the 
following formula:130  
Subsidy = k – (s * p * y%) 
 ‘k’ (R60 000) = average production cost plus a reasonable profit of a successful film. 
 ‘s’ (250 000) = average number of tickets sold per film. 
 ‘p’ (20 cents) = average entrance (ticket) fee per film. 
 ‘y’ (30%) = the presentation of the box office income generated by the producer (s * p). 
Subsidy = R60 000 – (250 000 * 20c * 30%) 
            = R45 000 or 18c per seat131 
What distinguished the black subsidy system (“B-Scheme”) from the original scheme (“A-
Scheme”) was that the former was based on every ticket sold (18c p/ticket) during a film’s 
screening. The financial risks involved in low-budget productions were, therefore, reduced as 
incomes were immediately provided, whilst allowing admission tickets to be less expensive for 
the black communities. Maximum subsidy pay-out was limited to R45 000 to discourage the 
                                                            
129 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 1, Memorandum provided by 
the Minister of Economic Affairs to Cabinet: “Memorandum aan die Kabinet voorgelê deur die Minister van 
Ekonomiese Sake: Bykomstige aansporing ten opsigte van rolprente vir die bantoemark vervaardig”, (n.d.), p. 
4.  
130 All the figures provided were estimations provided by state.  
131 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: R9‐40.  SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: 
N101/3/6/1, Volume 1, Memorandum provided to Cabinet: “Kabinetsbesluit: Bykomstige aansporing ten 
opsigte van rolprente vir die bantumark vervaardig”, 2 August 1971, p. 9‐10. 
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production of “expensive films”, seeing that the government – as discussed in the previous 
chapter – wished to limit state expenditure during and after the 1970s. The main actor and 75% 
of the cast had to be black, and only companies registered in South Africa could qualify for 
subsidisation.132 Subsidies were not limited to “Bantu-owned” production companies as the 
committee encouraged the involvement of whites:  
“Film production requires expertise and techniques which the BIC or the Bantu does not 
have and, therefore, needs to be undertaken by Whites”.133  
In a policy reminiscent of the postponement of SATV’s phase two, the government 
recommended that a period134 should be allowed in which blacks could master the necessary 
film techniques under the guidance of white employers. Apart from the state subsidy, financial 
assistance was also provided by the BIC. Created in 1959, the BIC functioned as a government-
controlled body that endeavoured to promote industrial development, whilst serving as an 
investment and financial institution for blacks – particularly within the designated Bantu 
areas.135 To encourage and stimulate Bantu film production, the BIC provided short-term 
economic aid through a film bank which assisted filmmakers in crossing (what was known as) 
the “interim stage”, i.e. the period between a film’s completion and its screening. 136 
Furthermore, the BIC aimed to give financial assistance for the building of cinemas in “Bantu 
towns” in which population numbers were deemed appropriate. The construction of twelve 
theatres, each costing approximately R60 000,137 was the initial objective.138 The government 
maintained that mobile film projection units should be used in other parts of South Africa.   
The B-Scheme subsidy system was officially approved on 28 February 1973. 139  The 
development of the industry was relatively slow from its initiation up until the introduction of 
television. BIC, for example, appropriated R500 000 in funds for the creation of the film bank 
                                                            
132 At least 51% of the shares of the production company had to be held by local South African citizens. 
133 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 1, Memorandum provided to 
Cabinet: “Kabinetsbesluit: Bykomstige aansporing ten opsigte van rolprente vir die bantumark vervaardig”, 2 
August 1971, p. 11‐12. 
134 Not specified.  
135 Bantu Investment Corporation Act no 34, Statutes of the Union of South Africa (1959), p. 348.    
136 The period in which producers generate an income.  
137 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: spproximately R2 million.  
138 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report of the Department of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika (Verslag No. 1753)”, 21 
December 1976, p. 26.  
139 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 3, Cabinet’s decision to 
implement the B‐scheme: “Uitbreiding van die subsidieskema vir die ontwikkeling van die rolprentbedryf vir 
die bantoe”, 28 February 1973, p. 1.  
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which was, however, utilised by only one producer. Only five theatres were constructed (seven 
less than the objective), whilst four films received subsidy pay-outs as indicated in Table 31. 
Table 31:140 B-Scheme Subsidy Pay-Outs, 1973/74-1974/75 
Year Number Subsidy Paid  
1973/74 1 R 37 323
1974/75 3 R 95 975
Total 4 R 133 298
 
Tonie van der Merwe’s Nogomopho (1974) was the first feature film produced in an African 
language, whilst u-Deliwe (1975) was the first motion-picture to utilise a black director, i.e. 
Simon Sebela – a figure who featured in over 34 local and international films.141 Demand in 
the black market was high, as illustrated by u-Dewile, which was viewed by over 2 million 
persons (a million more than what was generally perceived as a box office success).142 Capital 
was provided by Heyns Film and Television Ltd. (Heyns Films) – a company, managed by 
Thys Heyns, that produced some of the most expensive black films – which itself was later 
exposed as a Department of Information front company that endeavoured to “counter the 
Americanisation of South African Blacks.”143   
Subsidy amendments were made after the introduction of SATV with the maximum pay-out 
limit increasing to R70 000 in September 1977.144 Whilst the number of films produced for the 
white market decreased, black film production increased exponentially. Fourteen films 
qualified for subsidy between September 1977 and October of 1979, whilst 11 films were 
produced in 1980. However, the government argued that, apart from the films produced by 
Heyns Films and Bayeta Films (a production company managed by Tonie van der Merwe), the 
general quality of the productions was “extremely poor”. The subsidy scheme offered business 
                                                            
140 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 6, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 3, Report of the Department of 
Trade and Industry: “Ondersoek na die Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf in Suid‐Afrika (Verslag No. 1753)”, 21 
December 1976, p. 26. 
141 Other examples include Diamonds are Dangerous (1961) and Mapantsula (1988). Daily News, June 15, 
2016, “KwaZulu‐Natal Commission celebrates 100 years of films”, p. 8.    
142 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 63. 
143 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 257. 
144 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R2,7 million. SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry 
(BNF), 2, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 6, Memorandum: “’n Oorsig van die doelmagtigheid van die 
gewysigde skema sedert 1 September 1977”, (n.d.), p. 12.  
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opportunists and novice producers a chance to produce films for an under-exploited market – 
most of which had no interest in developing the black film industry. James Murray, co-owner 
of Murray-Metsing Films (a white-black partnership with Simon Metsing), argued: “Most of 
the White producers did not start out as film people. There were school teachers, plumbers and 
builders…”145 The scheme, however, also attracted the attention of established cinematic film 
producers who sought to generate alternative incomes to counter the effect of SATV.146 As a 
result, production quality remained low with budgets averaging between R30 000 and R50 000, 
with productions sometimes lasting only a few days.147  
Despite the involvement of blacks being an objective of the scheme, they remained absent as 
cinematic film producers. During the late 1980s only one registered production company – 
SASA Films – was entirely owned by blacks.148 The result, according to Martin Botha, James 
Murray and Keyan Tomaselli, was that most filmmakers either displayed little regard for, or a 
lack of knowledge of, the black experience and its values.149 A theme that became synonymous 
with the black production industry was the justification of segregation in South Africa. The 
urbanisation of blacks was depicted negatively as opposed to life in the black ‘homelands’ (or 
Bantustans), which was portrayed as more suitable for the ‘black lifestyle’. Examples include 
Heyns Films/Tonie van der Merwe’s Nogomopho (1974), Bayeta Films’ Vuma (1978) and Igoli 
Films’ Isiviko (1979).150  
Apart from the films produced under the A-scheme, the quantity of black cinematic productions 
kept increasing despite the introduction of TV2 and TV3 in 1981 (Table 32).  
 
 
                                                            
145 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 264. 
146 This will be illustrated in the section on Kavalier Films as a case study.  
147 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 60. 
148 Ibid., p. 58.  
149 Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), p. 115; 
Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 259; Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, 
(London: Routledge, 1989), p. 66. 
150 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 71. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
199 
 
Table 32:151 Number of B-scheme films produced, 1980/81-1984/85 
Fiscal Year Films Subsidy Paid152 (Rand) 
1980/81 11 631 380
1981/82 14 901 738
1982/83 12 1 084 057
1983/84 30 2 183 475
1984/85 64 4 190 343
 
    
Television did not discourage producers from making films for South Africa’s black market. 
Screen advertising in black cinemas, for example, was estimated to have increased 79% from 
1981 to 1982.153 Many reasons could account for this. This thesis reflects on two primary issues: 
the lack of black access to television, and the additional amendments made to the subsidy 
scheme which, in turn, attracted further exploitation. In 1985 research conducted by the SABC 
indicated that an average of 1,949 million adults tuned into weekly broadcasts made by TV2 
and/or 3.154 The black population of South Africa consisted of 24,4 million people at the 
                                                            
151 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 187, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 4, Correspondence (C.F. 
Scheepers): “Assistance to the Local Film Industry: South African Film and Video Institute”, 1985, p. 3.   
152 Subsidies paid are deliberately included, as will be discussed.  
153 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 3, Sunday Express article: 
“Mini‐boom reflected in January totals: SA advertisers step up their drive for Black consumers”, 18 April 1982, 
p. 24.  
154 SABC, Radio Park, SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1985, p. 18. 
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time.155 At the time the SABC faced various challenges stemming from the socio-economic, 
political and geographical issues in South Africa. During the launch of TV2/3, for example, 
only 25% of the black population lived in areas that could receive TV transmissions.156 The 
economic conditions affecting black South Africans made television less affordable. In 1980 
and 1985 the average income per capita for blacks was estimated at R5 107 and R5 423, 
respectively, as opposed to R46 670 and R48 370 for whites.157 Furthermore, the availability 
of electricity (or otherwise) was also a factor, considering that two-thirds of South Africa’s 
largely rural populace was without electricity during the 1980s. The SABC channels TV2/3 
were, therefore, not regarded as much of a threat by cinematic filmmakers. Amendments made 
to the B-scheme applied from 1 April 1981. The maximum amount of subsidy payable was 
increased to R80 000 per film. If a film’s admission tickets were sold for 21c each or more, 
subsidy was paid at 21c per ticket sold. In cases where tickets were sold for less than 21c, the 
amount of subsidy paid was equivalent to the price of the ticket sold.158 The amendments were 
made mainly in response to inflation, which contributed to the rise of production costs.159          
Problems with both distribution and exhibition impeded the development of the industry. In 
June 1970 André Pieterse proposed that the creation and expansion of a black film distribution 
and screening network could only occur after black communities had familiarised themselves 
with the idea of a cinema.160 Mobile units and multi-purpose theatres would raise the desired 
“bioscope awareness”. Pieterse subsequently received secret payments from the Department of 
Information to erect a “Bantu” cinema chain across South Africa, but the project was never 
realised. The money (£475 000 in total) was instead utilised for the production of Golden 
Rendezvous (1977).161 The secret funding received by Pieterse formed part of what would be 
                                                            
155 Servaas van der Berg & Megan Louw, “Changing patterns of South African income distribution: Towards 
time series estimates of distribution and poverty”, Paper to the Conference of the Economic Society of South 
Africa, Stellenbosch, 17‐19 September 2003, p. 11.    
156 SABC, Radio Park. SABC Media Library, Annual Reports of the SABC, 1981, p. 123. 
157 Servaas van der Berg & Megan Louw, “Changing patterns of South African income distribution: Towards 
time series estimates of distribution and poverty”, Paper to the Conference of the Economic Society of South 
Africa, Stellenbosch, 17‐19 September 2003, p. 11.    
158 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 3, Amendments made to the 
B‐scheme (Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism): Financial Assistance to the Local Film Industry: 
Films for distribution mainly among Black persons”, 8 October 1981, p. 3.  
159 Subsidy of R70 000 paid in January 1977 – value in 2016 taking into account inflation is approximately R2,4 
million. Subsidy of R70 000 paid in January 1981 – value in 2016 taking into account inflation is approximately 
R1,5 million.  
160 SAB, Bantoe Administrasie en Ontwikkeling (BAO), 11996, Addendum: N181/1, Volume 1, Minutes: 
“Ontwikkeling van Bantoe‐rolprentbedryf in Suid‐Afrika”, 19 Junie 1970, p. 59.  
161 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 59. 
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known as the “Information Scandal”. It was revealed that the government had misappropriated 
funds to set up or support, amongst other things, Louis Luyt’s The Citizen, 162  Thor 
Communications and as mentioned, Heyns Films and Pietserse’s cinematic distribution 
aspirations. The Ministry of Information was consequently abolished, and the scandal led to 
B.J. Vorster resigning as State President. In 1982 only 30 cinemas operated in black residential 
areas. Soweto, with a population of 1,25 million at the time, for example, had three cinemas.163 
Mobile distribution remained the foundation of the black cinematic film industry since, 
according to Thys Heyns, establishing a cinema chain required a monumental investment – i.e. 
“between R30-R40 million.”164 The mobile distribution system relied on an individual (an 
operator) with a copy of a feature, a vehicle and projector, who travelled across the country to 
screen the film at as many venues as possible. The operator negotiated with the owner/manager 
of the venue (in many cases a school principal or vice-principal) to determine his fee for a 
film’s screening. Subsidy was paid in respect of commercial shows including theatres, drive-
ins, halls or any location where the public might view the film on payment of an admission fee. 
However, subsidy was also payable in situations where cinema returns were unobtainable, in 
other words, films which were hired out for a fixed amount and not on a percentage basis. In 
this case, a certificate showing the date and venue of the screening, the number of tickets sold 
and relevant prices, the amount of the film rental paid and the name and address of the exhibitor 
needed to be signed by the exhibitor or a representative.165 In scenarios where admission tickets 
were not sold – for example, groups shows at compounds – subsidy equivalent to the amount 
of the film rental was paid. The system was introduced to compensate for the lack of screening 
venues as well as to provide recreation for impoverished black communities. However, this 
approach was ultimately subject to widespread exploitation and corruption among operators 
(who were employed by film producers) and ‘exhibitors’ as the system was entirely dependent 
on honest reporting. James Murray argued in Ethnic Cinema: How Greed Killed the Industry 
that there was a problem with mobile distribution:  
“It is supremely important to bear in mind that there existed an ‘anything goes’ situation. Films 
were shown in beer halls and shebeens, churches, community centres and even open-air cattle 
                                                            
162 The only major English‐language newspaper favourable to the National Party.  
163 The names of the cinemas: Eyethu (a 1000 seater), Lily and Boiketlong.  
164 The Star, 19 January 1982, “South Africa’s sleeping giant”, p. 21.  
165 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 3, Amendments made to the 
B‐scheme (Department of Industries, Commerce and Tourism): Financial Assistance to the Local Film Industry: 
Films for distribution mainly among Black persons, 8 October 1981, p. 6. 
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kraals… In such circumstances controls and checks were useless. The nearest thing to an accurate 
check was to visit a hall after the event and to cram as many people into it as possible.” 166    
Despite the corruption, cinematic film production remained profitable as producers claimed 
that more than a million black South Africans viewed a production each month. 167 
Consequently, producers established the Black Feature Film Producers Association (BFFPA) 
in January 1983 with Tonie van der Merwe, Director of a number of black film production 
companies, acting as Chairman. The birth of the BFFPA could largely be attributed to the 
VVRSA refusing to accept Black film production companies as members, because these 
companies’ activities were deemed to be amateurish.168 The BFFPA, which had approximately 
twenty members,169 was established with the objective of further expanding the black cinematic 
filmmaking industry. South Africa’s production industry, therefore, consisted of two 
competing organisations that reflected the broader socio-economic conditions of apartheid. 
Filmmaking was characterised according to race, whilst blacks had no authority over an 
industry that was, nonetheless, created for and dependent on their support.    
Between 1986 to 1990 235 B-scheme feature films were produced, over 600 mobile units 
operated throughout South Africa, while the maximum amount of subsidy payable per film was 
raised by a further R20 000.170 Corruption, however, remained an issue, with various state 
departments endeavouring to assert some sort of control over the matter. The industry was 
ultimately transferred to the Department of Home Affairs in 1989 as it had suitable resources 
to fully address the state of corruption. An investigation in 1990 exposed the full extent of 
discrepancies within the industry, consequently compelling government to abolish the B-
scheme altogether in the same year.171          
                                                            
166 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 260. 
167 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 186, Addendum: N101/3/6/1, Volume 3, Beeld article: “Vermaak vir 
swartes so beskerm”, 13 September 1984, p. 7.  
168 Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 61. 
169 The companies comprising the organisation included: Aim Productions, Bayeta Films, Bhekhile Films, 
Benher Films, Bensusan Films, Conlyn Films, Cyesta Films, Eagle Films, Igoli Films, Kundalini Films, Multi Films, 
Nicovista Films, Optima Films, Satellite Films, Spectrum Films, Taurus Films, Tugela Films, Tycoon Films, 
Visualink Films and Umziki Films. 
170 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 265. 
SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 2, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 5, Correspondence (Bureau for 
Information): “Hulp aan die plaaslike rolprentbedryf: Bepaling van kwotas ten opsigte van swart rolprente vir 
die 1989/90 finansiële jaar ingevolge die B‐skema”, 28 April 1989, p.1.   
171 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 265. 
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The End of Kavalier Films 
The introduction of SATV had a particularly harmful impact on the cinematic operations of 
Kavalier Films. Chairperson Schalk J. Botha stated as early as November 1976 that the effects 
were “almost destructive.”172 For example, the producer’s average income generated in drive-
in theatres dropped 45% in 1976.173 What made this figure so worrisome was that drive-in 
theatres accounted for 70% of Kavalier’s revenue. Furthermore, the fact that most drive-in 
theatres shortened a film’s running time from two to one week also had a substantial effect. 
Even without the introduction of Television, this meant that the GBO, would drop 30%.174 As 
a result, Kavalier Films developed four main strategies to counter the effects of television.   
First, the ambition of producing at least three films a year had to be scrapped. Films for both 
the local and international markets were produced much more selectively – thus resembling 
the strategy adopted by Mimosa Films. The result was that, apart from the films for which 
production had already started in 1975 (Hank, Hennery and Friend and Karate Olympia), 
Kavaliers failed to release a single (A-scheme) motion picture until the final amendments were 
made to the subsidy system which applied after August 1977.175 However, Kavalier Films still 
needed an income, whilst its search for suitable stories continued. As such, a contract was 
negotiated with Satbel to distribute films produced before 1976. Examples included Debbie 
(1965), Hoor My Lied (1967), Jy is my Liefling (1968) and Die Geheim van Nantes (1969). 
Crazy People, released on 28 September 1977, was the first feature completed by Kavalier 
Films after the new scheme came into effect.176 At first prospects appeared “promising” as the 
film grossed R174 000 within two months. 177  Kavalier Films’ optimism was short-lived, 
unfortunately, as the film’s revenue generated during the school holidays (December/January) 
failed to meet the estimates. Crazy People, for example, was exhibited by 28 drive-in theatres 
across South Africa, earning an average of R1 550 p/theatre – R1 250 (or 55%) less than 
                                                            
172GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 4. (1/35) Chairman Report: “Voorsitterverslag vir die jaar geëindig“, 26 November 1976, 
p. 1.  
173 Ibid.  
174 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 5. (2/12) Minutes: “Notule van die bestuursvergadering”, 19 Maart 1976, p. 3.  
175 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 1. (4/91) Agendas: “Direksievergaderingnotule”, 25 November 1977, p. 175.  
176 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 1. (4/92) Agendas: “Direksievergaderingnotule”, 25 November 1977, p. 181. 
177 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: Approximately R 5,5 million.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
204 
 
expected.178 By October 1979 box office revenues indicated that the film still had to recover 
R50 790 to cover the production expenditure.179   
The second strategy was that the attempts to provide a service to SATV, either through the 
production and/or dubbing of programmes, needed to be sustained. Kavalier Films had 
succeeded in supplying programmes for the SABC, although few in number, mostly a series of 
documentaries and short films. In June 1977, for example, the SABC commissioned Kavalier 
Films to produce a 10-part documentary series on the SADF.180 The duration of each program 
would be 40 minutes, whilst the producer earned R220 000 for the entire series. However, the 
offer presented by the SABC meant that Kavalier Films would produce a series fully aware 
that yielding a substantial profit would not be possible. This was the general situation as most 
of the programmes produced, such as Spitfire (a short TV film), Hengel (a documentary series), 
the 300 minutes’ worth of journal programme material created for the “Bantu-TV service” and 
films dubbed into Afrikaans (for example, Zoo Gang and Links and Regs van die Autobaan), 
only covered the costs of the various productions. The reason was that Kavalier Films aimed 
to establish a productive working relationship with the SABC. The producer believed that 
sustaining an “unblemished” relationship would possibly allow Kavalier Films to receive more 
substantial payments for future TV opportunities.181               
Third, Kavalier Films experimentally produced films aimed at South Africa’s black population. 
Two films, Abashokobezi and Unokukhanya, were produced during 1976. Since Kavalier Films 
had yet to undertake such an endeavour, it consulted individuals such as Justus Tsungu, a black 
radio presenter, to better understand the needs of the African market.182 Production was initially 
halted as a result of the political unrest which followed the Soweto Uprisings in June 1976.183 
When the films were ultimately distributed, attendance yet again failed to meet expectations. 
The political unrest in the black communities was held responsible for this, as no film 
                                                            
178 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 7V. 6(1) Reports: “Kort Verslag”, 12 January 1978, p. 4. 
Other films produced and released in 1977/1978 included Dr. Marais Hugo, Billy Boy and Die Spaanse Vlieg. 
H.B. Thom retired as Head of the Script Committee in June 1978. Consequently, the documents in the GBD 
(H.B. Thom Collections) did not provide a full account of the incomes and expenditures created by these films.   
179 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 2, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 6, Memorandum: “’n Oorsig van 
die doelmagtigheid van die gewysigde skema sedert 1 September 1977”, 17 April 1980, p. Appendix A.  
180 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 1. (4/89) Agendas: “Direksievergaderingsnotule”, 24 June 1977, p. 165.  
181 Ibid., p. 160. 
182 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 1. (4/80) Agendas: “Direksievergaderingsnotule“, 25 June 1976, p. 97. 
183 This was a series of protests organised by Soweto high school students which started on 16 June 1976. The 
protests were a response to the government introducing a policy requiring black students to be taught in 
Afrikaans as medium of instruction. Ali K. Hlongwane, “The Mapping of the June 16 1976 Soweto Student 
Uprisings Routes: Past Recollections and Present Reconstruction(s)”, Journal of African Cultural Studies 
19(2007), p. 7.     
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screenings could be held in areas such as Witbank, Krugersdorp, Diepkloof, Roodepoort, 
Randfontein, Benoni and Soweto.184 Theatres in these areas were temporarily closed by various 
sections within the Department of Bantu Affairs. The unrest that consumed black South Africa 
ultimately convinced Kavalier Films to permanently discontinue the production of “Bantu 
Films.”185   
Lastly, the producer investigated the possibilities of expanding its operations by utilising new 
video technologies, more specifically the conversion of film into video, a medium which had 
yet to be exploited in South Africa’s audio-visual industry. The business undertaking, initially 
known as the “Video-projek”,186 was a direct response to the scarcity of employment offered 
by SABC-TV.187 The subsidiary, ultimately registered as Video RSA with Ivan Hall acting as 
manager, became operational in March 1977. Video RSA was established mainly as a producer 
of video-tape productions for commercial producers, advertisers and broadcast TV stations, 
aiming to become “the pre-eminent commercial TV facility first in its field.”188 However, 
despite its potential, Video RSA was struggling to make inroads into the audio-visual industry. 
Two main reasons were held responsible, i.e. the reaction against the video medium by a film-
orientated South African industry and public, and the quality of the service itself.189 Expanding 
upon the latter point, Ivan Hall pointed out that the facilities at Video RSA’s studio were used 
“before it was professionally orientated, both in engineering quality and service.”190 Video 
RSA, consequently, suffered a damaged image. 
Because all four strategies failed to meet expectations, Kavalier Films faced the possibility of 
going into liquidation. In April 1979 Amalgamated Film and Television Investments – 
controlled by Irene Film Laboratories (Irene Films), South Africa’s most renowned film 
processing laboratory and subsidiary of Satbel – acquired a controlling interest in Kavalier 
Films.191 The takeover by Irene Films was largely motivated by acquiring control of Video 
RSA, thus allowing Satbel to gain further control of South Africa’s audio-visual industry as 
                                                            
184 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 5. (2/14) Minutes: “Notule van die bestuursvergadering”, 16 February 1977, p. 2. 
185 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV.1. (4/86) Agendas: “Direksievergaderingsnotule“, 25 February 1977, p. 141. 
186 Video project.  
187 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 5. (2/14) Minutes: “Notule van die bestuursvergadering”, 16 February 1977, p. 1. 
188 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 7V. 5(7)   Television: “Proposal for organisational system for Video RSA“, 15 November 
1977, p. 1.   
189 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 1. (4/89) Agendas: “Notule van ‘n bestuursvergadering”, 8 September 1977, p. 1. 
190 Ibid., p. 2.   
191 GLD, HBT, 191 KAV. 6K. (173) Correspondence (Letter addressed to H.B. Thom): “Halfjaarklikse Verslag”, 2 
April 1979, p. 1.  
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part of its expansion process.192 Messrs B. Vlok, R.B. Honeyborne and Professor B. van 
Deventer subsequently resigned as directors and were replaced by P.J. Zimmerman (Managing 
Director of Irene Films), J. Rijfkogel and C.G. de Kock. Apart from managing Video RSA, the 
acquisition entailed Irene Films being involved in all sectors of Kavalier’s operations, including 
the production of feature films. Two productions were completed and distributed within the 
same year, i.e. Pretoria, o Pretoria and Wat jy Saai.193    However, as regular cinematic film 
production for South Africa’s white audiences stagnated, so too did Kavalier’s activities, 
considering that the production house – once South Africa’s most prolific – failed to produce 
a film in 1980.  In 1981 Kavalier Films released its last feature film, Kill and Kill Again, a 
sequel to Karate Olympia (1976). Kavalier Studios, located in Northcliff Hill, Johannesburg, 
was later converted into the World’s View apartment complex.194  
“Charlie Chaplin of the Bosveld”: 195  Uys’s Continued Success despite SATV’s 
Introduction  
Despite the increasingly challenging climate, Jamie Uys/Mimosa Films still managed to 
produce box office successes, such as Funny People (1976) and especially The Gods Must Be 
Crazy (1980). However, when analysing the quality of a film a major challenge is that an 
individual’s critical perspective is based on his/her own personal standards, moulded by 
experience and ideology. Watchmen (2009), produced by Legendary Pictures and DC Comics, 
serves as a more contemporary example. The neo-noir-styled super-hero film received 
conflicting reviews from audiences and critics. Its dark satirical take on the genre was praised 
by, for example, Kyle Smith (writing for the New York Post), which compared the film to the 
work of one of America’s most iconic producers and directors, Stanley Kubrick.196 However, 
The Irish Time’s reviewer, Donald Clarke, commented that the film “turned into a colossal 
animated storyboard, augmented by indifferent performances and some moronically obvious 
                                                            
192 Die Transvaler, April 6, 1979, Phillippa Breytenbach. “Sanlam se Filmhap word groter: Kavalier films 
oorgeneem”, p. 1. 
193 Andre le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm, (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 217. 
194 The Citizen, January 13, 2009, Annette Bayne. “Silver screen beginnings: The history of South African’s film 
industry lies in the heart of Joburg”, p. 3.  
195 Headline of a newspaper article in Die Burger, which references Uys’s film Daar Doer in Die Bosveld and 
famous American comedy star, Charlie Chaplin. Die Burger, August 13, 2011, Leon Van Nierop, “Charlie Chaplin 
van die Bosveld”, p. 10.  
196 Director of films such as 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) and The Shining (1980). Lou Lumenick, “Is Zack 
Snyder the new Kubrick?”, New York Post, March 4, 2009, Accessed: 15 December 2016: 
http://nypost.com/2009/03/04/is‐zack‐snyder‐the‐new‐kubrick/.     
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music cues.”197 The same critical rule certainly applies when reviewing the work of Jamie 
Uys/Mimosa Films. What must be mentioned, however, is that Uys had a healthy working 
relationship with government since the formation of the MPPA, enjoyed both local and 
international acclaim before the introduction of SATV and had the financial means to produce 
large-scale productions (relative to the South African context), particularly after the release of 
Beautiful People (1974). This is illustrated by the following films:   
Funny People (1976)  
Funny People was the first “candid camera”-type comedy produced in South Africa. The film 
is not so much an example of the quality of Uys’ work, but rather one which highlights Uys’s 
international renown based on his previous works. The roots of the film can be traced back to 
1969, when Uys experimented with the concept whilst producing the short film Marching to 
Pretoria. 198  After Allan Hunt, creator of Candid Camera (broadcast in South Africa in 
1977),199  gave Mimosa Films permission to use the concept, filming commenced. Funny 
People was immensely popular upon its release, becoming the first local film to gross 
approximately R250 000 within its first week, whilst in addition receiving a subsidy in excess 
of R700 000.200 By 1990 the feature had grossed R4,2 million in South Africa alone, which 
made it the 5th highest grossing film in the country at the time.201 Uys’s acclaim was perhaps 
best illustrated when Dr Boet Troskie went to sell the film for foreign distribution at the Cannes 
Film Festival: “He successfully sold the film for distribution in most countries worldwide. They 
bought the movie without having seen it – the name Jamie Uys clinched the deal.”202 The 
success of Funny People spawned the production of numerous candid camera films during the 
late 1970s, such as Kavalier’s Crazy People, and in particular the 1980s. Uys released Funny 
People 2 in 1983, but it was local comedian Leon Schuster who would later become 
synonymous with the concept in the later 1980s, a reputation that continues to this day. 
                                                            
197 Donald Clarke, “New DVD’s”, Irish Times, July 24, 2009, Accessed: 15 December 2016: 
https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/new‐dvds‐1.706072.  
198 Mimosa Films, “Funny People”, Accessed: 12 December 2016: 
http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/Archive/Film/78/funny‐people.   
199 Andre le Roux & Lilla Fourie, Filmverlede: Die Geskiedenis van die Suid‐Afrikaanse Speelfilm (Pretoria: 
Universiteit van Suid‐Afrika, 1982), p. 177. 
200 The maximum subsidy of R300 000 was only introduced a year after the release of Funny People. Keyan 
Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 36. 
Mimosa Films, “Funny People”, Accessed: 12 December 2016: 
http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/Archive/Film/78/funny‐people.    
201 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 99. 
202  Mimosa Films, “Funny People”, Accessed: 12 December 2016: 
http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/Archive/Film/78/funny‐people.    
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Examples of Schuster’s films are You must be Joking (1987) and Oh Schucks… It’s Schuster 
(1989) which had earned R5,5 million in box office revenue in South Africa by 1990.203       
The Gods Must Be Crazy (1980) 
Examples of Jamie Uys’s endeavour to produce films based on quality rather than quantity had 
been demonstrated when he left Kavalier Films to produce features for Mimosa Films. This 
again became evident when, after a year of the VVRSA’s existence, Boet Troskie and Jamie 
Uys retired as members of the Association. The company’s strongest criticism of the Afrikaans 
cinematic film industry was that only the best foreign films were distributed in South Africa, 
whilst all locally produced films, “good or bad”, were screened, consequently damaging the 
image of the industry.204 Uys reached the pinnacle of his career with the production and release 
of the somewhat controversial The Gods Must be Crazy (1980) and its sequel The Gods must 
be Crazy 2 (1989). The sequel became the second highest grossing film in South Africa by 
1990, earning R6.3 million in GBO (to be outdone only by the American production Dirty 
Dancing [1987]).205 However, since the timeframe of this thesis extends to 1986, The Gods 
Must Be Crazy will be discussed in more detail. 
The film was distributed by Ster-Kinekor in South Africa and Twentieth-Century-Fox in the 
USA. The plot revolves around the life of Xi (played by N!xau) of the San tribe of Ju’/Hoansi 
bushmen living in the Kalahari Desert. When a Coca-Cola bottle is thrown out of an airplane, 
the tribe perceives it as an artefact from their gods and utilise it for multiple purposes. However, 
this gift from the gods soon becomes a cause for envy and ultimately friction within the tribe, 
since every member wanted to use the one bottle. Xi, after consulting the elders, decided on 
making a pilgrimage to find the edge of the world and dispose the bottle there. He subsequently 
encountered people from other civilisations, some of whom included biologist Andrew Steyn 
(Marius Weyers), school teacher Kate Thompson (Sandra Prinsloo), guerrilla troops who were 
being pursued by local government forces, and a safari tour guide called Jack Hind (Nick de 
Jager). Xi is jailed for an attack on livestock, but Steyn soon applied to employ Xi as a tracker 
for the remainder of his sentence. Kate, along with her pupils, meanwhile, were taken hostage 
                                                            
203 This made the film the third highest grossing film in the country at the time. Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, 
Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: Showdata, 1992), p. 99. 
204 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF, 2, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 5, Correspondence between 
Mimosa Films and J.C. Heunis (Minister of Economic Affairs): “S.A. Rolprentbedryf met betrekking tot 
buitelandse verdienste en subsidie”, 1 September 1978, Appendix B.  
205 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls and Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape 
Town: Showdata, 1992), p. 99. 
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and used as human shields by the guerrilla troops in their attempt to escape into a neighbouring 
country. Xi and Steyn’s fieldwork resulted in them discovering that the wildlife they were 
observing was in the path of the guerrillas’ escape. They eventually save Kate and the students 
after immobilising the terrorists. Xi finally reaches God’s Window and is convinced that he 
had reached the end of the world, since the landscape below the cliff was obscured by low 
clouds. Xi throws the bottle off the cliff and returns to his tribe.206 
The Gods Must Be Crazy has been a source of debate amongst academics and critics trying to 
establish whether the film is premised on content of a racially insensitive nature. Linda Hunter 
(at the time a Professor in the Department of African Languages and Literature at the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison), for example, maintained that the feature emphasised the uncivilised 
customs of a civilised people.207 Barbara Moss, in “Gods Must Be Crazy or Apartheid in 
Technicolour”, accused the film of subtle racism considering that the film was produced during 
the Bush War. She particularly referenced the role blacks played, labelling it as most disturbing:  
“The government that is attacked is black run, but woefully inept. The terrorists are also black… 
They too are incredibly inept. The fact that the South African government is presently fighting 
Angolan soldiers, who are aided by Cubans, makes the inferences all the more insidious.”208  
Regardless, Gods Must Be Crazy received numerous international awards including the Grand 
Prix at Switzerland’s Festival du Film du Comedie pour in 1981, the Award of Excellence by 
the Film Advisory Board in 1984, the Award of Merit by the Academy of Family Films and 
Family Television in 1985, and the Golden Scroll by the Academy of Science Fiction and 
Horror Films in 1985, to name a few. Within less than a year of its release the film had grossed 
over R22 million in the USA and R200 million worldwide (R80 million in Japan, which was a 
record at the time).209 By 1990 The Gods Must Be Crazy grossed R4,1 million in South Africa. 
In 1983, as a result of Jamie Uys’s contribution to the Afrikaans cinematic film production 
industry, he received an honorary doctorate from the University of Port Elizabeth and the 
Decoration for Meritorious Service by State President, Marais Viljoen.210  
                                                            
206 IMDb, “The Gods Must Be Crazy: Plot Summary”, Accessed: 15 December 2016: 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0080801/plotsummary.  
207 Linda Hunter, “The Gods Must Be Crazy – Unsolicited Opinions”, Issue: A Journal of Opinion 14 (1985), p. 34.       
208 Barbara Moss, “The Gods Must Be Crazy or Apartheid in Technicolor”, Black Camera 1 (1985), p. 6.  
209 The Citizen, May 13, 1985, “Jamie Uys ‘won’t treat apartheid in film’”, p. 8.  
210 Die Transvaler, January 29, 1983, Johan Allers, “Jamie Uys kry doktorsgraad”, p. 2. 
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Illustration 16: A scene in Gods Must Be Crazy in which the Ju’/Hoansi people (San tribe) study the 
famous Coke-bottle.211 
Subsidy Amendment in 1981: The Struggle against SATV Continues 
By 1980 television dampened the production of A-scheme films to such an extent that only 
eight films were released, i.e. the lowest since 1969. Meanwhile, André Scholtz, a MBA 
graduate and former employee of Kinekor, had become Chairperson of the VVRSA, whilst 
Tommie Meyer (previously employed by Kavalier Films) was appointed Deputy. 212  The 
election of Scholtz was much needed at the time, according to Tomaselli, as he had a long-term 
vision for the expansion of the industry with the adoption of a five-year plan as a short-term 
solution.213 The VVRSA proposed that films produced for both the local and foreign market 
needed to qualify for subsidy. Because of the dramatic increase of production costs, a higher 
subsidy should be paid, whilst the subsidy limit had to be disposed of, thus providing local 
filmmakers with the confidence to produce high-budget films similar to The Gods Must Be 
Crazy (1980). Local films produced simply for the South African market should continue to 
receive subsidies. Art/non-commercial films should be subsidised if a distribution network, for 
example a film society, could act as a kind of distributor to provide aspiring local filmmakers 
with the necessary experience before venturing into the commercial filmmaking sector.214 
These recommendations never materialised, however, as the subsidy scheme remained 
unchanged until April 1981 as a result of disruptions caused by a cabinet reshuffle. The industry 
                                                            
211 Mimosa Film Group, “Feature Films‐ Gods Must Be Crazy”, Accessed: 16 March 2017: 
http://www.mimosafilms.co.za/Feature/1/the‐gods‐must‐be‐crazy.  
212 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 14, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 7, Correspondence from the 
VVRSA: “Die Vereniging van Vollengte Rolprentvervaardigers van Suid‐Afrika”, 18 July 1979, p. 1.  
213 Keyan Tomaselli. The Cinema of Apartheid: Race and Class in South African Film (London: Routledge, 1989), 
p. 37. 
214 The NFB had the same objective, but the training would be provided by the private sector.  
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was left frustrated by the stretched-out process, with the government being approached by 
filmmakers on a “weekly basis.”215  Feeling uncertain about the future of South Africa’s 
cinematic film industry, Scholtz temporarily left the film production industry.216 Scholtz would 
make his return as an associate producer of Leon Schuster’s highly successful You must be 
Joking! (1986). The film had grossed R3,7 million in South Africa by 1990 (7th highest at the 
time).217  
Amendments to the A-scheme were introduced in April 1981 that were based on the same 
sliding-scale system established in 1977. 
 
 
The amendments applied to both Afrikaans and English films to encourage productions for the 
foreign market. The threshold was lowered to R75 000 per film. However, the amendments 
were short-lived as new changes were introduced which applied from October 1981. A 
concession was made to apply the new regulations to films produced since 1 April 1981. 
Subsidy was payable at a rate of 70% for the first R1 million received in NBO revenue and 50% 
for the next R1 million. Therefore, the maximum subsidy payable was increased to R1,2 
million,219 whilst the threshold of R100 000 (to compensate for the increased subsidy) was 
reintroduced. These amendments applied to both English and Afrikaans films, as well as films 
screened in South West Africa and states within the Customs Union Agreement, i.e. Botswana, 
                                                            
215 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 7, Correspondence: “Ons word 
nou byna…”, 17 February 1981, (n.p.).  
216 Andre Scholtz, e‐mail message to Coenraad J. Coetzee, December 27, 2016. 
217 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1981, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 99. 
218 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 2, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 6, Memorandum: “’n Oorsig van 
die doelmagtigheid van die gewysigde skema sedert 1 September 1977”, 17 April 1980, p. 12. 
219 Value in 2016 taking into account inflation: approximately R22,7 million.  
Table 33:218 Subsidy Scheme which Applied from 1 April 1981 
NBO (Rand) Tariff (%) 
< 150 001 80
150 001 to 250 000 70
250 001 to 350 000 60
>350 000 50
Maximum R 300 000
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Lesotho and Swaziland. The R900 000 increase in the maximum subsidy payable was 
introduced to compensate for the increase in production costs and lessen the financial risks 
involved in producing large-scale productions in an endeavour to eliminate the stigma 
associated with the local production industry.220  
Afrikaans Cinema’s Television Films 
“Everyone wanted to make TV programmes with the SABC … The risk of [making] TV programmes is 
continuity … There wasn’t a financial risk, there was a popularity risk. You will not be employed if people did 
not like your product.” – Franz Marx221 
From 1980 some of the most established Afrikaans directors/producers were involved in the 
production of SABC-TV programmes, including Elmo de Witt, Manie van Rensburg, Koos 
Roets and Franz Marx.222 The popularity of SABC-TV produced a period in which television-
based cinematic films overwhelmed the Afrikaans production industry – Brigadiers Films 
(owned by Albie Venter at the time) being the most famous example. For instance, feature 
films Nommer Asseblief (1981), Verkeerde Nommer (1982) and Bosveldhotel (1985) were 
based on TV series with the same titles. The TV-derivative films were financially lucrative 
(especially with the assistance of the 1981 subsidy amendments) as indicated by the feature 
film Skollie (1984), based on the 1982 TV series Vyfster. By 1988 Skollie, produced for 
R595 650, earned R1,048 million in box office income (R262 113 accruing to the producer) 
and a subsidy of R724 225, meaning that a total income of R986 338 was accumulated by the 
producer.223 However, the imitation of television productions caused further damage to the 
image of the Afrikaans films.  Leon Van Nierop, a renowned Afrikaans film critic, argued that 
these films “very quickly became a slavish server of television” since the features, produced 
purely for financial reasons, utilised TV techniques which meant that they failed to adopt 
                                                            
220 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 7, Press statement issued by the 
Deputy Minister of Industry, Trade and Tourism: “Rolprentvervaardigingsbedryf: Wysiging van die 
rolprentsubsidieskemas”, 1 October 1981, p. 1‐2.  
221 Franz Marx, interview by Coenraad J. Coetzee, Stellenbosch University, April 15, 2015. 
222 Elmo de Witt: former employee of Kavalier Films, whilst also producing and directing films through his own 
company such as Kom tot Rus (1977) and Grensbasis 13 (1978). Manie van Rensburg: for example, director of 
the feature film Die Square (1977) in association with Kavalier Films, whilst also directing programmes in 
association with the SABC such as the TV movies Die Perdesmous (1981) and Anna Meintjies (1983). Koos 
Roets: for example, director of the feature film Daar kom Tant Ralie (1976) and 13 episodes of the TV series, 
Kooperasiestories. Franz Marx: For example, director of the feature film Netnou hoor die kinders (1977) and 
the TV‐series Skooldae. Arguably best known for producing M‐Net’s TV‐soap opera Egoli.  
223 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 10, Memorandum: “Die Suid‐
Afrikaanse Filmbedryf”, 14 March 1988, p. Appendix 1.  
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conventions more appropriate to the cinematic film genre.224 Arguably, these films exploited 
the market with some success. Many of these productions presented the narrative culminations 
of TV programmes. Consumers, who had invested time in the series, would feel obligated to 
see how the story concludes. For example, Vyfster was followed by a second series Vyfster 2. 
The motion picture Vyfster: die slot (translates to Five Star: The Conclusion) was produced in 
1985.  The 1981 subsidy amendments were, therefore, unsuccessful in changing the perspective 
of the industry. The situation which engulfed the industry was best illustrated when Rapport, 
an Afrikaans national newspaper which had since 1975 bestowed various annual ‘Oscars’ for 
local cinematic achievements (for example, Best Actor/Actress, Best Film, Best director and 
so forth), ended the award system in 1984.225 Although TV-based Afrikaans films are still 
frequently produced (examples include Egoli: Afrikaners is Plesierig [2010], Getroud met 
Rugby: Die onvertelde storie [2011] and Molly and Wors [2013]), their dominance of local 
productions culminated in 1984/85. This could be attributed to the SABC increasingly using 
its own facilities from 1983 onwards.226 
Satbel Recovers from the Effects of Television 
By June 1983 Ster-Kinekor’s average cinema attendance had dropped to 228 199 persons per 
week – or 51% less than the 1975 figure.227 However, as a result of the increase in admission 
fees and Satbel’s rationalisation, the company managed to recover from the effects of TV and 
the difficult economic climate, as illustrated in Table 34. 
                                                            
224 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 210. 
225 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 382. 
226 The SABC utilised its own facilities because of the dire economic conditions in South Africa.  See “Expansion 
of SABC‐TV, 1981‐1986”.  
227 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 3, Addendum: N101/3/1, Volume 8, Correspondence from Ster‐
Kinekor: “Rolprentsubsidieskema”, 14 October 1983, p. 2. 
228 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Directors’ Meeting: “Satbel, FVB en Kersaf”, 
19 September 1984, p. Appendix 1.  
Table 34:228 Satbel's Track Record from 1980 to 1983 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983
Revenue (R'm) 53,9 63,9 80,2 93,3
Profit before Interest and Tax (R'000) 9 010 13 259 18 383 19 526
Attributable Profits (R'000) 4 947 7 221 9 665 10 136
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Therefore, Satbel’s annual profits, taking inflation into account, had increased by 
approximately 37% from 1980. Up until 1984 the Anglo-American Organisation and Sanlam 
owned Satbel. However, Federale Volksbeleggings Beperk (FVB), a Sanlam subsidiary, 
acquired control over Satbel from 1983, as Sanlam argued that the investment company was 
better equipped to maintain financial stability.229  In September 1984 Sol Kerzner – son of 
Russian Jewish immigrants, a hotel and casino tycoon in southern Africa and owner of Kersaf 
Investments Ltd (Kersaf) – who owned a 34% interest in Sun International Ltd,230 approached 
FVB to acquire a controlling interest in Satbel. Kerzner’s business proposition was approved, 
consequently providing Kersaf with a 40% interest in Satbel at a cost of R25 million.231 The 
acquisition allowed Kerzner to increase his control over South Africa’s leisure industry, whom 
himself speculated that Sun International shareholders’ earnings could increase between 5% 
                                                            
229 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel. Director’s meeting: “Satbel en FVB”, 17 
August 1983, p. 1. 
230 A resort hotel, casino and gaming chain from South Africa established in October 1983.   
Sunday Express, September 23, 1984, Lawrence Bradford. “Sun shares set to rise as Sol goes to movies”, 2. 
231Sol Kerzner is perhaps best known for his role in the development of Sun City in North‐West, South Africa. At 
the time, Sun City was located in the Bantustan, Bophuthatswana. As Bophuthatswana was declared an 
independent state by the South African government, entertainment ‐ such as gambling ‐ was permitted.    
Value in 2016 considering inflation: Approximately R335 million.  
SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Director’s meeting: “Satbel en FVB”, 17 Augustus 
1983, p. 1. 
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and 10%. Although FVB still owned 40% of Satbel, the terms and conditions of the contract 
entailed that Satbel’s managerial control would be transferred to Kersaf. Sanlam and the Anglo-
American organisation each had a 9,7% interest in Satbel.232  
Kersaf’s takeover of Satbel’s management (therefore including its subsidiaries, for example, 
Irene Film Laboratories, Satbel Films and Video RSA) led to a dramatic decrease in the control 
over the industry once asserted by Afrikaners. However, André Scholtz maintains that the 
Afrikaans cinematic film producer did not find it more difficult to get his/her film selected for 
distribution.233 South Africa’s distribution and screening industries were dominated by Ster-
Kinekor and UIP-Warner. In 1985 South Africa had 318 indoor cinemas and 133 drive-ins. 
Ster-Kinekor owned 100 cinemas and 51 drive-ins as opposed to UIP-Warner’s 29 cinemas 
and a drive-in.234 UIP-Warner was formed as a result of United Artists’ international arm 
amalgamating with CIC. Ster-Kinekor’s cinema attendance did improve during 1986 as the 
figure rose by 5% according to then-MD, Anthony Salisbury, who attributed the increase to 
extensive TV and radio marketing.235       
Possible Cinematic Film Production Recipes for Success in a TV-dominated Industry, 
1984-1986 
Approximately 20 A-scheme films were released between 1984 and 1986. Most cinematic 
productions were financial disappointments at the local box office. Films such as Nag van 
Vrees, The Lion’s Share, Die Groen Faktor and Magic is Alive my Friend all failed to make a 
profit by 1988.236 Certain films produced in the 1980s reflected the gradual political transition 
experienced in South Africa under the leadership of P.W. Botha. In 1984 Satbel Films produced 
one of the last feature films directed by Jans Rautenbach. Broer Matie (“Brother Matie”) is a 
melodrama in which a respected Afrikaner farmer, Matie (Joe Stewardson), of the Klein Karoo 
passed away in 1961, i.e. the height of Apartheid. In his will he declared that a Coloured pastor 
and childhood friend, Kieries Kammies (Simon Bruinders), had to conduct his funeral service. 
The white consistory was left to discuss the farmer’s request, producing a complex tale of 
human relations. Ultimately, Kammies gets permission to lead the service after the church 
                                                            
232 SA, Documents provided by Sanlam Archivist, Catherine Snel, Directors’ Meeting: “Satbel, FVB en Kersaf”, 
19 September 1984, p. 1. 
233 André Scholtz, e‐mail message to Coenraad J. Coetzee, September 18, 2016. 
234 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 10, Memorandum: “Die Suid‐
Afrikaanse Filmbedryf”, 14 March 1988, p. 2. 
235 Financial Mail, November 21, 1986, “Corporate Strategy: Let ‘em roll”, p. 88. 
236 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 10, Memorandum: “Die Suid‐
Afrikaanse Filmbedryf, 14 March 1988, p. Appendix 1. 
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members cast their ballots. Broer Matie encourages its viewer to identify with the characters 
supporting Maties’s request since, according to William Pretorius, “these people [were] 
portrayed as enlightened heroes.”237 Despite the film’s approbation of Coloured and white 
relations and its critique of the 1960s political context, the PCB allowed its distribution and 
screening, as South Africa was undergoing drastic political and social changes. In 1983 the 
government introduced a new South African Constitution, which substituted the Westminster 
system with a tricameral parliament, in other words three race-based parliamentary chambers: 
whites (178 members in the House of Assembly), Coloureds (85 members in the House of 
Representatives) and Indians (45 members in the House of Delegates).238 Black South Africans 
were not represented as they were, in theory, deemed to be citizens of the ‘autonomous’ 
homelands. The system was controversial in many ways. For example, the right-wing 
Conservative Party, formed in 1982 by MPs who opposed P.W. Botha’s power-sharing 
proposals and reform of apartheid policies, perceived the Tricameral Parliamentary System as 
a threat to white minority rule. At the opposite spectrum and despite the exclusion of blacks, 
the 1983 Constitution weakened parliament, as most of the authority was transferred to the 
newly created post of executive State President (at the same time abolishing the position of 
Prime Minister), who had the power to appoint the South African Cabinet. Furthermore, the 
Coloured and Indian Houses of Parliament, themselves being subordinated to the President, 
were less powerful than the House of Assembly.239  
Broer Matie, meanwhile, could not duplicate the success of Rautenbach’s Katrina.240 Including 
subsidy, the film made a loss of R205 138 by 1988.241 Leon van Nierop remembers: “When I 
went to watch the film in the Cine 3… in the city centre of Johannesburg (where, decades ago, 
the old Empire [theatre] used to be), I was the only person there.”242 One can only speculate as 
to why Broer Matie, which had the same director and explored the same themes as Katrina, 
failed. Leon van Nierop states that some Afrikaans producers thought that only TV-derived 
films could reap substantial profits. However, the GBO revenue earned by Boetie gaan Border 
                                                            
237 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 257. 
238 M.C. Dempsey, Die geskiedenis van die Raad van Verteenwoordigers as ‘n administratiewe komponent van 
die Driekamerparlementstelsel in Suid‐Afrika, 1984‐1994, (Ongepubliseerde PhD: Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 
1999), p. 13.    
239 Ibid., p. 14‐15.    
240 A 1969 film that reflected on the social and political position of the Coloured community (see Chapter Two). 
241 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 10, Memorandum: “Die Suid‐
Afrikaanse Filmbedryf”, 14 March 1988, p. Appendix 1. 
242 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 221. 
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toe (1984) indicated that melodramas and light-hearted comedies may have lost their appeal 
amongst the Afrikaans community since family-friendly entertainment was already provided 
by SABC-TV. In addition, the fact that Broer Matie was released in a context in which white 
and Coloured relations were becoming more tolerated, resulted in the film not having the same 
shock value as Katrina did. Censorship regulations for SABC-TV were very strict during the 
1980s, whilst those applying to the cinematic film industry became more lenient, as illustrated 
by Boetie gaan Border toe. This satirical film, produced by Philo Pieterse, directed by Regardt 
van der Bergh and starring Arnold Vosloo as Boetie van Tonder, revolves around a young 
spoiled Afrikaner, Boetie, who resisted military conscription. However, he reluctantly joins the 
military service after being bribed by his stepfather. Initially defying instructions, he ultimately 
graduates and subsequently gets deployed to Namibia during the Border War. In the climax of 
the film Boetie leads a counterattack against the enemy in an attempt to rescue Corporal Botes 
(Eric Nobbs). The mission is successful, with Boetie maturing into a leader.243 The harsh 
realities of military training and war were captured in the film. Additionally, the word “fok” 
was used.244 This might be seen as trivial in today’s context, but such on-screen profanity 
would not have been permitted in the 1960s and 1970s. Willie Esterhuizen, director of Poena 
is Koning (2007), best illustrated the point when he stated (at kykNET’s Silwerskermfees in 
2013) that he always wanted to make a film in which the word could be used.245 A nude scene 
featuring Vosloo also appeared in the film. By 1988 the feature had earned R1,416 million in 
box office revenue, whilst its profit (subsidy included) of R712 721 nearly doubled Skollie’s (a 
TV-derived production) surplus, despite Boetie gaan Border toe being R46 410 less expensive 
to produce. 246  The success of the film prompted the production of a sequel, Boetie op 
Manoeuvres, which was released in 1985 and also made a profit. Table 35 illustrates the 
number of films that received subsidy pay-outs from 1981/82-1985/86.  
 
                                                            
243 IMDd, “Boetie gaan Border toe (1984)”, Accessed: 18 December 2016: 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0242321/synopsis?ref_=tt_stry_pl.   
244 “Fuck”. 
245 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), p. 214. 
246 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 10, Memorandum: “Die Suid‐
Afrikaanse Filmbedryf”, 14 March 1988, p. Appendix 1. 
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Conclusion: A Change in Consumer Behaviour 
In conclusion, a consequence of the introduction of the television service, according to Johan 
Blignaut, was that audiences of the Afrikaans cinematic industry became more sophisticated 
regarding cinematic taste, since SATV catered for the demand initially satisfied in local 
cinemas.248 In retrospect, the industry perhaps contributed in its own demise by producing 
content for SABC-TV (using their experience and recources to create, develop and enhance an 
already threatening local TV-industry). The state of the Afrikaans cinematic film producing 
industry in 1986 might have been different were producers to adopt the policies of Jamie Uys 
– in other words producing only cinematic features. However, Jamie Uys had resources and 
international acclaim – a vital aspect that most local producers lacked.  
                                                            
247 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 10, Memorandum: “Die Suid‐
Afrikaanse Filmbedryf”, 14 March 1988, p. Appendix 2. 
248 Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South African Cinema 1979‐1991, (Cape Town: 
Showdata, 1992), p. 107. 
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Table 35:247 Number of Films that Qualified for Subsidy Pay-outs (A-Scheme), 1979-
1986 
Fiscal 
Year Films Subsidy Paid by Government (Rand) 
1981/82 5 2 264 035
1982/83 4 1 145 335
1983/84 5 2 248 616
1984/85 8 2 365 390
1985/86 8 3 421 573
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An additional challenge, which initially contributed to its formation and development, faced 
the Afrikaans cinematic film industry. In the article “Are We Afrikaners Getting too Rich? 
Cornucopia and Change in Afrikanerdom in the 1960s” Albert Grundlingh demonstrates that 
Afrikaner economic advancement and the economic boom of the 1960s brought about a gradual 
shift in the patterns of Afrikaner consumer consumption.249 In short, many Afrikaners felt less 
(ideologically) obliged to consume a product produced by a fellow Afrikaner by the time of 
the introduction of SATV.250 This trend stemmed from Afrikaners increasingly occupying 
better-remunerated positions (skilled labour) fuelled by South Africa’s increasing economic 
prosperity. Afrikaners became more materialistic and so too did their pursuit of quality and 
status. This suggests one reason for the popularity of television (called a “status symbol” by 
Volkshandel)251 amongst white South Africans and the significance of the modernisation of 
Ster-Kinekor’s cinema chain. Secondly, attention shifted from a focus on the group’s interests 
to the self, as many Afrikaners became more aware of preserving their own personal economic 
interests as oppose to – at least to some extent – those of other Afrikaners or the culture or the 
unity of Afrikaners. When asked about this, producer Franz Marx stated:  
“Most Afrikaners did not focus on the wellbeing of the Afrikaner as a community – or rather it 
was not the main objective anymore. Afrikaners wanted to prosper [politically and economically] 
to better their own position… I get so annoyed when people say that it was in the interest of the 
Afrikaner as a collective. I have never had someone come up to me and say we must study so 
that ‘Afrikaners can be at the top’.”252  
Considering these factors, one can argue that the ideal of South Africa having a flourishing 
Afrikaans cinematic film industry may have been less of a concern amongst Afrikaners during 
the late 1970s and 1980s as oppose to, for example, the period in which the A-subsidy scheme 
was first introduced.   
  
                                                            
249 See Chapter One (Afrikaner Economic Advancement) and Chapter Two (Hoor my Lied [1967]).   
250 Albert Grundlingh, “Are we Afrikaners Getting too Rich?”, Cornucopia and Change in Afrikanerdom in the 
1960s”, Journal of Historical Sociology 21(2008), p. 148. 
251 See Chapter Four (Technical and Financial Aspects).  
252 Franz Marx, interview by Coenraad J. Coetzee, Stellenbosch University, April 15, 2015.  
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Final Thoughts  
In analysing the influence of SATV on the Afrikaans cinematic industry, it was necessary to 
identify the intricacies of the socio-economic and political conditions within and encompassing 
the industry, as attempted in Chapters One and Two. In order for the industry to develop, state 
intervention was required; however, the subsidy scheme presented numerous complications. 
First, film subsidisation was intended to assist local producers in recovering their expenditures 
in an endeavour to compete with foreign products. Unfortunately, too many opportunities to 
exploit the system arose and consequently the image of the industry – despite numerous 
attempts to amend the scheme – suffered as a result. Furthermore, the continued production of 
features of a lower quality was ensured when Satbel, which deemed the circulation of local 
films a social responsibility, acquired control of the nation’s distribution network. Despite 
distributing only those films perceived as profitable, most films were still of a sub-standard 
quality because of the local market’s unwavering demand for locally produced films (until the 
introduction of television in 1976). This point was illustrated by films produced by Kavalier 
Films, an industry leader, which persisted in implementing the strategy of quantity over quality.  
Second, the subsidy scheme, together with censorship regulations, allowed government to 
assert an undesirable degree of control over the industry as demonstrated during the production 
and distribution of Debbie, Katrina and Ses Soldate. Since television had such a profound 
impact on the production industry (as seen, for example, in the struggle between the private 
sector and the NFB), the exploitation of the B-scheme subsidy system was inevitable and serves 
as an example of producers endeavouring to produce films, not in the interest of developing 
local cinema, but purely for financial gain. Subsidy and censorship, in retrospect, thus 
guaranteed the production of films that failed to meet the standards of foreign products. As a 
result, apart from a few exceptions, local motion pictures could not successfully penetrate the 
international market, as foreign distributors would understandably choose to avoid the 
circulation of a sub-standard product. The introduction of SATV presented an opportunity for 
large-scale productions, which, apart from a handful of exceptions (such as Mimosa 
productions), never materialised, since South Africa’s small white market remained the 
targeted consumer for most producers that ignored the utilisation of the B-scheme. In a speech 
delivered on 30 March 1988 (at a meeting held between the State President, P.W. Botha, and 
representatives of the film industry) Albie Venter (founder of Brigadiers Films) argued:  
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“… and products of quality requires money. Therefore, I [a producer] must accumulate millions 
of Rand, (the average American film costs $13 000 000 excluding marketing, the blockbuster 
$25 000 000) and that is more than what most of us have to put at risk.”1 
Consequently, many producers were forced to approach investors in an attempt to invest 
substantial amounts of capital in a project. This was a difficult undertaking, since the risk of an 
international box office failure was (and still is) very high:  
“…out of every ten films developed [before and including 1988], five were failures, three 
narrowly managed to make a profit and two can be deemed as successes.”2  
This fear of failure prompted a conservative attitude of rigidity amongst producers, therefore 
discouraging trial and error. Trial and error was perhaps, at least in hindsight, most needed in 
the Afrikaans cinematic producing industry.  
According to Boet Troskie (Mimosa Films), an additional reason for Hollywood’s dominance 
of the global industry stemmed from America’s ability to market a product/film more 
sufficiently than South Africa’s cinematic industry. He reasoned that the competition in the 
international communications industry (of which cinema forms part) was highly competitive – 
even ruthless – and access to the international market was determined by the profitability of a 
product:  
“Therefore, quality rather than morality is the key … The international communication game is 
played by professional players according to a certain set of rules, and we are anything but 
professional.”3   
Yet producing films for South Africa’s white audience produced a new set of challenges as 
consumer patterns were shifting within an economic environment that – because of increased 
hostility in the country and abroad towards apartheid (sanctions, etc.) intensified the difficulty 
of adapting and functioning as a prosperous company.     
                                                            
1 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 10, Speech made by Albie Venter at 
a meeting held between the State President, P.W. Botha, and representatives of the Film Industry at Tuynhuys, 
Cape Town: “Staatspresident se beraad met die rolprentbedryf op 30 Maart 1988: Die Internasionale 
Rolprent”, 30 March 1988, p. 4.  
2 Ibid.  
3 SAB, Home Affairs: Film Industry (BNF), 9, Addendum: N101/3/2, Volume 10, Speech made by Boet Troskie at 
a meeting held between the State President, P.W. Botha, and representatives of the Film Industry at Tuynhuys, 
Cape Town: “Staatspresident se beraad met die rolprentbedryf op 30 Maart 1988: Die Bemarking en 
Verspreiding van Rolprente”, 30 March 1988, p. 3. 
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The paramount test facing the industry, even before the SABC made its first television 
broadcasts, was the size of the local market. Since the content of the SABC’s programmes were 
highly regulated, both SATV and the Afrikaans cinematic film industry offered basically the 
same product – albeit through different technologies. The main difference, naturally, was a 
question of convenience. The unexpected popularity of SATV in the white market, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, only intensified the direct competition of the SABC. 
Both government and the Afrikaans production industry were responsible for the industry’s 
failure to adapt. Foreign case studies, such as those focused on Hollywood, indicated that 
incorporating content that distinguished the cinema experience from television viewing, 
through either themes or enhanced quality, would draw audiences – considering that the local 
market became increasingly visually literate after the introduction of SATV. The local box 
office successes of Boetie Gaan Border Toe and The Gods Must Be Crazy serves as examples.  
However, censorship regulations (and consequently, a shortage of stories/scripts which could 
be converted into features) and Afrikaans producers’ reluctance to invest substantial amounts 
of capital in local productions made the survival of the industry more precarious.  Despite being 
profitable, the production of TV-derived productions offered its own set of complications. 
Apart from copying television filming techniques (which according to critics further damaged 
the image of the production industry), the number of TV programmes which could have been 
converted into features was limited.  
The impact of SATV also demonstrated the importance of preparation and perhaps indicated a 
reason for the recovery of Satbel’s distribution and exhibition network – despite apartheid laws 
prohibiting racially integrated audiences until the mid-1980s. A number of factors should be 
taken into account here. Satbel was a subsidiary of established companies – Sanlam, the 
Schlesinger Organisation, FVB and Anglo-American – that had a firm understanding of South 
African consumer trends and, importantly, extensive financial resources. When three-quarters 
of South Africa’s distribution and screening interests were bought from Twentieth-Century-
Fox in 1969, Satbel immediately proposed a four-step rationalisation plan to adapt to the threats 
posed by television, i.e. the company had a clear vision to follow. It is important to note that 
the consolidation of its shares commenced even before television was officially announced in 
1971, thus showing its eagerness to adapt. Apart from diversifying its operations, which – in 
turn – guaranteed an extra stream of income, Satbel’s modernisation of its chain of cinemas 
(quality over quantity) and the integration of cinemas into large-scale retail and leisure 
developments attracted more consumers. From a consumer’s perspective, enhancing the 
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cinematic experience justified the increase in admission fees. Understandably, in terms of 
screening, four-wall/indoor cinemas became the focus of operations, as drive-ins – once 
considered a family activity but now replaced by television – failed to accumulate the kind of 
income once generated during the pre-TV era. Furthermore, South African distributors and 
exhibitors could circulate and exhibit both local and international productions – the latter in 
particular had improved considerably as foreign producers (particularly Hollywood) had raised 
the quality of their films since the 1970s (see Chapter Five).         
On the other hand, and contributing to the downfall of the Afrikaans production industry, as 
demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, was the industry’s over-reliance on assistance from 
the SABC and the government. One can speculate that the industry’s dependence stemmed 
from past experience, with subsidies being so readily available. Whatever the case may be, the 
assistance/employment offered by the SABC (which was perceived by cinematic producers as 
additional income) during the preparation phase and after the introduction of SATV, failed to 
meet expectations. As a result, producers – such as Kavalier Films – were inadequately 
prepared to face the impact of television. Whether the SABC should be held responsible, in 
terms of the number of opportunities the corporation offered to the private sector, depends on 
the approach of one’s argument. When drawing conclusions from Chapter Three (The Advent 
of South Africa’s Television Services, c.1924 - c.1971), it becomes clear that acting as a 
broadcaster in South Africa (considering its demography, geographical issues, etc.) also 
presented significant challenges as the objective was to remain economically stable. Therefore, 
the SABC’s utilisation of its own facilities and the amount of remuneration paid to the private 
sector is understandable – particularly during the 1980s when economic conditions worsened, 
as seen in Chapter Five. Naturally, the South African Broadcasting Corporation would rather 
ensure its own existence.  
To conclude, business adaptation, which Satbel managed to utilise as a strategy, was therefore 
a prerequisite. Business models require constant adaptation as they are continuously confronted 
with uncertainties and ambiguities. Market tastes, for example (as illustrated by Albert 
Grundlingh [see Chapters Two and Five]) are constantly changing. Unfortunately, the 
restrictions discussed here – be they social, political or economic forces – meant that the 
Afrikaans film production industry struggled to adjust to the challenges presented by the 
SABC’s television services.  
OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
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Since this analysis primarily considers the influence of SABC-TV on the Afrikaans cinematic 
film industry until 1986, the introduction and impact of pay-TV, in other words, M-Net and 
Digital Satellite Television ([DStv] launched in 1995), provides an opportunity for further 
research. Additional factors need consideration, the most significant of which are: the changing 
face of South African politics – i.e. the end of apartheid and its socio-economic consequences; 
the exploitation of South Africa’s tax laws by local and foreign film producers from 1987 to 
1990; an industry in which women fulfilled an increasingly significant function (Katinka Heyns, 
for example, became a leading South African director and producer);4 the launch of e.tv in 
1998;5 the establishment of the NuMetro Cinema Group in 1987; Ster-Kinekor’s temporary 
expansion to Europe in the 1990s; and the role played by videotapes (later DVDs) and the 
Internet. 
                                                            
4 For example, Heyns directed Fiela se Kind (1988), whilst acting as a producer of features such as Paljas 
(1992), which she also directed.   
5 e.tv is the fifth terrestrial TV channel launched in South Africa and became the country’s first privately owned 
yet “free‐to‐air” TV station.  
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was visited during March 2016 – May 2016. The head information librarian at the time was Thelma Hlapolosa.  
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APPENDIX 
A Chronology of Feature Films Produced in South Africa, 1956-19861 
1956 
By an African Camp Fire 
Die Groot Wit Voël 
Paul Kruger 
1957 
Dis Lekker om te Lewe 
Donker Afrika 
1958 
Come Back Africa 
Die Bosvelder 
Die Sewende Horison 
Ek sal Opstaan 
Fratse van die Vloot 
Goddelose Stad 
Nor the Moon by Night 
The Michaels in Africa 
1959 
Desert Inn 
Die Wilde Boere 
Nooi van my Hart 
Piet se Tante 
Satanskoraal 
1960 
Bloedrooi Papawer 
Die Jagters 
Die Vlugteling 
                                                            
1 Leon van Nierop, Daar Doer in die Fliek: ‘n Persoonlike Blik op die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Rolprent, 
(Pretoria: Protea Boekhuis, 2016), 455‐466. Martin Botha & Johan Blignaut, Movies Moguls Mavericks: South 
African Cinema 1979‐1981, (Cape Town: Showdata, 1992), F1‐F91. Keyan Tomaselli, The Cinema of Apartheid: 
Race and Class in South African Film, (London: Routledge, 1989), 261‐270. Martin Botha, South African Cinema, 
1896‐2010, (Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 259‐280.    
Hou die Blinkkant Bo 
Kyk na die Sterre 
Last of the Few 
Oupa en die Plaasnooientjie 
Rip van Wyk 
1961 
Basie 
Boerboel de Wet 
Diamante is Troewe 
Diamonds are Dangerous 
Die Bubbles Schroeder Storie 
Die Hele Dorp Weet 
Dooskry is Min 
Drums of Destiny 
En die Vonke Spat 
Gevaarlike Reis 
Hands of Space 
Hans en die Rooinek 
Kalahari 
Magic Garden 
Moord in Kompartement 1001 
E 
Skadu van Gister 
Spore in die Modder 
The Hellions 
Tremor as die Aarde Skeur 
1962 
As Ons Twee Getroud is 
Die Tweede Slaapkamer 
Geheim van Onderplaas 
Gevaarlike Spel 
Jy’s Lieflik Vanaand 
Lord Oom Piet 
Man in die Donker 
Murudruni 
Savage Africa 
Skelm van die Limpopo 
Strpers van die Laeveld 
Tom, Dirk en Herrie 
Voor Sononder 
1963 
Die Reën Kom Weer 
Gee My Jou Hand 
Huis op Horings 
Journey to Nowhere 
Kimberley Jim 
Ruiter in die Nag 
The Lion Speaks 
1964 
Die Wonderwêreld van 
Kammie Kamfer 
Dingaka 
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Piet se Niggie 
Rhino 
Sanders of the River 
Seven Against the Sun 
Table Bay 
The Foster Gang 
1965 
Coast of Skeletons 
Debbie 
King Hendrik 
Ride the High Wind 
Tokoloshe 
Voortreflike Famalie Smit 
1966 
Africa Shades 
All the Way to Paris 
Die Kavaliers 
Mozambique  
Operation Yellow Viper 
Sands of the Kalahari 
The Diamond Walkers 
The Naked Pray 
The Second Sin 
Zulu 
1967 
Bennie Boet 
Die Jakkels van Tula Metsi 
Die Kruger-miljoene 
Die Wilde Seisoen 
Escape Route Cape Town 
Hoor My Lied 
In die Lente van Ons Liefde 
Professor en die Prikkelpop 
The Scavengers 
1968 
Die Kandidaat 
Dr Kalie 
Find Livingstone 
Jy is My Liefling 
King of Africa 
Majuba 
One of the Pot 
Oupa for Sale 
Raka 
The Long Red shadow 
The Mercenaries 
Twee Broeders Ry Saam 
1969 
A Twist of Sand 
Danie Bosman 
Die Vervlakste Tweeling 
Dirkie 
Geheim van Nantes 
Joanna 
Katrina 
Petticoat Safari 
Staal Burger 
Stadig oor die Klippe 
Strangers at Sunrise 
Vrolike Vrydag 
1970 
Banana Beach 
Drie van der Merwes 
Forgotten Summer 
Haak Vrystaat 
Hulde Versteeg MD 
Jannie Totsiens 
Knockout 
Lied in My Hart 
Onwettige Huwelik 
Ryan’s Daughter 
Satan’s Harvest 
Scotty Smith 
Shangani Patrol 
Sien Jou Môre 
Sieraad uit As 
Stop Exchange 
Taxi 
Vicki 
1971 
A New Life 
Breekpunt 
Die Banneling 
Die Erfgenaam 
Die Lewe Sonder Jou 
Flying Squad 
Freddie’s in Love 
Gold Squad 
Lindie 
Mr Kingstreet’s War  
Pappalap 
Presurre Burst 
Sononder 
Soul Africa 
The Men from the Ministry 
Three Bullets for a Long Gun 
Zebra 
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1972 
Afrika! 
Boemerang 11:15 
Creatures the World Forgot 
Die Marmepoel 
Die Wildtemmer 
Just Call me Lucky 
K9 Baaspatrolliehond 
Kaptein Caprivi 
Liefde vir Lelik 
Makulu 
Man van Buite 
My Broer se Bril 
Next Stop Makouvlei 
Pikkie Leatherlip 
Salomien Lokval in Venesië 
Skat van Issie 
Spêrregebied: Diamond Area 
No. 1 
The Last Lion 
The Manipulator 
The Winners 
Vlug van die Seemeeu 
Weekend 
1973 
Aanslag op Kariba 
Africa 
Afspraak in die Kalahari 
Boesman en Lena 
Die Bankrower 
Die Sersant en die Tiger Moth 
Die Spook van Donkergat 
Die Voortrekkers 
Die Wit Sluier 
Dog Squad 
From Rags to Riches 
Groetnis vir die Eerste 
Minister 
Insident op Paradusstrand 
Jamie 21 
Môre Môre  
Siener van die Suburbs 
Skaduwees oor Brugplaas 
Snip en Rissiepit 
The Baby Game 
The Big Game 
The Brave, the Rough and the 
Raw 
1974 
Babbelkous en Bruidegom 
Bait 
Beautiful People 
Boland 
Call Me Lucky 
Cry Me a Teardrop 
Dans van die Vlammink  
Die Afspraak 
Die Kwikstertjie 
Die Saboteurs 
Dooie Duikers Deel nie 
Fraud 
Funeral for an Assasin 
Geluksdal 
Gold 
Joe Bullet 
Land Apart 
Met Liefde van Adele 
Nogomopho 
Oh Brother 
Ongewenste Vreemdeling 
Pens en Pooitjies 
Savage Sport 
Skadus van Gister 
Sonneblom uit Parys 
Suster Tharesa 
Tant Ralie se Losieshuis 
The Virgin Goddess 
Those Naughty Angels 
Vang vir My ‘n Droom 
Voorvlugtige Spioen 
Vreemde Wêreld 
Vrou uit die Nag 
1975 
Daan en Doors oppie dieggins 
Daar Kom Tant Ralie 
De Wet’s Spoor 
Diamond Hunters 
Die Rebel 
Die Square 
Diebare Diplomat 
Dingetjie is Dynamite 
e’ Lolipop 
Eendag op ‘n Reëndag 
Indedama 
Jakkalsdraai se Mense 
Trompie 
Kniediep 
Lelik is My Offer 
Liefste Veertjie 
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Ma Skryf Matriek 
Maxhosa 
Mirage Eskader 
My Naam is Dingetjie 
Olie Kolonie 
Sarah 
Sell a Million 
Ses Soldate 
Seuns uit die Wolke 
Shout at the Devil 
Soekie 
Somer 
Terwille van Christene 
Troudag van Tant Ralie 
U-Deliwe 
Voortreflike Familie Smit 
Wat Maak Oom Kalie Daar 
1976 
‘n Beeld vir Jeannie 
‘n Sondag in September 
Accident of War 
Death of a Snowman 
Die Vlindervanger 
Erfgoed is Sterfgoed 
Funny People 
Glenda 
Hank, Hennery and Friend 
How Long 
I-Kati Elimnyana 
Inkunzi 
Isimanga 
Karate Olympia 
Killer Force 
Liefste madalein 
Mahlomola 
My Liedjie van Verlange 
Ngaka 
Ngwanaka 
Ridder van die Grootpad 
Sestig Jaar van John Vorster 
Springbok 
Terrorist  
Thaba 
The Boxer 
The South Africans 
The Sportsman 
Tigers don’t Cry 
Vergeet My Nie 
1977 
Crazy People 
Die Besoeker 
Die Winter van 14 Julie 
Dingitjie en Idi 
Dit was Aand en dit was Môre 
Escape from Angola 
Golden Rendezvouz 
Inyakanyaka 
Irma 
Iziduphunga 
Kom tot Rus 
Kootjie Emmer 
Lag met Wena 
Mapule 
Mooimeisiefontein 
Netnou Hoor die Kinders 
Suffer Little Children 
Tears for a Killar 
The Angola File 
Wangeza 
Wild Geese 
Winners II 
1978 
‘n Sederval in Waterkloof 
Abafana 
Abashokobezi 
Billy Boy 
Decision to Die 
Diamante n die Dief 
Dr Marais Hugo 
Iemand Soos Jy 
Luki 
Moloyi 
Nicolene 
Nokf 
Seipana 
Sonja 
Spaanse Vlieg 
The Advocate 
The Pawn 
Utsotsi 
Vuma 
Vyfde Seisoen 
Witblitz en Peach Brandy 
1979 
Botsotso 
Charlie word ‘n Ster 
Eensame Vlug 
Elsa se Geheim 
Follow that Rainbow 
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Forty Days 
Game for Vultures 
Grensbasis 13 
Herfsland 
Ingilosi Yokufa 
Isoka 
Mightyman I 
Mightyman II 
Phindesela 
Plekkie in die Son 
Pretoria O Pretoria 
Umunt Akalahlwa 
Umzingeli 
Wat Jy Saai 
Weerskant die Nag 
1980 
A Savage encounter 
April 1980 
Baeng 
Biza Izintombi 
Botsotso 2 
Burning Rubber 
Confetti Breakfast 
Flashpoint Africa 
Gemini 
Hippo 
Iqhawe 
Kiepie en Kandas 
Kill and Kill Again 
Marigolds in August 
‘n Brief vir Simone 
Night of the Puppets 
Rally 
Rienie 
Shamwari 
Sing vir die Harlekyn 
Skelms 
The Demon 
The Gods Must Be Crazy 
Umbdhale 
Umdladi 
Umona 
Zulu Dawn 
1981 
A Way of Life 
Beloftes van Môre 
Birds of Paradise 
Blink Stefaans 
Dumela San 
Inkada 
Isiganga 
Iwisa 
Nommer Asseblief 
So-Manga 
Sonto 
Tommy 
Ukusindiswa 
Umnyakazo 
Ungavimbi Umculo 
Vimba Isipoko 
1982 
Blood Money 
Bosveld Hotel  
Bullet on the Run 
Doctor Luke 
Impango 
Isiqhwaga 
Pina Ya Qetelo 
Ubede Abuphangwa 
Ukulwa 
Umdlalo Umkhulu 
Umjuluko Me Gazi 
Verkeerde Nommer 
Will to Win 
1983 
Amazing Grace 
Botsotso 3 
Funny People II 
Geel Trui vir ‘n Wenner 
Impumelelo 
Inyembezi Zami 
Iziphukuphuku 
Joe Slaugter 
Johnny Tough 
Mmampodi 
Motsumi 
My Country my Hat 
Ndinguwakabani 
Ngavele Ngasho 
Running Young 
The Riverman 
Tommy 2 
Tora Ya Raditeble 
Vakasha 
Washo Ubaba 
Whose Child Am I? 
Why Forsake Me? 
Wolhaarstories 
1984 
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Ace of Spades 
Bank Busters 
Bird Boy 
Bobe mo Motseng 
Boetie Gaan Border Toe 
Boiphetso 
Bona Manzi 
Bozo and Bimbo 
Broer Matie 
Charlie Steel 
Cold Blood 
Crime Doesn’t Pay 
Die Groen Faktor 
Dien Groen Faktor 
Double Deal 
Fanakalo 
For Money and Glory 
Honour Thy Father 
I Will Repay 
Imali 
Inyoka 
Iqhawe 2 
Isalamusi 
Isithixo Segolide 
Iso Ngeso 
Izigedengu 
Mathata 
Mission Spellbound 
Modise 
Moon Mountain 
Mr Moonlight 
Never Rob a Magician 
Night of Terror 
Odirang 
One More Shot 
Playing Dirty 
Point of Return 
Run for Freedom 
Sanna 
Skollie 
Slow versus Boner 
Starbound 
Stoney, the One and Only 
Survival Zone 
Survival Zone 
Tawwe Tienies 
Tawwe Tienies 
The Banana Gang 
The Cross 
The Hitch-Hikers 
The Midnight Caller 
The Musicmaker 
The Reckoning 
The Spin of Death 
Ulaka 
Ulindiwe 
Umbodi 
Umfana 
Umfana II 
Upondo No Nkinsela 
Usiko Lwabafana 
Winner Take All 
Yonna Lefatseng 
Zero for Zep 
1985 
Abathakathi 
Abathumbi 
Allegra 
Amagoduku 
Amahlaya 
Amaphoyisana 
Bad Company 
Bhema 
Big Land 
Black Magic 
Blue Vultures 
Boetie op Manoeuvres 
Contact 
Deadly Passion 
Diamond catch 
Diamonds for Dinner 
Die Strandloper 
Eendag vir Altyd 
Emgodini 
Fist Fighter 
Foul Play 
Getting Lucky 
Guquka 
Herd of Drums 
Hotter than Snow 
Ihlathi Lezimanga 
Iholide 
Impindiso 
Imusi 
Indlela 
Indlu Yedimoni 
Innocent Revenge 
Intaba Yegolide 
Iphutha 
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Iqaba 
Isinamuva 
Isipho Sezwa 
Johnny Diamini 
Joker 
Kidnapped 
Lana 
Love in the Wood 
Lucky 
Magic is Alive, My Friends 
Magic Ring 
Mamza 
Mapansula 2 
Mapantsula 
Menzi and Menziwa 
Mmila we Bakwetidi 
Mohlalifi 
Mountain of Hell  
Mr. TNT 
Nkululeko 
No One Cries Forever 
Palao E Makatsang 
Phindisela 
Ransom 
Rescuers 
Revenge 
Revenge is Mine 
Rough Nights in Paradise 
Say-mama 
Seganana 
Sekebekwa 
Sixpence 
Skating on Thin Uys 
Somhlolo 
Somoholo 2 
Sonny  
Spider 
Stepmother 
Survival 1 
Survival 2 
Taste of Blood 2 
The Ace 
The Comedians 
The Dealer 
The Judgement 
The Last Run 
The Lion’s Share 
The Long Run 
The Man 
The Moment of Truth 
The Murderer 
The Scoop 
The Taste of Blood 
Thor 
Too Late for Haven 
Torak 
Tresurre Hunt 
Tselend Ya Bonokwane 
Ukuphindisela 
Ukuvuleka 
Ukuzingela 
Ulanga 
Ulunya of Lohlanga 
Umfana 
Umoni 
Umsizi 
Uxolo 
Uzungu 
Van der Merwe P.I. 
Visitors 
Vulane 
Vyfster: Die Slot 
Wie Laaste Lag 
Wind Rider 
Witch Doctor 
Yolaleko 
You’re in the Movies 
1986 
Abaphangi 
Ben Bonzo and Big Bad Joe 
City of Blood 
Dada en die Flower 
Dirty Money 
Eyewitness 
Friend’s Brothers 
Jake Speed 
Jock of the Bushveld 
Juluka 
Just Desserts 
Lair of the Hyena 
Liewe Hemel, Genis! 
Lindiwe 
Long Distance Runner 
Love in the Wood  
Love in the Wood II 
Mobsters 
Mountain of Hell 
Nag van Vrees 
Place of Weeping 
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Profit and Lost 
Raw Terror 
Ring of Fire 
Robin Muir 
Run for Your Life 
Runner Up 
Satan Shutes 
Shiyiwe 
Singabahabayo 
Slip Up 
Strike Back 
Strike Force 
Tap and Son 
Taste of Blood II 
Taxi War 
Tenth of a Second 
The Hand 
The Tiger and Kid Gang 
The Wedding 
Tholiwe 
Tip and Tap in the Haunted 
House 
Tip Meets Tap 
Tojan 
Tommy Le Segotsana 
Under Suspicion 
Vengeance 
Wipe Out 
You Gotta Be Crazy 
You Must Be Joking 
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